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HISTORY OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

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The third volume acquaints readers with the work of "legal" and illegal residencies, major operations and the fate of prominent intelligence officers in 1933-1941. The activities of the SVR during this period were determined by two factors: the threat of a new world war and the attempt of the Soviet state to prevent it on the basis of the implementation of the principle of collective security. In the context of the tightening of the counterintelligence regime, the intensification of anti-Soviet propaganda and spy mania in Europe and the United States, huge personnel losses during the years of repression, intelligence selflessly fought for the information support of the country's leadership, looked for allies in the upcoming fight against fascism, tried to influence government circles abroad in the right direction, helped to strengthen the defense capability of the state.

For a wide range of readers.

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## Foreword

The third volume of the "History of Russian Foreign Intelligence" is devoted to its activities in 1933-1941. These were the years of active preparation and unleashing by the bloc of fascist states of the Second World War. The growing military threat was the determining factor in the international situation in those years. The Soviet Union waged a difficult struggle to ensure the country's security. All this predetermined the nature of the tasks solved by foreign intelligence in the specified historical period of time, the specifics of its work.

From the moment of formation in 1917 until the beginning of the 1930s, the Soviet state not only managed to defend its independence in the conditions of intervention, the Civil War, the economic blockade, but also to restore the national economy, enter into economic and political relations with a number of countries. In the second half of the 1920s, the USSR recognized 13 states. At the end of 1933, the United States of America joined them. By 1936, 36 countries had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, including the major capitalist powers.

Along with the growth of the economic and military potential, the prestige of the Soviet state grew. The latter was especially noticeable against the background of the gradually growing world economic crisis of the capitalist system that erupted in 1929-1932.

Individual countries began to look for a way out of the unfavorable economic and foreign policy situation on the paths of revenge and aggression. In a number of European states - Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria, Spain, Germany, etc. - openly fascist and authoritarian regimes were established.

With coming to power in Germany in 1933, Hitler set about implementing the concepts of establishing a "new order" in Europe, conquering "living space" in the East, and revising the colonial division of the world in favor of Germany.

The Fuhrer's plans went far beyond the revision of the Versailles Peace Treaty. The ego had claims to establish world domination.

B. Mussolini in 1925 announced the creation of the Italian Empire, the transformation of the Mediterranean Sea into an "Italian lake". In 1935, fascist Italy attacked Abyssinia (Ethiopia).

In 1936 there was a fascist coup in Spain. A joint German-Italian intervention in this country followed.

In the East, Japan has become a source of danger to the world. Starting with the capture of Manchuria and the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo on its territory in 1932, the Japanese turned it into a springboard for preparing an attack on the USSR, Mongolia and expanding aggression against China.

Despite the fact that the governments of the largest Western countries embarked on the path of normalizing relations with the USSR, aggressive anti-Soviet propaganda and the rapidly gaining strength of the war machine of Nazi Germany gave them hope that, with small concessions, the Nazis would be able to direct their main blow to the East and finally put an end to Bolshevik Russia.

Therefore, the main danger for the country was the prospect of being face to face with the German aggressor. And such a possibility looked quite real. Soviet intelligence had to spend a lot of effort to be able to inform the leadership of the country in what position the Soviet Union might find itself in this or that turn of events. In particular, information was received that the American leadership would support the Soviet Union only if it was subjected to unprovoked aggression from Germany. It is not difficult to understand the ambiguity of such a position. Indeed, what is considered "unprovoked" aggression? Let us recall that in 1914 the German Kaiser declared war on Russia, using Russia's general mobilization as one of the "provoking" reasons.

In 1935-1937, intelligence reported to the country's leadership about the secret meetings of top-level British leaders with Hitler, during which Foreign Ministers Simon and Lord Halifax, as well as Prime Minister Chamberlain, agreed to redraw the map of Europe in favor of Germany, to satisfy her claims to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Memel region of Lithuania, provided, as Halifax put it at a meeting with Hitler on November 19, 1937, that Germany will remain "the bulwark of the West against Bolshevism", and its aspirations to expand "living space" will be directed to the East!.

The plans of Nazi Germany did not leave any doubts either. At the beginning of 1937, foreign intelligence informed the country's leadership about the meeting of the highest

political

German military and military leadership, which discussed the plans for the "Eastern campaign" of the German army. The meeting came to the conclusion that "no definite decision regarding the eastern campaign will be found until the question of establishing a base of operations in Eastern Poland itself is resolved." Poland had to fall in order to open the way for German troops to the expanses of the Soviet Union.

Thus, by the mid-1930s, the main goals of Soviet foreign policy were to ensure the country's security and prevent a war in which Germany, Italy and Japan would become the most likely opponents. The same tasks will become priorities in the activities of foreign intelligence for the entire pre-war period.

In December 1933, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on intensifying the foreign policy activities of the Soviet state in order to prevent war on the basis of a collective security plan.

The task was not easy. Most of the states bordering on the USSR took a hostile position towards it. Some of them, such as Romania, Poland and Japan, openly expressed territorial claims. Finland and the Baltic countries were ready at any moment to turn into a springboard for German aggression against Russia.

Poland was especially intransigent. The Piłsudski-Bek government, having signed the German-Polish Declaration on non-recourse to force in January 1934, notified Hitler of its plans: to lay a "corridor" for Poland to the Black Sea, to establish a joint border with Hungary, to unite territories from Finland under the auspices of Poland to Turkey. The Nazi leadership of the Third Reich, of course, was not going to satisfy the appetites of the Polish elite. Having signed with Poland the Declaration on non-recourse to force, it began to prepare to seize not only those lands claimed by Poland, but also Poland itself. Polish diplomacy, relying on the aforementioned agreement with the Germans, methodically frustrated all the efforts of the Soviet Union to create a system of collective security in Europe and even in the face of imminent German aggression refused to consider the joint defense measures proposed by the Soviet Union.

Before carrying out the campaign to the East, which was desired by many Western politicians, Hitler began to strengthen his position in Western Europe. In violation of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, in 1935, after a formal plebiscite held with the tacit consent of England and France, Hitler occupied the Saarland. In 1936, German troops entered the demilitarized Rhineland. These were Hitler's first steps to revise the territory

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al conditions of the Versailles system. Having received no due rebuff from the Western powers, Hitler annexed Austria in 1938.

In the same year, Germany, using the issue of national minorities in Czechoslovakia, provoked the Czechoslovak crisis through the pro-fascist organization of the Sudeten Germans. The proposals of the Soviet Union on the collective defense of this state did not find support from England and France. The governments of Chamberlain and Daladier did everything not to activate the measures of collective security against aggression provided for by the system of treaties between the USSR, France and Czechoslovakia concluded in 1934. The policy of concessions to German aggression led to the Munich agreement.

The content of the Munich agreements was predetermined at Hitler's meetings with Chamberlain in Berchtesgaden and Godesberg, respectively, on September 15 and 22, 1938. Despite the secrecy of these meetings, Moscow soon became aware of their content with the help of intelligence.

Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as an independent state and a member of the League of Nations. Along with fascist Germany, Poland and Hungary took part in its division. Poland captured the Teszyn region, part of the population of which were Poles, and Hungary - a number of regions of Slovakia.

Following Czechoslovakia, Germany occupied the Memel region in Lithuania.

In early 1939, Soviet intelligence learned that Hitler had signed a document code-named "Weiss" containing the plan and timing (August 1939) of the attack on Poland. The war was inexorably approaching our borders. In the face of the growing threat of aggression, in March 1939, the Soviet government proposed that Britain come up with a joint initiative to convene a conference of interested states - the USSR, Great Britain, France, Romania, Poland, Turkey - to develop measures for a collective rebuff to the aggressor. The British Government replied that it considered such a conference to be premature. Instead of

To this end, it spoke in favor of the Soviet Union assuming unilateral obligations to render assistance to any of its European neighbors in the event of aggression.

In March 1939, the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks stated that the "new imperialist war" for the redivision of the world "has become a fact", although it "has not yet become a general, world war." Contrasting "non-aggressive democratic states" with "aggressors" and reproaching them for abandoning the idea of collective security, I.V. Stalin noted that Great Britain and France would have to pay the price for unleashing aggression in the first place.

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In April 1939, the Soviet government came up with a new initiative. It proposed to the governments of Britain and France to conclude between the three powers equal treaties on mutual assistance. Unfortunately, this proposal did not meet with support. The Western countries continued to evade any obligation to help the Soviet Union in the event of aggression against it and its neighbors. All their actions were aimed at pushing Germany and the USSR one on one.

At the same time, Soviet intelligence continued to receive reliable information about the secret negotiations being held by the British with Nazi Germany. Negotiations were conducted through various channels: in London and Berlin, Chamberlain and Hitler exchanged personal messages through the German ambassador Dirksen and the British ambassador in Berlin Henderson; an informal exchange of views on the possibility of Anglo-German cooperation was conducted by the representative of Goering, the major industrialist H. Wohltath, and the Swedish industrialist Dahlerus. Dahlerus, at Goering's request, met with British Foreign Minister Halifax.

British diplomacy suggested that the Germans conclude a cooperation pact that would guarantee the observance of British interests in Europe and leave Germany a free hand in the East. For this, the British agreed to revise certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles on colonies and mandated territories. It was an attempt to repeat the version of the Munich agreement in relation to Poland. The German ambassador in London, Dirksen, assessed the maneuvers of British diplomacy as an attempt to gradually get rid of their obligations towards Poland. The US Ambassador in Paris, W. Bullitt, who followed the development of the situation around Poland, came to similar conclusions and in his message to Washington qualified the demarches of British diplomacy as preparations for a new Munich?.

From reliable sources in London and Paris, intelligence received information about the instructions that were given by the governments of England and France to military delegations at the talks in Moscow, where measures were discussed to prevent aggression against Poland. The instructions ordered to play for time, not to assume obligations, not to sign any documents, in other words, to contribute to the clash between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Nazi Germany's attack on Poland posed a threat to the Soviet Union. Encouraged by the Western powers, the German troops might not have stopped on Poland's eastern borders. And taking into account the data on the secret negotiations between the British and the Germans and on the instructions that the heads of military delegations received from their governments at the talks in Moscow, the support of the Soviet government could not be expected.

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Under these conditions, the Soviet leadership accepted the German proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact. Moscow made a bet on postponing the war for some time, using the delay to mobilize the country's economy, resources, and military potential. The conclusion of the pact allowed the USSR to return the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, torn away in 1920 by Poland. The borders of the USSR were moved several hundred kilometers to the West from vital administrative and industrial centers.

The task of intelligence was to help the leadership determine the timing of the respite and signal changes in the future policy of the Reich.

Until now, the "English background" against which Moscow came to the conclusion that it was necessary to sign a pact with Germany remains little known. Documents from the archives of the SVR about a series of meetings between the British ambassador in Berlin and Hitler at the end of August 1939 show that England was ready to put some pressure on the Polish leadership in order to induce him to acquiesce. On August 23, 1939, in an urgent message to Hitler, Chamberlain proposed to resolve questions of German-Polish relations in an "atmosphere of trust" through direct negotiations, in which England could be a mediator. The pro-German nature of such mediation left no doubt. The content of the message was reported to Stalin by intelligence a few hours before his meeting with Ribbentrop on the night of August 24th. The Soviet delegation, therefore, knew that the British were ready to give Poland to the Germans, and if it came to war, they did not intend to fight seriously because of it.

The demarches of British diplomacy strengthened the confidence of the leaders of the Third Reich in the impunity of the reprisals against Poland. On August 28, after Hitler's meeting with British Ambassador Henderson, F. Halder, Chief of the German General Staff of the Ground Forces, wrote in his diary: "The Fuhrer will not be offended by England if she wages an imaginary war"?. The leaders of fascist Germany needed the war, they longed for the complete defeat of Poland and access to the borders with the USSR. Without waiting for the results of the maneuvers of British diplomacy, the Nazis presented Poland with a tough ultimatum both in content and in terms of timing. The war has become a fait accompli.

The governments of England and France, forced under the pressure of public opinion to fulfill their earlier obligations to Poland and declare war on Germany, did not cease to hope that, having reached the Soviet borders, Germany would make a throw to the East.

A "strange war" began, which in its essence was nothing more than an attempt to continue the policy of the Munich agreement even in the conditions of military operations that had already unfolded. It is known what this led to. Hitler's Wehrmacht defeated France

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carried the British defeat at Dunkirk, occupied Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Norway. Almost all of Western Europe was under the fascist boot.

Such was the situation in the pre-war years in which foreign intelligence worked.

Of course, providing the country's leadership with information about the development of events in the sphere of international relations during this period was the most important task of intelligence work. At the same time, in the 1930s, foreign intelligence officers continued to fight against white émigré centers in France, Romania, the Balkans, and the Far East.

At the direction of the country's leadership, the residencies also carried out work on foreign Trotskyist organizations that were part of L.D. Trotsky GU International.

During this period, more and more often, intelligence was tasked with actively influencing the foreign policy of foreign states and statesmen in a direction beneficial to the USSR.

This forced the intelligence leadership to draw the attention of the residencies to acquiring connections in circles close to governments, diplomatic departments, and the leadership of bourgeois parties. Particularly successful, as is known, these tasks were carried out in England.

Among the population of Western countries there were those who with interest, and sometimes with sympathy, watched the course of an experiment unprecedented in the history of mankind - an attempt to build a society

social justice.

The economic development programs of the USSR, the labor enthusiasm and optimism of the Soviet people looked especially attractive against the backdrop of an uncontrollable decline in production, unemployment and despondency that gripped the capitalist countries during the years of the economic crisis.

By the mid-1930s, anti-fascist sentiments intensified in the West. The Soviet Union was looked upon with hope, as a force that could resist fascism and aggression, not only by ordinary people, but also by representatives of the highest circles of society, the democratic intelligentsia.

It was on these people that Soviet foreign intelligence relied, searched among them and found those who agreed to cooperate for political or ideological reasons in order to help the collective security policy pursued by the Soviet Union.

Kim Philby, one of the representatives of the British establishment, explained the motives for his cooperation with Soviet intelligence in this way: "I felt that my ideals and convictions, my sympathies and desires are on the side of those who are fighting for a better future for mankind. In my England, in my homeland, I also saw people looking for the truth,

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fighting for her. I was agonizingly looking for ways to be useful to the new society. And I found the form of this struggle in my work in Soviet intelligence. I believed and continue to believe that in this way I also served my English people.

Did intelligence use foreign communist parties in its activities? It is unequivocally difficult to answer this question, which has been raised more than once in the intelligence literature. Formally, there was a strict ban on the use of members of local communist parties in intelligence work by the highest party authorities and the intelligence leadership. However, in practice there were cases when the residencies, without notifying the Center, attracted the communists to cooperation.

In this regard, the memorandum of A.Kh. Artuzov, who at that time acted as the head of military intelligence, People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov about the reasons for the failure of residency in Denmark. "Tov. Ulanovsky (resident. - Auth.), - Artuzov writes, - was arrested because he violated the order prohibiting the recruitment of party members. All three Danes recruited by him are communists. Tov. Ulanovsky hid from us that they were communists."

A characteristic feature of intelligence activities in the pre-war period was the combination of work from "legal" and illegal positions. The intelligence leadership believed that intelligence officers who were in an illegal position could more successfully solve the tasks of obtaining information in the conditions of a tough counterintelligence regime that was taking shape during these years in Germany, Italy, Japan, England and a number of other countries. Besides, "legal" covers were still not enough at that time. Therefore, the creation of illegal residencies and groups was one of the main goals set by the Center in those years.

The solution of the most difficult tasks facing intelligence in the 1930s required the mobilization of all its internal reserves, the strengthening of the material base and personnel, and the constant adjustment of specific goals. Archival documents show that the state leadership understood the importance of the role played by foreign intelligence in protecting the national interests of the country, and paid due attention to it. But the decisions made did not always reach the desired goal. This was largely prevented by the repressions that began in the country in the second half of the decade.

In May 1934, the government considered the issue of increasing the effectiveness of the intelligence work of the INO OGPU and the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, and improving the coordination of their activities. A permanent commission composed of the chiefs of these bodies was created. It was entrusted with the development and coordination of a general plan for intelligence work for

border, exchange of experience, mutual information about failures, careful study of their causes. In May 1935, in order to closer cooperation and increase the level of intelligence

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work of the head of foreign intelligence A.Kh. Artuzov was transferred to work in military intelligence as its deputy chief with the rank of corps commissar. His successor was the former deputy A.Kh. Artuzova A.A. Slutsky.

Constant operational contact between the two intelligence services at the level of their leaders both in the central office and in the residencies, mutual assistance, coordination in actions - all this played an important role in the successful solution of a number of intelligence tasks. However, in the late 1930s, cooperation was disrupted due to illegal arrests and charges against a number of senior officials of both intelligence services.

On July 10, 1934, by a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was formed - the NKVD of the USSR, within which the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) was created. The main functions of the OGPU were transferred to this department. The foreign department became the 5th department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR. The government defined its tasks as follows:

“- revealing conspiracies directed against the USSR and the activities of foreign states, their intelligence agencies and general staffs, as well as anti-Soviet political organizations;

– exposure of sabotage, terrorist and espionage activities on the territory of the USSR by foreign intelligence agencies, white emigre centers and other organizations;

- management of the activities of overseas residencies;

- control over the work of the visa bureau, the entry of foreigners abroad, management of work on the registration and registration of foreigners in the USSR.

Whatever the shortcomings or omissions of the document, it was a state normative act that gave the right to the 5th department of the GUGB, that is, foreign intelligence, to conduct undercover work in foreign countries in order to obtain information on security issues of the Soviet state.

In 1938, the country's leadership again returned to the issue of improving intelligence activities abroad. The work of the 5th department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR was subjected to a thorough and comprehensive analysis, proposals for its improvement were considered in such a way, it was said in the adopted document, “so that the department could launch extensive intelligence work abroad through political, scientific and technical intelligence, revealing the intrigues of foreign intelligence services and white émigré centers on the territory of the Soviet Union. Thus, the main areas of activity of foreign intelligence remained: political, scientific and technical, and foreign counterintelligence.

The staff of the department was approved in the amount of 210 people, 13 divisions were created in its structure, 7 of which were engaged in

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management by foreign residencies on a geographical basis. The rest of the units performed various functions necessary for conducting intelligence work. In particular, they supervised scientific and technical intelligence, work on Russian emigration, the "development" of Trotskyist and right-wing organizations, operational records, etc. The 5th department, although small in number, thus acquired, on the eve of the war, a fairly developed, well-thought-out structure aimed at working on a large scale.



Well, how was foreign intelligence financed? The SVR archive kept the financial statistics of the OGPU and foreign intelligence for 1930. INO then received 300 thousand rubles for its maintenance and foreign operations.

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the budget of Soviet foreign intelligence for the first time reached the figure of 1 million rubles. For comparison: the expenditure part of the state budget of the USSR in 1940 amounted to 17.4 billion rubles, including defense - 5.8 billion, public administration - 0.7 billion?.

The combination of work from "legal" and illegal positions brought the desired results. In the prewar years, Soviet foreign intelligence succeeded in penetrating many important targets in the main capitalist countries. So, in 1933-1937, the "legal" residency in Germany, headed by B.A. Berman, and then B.M. Gordon, and illegal residencies under the leadership of V.M. Zarubin and F.K. Parparov acquired the most valuable agents, who had access to secret documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Through an agent recruited by Parparov under the cover of working with the intelligence of a third country ("foreign flag"), the residency systematically received information about the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German embassies abroad and foreign embassies in Berlin.

The agent network of foreign intelligence included persons associated with influential circles and the leadership of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany (NSDAP). Thanks to this, the Soviet leadership had information about the activities of the Nazi party apparatus. Systematically obtained information about the intelligence service of the Nazi Party. The work of the police against the Communist Party of Germany and foreign communists was regularly monitored, which made it possible to identify a number of provocateurs in their ranks. The Berlin residencies also had sources in the counterintelligence agencies of Nazi Germany.

In 1933 an illegal residency was established in England. Experienced illegal intelligence officers A.M. worked in its composition. Orlov, A.G. Deutsch, T.S. Mally, I. Reif. It was they who acquired and prepared a group of promising sources, which later became part of the gold fund.

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foreign intelligence called "Cambridge", or "Big Five". (It included Kim Philby, Donald McLean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross.) A prominent Soviet illegal spy A.G. played a special role in the creation of the group. Deutsch. Another illegal intelligence officer, D.A. Bystroletov, managed to recruit an employee of the cipher service of the British Foreign Office.

Good agent positions in England and France in the pre-war period allowed foreign intelligence to obtain the most valuable documentary information about the policy pursued by the British ruling circles of "appeasement" of Nazi Germany and encouragement of its aggressive aspirations to the East.

In Italy, intelligence managed to infiltrate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the intelligence service, and some diplomatic missions.

From the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, following the instructions of the country's leadership, foreign intelligence assisted the government of Republican Spain in the fight against the rebels and German-Italian interventionists. The discovery of the secret plans of Germany and Italy to prepare and commit aggression against the legitimate Spanish government, the transfer of volunteers and weapons from other countries to Spain and, finally, the transfer to the USSR after the fall of the republic of a large group of participants in the Civil War who were in mortal danger, - this is not a complete list of what foreign intelligence had to do during the heroic and tragic events in Spain.

Significant success was achieved by Soviet intelligence in the early 1930s in a number of other countries as well. In the USA, illegal residency under the leadership of I.A. Akhmerova and B.Ya. Bazarova recruited several valuable agents who had direct access to State Department employees,

and received from them information on a wide range of issues. A source with connections in President Roosevelt's entourage was acquired, who transmitted unique information about the position of the ruling circles of the country during the period of the military conflict in Europe maturing.

Much attention was paid to the organization of intelligence work in the Baltic states. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia served as a springboard for the intelligence and subversive activities of Germany, other Western states and the largest anti-Soviet emigre organizations against the USSR. It was carried out not only with the knowledge, but also with the active support of the governments of the Baltic countries.

The importance that the Soviet leadership attached to intelligence information on the Baltic states is evidenced by the fact that in May 1940, foreign intelligence resident I.A. Chichaev, operatives E.I. Kravtsov and V.T. Yakovlev, and from Kaunas - resident S.I. Ermakov for a personal report to Stalin.

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Our southern neighbors - Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey - in the pre-war years occupied a significant place in the activities of Soviet intelligence.

The diplomatic departments of the Soviet Union, with the active assistance of intelligence, managed to establish friendly relations with the countries of the Middle East region, provided them with all possible economic and technical assistance. Foreign intelligence did not work against these countries, since they did not pose a direct threat to the USSR, it used their territory to work against potential adversaries, primarily the Axis countries: Germany, Italy and Japan. Diplomats and agents of fascist Germany, for example, actively worked in Iran and Turkey, trying to draw these countries into the orbit of their designs against the Soviet Union. Soviet foreign intelligence, revealing these plans, carried out measures to disrupt or neutralize them. As is known, as a result of Nazi Germany, it was not possible to use these countries in the fight against the anti-Hitler coalition in the way it would have liked.

Much work was carried out in those years in the Far East. Japan made no secret of plans to seize territories in Primorye and Siberia, continued to openly support anti-Soviet, including the White Guard, forces in China, widely used them not only for military preparations for an attack on the Soviet state, but also in espionage, sabotage and terrorist actions. Thanks to a series of operational measures, the activities of many of the most dangerous white emigre organizations in the Far East region were neutralized and their leaders compromised. Some of them managed to be taken to the USSR where they were brought to trial.

Foreign intelligence has achieved considerable success in its work on Japan in other countries, in particular in China and Korea. At the beginning of 1938, reliable intelligence information was received that the Japanese had set up a secret laboratory in Harbin to develop bacteriological weapons. About 200 microbiologists from Kyoto University, together with the military, conducted experiments on the cultivation and spread of plague, typhoid, and cholera bacteria.

This information, as especially important, was reported to Stalin. As a result, individual people's commissariats, scientific and medical institutions were instructed to develop a system of measures in case of a massive occurrence of dangerous diseases both in the army and among the population of the Soviet Far East.

One of the important tasks of foreign intelligence in the prewar years was work on China. Based on the principles of its policy, the Soviet Union supported those forces in China that fought for the country's independence and opposed the dismemberment of its territory and the creation of puppet states. The Kuomintang was provided with various assistance, including military assistance, weapons and ammunition were supplied, military units of the Kuomintang army were sent

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military advisers. At the same time, the Soviet side constantly emphasized that it was providing assistance to repel the Japanese aggressors, and not to use it in the internal struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communists.

Part of this aid went through intelligence channels. She coordinated her work against the Japanese with Kuomintang intelligence. In 1938, for this purpose, the Joint Bureau was created on an equal footing. At first, the bureau operated quite successfully, but later the Kuomintang intelligence officers began to use it to obtain unilateral benefits, and gradually it ceased to exist.

Great assistance was rendered to the Chinese in the preparation of their reconnaissance and sabotage detachments, which were thrown into the occupied territories to fight the Japanese army.

Intelligence work in China was carried out through "legal" residences, of which there were about 20. They were located, in particular, in Harbin, Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, Tianjin, Nanjing, Hankou, in the regional centers of Xinjiang and other cities. In Harbin and Shanghai, in addition, there were illegal residencies.

The Harbin residency worked most successfully. Japanese-occupied Harbin was then the center of political and military activity in the region. It spread their networks and intelligence services of various states. The Harbin station (along with the Seoul station) managed to obtain in 1927 the well-known "Tanaka memorandum", obtain information about the preparation of the Japanese for an attack on the Mongolian People's Republic shortly before the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River, promptly inform the Center about the concentration near the borders of the Soviet Union units of the Kwantung Army before the battles on Lake Khasan, inform about the Japanese preparations for the capture of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai.

Very useful work for the country was carried out by foreign intelligence in the 1930s in the economic, scientific and technical areas. Materials were obtained in the USA, England, Germany and other countries that played a significant role in the technical progress of domestic industry, including the development of military industries.

Documentary information on aircraft and engine building, radio communications, military optics, synthetic gasoline production technology, anti-chemical protection, materials on new types of warships, submarines, artillery systems - this is not a complete list of information obtained by reconnaissance in the field of military technology. They provided significant assistance in strengthening the defense capability of the state and in the further development of science and technology in the USSR.

The generally successful work of Soviet foreign intelligence in the pre-war years was seriously undermined by the repressions that fell upon it.

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By 1938, almost all illegal residencies were liquidated, contacts with the most valuable sources of information were lost. Subsequently, significant efforts were required to restore them. However, some sources were lost forever. Sometimes only 1-2 workers remained in "legal" residencies, as a rule, young and inexperienced. The arrests created an atmosphere of confusion, mistrust and suspicion in the collectives.

In a report sent to the leadership of the NKGB on the work of foreign intelligence from 1939 to 1941, intelligence chief P.M. Fitin wrote: "By the beginning of 1939, as a result of the exposure of the enemy leadership at that time of the Foreign Department, almost all residents abroad were recalled and removed from work. Most of them were then arrested, and the rest were subject to verification.

There was no question of any intelligence work behind the cordon in this situation. The task was to create, along with the creation of the apparatus of the Department itself, the apparatus

residency behind the cordon.

The losses of the composition were so great that in 1938, for 127 days in a row, no information was received at all from foreign intelligence to the country's leadership. It happened that there was no one to sign even messages addressed to Stalin, and they were sent for the signature of ordinary employees of the intelligence apparatus.

In order to restore the staff of intelligence, people with experience in party and organizational work, commanders who had proven themselves in the army, and students who graduated from universities were sent to it as before. However, without the organization of their special training, this did not solve the problem. Persons who did not know foreign languages, were poorly versed in foreign policy issues, and did not have operational skills were often sent to residencies. There was a moment in the Tokyo residency on the eve of the war when not one of the employees of the "legal" residency knew either Japanese or any other foreign language. A similar situation arose in a number of other residencies. Life dictated the need to create a special educational institution of a closed type. And in 1938, the Special Purpose School (abbreviated as SHON) was established.

The repressions did not bypass the central apparatus of foreign intelligence. In 1936, A.Kh. Artuzov. He was replaced as head of intelligence by A.A. Slutsky. In 1938, he died suddenly in his office from a heart attack. He was buried with full military honors. Slutsky's successors (from 1938 to 1939 there were two of them - Z.I. Passov and S.M. Shpigelglas) were repressed.

In 1939, V.G. Dekanozov. He did not know intelligence. This soon became clear to everyone, including the leadership of the country. Dekanozov was urgently sent

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plenipotentiary to Berlin. At the end of 1939, the department was headed by P.M. Fitin, he was then only 31 years old. A capable, energetic, ardently dedicated person, he quickly mastered the basics of reconnaissance skills and showed himself to be a talented organizer. As head of intelligence, he worked until 1946. On the shoulders of Pavel Mikhailovich fell the burden of healing the wounds inflicted by the repressions, restoring the combat effectiveness of intelligence on the eve of the war.

In the same report cited above, P.M. Fitin pointed out that in the middle of 1940, 695 people worked in its central office. By 1941, thanks to the selfless work of its employees, it managed to restore a functioning intelligence apparatus in Germany, Italy, England, France, the USA, and China. The largest residencies were in the USA - 18 people, Finland - 17 people, Germany - 13 people. In total, by this time, foreign intelligence had 40 residencies. They employed 242 scouts, who were in touch with a total of about 600 different sources of information. Actively using them, intelligence regularly received on the eve of the war important information about the foreign and domestic policy of the bloc of fascist states and the leading Western powers.

The essays brought to the attention of the reader, as in the first two volumes, are not a consistent, scientific presentation of the history of Soviet foreign intelligence in the prewar period. These are just separate episodes and fragments of her activity.

For security reasons, many surnames and pseudonyms, places of operations and names of institutions have been changed. But the essence and specifics of the work of intelligence, the tasks it solved at that time and the main directions of activity remained. The authors hope that after reading the essays, the reader will get an idea of how and under what conditions Soviet intelligence officers worked in that period of history responsible for the fate of our Motherland, and will see on concrete material that, acting with its specific methods, foreign intelligence had a significant assistance to the country's leadership in the development and implementation of its foreign policy.

The excerpts from documents given in the third volume, to which there are no special references, are taken from the archival files of the SVR with the preservation of the stylistic features of that time.

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what are we

1

The man who stood at the origins of the "Cambridge Five"

In the office of the history of intelligence in Yasenevo, on a stand with portraits of its distinguished employees, there is a small photograph of Arnold Genrikhovich Deutsch. It involuntarily lingers on the views of visitors. Clever penetrating eyes, strong-willed face.

For the first time, the name of the person who attracted Kim Philby and other members of the "Cambridge Five" to work was named on the pages of the "Soviet Intelligence Courier" in 1990. For over 50 years the archives have kept this secret. But now the opportunity arose to pay tribute to one of the creators of the "five" - the outstanding illegal intelligence officer Arnold Deutsch.

Deutsch was born on May 21, 1904 in Vienna into the family of a small businessman, a former rural teacher from Slovakia. He received an excellent education: in 1928 he graduated from the University of Vienna, becoming a Doctor of Philosophy, and in 1936 from London University, majoring in psychology. He was fluent in German, English, French, Italian, Dutch and Russian.

From his youth he took part in the revolutionary youth movement. In 1920 he became a member of the Union of Socialist Students, in 1924 he joined the Communist Party of Austria. From 1928 Arnold worked in the underground organization of the Comintern. Traveled as a courier and liaison to Romania, Greece, Syria, Palestine. Passwords, turnouts, surveillance detection - this school proved invaluable for his future work as an intelligence officer.

In January 1932, Deutsch arrived in Moscow, was transferred from the CPA to the CPSU(b), and a few months later, on the recommendation of the Comintern, he began work in the Foreign Department of the NKVD. After a short training, together with his wife Josephine Pavlovna, originally from Austria, Arnold went to work abroad.

Deutsch's formation as an illegal intelligence officer took place in France. The political situation in the country was quite difficult

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Noah, and it took time to figure it out. In addition, it was necessary to master the manners and behavior of the French, but Deutsch adapted to the new environment rather quickly. At first, he acted as a courier, contacting the right people, making contacts with those who could be useful in case of war (suppose a radio operator, when it is impossible to use the usual channels of communication of intelligence groups with the Center).

Repeatedly Deutsch traveled from Paris to Vienna for the same purposes.

In the course of the work, a rare trait of a young intelligence officer was revealed - the ability to select the right people and patiently prepare them for work in intelligence. In addition, Deutsch was characterized by the highest

responsibility for the assigned work, accuracy, thoroughness and scrupulousness in work with colleagues. For many years he constantly worked on the professional education of his assistants, developing the necessary qualities in them.

Some of the people in France and Austria recruited by Deutsch to cooperate with Soviet intelligence went to Great Britain.

The work in England was complicated by the fact that diplomatic relations, interrupted in 1927 as a result of a series of gross provocations by the British authorities and secret services against the Soviet institutions in London, had only just been restored. The employees of Soviet institutions were subjected to intense surveillance, telephones were tapped, mail correspondence was monitored, business and personal contacts were taken into account, and the British intelligence services actively introduced their agents into their environment.

Under such conditions, it was difficult and dangerous to conduct reconnaissance from "legal" positions, since any failure could be used to compromise employees of Soviet institutions and serve as a pretext for inflating another political scandal. That is why it was decided in Moscow to concentrate the main efforts on the deployment of an effective illegal

networks.

And so, at the end of 1933, twenty-nine-year-old Arnold Deutsch appeared in London to "take a course in psychology" at a British higher school.

The resident of the illegal residency quickly felt that he had been sent a sensible person.

The work of illegal residency has significantly revived. Following Deutsch, three agents arrived from Austria, with whom he had worked in Vienna. One of them - "John" - was an Englishman. He helped Arrow, with whom he was friends in Vienna, to get a job in the London office. The young Austrian graduated from photography courses and became an excellent photographer. Strela's apartment was used for processing and photographing reconnaissance materials, while John carried out operational assignments. Both were exceptionally conscientious people.

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The third assistant ~ "Edith", also an Austrian by nationality, married an English doctor. She received British citizenship, and through her husband's connections, access to high English society. The task of "Edith" was to study people who worked in institutions of interest to Soviet intelligence. She acted actively and boldly. It was "Edith" who introduced Deutsch to Philby, the first scout from the future "Cambridge Five".

Arnold Deutsch made a bet on the acquisition of promising agents, which would subsequently be able to influence the country's foreign policy. He began to look closely at the students of universities and colleges, where people from the high society of Great Britain worked and studied. There, he believed, it was easier to find potential candidates and, after establishing cooperation with them, to achieve their promotion to the required positions.

In a relatively short period of time, Deutsch picked up a group of reliable assistants who entered educational institutions that train personnel for the highest echelons of the British administration. Deitch and his confidants focused on Cambridge, Oxford, the University of London, and the Foreign Office's technical training schools.

How attentive and patient Deitch was with his young charges was testified by Kim Philby. For a long time, Deutsch gave him practically no assignments. "He was testing the strength of my decision," Philby said. "I came to meetings usually empty-handed, but the response was a patient and supportive attitude." "When it came time for professional training, Deitch did a rigorous job of mastering the rules of conspiracy, based on a thoughtful combination of theory and

examples from practice, partly from my own experience. I must confess," wrote Philby, "that at times I found repetition tedious. I once stated:

- We worked out this question ten times. Does it need to be repeated over and over again?
- What? he cried. — Only 10 times! You will have to listen to this 100 times before we are done with this question.

I am deeply grateful to him for such perseverance. When I started working for real in Nazi Germany and Fascist Spain, I was literally obsessed with security and secrecy. To a large extent, that is why I managed to survive."

After graduating from two universities, fluent in many languages and possessing the inclinations of a researcher, Deutsch brought new ideas to intelligence activities. He paid special attention to the application of knowledge in individual and social psychology. A non-standard approach allowed him to acquire a significant number of valuable sources. It is difficult to find another scout who would be able to

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a relatively short period of time - 5 years of stay abroad - to perform such a huge amount of operational work and with such high quality.

In 1935, Deutsch was presented for the award of personal combat weapons for the results achieved. The submission indicated that, having been working illegally abroad since 1932, "he showed himself in various sections of the underground as an exceptionally combative and devoted worker... The comrades who worked with him note his exceptional merits in organizing the illegal residency, the acquisition of sources and work with them, exceptional initiative in the organization of technology.

When for a short time the question arose of transferring Deitch to another country for security reasons, the resident, not wanting to lose a valuable employee, wrote to the Center: "1. You must be extremely careful in your decision regarding Stefan (Deutsch's pseudonym — Stefan Lang — Ed.): he has a real book (meaning his passport — Ed.), and his origin has nothing to do with our country.

2. He is perfectly legalized here.

3. He travels abroad better than me and my deputy, and causes less suspicion in society than all of us. In addition to the operational work that he performs, he is also brilliantly versed in technical issues. Consider also such a "trifle" as writing letters in his native German, which no one but him can do.

In 1937, Deutsch was forced to leave England and temporarily stop working with his assistants and sources. He wrote a letter to the intelligence leadership, in which he outlined his thoughts on the future fate of these people. The letter is an example of sensitive care and understanding of the psychology of agents. Here are a few excerpts: "Having gone to London, I received an order from you to mothball all people for three months, gave everyone a salary until February 1 and agreed that by that time someone would come to them. It is now the end of February, and, as far as I know, we have met only two. For various reasons, I consider it very important to renew, if not personal, then written contact with our comrades. All our people are young and have no special experience in our work. For them, a promise from our employees is something reliable, of which you can be absolutely sure. Many of them are counting on our money, because they have to live on it... Not getting any news from us, they may be disappointed. They all work primarily out of conviction and with enthusiasm, and they may easily have the idea that we have abandoned them... Once again I would like to point out the special composition of our apparatus. They all believe in us. They are sure that we

always in place

that we are not afraid of anything, we will never leave anyone to the mercy of fate, we are, above all, accurate, precise and reliable. And part of the success of our work up to now has been based on the fact that we have never disappointed them. And right now it is very important from a psychological point of view that we send them a message about ourselves, even if we do not immediately start working with them."

The letter mentions seven people who needed to be taken care of first. Moreover, in each case, he gives specific recommendations, which should first of all be paid attention to.

Deutsch made a great contribution to the improvement of operational technology. Using knowledge in physics and chemistry, he actively contributed to the introduction into the practice of reconnaissance activity of technical means that were new at that time, which made it possible to significantly increase its efficiency. He developed several secret writing recipes that were used while maintaining communication with the Center and within the residency. Some of the nicknames turned out to be very persistent and were successfully used on the most dangerous COMMUNICATION lines.

Deutsch suggested using infrared rays in night vision devices, in photography, when shooting at night and from the air on cloudy days, etc.

At that time, our intelligence almost did not use radio, only the first searches for ways to master the methods of maintaining long-range radio communications were going on. Deutsch's recommendations on this issue found a positive response in the Center and were actually taken into account in the development of new radio equipment.

While studying at the University of London, Deutsch officially filed six patents for inventions. Anticipating the future, he developed the design of a movie simulator for pilots, tank crews, sailors and gunners. The simulator was cheap and convenient. A description of this invention, like others, was sent to Moscow.

In November 1937, Deutsch's permission to stay in the country expired. He was supposed to go abroad and there he would arrange a business visa for a new trip to England. However, this plan had to be abandoned. Counterintelligence became interested in Deutsch's personality, and for security reasons he was recalled to Moscow.

Returning to the USSR, the Deutsches received Soviet citizenship and passports in the name of Stefan Grigoryevich Lang and Josephine Pavlovna. This was done at the request of the applicants themselves. Remaining in the ranks of foreign intelligence, Deutsch was recommended to the Institute of World Economy of the Academy of Sciences for the position of senior researcher, where he worked until June 1941.

With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, Deutsch began to actively prepare to go to work abroad as an illegal resident. This time he had to travel across the ocean, to one of the Latin American countries, which was used by Hitler as an important source of raw materials for the German military industry. Deutsch was supposed to settle down there, get in touch with valuable agents and organize the receipt of information on German deliveries. It was decided to move to Latin America through the countries of South or Southeast Asia. However, before the scout reached Tehran, the war between Japan and the United States began. The intended route to the country of destination was closed.

The development of a new plan dragged on, and the active Deutsch, who considered the delay an unacceptable waste of time, sent a letter to the head of intelligence, Fitin, with a personal request: "I appeal to you as a boss and comrade. I have been on the road for 8 months now, but we are as far from the goal as we were at the very beginning. Now we are again faced with uncertainty, waiting. This I can no longer reconcile with my conscience. Conditions in countries of destination



have changed since leaving Moscow. The tasks set then, as far as I understand, are now partly unrealistic. Even in the best case, it will take 3-4 months to get to the place...

The purpose of this letter is to state my thoughts and ask you, as a boss and comrade, to help me now to switch to useful work and make up for the lost time.

Permit me to return to the USSR and go to the front to carry out work directly related to the war. If you need me, send me to underground work wherever you want, so that I have the consciousness that I am doing something directly for the war, for victory against the fascists.

The intelligence leadership quickly responded to Deutsch's appeal. He returned to Moscow, where a new route was drawn up for the transfer of a scout to Latin America.

At the end of October 1942, Deutsch and his assistant on the Elna-2 steamer left Arkhangelsk for the USA. However, at the last moment, due to a change in the route, the captain of the Elna transferred Deutsch and his colleague to the Donbass transport, which was heading to the United States via Iceland.

As often happens in war, an accidental change of ship and route played a fatal role in the fate of a remarkable intelligence officer.

At the end of 1942, the Donbass, a large transport steamship, slowly rocked on the cold waves of the Norwegian Sea. The sky, covered with lead clouds, merged with the water of the same colors.

Suddenly, German bombers emerged from behind the clouds. Having dived, they brought down their deadly cargo on the Donbass.

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This was the second raid on the ship in the last 24 hours. The piercing howl of the Junkers diving for a few seconds was mixed with bomb explosions, the crackling of deck superstructures - and everything suddenly died down. The planes disappeared behind the clouds as suddenly as they appeared.

According to the Main Staff of the Navy, part of the crew of the broken and sunken "Donbass" escaped and was picked up in the sea by the Germans. But among the rescued, Arnold Deutsch and his comrade-in-arms were not.

Subsequently, the captain of the Donbass, released from German captivity, said that Deitch was thrown into the bow of the ship by the explosion. He tried to get up, but could not: his legs were broken. Together with the rest of the ship, the helpless scout quickly disappeared into the abyss.

Thus ended the short but heroic life of Arnold Deutsch. The group of assistants and information sources he created in England did a lot to ensure the security of our Motherland and victory over fascist Germany, although he himself was not destined to live up to it.

2

Kim Philby makes a choice

Kim Philby has become a legendary figure. His name has firmly entered the history of the 20th century as a "super agent" of Soviet foreign intelligence, who played an exceptional role in the struggle of the intelligence services of the great powers at critical moments in history - and in the pre-war years, when the question was being decided whether or not to be a new world massacre, and during the war years, when the efforts of all the progressive and democratic forces of the world were concentrated on the fight against fascism, and finally, during the years

Cold War, when the world again faced the threat of an even more terrible, nuclear catastrophe.

Usually the names of intelligence officers, especially prominent ones, remain a secret for many years, buried in the archives of the secret services. With Kim Philby it was different. In the fact that he became widely known in the world, the intelligence officer was lucky and unlucky at the same time. He was lucky because his name did not remain in the dust of archival folders, he became world famous, which gave him the opportunity to continue his active work and start a new page in the struggle for the cause to which he devoted his life. No luck - because world fame came to him as a result of an involuntary decoding of his belonging to the Soviet intelligence. Too many factors are invisibly linked by a chain of interdependence, and not always everything can be foreseen and taken into account, and events can be subordinated to one's will. Philby was forced to put himself in jeopardy, saving his friends, Soviet intelligence agents McLean and Burgess, from the inevitable arrest. And the name of the scout sounded all over the world. The very fact of the existence of a Soviet agent in the leading spheres of the Intelligence Service raised the prestige of Soviet intelligence and acted depressingly on its opponents. For nine years of work in British intelligence, Philby went through all the service levels. In 1949, he was appointed to the post of liaison officer with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), infiltrating

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and thus to the very center of the subversive activities of Western intelligence services against the Soviet Union. Philby was even considered as a candidate for the position of chief of British intelligence.

When Philby's true role was made public in 1978, former CIA officer Miles Copeland, who knew him well, stated: "This resulted in the fact that all the extremely extensive efforts of Western intelligence in the period from 1944 to 1951 were inconclusive. It would be better if we did nothing at all."

Kim Philby (full real name Harold Adrian Russell Philby, nickname "Kim" parents gave their son in honor of the hero of one of Kipling's novels) is the successor of one of the oldest families in England. His paternal grandfather, Monty Philby, owned a coffee plantation in Ceylon at the end of the last century, and his wife, Kim Philby's grandmother, Quinty Duncan, came from a well-known military family in England. One of the representatives of this family is Marshal Montgomery. Thus, Kim Philby was a distant relative of the famous British commander. Kim's father, St. John Philby, worked for a long time in the British colonial administration in India, and then became interested in Oriental studies and became a well-known and respected Arabist in England. For his scientific work he was awarded the medals of the Royal Cartographic and Royal Asiatic Societies. Being an original person, he adopted the Muslim religion, took a Saudi girl from among the slaves as a second wife, lived for a long time among the Bedouin tribes, and was an adviser to King Ibn Saud. But Kim was brought up in the spirit of classical British traditions and received the most prestigious education in England.

When it comes to Kim Philby as an agent of Soviet intelligence, the question involuntarily arises: how could a person of such a circle and upbringing decide to link his fate with Soviet intelligence? In a short essay on Philby's first steps in intelligence, based on archival materials and Philby's own stories, we will try to answer this question.

Early 30s. England. Cambridge. Young people enrolled in this privileged educational institution discuss with passion the events of political life. The capitalist world has just gone through an economic crisis on a scale never seen before, with all its horrendous consequences: unemployment, want, despair, the collapse of hopes for a better future. Why did the crisis break out? What, capitalism as a system has exhausted itself? many young people asked themselves questions.

And in the east of Europe, the state with a new social system claimed to create a society of social justice. His economic and political successes were undeniable. The Communists preached ideas that could not be denied attraction.

value.

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In Germany, the fascists came to power with their desire to win "living space" for the "superior Aryan race". The ideology and practice of fascism repelled the honest people of the world. The leading capitalist countries, instead of curbing fascism, flirted with it, seeking to use fascist Germany to crush the Soviet Union.

The atmosphere of elation, civic duty and personal responsibility, involvement in the events taking place in the world could not but affect the young Philby. He decided to devote his life to the struggle for socialist ideals. Much later he himself would say this: "I made up my mind to work in some form for the communist movement during my last week in Cambridge. The process of my coming to this decision lasted about two years. It was partly a rational approach, partly an emotional one. It included the study of Marxism and, of course, the study of the Great Depression and the rise of the Fascist movement. Of course, I had doubts, and hopes, and criticism of myself, but my self-education and the influence of external factors, events in the world led me to this decision. I have not seen ways to get around this issue: either I have to make this decision, or I have to quit politics altogether. And one evening I was sitting in my room in Cambridge, sitting in a chair, and I made a decision. This decision was made for life. At that time, this decision was known only to me. I said it to myself."

However, Kim Philby was in no hurry to become an official member of the Communist Party. Something kept him from it. Perhaps the routine of daily party work - rallies, distribution of newspapers and the like. This was not what Philby prepared himself for. The young man was looking for a more effective way to participate in the anti-fascist struggle. He wanted to test himself in combat, dangerous work, to make sure of his abilities and readiness to make sacrifices. Philby decided to go to Austria, to help the anti-fascists there. Austria in 1933 was the place in Europe where the real fight against fascism was going on. The country was on the verge of a fascist coup. The situation was aggravated by the fact that a stream of refugees from Nazi Germany poured into Austria. Progressive parties and organizations assisted them, organized their illegal transfer to the "safe" countries of Europe. For this, money, documents, and, most importantly, people who would be engaged in this risky work were needed. The Committee for Assistance to Refugees from Fascism operated in Paris.

Philby was faced with the question of how to contact the Austrian communists. For advice, he turned to a lecturer, later professor of economics at the University of Cambridge, Maurice Dobb, who was a member of the British Communist Party. Dobb said: "I have been watching you for several years now and I see you moving in this direction. I am very glad that you have made this decision."

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After that, he gave Philby a letter of recommendation to the head of the Refugee Assistance Committee.

And here is Philby in Vienna. On the recommendation of friends, he settled in a very comfortable room in the apartment of the parents of Litzi Friedman, an activist of the Austrian Communist Party. Soon the relationship between the two young people, who were connected by a common interest and participation in a risky business, became close.

In the Vienna organization MOPR (International Organization for the Relief of Revolutionaries), Philby had to perform many duties. He was both the treasurer of the cell, and the compiler of leaflets, and the collector of donations. But his main job was to keep in touch with

communists living illegally in Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. An English passport gave him the opportunity to travel almost unhindered.

"Usually I took a large envelope with me, in which there were quite a lot of papers, and often in addition I took with me a parcel wrapped in brown paper. What was inside, I had no idea. There might be money, there might be instructions, there might be private letters from husband to wife. I took it all in full confidence. But if I was arrested or asked what is in the envelopes and in the parcel, - recalls Kim Philby, - then I would simply answer that one of my friends asked me to smuggle it, but I don't know what is inside. . Maybe I would be asked the question: who are you taking all this to? To which I was ready to answer: I have the address in my wallet. I would take out my wallet, look for the address, and naturally say, oh God, I forgot it in Vienna. Sure, it's not the most compelling story, but you can't always tell only compelling stories. Conspiracy at that time was at an amateur, very primitive level."

The password for meetings in Prague or Budapest was just as uncomplicated - a branch of mimosa. Despite the insecurity of this courier activity, Philby claimed that he did not remember a single case when he felt the danger of these trips.

At the beginning of 1934, Philby believed that everything was heading towards the imminent seizure of power in Austria by the Nazis. And although he could feel safe with this English, "almost diplomatic" in terms of prestige, Philby understood that Litz Friedman would not escape reprisals. A member of the Communist Party, half Jewish, who also served time in prison for political activities, she could become one of the first victims of the coming terror. "If the Nazis had come, of course they would have killed her," Philby says. "So I decided to marry her, give her an English passport, return to England and continue the party work from there, from England."

This happened in April 1934. Work in Austria, the threat of fascism, seen there with my own eyes, felt by the heart and understood by the mind, had a strong impact on the

thirty

the formation of communist beliefs in Kim Philby. His first step upon his arrival in London was to apply to the headquarters of the Communist Party of Great Britain with a request to be admitted to its ranks.

- Where have you been? they asked him there. - Who are you?

— I was in Austria, took part in the uprising.

Well, we have to check that. The party is illegal there, so this is not easy to do. Come back in six weeks.

These six weeks were perhaps the turning point in the life of Kim Philby. He never became a member of the Communist Party, remaining a communist all his life. His last "communist action" was participation in the May Day demonstration in 1934.

Kim Philby did not know that the Soviet foreign intelligence had already paid attention to him for a long time. Even when he was studying at Cambridge, he was noticed as a capable and honest young man who thought about his place in life in the struggle for the best lot of mankind. Soviet intelligence also knew about Philby's stay in Austria, his participation in anti-fascist work, and his desire to join the British Communists. But there is another way of struggle – underground work, a dangerous but noble way. Intelligence decided to offer it to Kim Philby.

Philby says: "Fortunately, before the six-week period was over, a friend of mine in Austria found me and asked if I would like to meet a very

an important person who might interest me. (This friend of Philby's was Edith Tudor Hart. ~ Auth.)

"Of course," I replied without hesitation.

And after two or three days we went with her on a long journey around the city, taking a taxi, going down to the subway, walking, unexpectedly stopping a taxi and changing to another.

— Kim, I beg you, do not rush, because I need to remember as many details as possible.

I understand, I won't be in a hurry.

In a word, it was a very difficult journey, lasting several hours. And it ended in the middle of the day in Regent's Park in London. There we saw a man who was sitting on a bench. My friend brought me to him and said: "This is the man we were talking about."

"Hello," I said.

The man on the bench shook my hand. I saw my friend from Austria quickly leave us. I never saw her again. And I stayed with this man. He began to question me about my views, about my activities. Most of the time we spoke German. After a long conversation, he told me:

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— I know that you want to join the Communist Party. You will become one of many thousands of communists. You will have a direct connection with the working class. Direct connection. However, you are bourgeois by education, appearance and origin. And you could have a bourgeois career ahead of you. And we need people who can enter precisely into the bourgeoisie. From us to enter.

I didn't ask him any specific questions about himself. And, to be honest, I didn't even know then where he came from, who he represented – the Soviet Union or the Comintern. But the meaning of this conversation was that he offered me a very interesting future, a very interesting job and prospects, so that I, being in interesting positions, would give information that communists usually cannot get.

"In other words, you are just politely asking me if I would agree to be a deep penetration agent?"

"That is what I want to offer you.

I liked it all very much. My future looked romantic now. And although later I realized that my activity could not always be defined by the word "romantic", but this activity was difficult, everyday, sometimes very difficult, but then I did not know this. Yes, even if he knew, maybe he would still give the same answer.

"I agree," I said.

We agreed to meet him in two weeks."

This conversation in Regent's Park took place in early June 1934. The man on the bench was an illegal Soviet intelligence officer, Arnold Deutsch, aka Otto. From that time on, Philby began to be called "Senchen" in operational correspondence, which means "Sonny" in translation from German into Russian.

So, in June 1934, Kim Philby began his work in Soviet intelligence. The first thing Deitch asked him to do was cut off all contact with the communists, with people, even just sympathizers of the communists, in order to look impeccable in the eyes of the English establishment. Philby's wife Litz, who knew about his connection with Soviet intelligence, should have done the same. It was also necessary to get rid of leftist literature in the home library. The second thing Philby had to do was to carefully look at his friends and acquaintances, including those from Cambridge, in terms of their suitability for intelligence work. And finally, the third is to define your career, again in terms of solving intelligence problems.

In July 1934, an illegal intelligence group in London by the Center was given the long-term task of infiltrating British intelligence, the Intelligence Service, and obtaining information about its intentions and specific actions regarding the Soviet Union. To what extent Kim Philby, who had one of the most prestigious universities not only in Great Britain,

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taniya, but also the world, could solve this problem? A career in diplomacy was out of reach for him because of the refusal of Robertson, an old friend of his father's university professor of economics, to recommend a "radical socialist," as he considered Kim, for a job in the Foreign Office. His friends themselves were just beginning their life journey and could not help him in any way. The father, who was compared in the press of the time to the famous spy Lawrence of Arabia, did little to help his son in his career and was happy when he chose the profession of a journalist and became editor of the insignificant Review of Review magazine. It would seem that there is no way to penetrate intelligence.

Illegal resident A.M. thought otherwise. Orlov is a very experienced, resourceful and temperamental intelligence officer with whom Philby began working at the end of 1934. It was journalism that opened the way for Philby to English intelligence. Kim could meet and talk with a wide variety of people. His father told him something. In 1935, sometimes more, sometimes less valuable political information began to flow from Philby. In June 1935, Philby reported on a closed meeting of the Central Asian Society, where his father gave a report on the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, information on King Ibn Saud and British policy towards Saudi Arabia.

Of particular interest to the Center was a copy of the Saudi ambassador's response to the British Foreign Office with consent to the construction of an air base by the British in the Middle East, as well as a review of the activities of the War Office and its intelligence with references to some of its employees.

The latest information came from Kim Philby's university friend Tom Wylie, who served as Secretary of the Permanent Assistant to the Secretary of War. In June 1935, Orlov wrote to the Center:

"Among the new undercover hints is the approach that "Senchen" has to its university comrade, a certain Wylie, who has worked in recent years in a position of no interest to us and was appointed secretary of the permanent assistant to the Secretary of War Creedy three months ago ... Wylie is a capable and an educated fellow... I gave "Zenken" the task to do nothing in essence, resuming only friendship with him." This friendship enabled Philby to receive valuable information from Wylie for a long time.

A.M. Orlov found a way to use the magazine where Philby worked in the interests of the intelligence work of the residency. In the hope of reaching out to the secretaries of British institutions that were of interest to Soviet intelligence, he advertised in the newspaper through Zenchen that a typist-stenographer capable of working in the line of economic and political literature was required. "Among the sea

zheniya, seized by us from the mailbox, - Orlov wrote to the Center, - the stenographer of the Central Secretariat of the Naval Ministry turned out to be the most suitable. In order to get to know her better, "Senchen" took her to work in the evening at their editorial office (twice a week). Now we have the task of finding her a "lover". You yourself understand that the outcome of such a case is always extremely mysterious. The archive preserved the resolution of the Center in a letter: "The use of "Zenchen" for recruitment is strictly prohibited." The Center understood Philby's promise. Big things awaited him. The study of the secretary of the Naval Ministry was entrusted to an employee of the residency.

And yet the main task set by the Center for the London group - penetration into British intelligence - was far from being solved.

Soon, however, new opportunities opened up for the use of Philby.

Tom Wylie introduced him to his friend Talbot, who had been editing a magazine called Anglo-Russian Trade Newspaper for several years. This publication was an association organ of those English financiers and businessmen who had business interests in pre-revolutionary Russia and would like to get something back. Their pressure on the parliament in this direction was not successful, with age they retired from active work, the journal constantly lost financial support and quietly died. Talbot, once meeting Philby, said to him:

"Listen, since my journal is dying, what if I start a new one, of the same kind, but on an Anglo-German basis, to boost Anglo-German trade?"

Philby found this idea very interesting, and they discussed it.

"I'm getting old," said Talbot. I am too old to start another magazine. I need a young editor. Why young - so that he does not ask for too much money.

It is not difficult to guess that he meant his interlocutor. The amount was named, which suited Philby, and he said: "OK." "It seems to me," says Kim, "that it was my consent that was the beginning of my real work for the Soviet Union." By that time, A.M. Orlov left and Otto again directed Philby's work.

As editor of a new magazine, Philby joined the Anglo-German Commonwealth, an organization that existed at the time to improve relations between England and Nazi Germany. He made acquaintances in the German embassy, and through them he got access there. He began to receive inaccessible information about informal contacts between England and Germany through financiers, industrialists, export and import specialists - all those who were interested in bringing the two countries closer together.

Philby began to travel frequently to Berlin - about once a month for a week. Being introduced to Ribbentrop when he was ambassador

in London, he continued to meet with him and his staff in Germany as well. Naturally, contacts were also made with the Goebbels Ministry of Propaganda.

Very productive and useful in terms of intelligence, this work was especially difficult for Kim Philby psychologically. He was among those whom he hated and because of the hatred for whom, in fact, he decided to cooperate with Soviet intelligence.

Philby recalled bitterly a visit to an old acquaintance. When he saw him, he asked: "Tell me, please, when you were in Austria, did you already work as a police informer against us?"

However, the intelligence business, to which Philby devoted himself, became his life's work. He was ready to make such sacrifices. Otto constantly reminded him that his task was not to mold himself as a Nazi, but as an independent-minded Englishman who perceived Hitler's Germany as a factor in European life in the mid-30s and tried to derive economic and cultural benefits from this for his own countries.

One can only marvel at Arnold Deutsch's intuitive, and perhaps even conscious sense of proportion, as well as his foresight and foresight. As if able to look into the future, he assumed that England would be at war with Germany. And then, if you overdo it in filing Philby as a pro-Nazi journalist, he will not escape imprisonment during the Second World War. This is exactly what happened to Carroll, the editor of the Nazi leaflet that replaced Philby's magazine in late 1936.

At the next meeting with Otto, Philby told him about this conversation with a contact in the Propaganda Ministry, who informed him that funding for the magazine had been cut off. He, to his surprise, was not upset at all and said:

- Well, to hell with them. It's just in time because you're going to Spain.

- Where? asked a delighted Philby. From childhood he was very interested in Spain. But in 1936 there was already a war going on. ~ Where am I going? Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia? Philby named the areas occupied by the Republicans.

— Oh no, you're going to the other side. What other side could Kim Philby, an English journalist and "sincere friend of Nazi Germany" be on?

During this period of work of Soviet intelligence with Philby, a new resident appeared as part of the London illegal residency, who replaced Orlov, who left at the end of 1935 for another country. It was Theodore Malli, who was working on foreign intelligence under the pseudonym Mann. But Philby and his friends in the Cambridge group knew him as Theo. From April 1936, as a resident, he became the leader

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to work with A. Deutsch, together with him he developed and planned operations for the most effective use of Philby's capabilities and his advancement in the British intelligence services. Malli personally held several meetings with Philby in London and Berlin, where he specially traveled for this purpose. At these meetings, among others, the question of Philby's trip to Spain was discussed.

Theodore Malley was far from being an ordinary person. A Hungarian by nationality, a Catholic priest, he served during the First World War as a chaplain in the Austro-Hungarian army, was captured by the Russians on the Carpathian front and until 1917 was in prisoner of war camps. The revolution freed him. By this time, Theodore Malli had rethought a lot. The horrors of the bloody war unleashed by the imperialist powers shook his former faith. He decided that in order to fight for universal ideals, one must go a different way. He participated in the Civil War in the ranks of the Red Army, and then was invited by F.E. Dzerzhinsky to work in the Cheka. A good education and intelligence, the ability to find ways to the hearts of people and establish trusting relationships with them, knowledge of several foreign languages and the Western way of life - all this helped Malli become an excellent illegal intelligence agent. He successfully worked from illegal positions in Austria, Germany, France, England, acquiring many valuable sources of information for Soviet foreign intelligence. He devoted his life to fighting the looming threat of fascism, realizing that it would inevitably lead to a new world war.

However, the fate of this remarkable man turned out to be tragic. In June 1937 he was recalled to Moscow and repressed. Subsequently, Theodor Malley was fully rehabilitated.



His name will forever remain in the memory of Russian intelligence officers. The photograph of Theodor Malli occupies a place of honor in the Cabinet of the History of Foreign Intelligence.

Kim Philby's trip to Spain at war was conceived not only and not so much in order to collect information about the state of affairs among the Francoists. It was largely a continuation of the implementation of the Soviet intelligence plan to expand Philby's intelligence capabilities and create prerequisites for his subsequent introduction into British intelligence. Kim was given the task of creating a reputation for himself as a bold, flamboyant journalist capable of attracting the attention of British intelligence. There was no better place than Spain, the hottest point on the planet at that time, for this purpose.

Philby went to Spain as an independent journalist, that is, for his own money, hoping to compensate for the expenses by publishing articles in England that he would send from the fronts of the Civil War. In reality, of course, his trip was fully funded by Soviet intelligence. But in order to "legend" these funds, Philby had to sell part of their books.

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Before leaving, he received an address in Paris, to which he was supposed to send his reports by post, and a simple code for enciphering them, executed on a piece of thin but very strong paper. This leaflet, if necessary, could be crushed and swallowed.

The way to Spain lay through Portugal. In Lisbon, Philby received a Francoist visa not at the embassy, which the rebels did not yet have, but at Franco's so-called "agency". At the end of January, he arrived in Seville, from where he began to act. About two weeks later, Philby began sending his letters to a Paris address and tried to write every week. The military operations, which he could observe directly as a journalist, were active. He could see with his own eyes the temporary airfields that were just being built, observe the movement of troops, and not only by the buttonholes and shoulder straps to determine what kind of troops they were. In addition, he established some contacts with the Spaniards. They liked to talk and sometimes boasted so much that Philby didn't even need to ask questions.

In March 1937, the same episode with the code occurred, which is described in detail in Philby's book "My Secret War". After being forced under emergency circumstances to swallow a piece of code, Kim had to write a letter to Paris asking for a new one. "The difficulty was," recalls Philby, "we didn't have a code word for the word 'code,'" so I wrote in a letter that I had lost the book I was given and asked for a new one."

In fact, he soon received a reply from his Cambridge friend Guy Burgess, who made an appointment for him at the Rock Hotel in Gibraltar. This meeting took place and was the greatest surprise for Guy, since he, according to Philby, did not know until that moment about his cooperation with Soviet intelligence. Philby was well aware of Burgess's work, having himself recommended him. Some time later, Burgess "repaid" Philby by helping him join the Intelligence Service.

In Gibraltar, Guy gave Kim a new code and money. They had dinner together and talked all evening. Philby gave his old friend as much information as possible about the Francoists. Guy left the next day.

Soon Philby himself returned to London. His first three-month Spanish period is over. At a meeting with him, Otto began to tease Kim:

"Listen, you wrote letters to a beautiful woman in Paris, Mademoiselle Dupont. And how were you not ashamed to write such boring letters?"

"Try to write an interesting letter if you have to say something serious in every fifth word," Philby joked (this was the code rule he used).

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"Your information was very important nonetheless, and the Center thanks you for it," Otto said. – But now your stay in Spain should be used by 100 percent. You need to move into big journalism. We would like you to go to Franco again, but from some major newspaper, in order to have more access to all questions. To do this, you need to publish in some reputable publication.

Philby wrote an article about his impressions of Spain. He wrote freely, not bound by the shackles of Francoist censorship. Then he went to his father for advice. He said: "We must start from the very top. Send it to The Times."

Kim sent the article to The Times. He got lucky. The Times had just lost its two correspondents in Francoist Spain. One died in a car accident, the other could not withstand the pressure of censorship and resigned.

And soon Kim received a call from his father: "I just met the Deputy Editor of The Times, Berington Wood, at my club. He told me that you had written a perfectly acceptable article and they would be happy to publish it. Moreover, they would be happy if you agreed to go back to Spain from them as their permanent correspondent. "I would love to do it," Kim replied.

Arriving at The Times, Philby was promptly introduced to foreign editor Ralph Dicken, a fifty-year-old bachelor, "a little pompous and snobbish, but basically a good man," and editor-in-chief Dawson. Before being sent to Spain, he was offered to work for two or three weeks in the editorial office of The Times in order to get acquainted with how

newspaper is being made.

In the London residency, preparations for Philby's departure to Spain also went on as usual. He was given the conditions of communication with A.M. Orlov, who, after leaving England, served as a resident of the NKVD and a security adviser to the republican government in Spain. The meetings were supposed to take place in the French town of Narbonne, bordering with Spain, where both of them could travel. The train, which ran from Bayonne along the entire Franco-Spanish border to Narbonne through the most beautiful valleys of the Pyrenees, was famous for its excellent cuisine and was a favorite leisure activity for vacationers and tourists.

Between meetings with Orlov, Philby sent information written in sympathetic ink to an address in Paris. The sympathetic ink used was the most common photographic solution, which could be bought at any store. His keeping at home did not arouse any suspicion. But with the Paris address, a serious failure could occur. The fact is that it was the address of the Soviet embassy. Much later, when Kim had already returned from Spain, he was horrified to learn about

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this. But, fortunately, there was no failure: counterintelligence then was not as strong as it is now.

In May 1937, with the blessing of The Times and Arnold Deutsch, Kim again left for Spain. This time he secured letters of recommendation from the German embassy in London, where he was well known as a "sympathizer". But even without this, the attitude of the Francoists towards him has noticeably changed for the better. The Times correspondent was considered an important person. Nevertheless, Philby continued to use his past acquaintance with Ribbentrop to strengthen his position and expand his ties. Even a five-minute meeting with Ribbentrop, which gave Philby nothing in terms of information, had a huge impact on the development of his contacts with the right people. As soon as they found out that Philby had been accepted by Ribbentrop, they began to behave

much more freely and talked about those things that they would never have dared to tell him if he were a simple journalist. Perhaps it was this tactic that opened the way for Philby to get to know and "friend" with the head of the Abwehr in Spain.

To work in the Francoist camp for a person with communist convictions meant constantly experiencing great psychological stress. He had to visit the battlefields littered with the bodies of killed and wounded comrades, to be a witness to their executions and executions. "It's almost impossible to describe," says Philby. "It was a terrible ordeal. I tried in my articles to suppress any feeling. I tried to report only cold information".

The war in Spain is over. The fascist regime of Franco reigned. For intelligence officers and journalists, the country turned into a backwater. In early August 1939, Philby returned to London. A military threat is already looming over Poland. The editors of The Times told him that in case of war he would be the chief war correspondent and his office would be at the headquarters of the British troops.

... In 1940, already after the fall of France under the onslaught of the Nazi troops and Philby's return to London, he was summoned to the editorial office of The Times and told: "You received a call from the War Department. Captain Sheldon wants to see you."

Philby's first steps on the way to English intelligence ended. He "went out on the big road." Like other members of the Cambridge Five, Kim Philby continued to work in Soviet intelligence for many years to come. The story of their deeds is in the following volumes of essays.

! Knightley F. Kim Philby is a super spy for the KGB. - M., 1992. - S. 5.

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Donald McLean: first steps

On a January day in 1936, Stalin was looking through the documents sent to him by the Main Directorate of State Security. His attention was drawn to a foreign intelligence report about secret negotiations with Hitler by representatives of the British government. The information was extremely important. The intelligence report spoke of the preparation of an air pact and the exchange of data on the state of the air force between England and [Germany].

The London illegal residency reported that it had received the document from the British Foreign Office through a newly acquired source, Weise. This is how one of the best and most valuable Soviet intelligence officers began his operational life, who later joined the so-called "Cambridge" or "magnificent" five. Today, his name, like the name of Kim Philby, is widely known in the world - Donald McLean.

Donald McLean came from a family that belonged to the circles of the London political elite and had extensive connections in government circles. His father was a member of the postwar cabinet. Like Philby, McLean studied at the University of Cambridge. With his like-minded friends, he also thought about the acute problems of our time, looking for his place in the political struggle. Having joined an underground communist student cell, he actively participated in its work, at one time he was its secretary. Philby characterized McLean as an exceptionally capable and convinced person of his anti-fascist views. At Cambridge, he received an honors degree in foreign languages and intended to take the examination for a position in the British Foreign Office.

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Resident of illegal residency in London A.M. Orlov (pseudonym Shved), decided to involve McLean in cooperation with Soviet intelligence and entrusted this to Arnold Deutsch.

In 1939, Arnold Deutsch, describing the history of the founding of the Cambridge group, recalled:

"Swede had a plan to bring in Weise and Medchen (Guy Burgess. - Auth.) through Senchen (Philby. - Auth.). "Senchen" was instructed to talk to "Weise":

a) establish its capabilities and connections;

6) find out whether Weise is ready to give up active party work and, like Senchen, to start working with us.

"Senchen" fulfilled our order with a positive result for us. Weise stated its readiness."

But the events that Deutch squeezed into a few lines of text did not actually happen so smoothly. In August 1934, on one of McLean's visits to London, Kim Philby invited him to visit him. When the conversation turned to Party work, Philby asked how his friend was going to conduct it in the Foreign Office, where he intended to enter the service.

"If you sell the Daily Worker there, I don't think you'll last long. But you can do special work there.

And Philby explained what he meant. McLean asked only one question:

— Do you mean the Soviet government or the Comintern?

- Honestly, I do not know. But the people I deal with hold very important positions, work in a very serious organization and are connected with Moscow.

McLean thought for a moment and asked if he could consult his great friend James Klugman.

"If you do that, you can forget about our conversation," Kim replied.

Two days later McLean told Philby:

- I agree.

In August 1934, Orlov was in Moscow on business, and the duties of a resident of an illegal Soviet intelligence group in London were temporarily performed by his deputy Marr, an illegal immigrant, Ignatius Reif. He left for communication in Copenhagen and on August 26, 1934, telegraphed to the Center about the result of Philby's conversation with McLean. The certificate taken from this cipher telegram is kept in the "Vaise" file, as McLean has since become known in secret correspondence, and sparingly informs us:

Marr reports that "Senchen" contacted his friend. The latter agreed to work. Would like to get in direct contact with us. Marr asks for consent."

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Since there was no postal communication between the London residency and the Center for a long time - from June 1934 to January 1935 - Moscow had a very vague idea about working with members of the future Cambridge group. The center responded:

"Abstain from direct communication until verification and clarification of its capabilities. Use for now through "Senchen".

On September 18, 1934, Orlov returned to London again and, having assessed the situation, independently decided to establish direct contact with Weise. This case was assigned

Marr, who had a successful first meeting with McLean in October 1934. In November, this was reported to the Center:

"We got in touch with a friend of Senchen, Weise, about whom we wrote to you. He completely cut off his ties with fellow countrymen (meaning the communists) and became a member of the society of the highest circles... His connections are exceptional, and it is possible that he will get a good position."

In February 1935, in connection with the forced departure of Marr from London, Orlov himself began to maintain contacts with Weise, given its value and potential as a source. At that time McLean was mainly busy preparing for the exams for admission to the British Foreign Office, studying at special preparatory courses. The center, however, was not satisfied with his work only for the future, although very tempting, and at the beginning of 1935 instructed A.M. Orlov:

"It is necessary to use Weise even when he has not yet received the position we are interested in. Submit your specific thoughts.

Orlov after some time reported to the Center:

<"Weise" is preparing for the exams in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

a) became a member of Motep's, where women are concentrated, mainly secretaries of ministries and political organizations;

6) met Simon's wife's secretary (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) there;

c) became friends with an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Shackberg. The latter, himself working in Spain, is not interesting, but through him he meets with the service public from the Foreign Ministry;

d) through an American journalist, he met an employee of the Foreign Ministry, Strecher. From 2 sources, S.'s connection with the secret department is confirmed;

e) got acquainted with a certain Sta'm Nip'ly, also an employee of the secret department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

The Center responded to Orlov's message with a letter dated March 7, 1935. It outlined the concept of McLean's work for the future as it was seen in Moscow:

"9. About Weiss.

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Your message about him satisfies us extremely. With regard to him, our main goal is to penetrate through him into the Foreign Ministry. We ask you to direct your work with him unswervingly and firmly in this direction, since "Weise" thanks to his connections has real opportunities to achieve his appointment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

His new connections, especially Shackberg and Strecher, since they are employees of the secret department of the Foreign Ministry, are extremely interesting for us.

Our general remark about "Vaiz": he is undoubtedly a promising source that deserves special attention to himself, especially since, judging by your reports, he is really disposed towards us and does not work because of material benefits. The last circumstance, of course, should not be regarded as our indication that you should not pay him, especially since, probably, he will need material support in connection with the fact that he is getting a job at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MacLean's acquaintance in London's high society naturally contributed to the fulfillment of the most important of the conditions set before him for secret work, namely

a complete break with the Communist Party and a departure from it. It is quite natural that the "countrymen", seeing MacLean's passivity and even a certain coldness towards his former comrades in the Cambridge party cell, after 3-4 months, as Marr wrote, put an end to his work.

So, freed from the connection with the Communist Party, renewing old and making new useful contacts in the British establishment, having completed special preparatory courses, Maclean was ready to fulfill his main task - to go to work in the Foreign Office. But for this it was not enough to successfully pass the entrance exams. In such a caste system as the British civil service, appropriate recommendations were an additional guarantee and even a necessity. McLean went to great lengths to get them and succeeded at the highest level. Marr, having already returned to Moscow, wrote in his report on his work in London:

"Since Baldwin (a Conservative, in 1923-1929 and in 1935-1937 he was Prime Minister of Great Britain. - Auth.) Is a personal friend of the McLean family, then the mother of "Weisa" managed to get a letter from him (I personally saw the letter), in which he writes that he will do everything in his power to help "Weisa" pursue a diplomatic career. The letter mentions that the relevant person in the Foreign Office has been informed by him, Baldwin, that he has a personal interest in the promotion of Weise."

Under these circumstances, neither Shved nor Marr doubted that the brilliantly prepared "Weise" would pass the exams and be hired by the Foreign Office. And so it happened in October 1935.

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Orlov, forced to leave the UK because of the danger of being discovered, brought to Moscow in November a copy of Lord Simon MacLean's congratulatory letter on the latter's admission to the Foreign Ministry. By that time McLean already knew that he was working not just for an anti-fascist organization, but, in the words of Marr, "is an agent of the Union, and he devoted himself to our work with even greater desire." For him began a long period of underground life and work.

At the Foreign Office, McLean received the rank of third secretary and was appointed to the Western Department of the ministry, which was in charge of Great Britain's relations with such countries as France, Holland, Belgium, Spain, and the affairs of the League of Nations. The Soviet Union was then under the jurisdiction of the Northern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. McLean had a friend in that department named Lebouchet who, he said, could help him get there, but it wouldn't be easy. Yes, however, at first MacLean was ordered only to get used to the atmosphere of the British Foreign Office and establish there connections.

The past few months have shown that Weise enjoys free access to all documents passing through his department. It turned out quite favorable conditions for the seizure of documents and their photographing.

According to the order established at that time in the Foreign Office, all incoming documents were first received by the secretaries of departments and then, after processing, they were reported to officials of a higher rank - deputies and heads of departments. Moreover, every second or third secretary had free access to the materials of his colleagues. It was also possible to take secret documents to work at home. And already at the beginning of 1936, "Weise" brought the first bundle of secret documents to the meeting with A. Deutsch. Over time, their flow and value began to increase. On May 24, 1936, Mann (Theodor Malley), who had already taken over the leadership of the illegal London residency since April, reported to the Centre:

"Weise came in the evening, brought a huge bundle of reports ... We filmed only a part (marked with \yU - this is from Weise), because our tapes came out, and today is Sunday, and even night. I wanted to take out the Bulletin "Military Intelligence" - it was not possible today. On Trinity, he must stay in the city, we hope that he will be able to bring more and what he still has not been able to endure. This message well conveys the climate of business concern that

formed in the London illegal residency. An important and dangerous business - the extraction of secret information - was formed from ordinary, at first glance, everyday affairs.

After the forced departure of Orlov from England at the end of 1935, only one operative worker remained in the London illegal residency - Arnold Deutsch. Despite his outstanding abilities, he could not control the entire intelligence network alone,

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lead new developments and solve numerous technical issues. And although in January 1936 our illegal immigrant Theodore Malley arrived in London, for purely formal reasons it was simply impossible to demand serious operational assistance from him. His task was solely to maintain contact with a valuable agent in the British Foreign Office - "Magus". But, since Mally was an experienced intelligence officer, who had both work in counterintelligence and the practice of complex recruitment operations in Western Europe, the Center had an idea to entrust him with the leadership of illegal residency. Mally was briefly recalled to Moscow for briefing and in April 1936 he returned to London again - already a resident.

In his new capacity, Malli, having appreciated the abilities and possibilities of McLean, came to the conclusion that it was necessary to separate work with him into an independent line. It would be both safer and more efficient. He bombarded the Center with dispatches: "I emphasize to you again that the Weise will have to be separated into an isolated line." To which the Center replied: "Take care of the Weise like the apple of your eye. Give him maximum attention and caution.

Meanwhile, McLean continued to lead an outwardly unremarkable but stressful and dangerous life. He met regularly with Mally or Deutsch and handed over bundles of important documents that passed through his department to the Foreign Office. The documents were photographed at the apartment of the Hertha residency courier and returned to him so that he could put them back the next day. In case he had only a few hours to get very valuable documents, Mulley gave him a camera so that McLean could take them himself. All this was, of course, extremely dangerous, especially after several revelations made in the Foreign Office by the British counterintelligence, and in connection with this, the tightening of the regime for working with documents.

But McLean was not just a transmission link in the chain "Foreign Ministry - Soviet intelligence." Having extensive connections, he himself comprehended and analyzed the information received. Of particular interest was the information received from him about the setting up of an encryption and decryption case in the Foreign Office. McLean reported that the British read all telegrams from the Comintern and decipher American and German cipher telegrams. Particularly curious is the technique used by the British decryption service in the hope of "breaking" the Soviet diplomatic cipher. McLean wrote that for this purpose some inquiry concerning the Soviet Union was inspired in the British Parliament. Naturally, the British government responded to it. At the same time, the codebreakers expected that the text of the question and answer would literally be transmitted by the Soviet embassy to Moscow by cipher telegram. Since

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Since the cipher correspondence went through open channels and it was not difficult to intercept it, then special attention was paid to all cipher telegrams sent immediately after the request and response in parliament. Then, by superimposing the known text on the encrypted one, the British tried to penetrate the secrets of the Soviet cipher. According to McLean, the British side still did not disclose the Soviet cipher.

For the Soviet counterintelligence, it was also interesting that, based on the information received by the British Foreign Ministry, it was possible to identify its sources. Thus, it was established that an English agent was operating in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and that there were also agents of British counterintelligence in the entourage of the well-known figure in the international communist movement, Münzenberg.

Some of what McLean reported was useful for infiltrating the British intelligence services directly. In August 1936, McLean received a letter signed by Sir Vernon Kell. From it, as Mally wrote to the Center, it followed that Kell was "the head of the secret part of MI5." <...We have established Kell's address and will put him under surveillance in the coming days to find out where he goes to work.'

In early October 1936, McLean reported that a certain David Footman, who is a British intelligence officer, visited him at the Foreign Office. Mally and Deitch decided to send Guy Burgess to establish contact with Footman and thus expose him to British intelligence.

In the middle of 1937, Arnold Deutsch had to leave London due to the expiration of his stay in Great Britain, where he studied psychology at the university. He only briefly returned there in the autumn of the same year to mothball all the sources of residency. Donald McLean, like others, was left without contact for some time.

The Center realized Theodore Mulley's idea of singling out work with McLean into a separate line only in the spring of 1938, when Mally himself was no longer alive. By this time, a young intelligence officer, Norma, had arrived at the illegal residency in London. She rented a more or less suitable apartment and soon settled in this big city. Her only operational task was to maintain contact with Lyric, as McLean was then called in operational correspondence.

Norma was the fifth Soviet contact of Donald McLean, which, according to the laws of conspiracy, is too much for four years of work, but such was the reality.

those years.

Norma received permission from the Center to establish contact with McLean on April 4, 1938, and six days later, the new resident of Soviet intelligence in London, Sam, telegraphed to Moscow: "Communication

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The norms with Lyric have been established. Everyday reconnaissance work began. McLean brought the Foreign Office documents to Norma's apartment, where she photographed them, and then took them with her. Norma, in turn, passed the tapes to Sam.

For an outsider's eye, if such a person appeared, say, in the person of the mistress of the house, the relationship between Norma and "Lyric" looked quite natural: a young man visits a young woman: whether his bride, whether his mistress, and the frequency of visits depends, probably, on the strength of the relationship. - a lot of attraction, and not on how often interesting documents get to the third secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, what was a legend soon developed into a close relationship. Norma and McLean were young and beautiful, doing the same job, and it was natural. Of course, the Center would never have known about this if McLean, unwittingly, had not betrayed their little secret.

In the summer of 1938, he wrote and sent a letter to the Center through Norma. When it was opened in Moscow, they found a surprise: the letter was signed by McLean's operational pseudonym - "Lyric". According to the rules of conspiracy, McLean was not supposed to know his pseudonym. An order was sent to London to find out what was the matter. Sam, in a meeting with Norma, asked her how it happened that McLean knew his pseudonym. She admitted that they were in love and she told her friend and his pseudonyms. Norma repented of her frivolous act, the Center did not know what to do. The barely established line of communication was under threat. In the end, they decided to leave everything as it is, changing the aliases of Norm and "Lyric" to Ada and "Stuart". Although Ada continued to love McLean, this time she didn't let it slip. Proof of this is in an autobiography written by Donald in 1942: "At some point, I don't remember, I received then the sweet-sounding nickname "Lyric" and, having no contrary data, I believe that I bear this name and Now".



Back in 1937, MacLean warned Arnold Deutsch that after a while he would be offered to go to work in one of the British embassies. He asked which one would be better for him. Soviet intelligence was, of course, more interested in his work in London, but, realizing the inevitability of his departure, they did everything possible to acquire other sources of information in the Foreign office.

In the summer of 1938, McLean announced that he would soon leave for Paris, where he would work as Second Secretary at the British Embassy. The question arose of how to establish contact with him in France. Ada was very worried that, remembering her previous offense, she would not be sent to Paris with Stuart, but the Center, having decided that it would be difficult for MacLean to create a new communication line, and the separation of young people would inflict a heavy mental blow on them, ordered Ade was going to Paris in August 1938. "Norma came to Paris working

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come with me," MacLean wrote in his autobiography, "and continued to work until my departure with the embassy in June 1940."

In Paris, McLean's ability to receive information was greatly reduced. He understood that he was doing little, and he was worried about it. Moreover, he had to get involved in secular life, which he, as a closed person, did not like. Seeing the impending crisis, Ada wrote to the Center in December 1938:

"Working in Paris is a complete change for him in many ways. When he was in London, he could do as he pleased. He had his friends, had the opportunity to read a lot. The situation is different in Paris. He must lead a completely different social life. He must attend dinners and evenings. All life is concentrated around the consular circle. He hates this atmosphere, but at the same time he has to work here. I know that he is a very good comrade, and the new environment will not affect him, but I think that a letter from home will be very pleasant to him in this environment. He has very great confidence in me and often shares his thoughts with me, so I know that the letter means a lot to him. I brought him instructions for work, and sometimes personal letters, and therefore I know what impression they make on him.

"Letter from home" meant "letter from Moscow". It was written by Arnold Deutsch and really visibly lifted Donald's spirits, who replied to Deutsch with a message thanking him for his support.

In January 1940, Ada, by prearranged signal, asked for an urgent meeting with her superior contact, Ford, a Soviet intelligence officer in Paris. After the meeting, Ford reported to the Center:

"On a date, Ada said the following:

Lately, she had noticed that "Stewart" had become intimate with some woman, although he himself had not told Ada anything about it. Noticing a number of changes in his behavior and room furnishings, Ada decided to directly ask "Stuart" about it. The latter was surprised that Ada knew about this, and admitted that he became intimately close and loved a young American woman ... This American - Melinda Marling - is of liberal views, the daughter of wealthy parents living in America, without much interest in politics. "Stewart" admitted to Ada that he told Melinda Marling about his membership in the Communist Party and his connection with us on "espionage cases." At the same time, "Stuart" assures that he did not give Ada's last name to his beloved, although he generally told her that he communicates with us through one woman ... Ada reports that, according to her observations, "Stuart's" act is explained frivolity and that he still works with us sincerely and enthusiastically.

What Ada called "boyish frivolity" was actually a strong feeling MacLean had for Melin-

de, the desire to interest her in herself and keep her in this way. McLean carried this feeling throughout his life. In 1942, he explained his long-standing confession to Melinda about cooperation with Soviet intelligence as follows:

"When we first got to know each other, she had no reason to think that I was anything more than an ordinary official in the British Foreign Service ... After a while, she came to the conclusion that my lifestyle as a diplomat was making our relationship impossible, and she left. I told her the reason why I lead this life. Then she came back and we've been together ever since." Being a serious and deeply decent man, McLean did not consider it possible to link his fate with a woman who would not know what he decided to devote his LIFE to.

June 10, 1940 Melinda and Donald got married. On June 12, the British embassy was evacuated from Paris in connection with the defeat of France in the war with Germany. "Stuart" returned to London to continue working in the Foreign Office. Ada left for Moscow, so that later, as she wrote, she would return to "outside work."

At the end of 1940, the "Stuart" file, where his materials were accumulated, already amounted to many volumes. Having completed a third of his career in Soviet intelligence, in a letter to the Center dated December 29, 1940, he wrote:

"This work means as much to me as it does to you, if not more, because it is my life, for it I live, and I will try my best not to do anything to put it in danger. I cannot say that I enjoy my job, but I admit that this is one of the positions in our great struggle that I am most suited to, and I intend to stand on it until I am released from it.

#### Guy Burgess: the path to British intelligence

Among the members of the "Cambridge Five" the name of Guy Burgess is in a special place. Few people have written and told so many stories and tales, few people have been poured so much dirt on. Indeed, Guy Burgess was far from an ordinary and highly controversial personality. Along with exceptional natural talent, a sharp analytical mind, and a broad and versatile education, he sometimes surprised his entourage with extravagant deeds. Distancing himself from the "bourgeois worldview", Burgess, with his inherent instability and openness, demonstrated this gap with his "outrageous" behavior and bohemian lifestyle. He deliberately dressed sloppily, drank a lot, was aggressive in disputes with his opponents.

There is an opinion that it was these traits of his personality that made it possible for Soviet intelligence to establish cooperation with him. In reality, this is not so. Documents kept in the archives of the SVR show that the situation was just the opposite: Burgess's negative qualities were an obstacle to his work. Having received a full characterization of Burgess from Philby, the resident of the London illegal residency A.M. Orlov and his assistant A. Deutch racked their brains for a long time before deciding to start working with him. Yes, and this decision was more of a forced character: McLean, yielding to the persistent inquiries of his friend Burgess about the reasons for leaving his former activities in the Communist Party, could not stand it and let it slip that he was performing a special task. Burgess understood instantly. Under these conditions, Orlov and Deutsch decided not to let him out of their sight, to constantly keep him under control. Their decision was also influenced by the fact that Philby spoke of Burgess as a very convinced person. Being good psychologists, Orlov and Deutsch realized that

that behind the unbridled character of Burgess, in reality, lies an easily wounded, exceptionally honest and decent person who rebels against an environment he hates.

Guy Burgess was born in 1911 to a naval officer who rose to the rank of vice admiral. He studied at one of the most privileged private schools in England - Eton. Eton was followed by the University of Cambridge, where Burgess studied and then taught history. Here, in the atmosphere of the general enthusiasm of students and teachers for Marxism, he became a member of an underground communist group. But his path to Marxism was not just a tribute to the fashion of the 1930s. Burgess has read a huge number of books by past and contemporary thinkers. And he came to Marxism through the study of theoretical works.

In January 1935, Donald McLean arranged for Deutsch to meet with Burgess. Guy gladly accepted the offer made to him, saying that it was a great honor for him and he was ready to sacrifice everything for the cause. This is how the Cambridge group of Soviet intelligence arose, which consisted of three people (Philby, McLean, Burgess) until 1937, when new Cambridge graduates began to join it.

The inclusion of Guy Burgess in the illegal Orlov group and the appearance in the correspondence of the residency of a new pseudonym - "Medchen", as well as the development of some operational combinations with his participation were completely unexpected for the Center and raised questions. "You are perplexed as to who 'Medchen' is, and order to break with him before explaining to you who he is. I gave the order to Stefan (Arnold Deutsch. - Auth.) By telephone with him to suspend communication in accordance with your instructions, - Orlov wrote in one of his letters to Moscow. "But I am very surprised by the misunderstanding: I am beginning to suspect that our letters do not reach you in full, or perhaps some of them were not fully shown ... The gunners to him were "Senchen" and "Weise" (Philby and McLean. - Auth.), who regard him as a very capable and adventurous fellow, able to penetrate everywhere ... "Medchen" is a former fellow countryman of the Cambridge group, a very educated guy, indispensable in society, with adventurous inclinations. Although I regard it below "Senchen" and "Weise", I still think that it can come in handy.

Guy Burgess, like Philby and McLean, cut off contact with the underground party group in Cambridge and moved to London. The question arose of what to do next and what job to get in order to be closer to completing the main task - infiltrating British intelligence, and this was precisely the goal set for the new employee Deutsch. It was decided to go the classic way for intelligence - to use Burgess's connections. Soon Guy began to work

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at the British Broadcasting Corporation and made several radio appearances. These performances drew attention to him. Now Burgess could be "substituted" for the Intelligence Service.

In the spring of 1937, McLean, then serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, found out and handed over to the Soviet intelligence officer data on a person who was definitely an employee of the British special services. His name was David Footman. Arnold Deutsch, together with Theodor Malley, who in April 1936 replaced Alexander Orlov as a resident of an illegal London group, developed a plan of combination with the aim of organizing Burgess's acquaintance and development of relations with this man. Theodor Malley wrote about Medchen in one of his letters to the Center:

"He used to lead a careless lifestyle. Now he has become more serious. He is not shy, but, on the contrary, a little cheeky; no matter what tasks he is given, he will crawl through everywhere. When you tell him: "You must get acquainted with this and that", he will do it very quickly. Moreover, he is not imposed, but knows how to make the person of interest to us invite him himself.

Deutsch also believed that Guy had such abilities. He also managed to meet David Footman. It was known that in addition to working in British intelligence, Footman was also engaged in literary work, writing books on history (including Russian). Guy, under this pretext, contacted him and offered to speak on the BBC. Footman agreed, but requested enough

high fee. Guy managed to settle this issue as well. Between him and Footman began business, and then friendly relations. "At last I managed to invite Footman to dinner," Burgess wrote. "As a result of a successful and friendly conversation, I became so close to him that he invited me to dinner tomorrow." Guy summarized his first impressions of Footman in a succinct portrait:

"He is an intelligent, calm person of the English type, but quick, quick-witted and eloquent ... I learned something about his past. Around 1920-1924 he was Vice Consul in Egypt. Then he was at a similar job in Belgrade. After that, he left the consular service and represented large companies in the Balkans. He did this for several years, and then was again accepted into the civil service, where he still works, namely the Passport Control Bureau (a cover for intelligence officers. - Auth.). We talked a little about this institution. The Passport Control Bureau, he said, monitors foreigners and complications in the passport issue. I verified this through another civil service official, Proctor. F. is on the alert... But I think he liked me, and that's what I wanted to achieve.'

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Not limited to a verbal portrait of David Footman, Burgess sketched his profile in pencil. This drawing is still kept in the SVR archive.

This lunch was followed by others. Footman produced two broadcasts for the BBC and, according to Guy, became very friendly with him. In May 1938, Burgess learned from one of his many acquaintances that there was "work to be done" in the passport control department. At the next meeting, he told Footman that he had heard about vacancies in his department and asked if he could help him get a job there, since he was not very happy with the BBC job. Footman replied that Burgess was just the right person for them. A couple of days later, David invited Guy to lunch and confided to him that he was in fact an intelligence officer and considered Burgess to be quite the right person for this job.

This was the first success of the London illegal station in their persistent attempts to infiltrate the SIS. The path through journalism turned out to be the right one. But there was still a lot of work ahead - Guy Burgess had to be promoted to a place where he could be most useful for Soviet intelligence.

A week later, Footman introduced Burgess to Commander Norman, a former resident in Prague, from where intelligence work was carried out against the Soviet Union.

The meeting with Norman took place at the Royal Automobile Club. Later, Burgess learned from personal experience and from conversations with intelligence officers that this club is often used for meetings with agents. In any case, all of Burgess's colleagues were members and had open restaurant accounts there.

The study of Burgess by British intelligence began, which was also looking for ways to use it most effectively. Following Norman, Major Valentine Vivian appeared. This was already an official of a higher rank than Norman. He subsequently became Deputy Chief of British Intelligence. The option of sending Burgess to Italy to collect information about the intentions of the Italian government regarding the future Francoist Spain was considered. However, British intelligence found it difficult to choose the cover of Guy Burgess for this assignment. Vivian thought that as a journalist it would be difficult for him to cope with this task, and the path to diplomatic cover would be too difficult AND LONG.

Then, after learning that Burgess had previously been a communist, Vivian considered using him to study the communist movement in England. "We want you to work not only in the party," Vivian developed his thought, "but also among individuals. Legal party members are not dangerous. You should not work among activists.

This is a police case, they are handled by a special department. You should be interested in people who are not members of the party. You should have met Victor Gollants first. It is important and very dangerous. Then there is a young student at Oxford named Dennis Jones. He is a true revolutionary from the age of sixteen. Both at Oxford and Cambridge this conspiratorial membership must be exposed. Then there is a secret communist organization on the BBC. We need to find out who belongs to it."

At the end of the conversation, Footman and Vivian explained to Burgess that his main and ultimate goal would be to secure an appointment from the party to some post in Moscow related to cultural work. In their opinion, it would be easy for him to do this.

Guy Burgess's contact with the anti-communist section of the Intelligence Service was his own initiative - at that time he found himself without contact with the Center. Moscow considered such a game too complicated and risky. In addition, it distracted him from his main goal - penetration into those areas of the British civil service that are related to the Soviet Union. Therefore, Burgess was banned from doing this kind of work for British intelligence. Guy did not agree with this decision of the Center. In his next letter, he explained his motives as follows:

"An anti-communist whom I met later told me that he used his son, an Oxford student, as a spy in the left wing of the student movement. It is very likely that in this way they can frame someone in Oxford or Cambridge and he will be able to open me or other persons known to you.

I gave this example to show and note that it would be better if the person conducting such work would be our person, who would be able to hide the people we need or present the facts in such a way that they look unimportant or introduce astray. Otherwise, they can find someone for this job themselves.

I say this because I want to justify my opinion that I am not entirely convinced by your ban on such work. If they do this to us, why can't we do the same?

But the direction of the Center had to be followed, and after a while Burgess said:

"According to your instructions, I told F. that I do not think that I could ever become a "leftist" and work as a provocateur in the English Communist Party. They don't trust me too much."

David Footman agreed with Burgess that the Communist Party would not accept him back, and praised him for being honest in assessing his own abilities in this regard.

The purposefulness and perseverance of the Center in achieving the set goal justified itself. Soon Footman introduced Burgess to Major Lawrence Grand, head of the British Intelligence Section, created in March 1938. This section was formed at the direction of Chief of Intelligence Sinclair, and its task was to study alternative methods of warfare. Section D operated under the guise of the Statistical Research Department of the War Office. In fact, it was a unit that was engaged in disinformation and carried out activities to actively influence the most important political events in a direction beneficial to the British.

Burgess was introduced to Lawrence Grand in late 1938. Guy's first major assignment in Section D was organizing a split in the Jewish movement in Palestine and creating opposition to Zionism and its leader, Dr. Weisman. Strengthening its position in

In the Middle East, England operated with traditional divide and rule methods. Burgess successfully coped with this task.

Then Burgess was connected to the work of the section on Germany. Informing our intelligence about this area of work, Burgess reported:

"From various conversations about our tasks that I had with Major Grand, with his assistant Lieutenant Colonel Chidson, with Footman, etc., I got an impression in relation to English politics," Burgess wrote. - The main policy is to work with Germany almost at all costs and in the end against the USSR. But this policy cannot be pursued directly, it must be maneuvered in every way... The main obstacle is the impossibility of pursuing this policy in contact with Hitler and the existing system in Germany... Chidson bluntly told me that our goal is not to resist German expansion. to the East".

This was already political information about the position of England in relation to Germany and the Soviet Union. "Bureaucratically," wrote Burges, "my position was determined in such a way that I would be a liaison between Section D of British intelligence, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information ... SIS, and therefore the personal secretary of Lord Parth, head of information at the Foreign Office, Young told me that he would be able to give me any information. Thus, Burgess gained access to cipher telegrams and reports from the Foreign Office. Its reconnaissance capabilities were expanding. He continued to receive quite interesting, albeit often fragmentary, political information from intelligence officials as well. Notable in this respect was his conversation at dinner on August 3, 1939, with Miss Mattison and Section D Chief Grand. Referring to a member of the British military delegation on

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Major General Hayward's talks in Moscow, Grand told his listeners that the British government proceeded from the fact that "in England the power of the Red Army is regarded low" and that "England's war against Germany can be easily won." Therefore, there is no special need to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union and negotiations with it should be dragged out until November, and then interrupted.

What Grand said about the attitude of the British towards negotiations with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939, on the eve of the outbreak of World War II, was confirmed by other sources of Burgess. In his letter to the Center dated August 28, 1939, he reported:

"In all government departments and in all conversations with those who have seen the documents of the negotiations, the opinion is expressed that we never thought of concluding a serious military pact. The Prime Minister's office openly states that they thought they could get away from the Russian pact (actual words spoken by Horace Wilson's secretary)."

This was important political information, revealing the true intentions of the British government towards the USSR at a critical moment when Hitler was ready to attack Poland.

The functions of Guy Burgess in British intelligence were not limited to the organization of anti-Hitler propaganda. The opinion once expressed by Theodore Malley about his versatile abilities ("Medchen is a jack of all trades") was also shared by British intelligence. Grand, who was in charge of sabotage and sabotage, in August 1939 entrusted Guy with another line of work - sabotage and reconnaissance, including the organization of economic sabotage against Germany. Burgess suggested that Grand create a school for foreign agents, where they would be trained in sabotage work. He considered this a good way to strengthen his position in intelligence, to get to know the agents who were sent abroad, and to make contacts with intelligence and counterintelligence officials who could be invited to lecture at the school. The educational institution was opened and served as a prototype for future sabotage

Schools of the Special Operations Department. At first, Kim Philby was taken to work in it, not without the help of Guy Burgess.

However, soon Burgess's career in British intelligence was destined to end. Intelligence Chief Sinclair has died, his protégé Grand has been fired. Following this, in late 1940, Burgess was asked to look elsewhere.

With the departure of Guy Burgess from intelligence, his connection with the British special services did not break off. Even while working for Grand, he, at the behest of Colonel Vivian, kept in touch with Guy Lidzel of counterintelligence and gave him information on some people of interest to him, for example, Gerald Hamilt, a member of parliament.

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on the. Therefore, a plan was developed by Soviet intelligence, according to which Burgess was to try to get some post in counterintelligence for himself. Old acquaintances Footman and Vivian supported him. Footman even wrote a letter to counterintelligence for this purpose. Burgess' candidacy was supported there. He was introduced to Campbell Johnson and began working for him using his old connection, the Swiss journalist Eric Kessler. Guy met Eric Kessler back in 1938 when, on Grand's assignment, he was looking for the possibility of creating a radio station in Liechtenstein for conducting illegal anti-Hitler propaganda, as a person who could point to the necessary contacts in the Swiss state apparatus. British counterintelligence had previously tried to recruit Kessler through their agent Ustinov, the father of the famous American actor Peter Ustinov, but Kessler refused to recruit because he did not trust him. Eric Kessler became of even greater interest to the British when he left his job at the Neue Zürcher Zeitung newspaper and joined the Swiss legation in London. Burgess suggested that British counterintelligence recruit him, and at the end of 1940 he successfully carried out this recruitment. Counterintelligence gave the Swiss the pseudonym "Orange".

Through Burgess, Kessler was actively used by British counterintelligence to collect political information and characteristics on the representatives of the diplomatic and journalistic corps in London that were of interest to her, as well as on some of the British, including representatives of the London establishment.

Naturally, Guy Burgess regularly reported to his Soviet colleagues about everything he did for counterintelligence. The interest of the British in influential London circles fully met the needs of Soviet intelligence, and it did not pass by the opportunities that Gai's cooperation with "Khata" opened up for her, as the British counterintelligence was called in operational correspondence. Reporting to the Center about the meeting with "Medchen" on October 14, 1942, the London Resident put forward the following concept of work:

"In connection with the development and interest of "Khata" by the Bank of the International Settlement and the participation of "M." In this development of the "Khata", new possibilities open up for us in using people "in the dark". In this particular case, "M." had the task of the chief through the Proctor (Personal Secretary to the Minister of Finance) to obtain information about the activities of English financial circles in connection with the Bank of the International Settlement. "Hata" knows that "M." is on good terms with Proctor, so they instructed him to get in touch with him and ask him about their questions. "M." says that Proctor will provide such information for Khata.

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"M." in general, he proposes to "Khata" to recruit Proctor to receive from him regular information about the situation in the Ministry of Finance and among financial circles.

This plan "M." as if he could be accepted by "Khata", and they could instruct "M." recruit him. In this case, if Proctor will be an agent of "Khata" and will be connected with it through "M", then he,

will undoubtedly tell the latter much more than he has done so far.

Further, if Proctor's recruitment plan succeeds, then before "M." there may be a prospect of involving other prominent Englishmen in the work of "Khata". This task before "M." we have set. Namely: to achieve such a position in the "Khat" that he would have interesting agents in touch, which we could use in our interests through him "in the dark".

While Burgess was working on the implementation of this plan, the British gave him the task of involving Andrew Rivai, leader of the Free Hungarians group, in secret work in order to develop the Hungarian, Czech and Polish political emigration. Guy was acquainted with Rivai through foreign press officer Peter Hulton of the Foreign Office. The recruitment of Rivai was carried out by Burgess in November 1942 on behalf of the Security Service. In her annals, he appeared as an agent of "Toffee".

In addition to recruiting agents for the British counterintelligence and on its behalf, Guy Burgess carried out a large number of its other current assignments. This allowed him to communicate with a wide variety of people from the British secret services. During the years of close cooperation with them, he had a connection with a large number of regular officers of the special services, as well as British and foreign agents who worked for them. He also shed some light on the forms and methods of work of intelligence and counterintelligence in Great Britain, which was undoubtedly useful for Soviet intelligence to know. In a letter to the Center dated July 1, 1939, Burgess wrote:

"A good measure of our work is that after 6 months I can tell you something about them, while after 6 years of working with you I can't tell them anything about you."

It was true. Neither Burgess nor his comrades in the Cambridge group knew the real names of the Soviet spies who were in contact with them. For them they were George, Otto, Bill, Henry, Pierre, Max, etc. They didn't even know if their Soviet contacts were permanently living in England or if they were coming for meetings from abroad. Sometimes the Cambridges themselves traveled outside of England for meetings. Those were the strictest rules of conspiracy.

In the early years of his work in Soviet intelligence, Guy Burgess did not have wide access to classified information. He sporadically handed over some documents of a limited use,

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for example, the weekly information reports he receives from Grand, compiled on the basis of materials from the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs and intelligence. But his ability in this respect was no match for that of Donald MacLean. However, Burgess fully compensated for this shortcoming with his work in acquiring valuable new sources of information for Soviet intelligence. We can say that he was simply created for this kind of work.

Guy Burgess had his own understanding of the priority of intelligence tasks and his own inclinations towards conducting intelligence work. Realizing the need for his personal penetration into the British special services and skillfully using his cooperation with them for this, he nevertheless considered that for him this was a job of necessity. In one of the operational letters, the illegal residency reported:

"The work that he considers even more important and promising, the work that he would do with great moral satisfaction, being absolutely sure of its success and effectiveness, is the recruitment for us of young people graduating from Oxford and Cambridge universities and preparing to enter the civil service. For this work he has such assistants as Blunt for Cambridge and "Gross" for Oxford. To this thought "M." returns at all meetings, arguing that only such agents will be able to give us the only reliable information."



Guy Burgess did not limit himself to simply talking about his next idea of recruiting operatives. He prepared and sent to the Center detailed written proposals, which he entitled "On the development of work among students to prepare them for civil service." In them he, in particular, wrote:

"The organization of work among university students is of the greatest importance, because through it we could manage a regular flow of people going to public service, who could be recruited before they become too prominent, and put them on safe places of a particular branch of service. The two most important universities are, of course, Oxford and Cambridge. To run the work there, we need someone who has a close relationship with the students."

For the Center, these thoughts of Burgess were not new. After all, Kim Philby's first assignment was to visit Cambridge in order to select the most suitable candidates for work in Soviet intelligence, and he was the first to pay attention to Guy Burgess. But in order to put this business on a regular basis, people were needed who were completely devoted to this idea and who were aware of the need for its practical implementation. At Cambridge, Burgess was just such a man.

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com. To a certain extent, his recruiting work was facilitated by the fact that he himself grew up on Cambridge soil.

In 1944, when Burgess took a job at the British Foreign Office and was able to pass on hundreds of secret British government documents to Soviet intelligence, he was fond of saying that he did almost nothing in the pre-war years. But it's not. Thanks to the recruiting work of Burgess and his friends Anthony Blunt and Kim Philby, in a short period of time - from the beginning of 1937 to the beginning of 1939 - the core of the Cambridge group was strengthened by five agents at once: "Mayor", "Abo", "Ralph", Molière and Nigel. This work served as a prototype for the creation of the Oxford group, led by "Scott". But it is also true that the main affairs of Guy Burgess were still ahead of him.

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On the banks of the Seine

By the beginning of the 1930s, Soviet foreign intelligence had accumulated considerable experience of successful work in France from both "legal" and illegal positions. However, with the advent of Hitler to power in Germany, the agent-operational situation in Europe changed significantly and the Paris residency, as well as all of our intelligence, faced the most difficult tasks. First of all, there was a possibility of a world war in this region, including against the Soviet Union. In the current situation, the leaders of the country began to make higher demands on the political, military, economic, scientific and technical information obtained by our residencies. At the same time, in Germany, where the residencies have always been the largest and strongest, the conditions for obtaining the necessary information have deteriorated sharply. In view of the beginning of the persecution, many agents known for their democratic convictions and anti-fascist views were forced to leave the Third Reich. Some of them settled in France. At the same time, the important role of France in international affairs, its favorable position on the European continent contributed to the expansion of intelligence activities in this country.

Taking into account these circumstances, in the summer of 1934, a plan was developed in Moscow to reorganize the agent apparatus of the Paris residence, as well as to intensify intelligence work in Germany from French territory. The center demanded from the resident to provide coverage of the activities in France of German emigration, National Socialist organizations and their agents, employees of the embassy and German intelligence. In February 1937, after the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Berlin and Tokyo, the Paris residency was

already focused on the deployment of "full-scale work on Germany." To solve this tasks

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it was ordered to involve "all forces and workers of all lines of residency".

Until 1940, the agent apparatus of the Parisian residency allowed it to regularly obtain secret information, including documentary information. It concerned the alignment of forces, positions, plans and actions of the main participants in the complex political struggle that unfolded in Europe on the eve of World War II. A significant part of them was sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and government departments of the USSR

Information from Paris made it possible to draw the necessary conclusions about the aggravation of the situation on the continent, about the proximity of an armed clash.

In the summer of 1935, the residency reported to Moscow that the British ambassador in Paris had reported to his Foreign Office that the French cabinet was deeply worried about France's serious lagging behind Germany in the field of armed forces. Some French ministers, according to the ambassador, believed that the war would start in the spring of 1938. Another document dating back to the end of 1937 spoke of an active discussion in leading Italian circles of the question of a possible outbreak of war in the spring of 1938 as a result of the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Germans and their adoption of other measures to establish a "new order" in Central Europe. In early 1938, the British ambassadors to Germany, Italy and Japan informed the Foreign Office "of a possible armed action" by these countries "in the near future". At the same time (January-February 1938), British Foreign Secretary A. Eden and British intelligence believed that the aggressive behavior of Berlin and Rome was just a "bluff", a means of intimidation, in particular, the British and French.

A year later, the British government already proceeded from the "possibility of an early German attack on the Western states." According to the same data, the French leadership was in agreement with the opinion of London. The French ambassador in Berlin assessed the "current moment" somewhat differently. He reported in mid-January 1939 at the Quai d'Orsay that Hitler was more inclined to carry out a military operation in the East. The French General Staff, for its part, was generally convinced that Germany and Italy were "not in a position to wage war" and that the "Maginot Line" was reliably protecting France.

Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, the residency reported to Moscow about the data received by France in mid-June 1939 regarding military mobilization measures being implemented in Germany and about the concentration of German troops planned for the end of the same month on the western and eastern borders of the Reich. According to the plans of the German General Staff, as the French found out, the disposition of German troops on the Franco-German border should

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was defensive, and in the Polish-German ~ offensive character.

A few days before the start of the Second World War, information was received from agents in France about secret negotiations between the British and the Germans, in particular, about the instruction given by the leadership of the Foreign Office to the British ambassador in Berlin to tell Hitler that if he really wanted to conduct Anglo-German negotiations on matters of dispute, the British government will do everything possible to satisfy the territorial claims of Germany. But if he wants to impose his will by force and starts aggression against Poland, then war will become inevitable.

There was no lack of documentary evidence of the desire of France and England to divert the eventual German military strike from themselves and direct it to the East. For example, during the preparation of the Franco-German declaration in December 1938, Paris promised Berlin "not to

be interested in eastern and southeastern affairs," provided that the Germans strictly adhere to the same line with regard to the Mediterranean. A month later, the French lamented that the German side did not comply with this agreement.

By giving Germany a free hand in the East, the French and British hoped that the Germans would get bogged down there and cease to be a threat to their countries. In one of the analytical reports of the French Foreign Ministry of December 1938, it was directly stated that Hitler was mistaken when he expected to easily cause a disorderly flight of the Russian army and the fall of the Soviet system. However, instead of dissuading the government of the Third Reich from committing "fatal indiscretion", France, on the contrary, should support and encourage it with unbinding promises.

A similar position was followed in London. As early as the end of 1937, many British politicians (Lord Halifax, John Simon, Samuel Hoare, Kingsley Wood), referring to Britain's unpreparedness for war, advocated appeasing Germany by sacrificing Central and Eastern Europe to it. This information from France confirmed that which Soviet intelligence received in London and Berlin.

Even after the outbreak of the "strange war" in 1939, according to the Paris residency, London and Paris continued to hope that they would be able to "turn" Hitler in an easterly direction. Western ambassadors accredited in London reported to their capitals that the British government, referring to the secret information at its disposal, did not believe in the possibility of a German offensive on the Western Front.

Important information also came from Soviet intelligence in France on the question of the policy of the Western powers with regard to

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conflict situations in Europe and Asia. Among them are the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet-Japanese and Soviet-Finnish conflicts.

The Paris residency was actively involved in Soviet intelligence operations related to the events in Spain. After the establishment of a "legal" residency there in 1936, our operatives in France were entrusted with the task of providing them with the necessary assistance in solving operational problems. In the same year, an illegal purchase and transfer to Spain "on their own" of a large batch of French aircraft for the Spanish Republican army was organized. Some of the aircraft were of the latest design. The operation went brilliantly, especially considering that French firms were banned from selling aircraft to Spain.

With the establishment of the fascist regime in Spain, the "legal" residency in that country was liquidated, and most of our assistants left for France. These people were handed over to our reconnaissance apparatus in Paris. Of these, two illegal residencies were subsequently formed, which continued to work successfully in Spain and carry out other tasks of the Center.

In the information obtained by the Paris station, there was a clear connection between the events in Europe and the situation on the eastern borders of the Soviet Union. At the beginning of 1938, very interesting documentary materials were received from the residency about the emergence of new moments in the position of the Japanese leadership in relation to the Soviet Union. They said that the Japanese emperor was wary of Hitler's and Mussolini's attempts to push Tokyo to unleash a military conflict between Japan and the USSR or between Japan and England and their promises in this case to also oppose these states. The emperor did not believe in the sincerity of the statements of the Germans and Italians about their intention to help Japan in this way solve their affairs in Asia. He saw in all this only the desire of Germany and Italy to facilitate the achievement of their goals in Europe with the help of Japan. Japan, as the emperor believed, should retain "complete freedom of action and choice."

These data were undoubtedly taken into account by the Soviet leadership when making foreign policy decisions at that difficult time, including during negotiations with the Japanese on the treaty of neutrality, which was signed on April 13, 1941 and played an important role in ensuring the security of the eastern borders of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War.

Among the materials of the Paris residency there were quite a few messages that were unpleasant for the Soviet top leadership, which contained very critical assessments by Western countries

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the foreign policy of the Kremlin ("Stalin completely follows in the footsteps of Hitler" - December 1939), the state of the Soviet armed forces ("not capable of waging an offensive war" - 1938) and the situation in the Soviet Union ("weakened by an internal crisis" - 1938). People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N.I. Intelligence reported to Yezhov a complete translation of the report of the military attaché of one of the Western countries in Moscow to his leadership on the execution of Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky and other representatives of the high military command in 1937. This document noted, in particular, that almost all foreign representatives in the Soviet capital considered the accusations leveled against these military leaders to be absurd and implausible. "They consider the trial of commanders of such high rank as a kind of repetition of the trial of the Trotskyists. Experiencing a painful fear of the slightest manifestation of resistance to his will in any area of life, the red dictator, this report said, is now worried that the army will not get out of his absolute control. In the final part of his report, the military attaché expressed the opinion that the execution of the highest military commanders in the USSR and the consequences that it would undoubtedly have would greatly undermine the military power of the Red Army. From the file kept in the SVR archive it is not clear whether Yezhov brought the contents of this document to Stalin.

Since the Soviet leadership attached great importance to catching up with the industrialized countries in terms of economic development and equipping the Red Army with modern weapons and military equipment, the Paris residency in the 30s paid much attention to scientific, technical, military-technical and economic intelligence. In this regard, illegal intelligence groups were created that dealt with these issues. In 1938, the Paris residency consisted of more than 20 sources of scientific, technical and military technical information. Among them were very valuable agents who reported information, for example, in the field of computer technology, bacteriology, artificial fibers, as well as a large number of documentary materials about French, German, Italian military equipment and weapons (including some types of the latest combat aircraft), on the production of chemical warfare agents by the Germans. Information of this kind was highly appreciated by the relevant Soviet departments.

The main drawback in the work of the Paris residency on German topics at the end of the 30s was the lack of sources in those German circles in which they could reliably know about Hitler's real aggressive plans and the specific dates for their implementation. There was a constant shortage, and often a complete absence of operational workers in the "legal" residency,

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who know the German language and have the appropriate knowledge of regional studies. Because of this, the Center was forced in 1934 to transfer to the illegal network a valuable agent, a German by nationality, who worked along the "German line". In 1937, after the only operative who spoke German was recalled to Moscow, contacts with the promising agent were practically terminated. A few months before the outbreak of World War II, there was not a single person in the residency who knew German, and she sent to Moscow, without reading, the materials of a German agent.

The main reason for these and many other difficulties that Soviet intelligence faced in France should be considered political repressions in the Soviet Union in 1937-1938. In November 1939, a certificate of the Paris residency for the intelligence leadership stated the following: "For a number of reasons, over the past year, the entire cadre of our employees, both "legal" and illegal apparatuses (10 people) was thrown home from the Paris residency )... As a result of this, a part of very valuable agents (for example, according to the Germans - 8 people) has been mothballed in the Parisian residence for a long time, and a number of the most serious objects have been exposed and are not being developed at all." The same reference noted that from France "it is possible to carry out a great deal of active work on Germany." However, in order to deploy it, the resident asks to reactivate the "agents for the Germans" that have been inactive for more than a year and asks to send him at least one experienced worker with knowledge

German language.

The frequent replacement of "legal" residents had a negative effect on the efficiency of the mining apparatus in France: in the period from 1933 to June 1941, five people were replaced. The same number of employees temporarily performed the duties of a resident.

The Second World War began. Statements appeared in the French ruling circles in favor of breaking off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Based on the possibility of the development of events in the worst-case scenario, the intelligence leadership considered it necessary to take measures in advance to ensure the uninterrupted operation in this country during a special period. In September 1939, the Center developed and approved a plan for the reorganization of the illegal network, according to which all agents were once again carefully checked in terms of reliability and capabilities, and then divided into three main categories. The first included the most valuable and efficient agents, from which four illegal reconnaissance groups (residences) were subsequently formed. The second group included agents whose work was temporarily stopped. The third category consisted of persons who were excluded from the agent network for security reasons and for other reasons.

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Each head of the reconnaissance group was given the necessary information on his agents and the conditions for contacting them so that they could start work immediately after the break in diplomatic relations between France and the USSR. Until that moment, only "legal" residencies were supposed to work with agents.

The German invasion of France in May 1940, the rapid capture of half of French territory by them, was a serious test for Soviet intelligence. Communication with many assistants was broken. Some of them were arrested by the Germans - mainly for their anti-fascist views. Others managed to leave for the southern regions of France. Some agents moved to England or North Africa. Some of them later managed to establish contact and successfully cooperate during the war.

Nevertheless, the core of the agent network of Soviet foreign intelligence in France was preserved. In the "free zone" (southern part of France), along with the agents who permanently lived here, there were sources who fled from the German occupation and from Francoist Spain. By decision of the Center, the main part of the remaining able-bodied agents was united into reconnaissance groups (residences). Among the largest were the "Gustav" groups in the "free zone" and the "Roma" group in the northern, occupied part of France.

The group leader "Gustav" was one of the oldest agents who connected his fate with Soviet intelligence back in the 20s. Before the war, "Gustav" led a network of agents operating in France and two illegal intelligence groups in Eastern Europe. He was a brave, strong-willed man. For the successful fulfillment of responsible tasks of Soviet intelligence, "Gustav" was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and accepted into Soviet citizenship.

Experienced, proven in specific cases was "Rom", who led a reconnaissance group in the occupied territory of France. For a long time he was the deputy of "Gustav". However, by the time of his appointment as a group leader, he was actually already in charge of the entire intelligence network, since in the early spring of 1940 "Gustav" was mobilized into the French army, and after the capitulation of France, he was forced for security reasons to live in the unoccupied part of the country.

Taking into account the split of the country into two parts, the relocation of the French government, various departments and foreign diplomatic corps (including our embassy) from Paris to Vichy, the intelligence leadership decided, in addition to the "legal" Parisian residency, to form another one in the south of France, subordinating it, however, to the Parisian resident. It was created under the guise of the official representation of the USSR in Vichy. In the northern zone occupied by the Germans, our scouts continued to work

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under the guise of a small consular department, which received from the German authorities the status of "consulate in Paris of the USSR embassy in Berlin". The head of the consular department was the resident.

Both "legal" residencies and the undercover apparatus worked in very difficult conditions. At the beginning of 1941, there were only two operational officers in the residencies. They either did not have sufficient experience of working abroad or had a poor command of French. A letter from the Parisian resident dated July 1940 has been preserved, in which he informs his leadership in Moscow that due to the departure of one operative to the Union and the illness of another, "all active agents switched to communication exclusively with me." In May 1941, he worked with 15 agents, including Roma. From time to time there were difficulties in maintaining telegraph and postal communications with the Center and especially between the residencies themselves. In April 1941, communication between Paris and Vichy was almost completely interrupted due to a breakdown in telegraph communications and the refusal of the German authorities to issue passes for our official representatives to travel around the country, in particular between the two zones. The operational staff felt the need for the most elementary things. Thus, the resident in Vichy wrote to the Center on January 4, 1941: "Thank you for the parcel, because none of us have had soap, sugar or tea for a long time. We shared the contents of the package among ourselves, not forgetting Paris."

The sources also found themselves in a difficult situation. Most of the agents who took refuge in the south of France were in a difficult financial situation, in fact, without operational and informational capabilities useful for Soviet intelligence. The Paris "legal" resident reported to Moscow in November 1940 the following: "The real possibilities of the agents settled in the southern part of France are almost zero both in terms of collecting political information and in other lines of work, and they themselves need support." His colleague in Vichy noted in May 1941 (referring primarily to former members of the International Brigades): "The situation of foreigners in the unoccupied zone is deteriorating every day. The police repression is intensifying..."

There have been several failures. Thus, at the beginning of 1941, the police arrested several of our sources who worked in Paris and its environs. As a result, intelligence work in Paris was temporarily suspended.

Taking into account the current situation, the intelligence leadership decided to strengthen the conspiracy in the work, increase the security of the residencies and their employees. Also, for the purposes of secrecy, it was allowed, and in some cases recommended, that individual agents simultaneously take part "on their own behalf" and "on a personal basis" in the activities of organizations of the French movement.

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resistance, various combat groups created in France by the intelligence services of General de Gaulle and the Anglo-American allies.

However, despite the serious complication of the situation in connection with the outbreak of World War II, Soviet foreign intelligence in France continued to operate. At the end of 1940, she even managed to send several agents to Germany and establish good communication with them.

In accordance with the instructions of the Center, both residencies paid much attention to obtaining information on military issues.

Until May 1940, the information received from our sources concerned mainly the preparation of the French for war and the nature of the grouping of German troops aimed at France. With the occupation of the northern part of French territory by the Germans, measures were taken to collect data on German troops and their movements. The residencies organized special trips around the country for agents who, due to the nature of their activities or for other reasons, could obtain the appropriate permissions from the German and French authorities. It was possible to infiltrate some German military units under the guise of service personnel, from whom information was also received about the Wehrmacht troops in France.

In June 1940, the Paris residency began to inform the Center about the transfer of German troops from France to the east, to the Soviet borders. This information supplemented and confirmed the information available in Moscow about the military preparations of Nazi Germany for an attack on the USSR.

Separate agents, as noted above, participated in various sabotage actions against German troops stationed on French territory and individual objects. However, the intelligence leadership at that time forbade the carrying out of such activities by the reconnaissance groups themselves and demanded that all forces be concentrated on the deployment of active undercover work and obtaining intelligence information.

A significant number of assignments from the leadership of intelligence to the residencies in Paris and Vichy concerned the subversive activities of the French and German special services against the USSR, in particular, their use of emigrant anti-Soviet centers for these purposes. Approximately 25% of all instructions from Moscow were devoted to the issues of identifying the German intelligence network on the territory of the Soviet Union. And this is not surprising. The beginning of the Second World War was perceived by the leaders of the anti-Soviet emigre organizations as a particularly convenient moment for the deployment of large-scale subversive and terrorist activities against the USSR. Already in the autumn of 1939, the Parisian resident informed the Center that such a decision, in particular, had been made by the leaders of the French branch

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People's Labor Union (NTS). It was immediately supported by the executive bureau of the NTS and approved by the French authorities. Noting the "extreme importance" of this information, Moscow asked the residency to pay special attention to the development of the NTS as "the most united and numerous organization that had previously carried out active work against the USSR." The intelligence leadership asked that the work on the NTS be based on obtaining information about its specific counterintelligence, terrorist activities against the Soviet Union, its activists in our country and the channels of COMMUNICATION WITH THEM.

From the sources of the residencies in Paris and Vichy, information was received about the selection and recruitment in France of anti-Soviet persons from among the Russian, Ukrainian and other emigration in order to use them in a future war against the Soviet Union as saboteurs or as part of special military formations. . This information helped the Soviet internal organs preempt the enemy and prevent espionage and sabotage actions on the territory of the USSR on the eve and in the first months of the war.

After the Germans attacked the Soviet Union and the Vichy government broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR, employees of all Soviet missions and institutions were forced to leave the country. "Legal" residencies ceased to exist. But the agent network created by Soviet intelligence in France in the 1920s and 1930s continued to operate, despite the difficulties of maintaining contact with the Center, and serious blows inflicted on it throughout the war by the French and German special services.

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## Debut in France

The name of Vasily Mikhailovich Zarubin is well known in foreign intelligence. 25 years of Vasily Mikhailovich's service were spent in the conditions of extra-cordon activities, 13 of them he was in illegal work. About the long-term work of V.M. Zarubin in foreign intelligence will be told later, but here our story is only about some of the first steps of his illegal work in France in the late 20s and early 30s.

Zarubin received the task to move to France, settle there for a long time, and then get in touch with his assistants, establish reliable contacts within the illegal residency and with the Center, and start acquiring new sources of information when he had just settled illegally. in Denmark. But the work in France was more important, and I had to start all over again. The main task set by the Center for Zarubin was to organize intelligence in Germany, where fascism was raising its head.

After a short stay in Switzerland, Zarubin arrived in the south of France in the late 1920s and settled in a place not far from the resort town of Antibes. He stayed in a modest boarding house "Chrysanthemums", where 10-12 people lived, most of them were foreigners on vacation.

The scout's attention was attracted by a young French woman. Her name was Maya. Maya told Zarubin that she was from Paris, a student at the Sorbonne, her parents had previously lived in Russia. After the 1905 revolution, they, its active participants, were arrested, imprisoned, and then left for France as political emigrants. She was born on May 1, and her parents named her Maya in honor of the holiday.

Maya was going home and gave Zarubin her address. After some time, a letter came from the girl, in which she confirmed

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invitation. Vasily Mikhailovich answered her... As subsequent events showed, acquaintance with Maya turned out to be very useful.

Following her husband, Elizaveta Yulyevna Zarubina, an experienced scout who knew French and German well, soon arrived at the Chrysanthemum boarding house. Before settling in the country, one should first at least look around a little. The spouses deliberately did not apply for a permanent residence permit, they lived as tourists, which made it possible to move freely around the country for two months. Vasily Mikhailovich bought a used car of a good brand. She decided to go to Paris.

Upon arrival in Paris, the Zarubins stayed at a small hotel. It took several days to get acquainted with the capital and its sights. After 5-6 days, they decided to visit Maya and see if it was possible, with her assistance, to gain a foothold in France.

At dinner in Mai's family, the Zarubins told about themselves according to a well-established legend. They reported that their parents in the past were Austrian subjects, Czechs by nationality, lived in Russia before the First World War, that their fathers served at the Kalinkin brewery. After the war, both families returned to their homeland, to Czechoslovakia. Since their parents were friends, the Zarubins know



each other since childhood. That is why they speak Russian. Vasily Mikhailovich is a businessman. After the death of their parents, Zarubin said, he and his wife decided to try their luck in a foreign land, since things were not going well in Czechoslovakia. They are thinking of settling down here in France and starting some business.

Noticing that Maya's father (let's call him "Jeweler") spoke positively about Soviet Russia, they began to talk about her. "Yuvelir" said that he was in conflict with his old friends, accusing them of doing nothing to help the former Motherland. Vasily Mikhailovich tactfully remarked that one should not waste one's energy in vain. The homeland can be helped in various ways. Elizaveta Yulyevna and the wife of "Yuvelir" (hereinafter "Nina") actively participated in the conversation.

Saying goodbye, Jeweler asked the Zarubins to visit them more often. But the main task remained unresolved: to find a place for permanent residence and an opportunity to get a job in order to obtain a permanent residence permit. We decided to look for him in the vicinity of Paris.

The choice fell on the picturesque town of Saint-Cloud, in which the Zarubins rented a house on a hillock near the forest for a small fee. Zarubin left his car downstairs in a commercial garage. The garage was owned and operated by Paul, a Frenchman in his 40s, married but childless.

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2-3 times a week, Vasily Mikhailovich went to Paris to look for work and establish contact with his assistants. In a conversation with Paul, Zarubin said that he was going to start a small business, since he had no funds for more.

Once Zarubin turned to Paul with a request to use his garage and tools to sort out his car. Paul watched Zarubin's work closely. And when he finished, he offered Vasily Mikhailovich to enter into a share with him in order to expand the garage, buy a lift, a lathe and something else. The scout promised to think. The main difficulty, Zarubin said, was that he did not yet have a permanent residence permit. Paul noticed that he had contacts in the police and could easily arrange a residence permit.

We agreed that Zarubin would give money for the purchase of tools and equipment and start working for him in his spare time, but for now he would continue looking for a suitable place in Paris.

After 2 days, Zarubin, together with Paul, went to a special department of the Saint-Cloud City Hall, paid the fee and received receipts that gave them the right to stay in the country until they received a residence permit from the main police prefecture of Paris. Soon a permanent residence permit was obtained.

After that, Vasily Mikhailovich worked in the garage for 2-3 days a week, repaired cars, sewing machines, stoves, and so on. He lent the owner of the garage 10,000 francs (\$400 at the then exchange rate) against a perpetual bill without interest to buy equipment.

It could be considered that Vasily Mikhailovich firmly settled in Saint-Cloud. But this did not quite suit the scout. He constantly puzzled over how to move to Paris and establish a business that would make it possible to fully concentrate on intelligence work. I needed a good companion.

V.M. Zarubin recalled that a few years ago, while working in the Far East, he attracted for cooperation along the economic line of the Shoemaker, who provided interesting information about various "combinators" - speculators, about the "former", knowing everything that was happening in their midst, who supported interesting connections abroad. The history of the "Shoeman" in a nutshell was like this. During the First World War, he, being a businessman, left Poland for Russia to rescue cargo stuck in the Far East. The revolutionary events did not allow the merchant to immediately return to Poland. There, intelligence drew attention to him. He became

cooperate with her. Zarubin wrote to Moscow about all this and asked that the "Shoeman" be sent to him.

The Shoemaker was summoned to Moscow. Then he was to proceed to Warsaw and wait for instructions from the Center. In financial aid

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he did not particularly need cabbage soup: he had real estate in Poland, and reparation money was due from Germany for the destroyed factory in Warsaw. A very important circumstance was that the "Shoeman" had connections and relatives in France, in particular in Paris.

Some time later, through illegal channels, a letter was sent to the "Shoeman" informing him that he was to come to Nice, where he would be met by a familiar person. And here is The Shoemaker in France. Vasily Mikhailovich comes to meet him.

Zarubin suggested that a colleague open a small business. He replied that his younger brother lived in Paris, who worked in the field of advertising and was the owner of a small workshop. He is an unimportant businessman and all the time asks his brother to come to Paris, head the firm, expand the enterprise. If this option is suitable, then he, the Shoemaker, will discuss everything with his brother, without involving him in intelligence affairs.

The negotiations ended successfully. The merchant accepted him and Vasily Mikhailovich as partners. An agreement was concluded between them, which was registered in the commercial and industrial department of the department of the Seine and Oise. They paid the fee and received a patent for the right to engage in their production.

So our scout became a partner of one of the advertising firms in Paris. Soon the Shoemaker arrived in Paris with his family. Vasily Mikhailovich said goodbye to his partner in Saint Cloud and moved to Paris.

So Zarubin completed the work of organizing a cover in France.

At the same time, sources of information were acquired, the search for apartments needed for meetings with assistants, preparing mail and photographing documents was underway.

Dealing with these matters, Vasily Mikhailovich and Elizaveta Yulyevna did not forget about Maya's parents. One day Zarubin called Jeweler and accepted an invitation to visit their country house. It was a two-story stone building with a large garden. "Jeweler" loved the garden, kept it in exemplary order.

Before breakfast, the men worked in the garden, and the women cleaned the house. As he trimmed the shrubs, "The Jeweler" talked about the neighbors, who, he said, were ardent reactionaries, although he was friends with some. He also touched upon political topics, obviously trying to probe his interlocutor. Zarubin evasively replied that sometimes he helps anti-fascists. Jeweler spoke about his revolutionary work in his youth, as well as in the first year after his arrival in Paris. He conducted trade union work here, organized strikes. He was fired from his job, he retired from political activity and now "only sharpens his folly." He was tired of all this, and he would like to do the right thing.

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Outwardly, it might seem that "Yuvelir" itself is stuffing itself into cooperation, although the situation was different. He really adhered to liberal views, was energetic and could not, according to him, forget about his revolutionary activities.

For several months, the Zarubins met with the Jeweler family, studied their views and relations with the environment. All their friends, including the district police commissioner, believed that

"Yuvelir" is simply "blissful", "furiously furious" and expresses liberal views only out of a passion for discussions.

In the end, Vasily Mikhailovich asked the Center for permission to involve Yuvelir and his family in cooperation. Having received the Center's sanction, Zarubin called Jeweler and told him that he would like to talk about a very important matter.

The business conversation took place on Sunday morning in the summer pavilion of the garden. The scout reminded Jeweler that he had repeatedly expressed his desire to help the revolutionary movement and Soviet Russia. How would he look if such an opportunity presented itself? This is a small service that will not be associated with material costs. The proposal took Jeweler by surprise. He changed his face and said that initially he would like to know what services he was talking about, and after that he would consult with his wife.

Zarubin said that the idea was that he would allow them to use their apartment in Paris and a country house for several hours 1-2 times a week to meet with comrades. The word "comrade" was especially emphasized. These are reliable and serious people and will not cause any damage to the Jeweler family. Occasionally meetings could be held in his shop.

The Jeweler asked: who will he help - the Comintern or Soviet Russia? Vasily Mikhailovich hinted that a participant in the revolutionary movement should not be asked many questions ...

The Zarubins, "Yuvelir" and "Nina" went out into the garden and, seated in the arbor at the round table, began a conversation. The "jeweler" told his wife that the "comrades" (he called the Zarubins this way for the first time) asked them for their consent to use an apartment in Paris, a country house and a shop for meetings with their associates, who would come to them 1-2 times a week. We are talking, of course, about secret meetings. He cannot do this without her consent. This issue has been discussed for a long time. Finally, Jeweler and Nina agreed. The owner of the house firmly said that there could be no question of any payment, and asked Vasily Mikhailovich not to talk about it anymore.

Zarubin thanked Yuvelir and his wife for agreeing to help and assured once again that there would be no risk to the family. At the same time, Vasily Mikhailovich advised Jeweler to argue less with his acquaintances on political topics so as not to attract too much attention to himself.

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Somewhat later, Maya was also involved in intelligence work, she performed separate tasks. Once I even carried urgent mail to Moscow and back. Later, when the Zarubins worked in Nazi Germany, she came there too to pick up the mail and send it to Moscow.

In the summer pavilion of the Yuvelira country house, scouts equipped a photo lab where they processed mail.

The son of "Yuvelir" was the last to be involved as an assistant, but already without the knowledge of his father and mother. After graduating from the architectural school, he had to serve his military service. Zarubin advised him to enter a prestigious military school. The intelligence officer had a long-range aim - he had to prepare and introduce his man into the highest military circles. The young man successfully graduated from a military school, became an officer in the French army and completed his service in a high rank.

Intelligence worked with the Jeweler family for 20 years. In addition to creating three points for meeting with assistants, photo labs for processing mail with the help of Yuvelir and Nina, Zarubins acquired several more faithful assistants.

One of them was "Friend", an Armenian by nationality, a native of Turkey, a journalist. Zarubin's wife knew him from Vienna, where she maintained relations with individual members of the

anti-fascist organization. "Friend" in his views was a supporter of the national liberation struggle. He knew the Zarubins as Soviet people doing illegal work.

They found him in a small town near Paris, where he lived with his wife. "Friend" accepted them with joy. They reminisced about past activities, talked about the Soviet Union. Zarubin explained that the purpose of their visit was not only to visit an old friend. Their work requires people who are well informed about the policy of the ruling circles of Germany and France, about fascist and white émigré organizations. "Friend" promised to think.

At one of the subsequent meetings, he spoke about a German journalist who, along with his mistress, a stenographer at the German embassy in Paris, often visits him. This journalist once told him such a story. Being with his mistress, let's call her "Khanum", he accidentally read a very important message from the German embassy in the German Foreign Ministry about the economy of France on a carbon paper left by her.

"Khanum" took work home, as she did not have time to do everything at the embassy. She lived hard. In Germany, she had an old mother, whom she had to support.

Vasily Mikhailovich asked "Friend" to involve "Khanum" in cooperation. She will give information that he allegedly needs as a journalist, and he will pay her for it. "Khanum"

gradually

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began to inform "Friend" of the information that he cautiously used in his articles.

Some time after the work of "Khanum" with "Friend", Vasily Mikhailovich decided to transfer her to a relationship with his wife, who performed under the name of the German Vardo.

One Sunday the stenographer was invited to the "Friend". On the same day, his German acquaintance Vardo also arrived. The hope was that Vardo would like "Khanum" and they would establish a connection with each other. And so it happened. Vardo began to receive oral information from "Khanum" and pay her money.

When "Khanum" was already used to getting money for information, Vardo, on behalf of "Friend", told her that oral information did not suit him much, it was desirable to receive documentary information, for which she would be paid much more. "Khanum" met the proposal very cautiously, but then, when it was explained to her that this information would not fall into private hands, but would be impersonally sent to Moscow through reliable channels, she agreed.

"Khanum" took shorthand and printed almost all the documents coming from the German embassy to Berlin. This information was of great value to us.

From conversations with "Friend" we found out that among his acquaintances there is a Hungarian journalist, let's call him "Ross". He came to France from Horthy Hungary, he is 35 years old. "Ross" adheres to semi-liberal views, condemns Horthy and Hitler, but does not share the views of the communists. His income is small. He got a job as a technical secretary to a member of the French Parliament and uses the parliamentary documents of this member.

A plan was developed to establish contact between the Zarubins and "Ross", in which the wife of "Friend" was used as an intermediary.

The first meeting with him took place in a country restaurant. When "Ross" said that he was a Hungarian, Vasily Mikhailovich asked him what kind of Hungarian he was, Horthy or not, while noting that he did not like Hitler, Mussolini and Horthy. "Ross" replied that he was an anti-fascist, which was one of the main reasons for his move from Hungary to France.

Zarubin told "Ross" that he was a Slovak by nationality, that in the recent past they were compatriots in Austria-Hungary, and began to question "Ross" about the situation in Hungary. He had good information.

Zarubin informed the Center about the meeting. The Center pointed out: "Agree with him to transfer information to us for a moderate fee, but conduct business in such a way that communication with him can be terminated at any time without complications."

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After 10 days, Vasily Mikhailovich phoned Ross. "Ross" complained about financial difficulties. At a meeting that took place the next day, Zarubin said that the other day he had met an acquaintance with whom he could earn extra money by passing him some information about fascist countries and movements. Information, of course, should not be from the open press. Zarubin offered to take advantage of this opportunity.

After thinking, "Ross" said that before giving an answer, he must know what they want from him.

Zarubin replied that he had little experience in these matters and could not answer this question, that his acquaintance was not in Paris at the moment, and that he himself was leaving tomorrow morning. At this point, the conversation was interrupted. The scout was waiting to see if "Ross" would return to this topic. After some time, the journalist told Zarubin that he agreed to earn extra money, but how much would he be paid? Vasily Mikhailovich replied that the fee would depend on the importance of the material.

Leaving the restaurant, Vasily Mikhailovich asked that "Ross" not tell anyone about this conversation. "Ross" noted that he also counted on the confidentiality of the meeting.

Work began with Ross. It was led by his wife Zarubina, who, as in the case of "Friend", performed under the name of the German Vardo. The information coming from "Ross" was of interest. Of course, he did not have great opportunities, but thanks to his information, the intelligence officers knew well about the documents being prepared in the French parliament. Noteworthy information was received on Hungary and Germany ...

The task that the Center set for Zarubin when sending him to France was fulfilled: sources of information were acquired, a secret connection was established.

After a four-year stay at illegal work in Paris, the Zarubins, with the consent of the Center, had to leave the country and arrive in the Soviet Union, where new assignments awaited them.

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In the labyrinths of fate

Active work on Trotskyist organizations abroad began only in March 1936.

There is a known case when a call came from the Politburo with a request to tell where Trotsky was now. No one in foreign intelligence could answer him, since there was no information about him. Meanwhile, Trotsky and his like-minded people created quite extensive structures in a number of countries, and active preparations were made for the convocation of the Trotskyist [At the International.

The main center of activity of the Trotskyist organizations, headed by the son of Trotsky and Natalia Sedova, Lev Sedov, during this period was located in Paris. All practical work was concentrated here. In addition to Sedov, Trotsky's most trusted people were in Paris. He himself, living in Mexico in recent years, directed the work of the center and was engaged in the development of theoretical issues related to the idea of "permanent revolution" and the spread of Trotskyism.

The spearhead of Trotskyist activity was aimed primarily at the Soviet Union. She sometimes took on a dangerous character. Anti-Sovietism turned into criminal actions in various countries. This was the case, for example, in Republican Spain, where Trotskyists and anarchists rose in revolt against the government of the Popular Front at a time when many anti-fascist people, including those from the Soviet Union, were fighting in Spain against the future dictator General Franco, supported by Germany and Italy. Historian N.A. Vasetsky in his work "Trotsky, the experience of political biography" writes about this: "It is difficult to imagine a more senseless action than this uprising. In the midst of the Civil War, numerous victims on the fronts, deprivations in the rear, the Anarcho-Trotskyists raised a coup. This is worse than July 6, 1918 in Moscow. govern

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The government was forced to withdraw the division from the front to suppress the uprising. The fighting went on for three (!) days with the use of tanks, artillery, mortars. More than a thousand people died on both sides. Is it any wonder that after the Barcelona uprising, the Trotskyists and anarchists began to be treated in the same way as the fascists?

Seeing the danger posed by the Trotskyists, the Soviet leadership instructed foreign intelligence to begin "development" of the Trotskyist organizations and undermine their influence in the countries where they had the strongest positions.

The Trotskyist center in Paris caused great concern. To work on it in March 1936, a group was created, headed by Boris Manoilovich Afanasiev.

He was a career intelligence officer who actively worked abroad from illegal positions in the mid-30s. Since 1933, he headed an illegal group in Paris that covered the activities of emigrant centers. By 1936, the White Guard anti-Soviet activity had noticeably declined, and from that moment until 1938, the Afanasiev group was engaged in the development of a Trotskyist organization headed by Sedov.

Boris Manoilovich, a Bulgarian by nationality, was born in 1902 in Bulgaria into a poor family, was left without a father early and from the age of 12 earned his living as a seasonal worker in the vineyards. Nevertheless, he graduated from the Pedagogical School as an external student. Since 1918, he began to engage in social activities among the Bulgarian youth. He was repeatedly arrested. In 1922 he was forced to emigrate to the Soviet Union. Afanasiev's entire subsequent life was connected with our country.

In Moscow, he worked and studied. He graduated from the Academy of Communist Education and postgraduate studies at the same educational institution. He was accepted into the special services in 1930, at first he taught at the Central School of the OGPU, and from 1932 he was transferred to the INO. In the same year he went to work abroad.

The Afanasiev group was tasked with infiltrating the governing bodies of the Trotskyist organization in order to obtain information about its activities and plans regarding the USSR. The group was entrusted with the preparation and implementation of measures to disorganize the activities of the Trotskyists.

The group included a foreigner under the pseudonym "Thomas", who had connections in circles close to Sedov and in the International Secretariat of the Fourth International. Afanasyev decided to bet on this man. He was instructed to renew old connections and get involved in the active work of the Trotskyist center.

The activities of "Thomas" began to develop successfully. He very quickly became close to the most influential functionaries of the Trotskyist

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center, established good personal relations with Lev Sedov, and after a while took a solid position in the center.

In France, as in other countries, there was no single Trotskyist organization. There were groups that at times entered into an internecine bitter struggle. In this environment, "Thomas" was relatively easy to win the trust of the right people and get the necessary information.

An important task was to gain access to the information that came from Trotsky to Sedov. Knowing what instructions and instructions Trotsky gave to his son was considered as a primary goal. "Thomas" gradually managed to ensure that the correspondence of L.D. Trotsky, before she came to Sedov, began to get to him. As a result, its perusal was arranged, letters and documents were photographed and sent to Moscow. Trotsky's correspondence sometimes went on the table to the leadership of foreign intelligence before Sedov had time to familiarize himself with it.

As a result, Trotsky's plans and activities, including sending emissaries to the USSR, his connections with supporters in the country, work on the creation of the International, became known to the Soviet leadership in a timely manner.

Trotsky's archives were of great importance. They were divided into two parts: personal, where letters, articles and other materials related to Trotsky's official activities were concentrated, and operational archives, where documents relating to the illegal forms of his current work were stored. The operational archives were of the greatest interest to the residency. Trotsky handed over part of the archives to foreign universities and libraries for safekeeping, while the rest, mostly operational, were stored at Sedov's headquarters in Paris.

Afanasiev and his group from the end of 1936 to the beginning of 1938 carried out a series of operations, as a result of which Trotsky's archive, the old and new current archives of Sedov, the archive of the International a new archive of this secretariat was received. The documents contained correspondence on the state of work in the Soviet Union and Western Europe, a number of encrypted letters from Sedov to Trotsky about meetings and conversations with representatives of Trotskyist groups who came from the USSR, including letters written in secret. Among the documents received were lists and addresses of persons in the USSR who collaborated or were planned to be involved in cooperation with Trotsky's apparatus, instructions to a number of functionaries in other countries, action plans, records of conversations, etc. The archive of the International Secretariat contained a list of addresses for illegal correspondence with Trotskyist activists in all the countries with which he worked.

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Based on the materials received, a card file was created, reflecting the active of international Trotskyism.

The loss of the archives dealt a great blow to the Trotskyist movement. Some materials were published in the Soviet and foreign press. All this played a big role in compromising Trotskyism, undermining the authority of its leaders, and leaving a significant part of its supporters behind.

In 1938, Boris Manoilovich Afanasyev returned to Moscow and continued to work in the central office. After the war, he went on short trips abroad on a "legal" line. He completed his service in intelligence as a department head with the rank of colonel.

But back to Paris. Here in a small clinic on February 16, 1938, Lev Lvovich Sedov died after an appendicitis operation. Many historians and publicists suggested that the "hand of Moscow" was to blame for his death. We considered it necessary to turn to the archives to check how reasonable this version is.

The NKVD residency undoubtedly showed personal interest in Sedov and his associates. In addition to Afanasyev, the "development" of Sedov's entourage was carried out by "Tulip". He became the closest assistant to Trotsky's son. In 1936-1937, telephone eavesdropping equipment was installed in the apartments of Sedov and his confidant and mistress Lilia Estrina. (This operation received the unusual conditional name "Petka".) Through the recruited postal employees, the current correspondence of Sedov and his center was looked through.

Of course, Sedov himself was the focus of the residency. His rather disorderly lifestyle would have made it relatively easy to carry out an assassination attempt on him, if such a goal had been set. He was not averse to "going wild", taking risks at roulette, sometimes traveling to Monte Carlo. The picturesque story "Tulip" has been preserved about how one day in 1937, after a party, they wandered around various drinking establishments until late at night, and then Sedov headed ... to a brothel.

Already from the end of 1937, Sedov often felt unwell: his heart ached, he was tormented by insomnia. He apparently did not pay attention to several attacks of appendicitis, and medical assistance was late. Death came after two operations carried out one after the other. According to the doctors, it was caused by postoperative complications and low body resistance. One authoritative doctor, a friend of the Trotsky family, having studied the medical documentation, agreed with the conclusions of colleagues from the Paris clinic. However, Sedov's wife began to strongly object, arguing that this death was "the work of GPU agents." She asked for a cop

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investigation, which, however, did not find evidence of premeditated murder.

Since then, for decades, until very recently, in publications on this topic in the West, and in our country, it is certainly noted: Sedov died "under very strange (mysterious, unclear, suspicious, etc.) circumstances", while other authors continue to talk about the "hand of Moscow."

In fact, as can be seen from archival documents, intelligence had nothing to do with Sedov's death. had.

Here is an excerpt from a note by a prominent Soviet intelligence officer of the 20-30s, the former head of the "special group" of the OGPU-NKVD, Yakov Isaakovich Serebryansky, who worked at that time in France.

"In 1937, I received the task to deliver the "Son" (as Sedov was conventionally designated - Auth.) to Moscow ... The task was about the disappearance of the "Son" without any noise and delivering him alive to Moscow ... "Then we are talking about a detailed plan for the capture of Sedov on one of the streets of Paris. Preliminarily, by observation, the time and usual routes of Sedov's movement in the city were established. Rehearsals for the takeover were held on site.

There were two options for its delivery to Moscow. The first is by sea. In the middle of 1937, a small fishing vessel was purchased, assigned to one of the country's northern ports. On the outskirts of the port city, they rented a house - a place of temporary shelter, where they settled a married couple of agents.

"We picked up the crew," writes Serebryansky, "only the captain knew that he might have to make the transition to Leningrad with a group of comrades and take equipment there for republican Spain. The captain studied the route, had a sufficient supply of coal, water, food. While waiting for the command, the ship made regular trips to the sea for fish ... "

The second option is by air. The group had its own aircraft based at one of the airfields near Paris. The pilot is a reliable agent. In aviation circles circulated



legend: a sports flight on the Paris-Tokyo route is being prepared. The pilot began training, bringing the non-stop time in the air to 12 hours. Experts' calculations showed that, depending on the direction and strength of the wind, the plane could fly from Paris to Kyiv without landing in 7-8 hours.

7 agents and proxies who had nothing to do with the "legal" residency in Paris took part in the preparation of the operation. An active role in this matter was assigned to Serebryansky and his wife.

It is not difficult to imagine what would have awaited Sedov if the planned plan had been implemented. But fate decreed otherwise. A number of circumstances prevented the operation from being carried out. played its part

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and rapidly declining health. And death in a French clinic put an end to his fate.

Thus, a journey through the archives, without confirming the allegations of the violent death of Sedov, led, however, to the discovery of plans for his abduction, which were not destined to take place.

It was also possible to discover other materials with completely different and somewhat unexpected properties. It turned out that long before Operation Duck, as the assassination of Trotsky was called, this act was planned by the white emigration. For her, Trotsky remained a significant figure, with whom both the revolutionary events in Russia and the defeat in the Civil War were connected. Almost every emigrant could present Trotsky with a personal account for lost property, position in society, forced flight to a foreign land.

The decision to commit a terrorist act directed against Trotsky matured in the leadership of the ROVS in the summer of 1933. The military organization of the white emigration was also pushed to this step by internal reasons. Mutual suspicion grew in the ROVS, career intrigues intensified, and the morale of the participants fell. Charitable donations to the Union have been noticeably reduced, and the problem of financing has become particularly acute.

The chief of staff of the ROVS, General Miller, in confidential conversations with his deputies, said that inaction corrupts and destroys Russian officers. As a result, the idea of a "high-profile action" was born in a narrow circle, which would once again draw the attention of the world community and the emigration itself to the significance of the Union, attract money to the cashier and give dynamism to its activities.

In a note dated May 23, 1934, sent to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Yagoda, the leaders of the People's Commissariat Prokofiev, Agranov and Guy, the deputy head of the foreign department of the OGPU A.A. Slutsky reported, based on the received reliable data, that General Shatilov, head of the 1st department of the headquarters of the ROVS, turned to General Miller with a proposal to discuss the question: should an assassination attempt on Trotsky be organized? Miller agreed and asked Shatilov to present his views. But when Shatilov reported on the preliminary outlines, Miller told him that he was transferring the question of preparing an assassination attempt on Trotsky to one of his closest associates, Fock, a former general in the tsarist army.

It can be seen from the note that the top leadership of the ROVS, although with the reservations necessary to mask such a case, was enthusiastic about the project of destroying Trotsky. However, it is not entirely clear who, apart from white emigration, was behind this step. Could one of the foreign patrons of the ROVS be interested in this? It still remains a mystery, and various guesses are not supported by documents.

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At the same time, from the very beginning, as follows from the cited document, frictions arose in the leadership of the ROVS regarding the conduct of the terrorist act. The idea of a terrorist attack was defended by General Shatilov.

Miller instructed Fok to draw the conclusion on the project of the operation. This could not but cause alienation between them, which later affected the course of the operation.

In the summer of 1933, when the question of the attempt on Trotsky's life was considered in the Miller Shatilov-Fock triangle, Lev Davidovich Bronstein himself, also known as Trotsky, was in the south of France. Trotsky was looking for solitude and a quiet place where he could rest, look around and put his thoughts and plans in order. The resort town of Royan at the mouth of the Dordogne River, which emptied into the Bay of Biscay, seemed to meet the most demanding requirements. Without too much fuss, but with security, he moved to the resort, rented an apartment in an old hotel and began to regularly go to the local source to drink mineral water. The appearance of Trotsky in Royan pleased those who were preparing the assassination attempt, and the behavior of the "summer resident" gave rise to the illusion of an easy terrorist attack. But the white émigré terrorists overestimated their strength. Trotsky was guarded tightly and reliably.

When implementing the plan to destroy Leon Trotsky, Fok expressed his opinion to Miller that it was expedient to carry out the operation without the participation of Shatilov in it. It was implied that Shatilov had recently behaved arrogantly and, if successful, could imagine God knows what about himself. Then calling him to order will be even more difficult. Miller supported him. Fock proposed to put General Turkul, known to him, who already had rich experience in such matters, in charge of the operation. Miller didn't object. With Fock's instructions, Turkul proceeded to carry out his plan. For this purpose, he summoned N.I. Spodin, a former staff captain who served under the command of General Markov, who constantly boasted in the circle of officers that he was ready to do anything in the name of saving the Motherland. In 1932, together with militants in Geneva, he already participated in an assassination attempt on the life of M.M. Litvinov, which ended in vain. After passing his exams at the University of Royan, Spodin worked temporarily at the Citroën car factory in Boulogne-Billancourt, near Paris.

In early August, N.I. Spodin crossed the threshold of Turkul's office. The general received the terrorist as an old friend and asked if the staff captain was ready, as before, to serve the Fatherland?

"That's right, Your Excellency!"

Turkul asked Spodin to move closer: the conversation would be confidential. Turkul explained that an urgent need to go to Royan to liquidate Trotsky. Turkul gave Spodin 4,000 francs for operating expenses.

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The task did not cause a shadow of doubt in Spodin. The second person in the October Revolution, one of the founders of the Red Army, Trotsky could not but arouse hatred in the White émigré officer.

But Spodin expressed slight concern about the ambiguity of the situation. He asked Turkul if he had any operational information about Trotsky's whereabouts, his daily routine, and the number of guards.

Turkul grimaced in displeasure: "Act according to the situation. The town is small, and I hope that you will not be disturbed. If necessary, we will send more people, let me know. All it takes is to kill Trotsky."

Turkul escorted the terrorist to the door.

Documents stored in the archives of foreign intelligence testify to the lightness of the "plan" of the ROVS.

Spodin stopped for three days at Clermont-Ferrand, a two or three hour drive from Royan. Every day, by public transport, he went to the resort town and walked there, studying the situation. Spodin hid his Browning in a safe place.

At the end of the first decade of August, Spodin finally met Trotsky. The terrorist was sitting in the city park opposite the source. A man came up from the opposite side and began to drink water. Guards were stationed around, carefully watching the entrance to the park. No one looked at the bench where Spodin was. The gunman almost reached into the inside pocket of his jacket for a Browning, but remembered that he had left it in Clermont-Ferrand. Spodin mentally cursed himself for what the world was worth - it was necessary to miss such an opportunity!

The frustrated terrorist immediately informed Turkul about what had happened. The latter promised to urgently send help. The next day, Vladimir Naletov, aged 33, a former staff captain, who also served under General Markov, arrived in Clermont-Ferrand (on behalf of the ROVS, he illegally visited Russia in 1931, maintained close ties with the ROVS terrorist militants), and Krivosheev, about whom no data has been preserved. The group immediately moved to Royan. Spodin settled in a city boarding house, and his two companions - in private apartments on the outskirts. Naleyto, who was good at drawing, got hold of a sketchbook, a spacious blouse and a beret, and in the morning he stationed himself at the entrance to the park, watching everyone who came in. It was one of the key positions. But Trotsky did not appear. At night, the terrorists held brief meetings, trying to predict how events would develop. "They acted according to the circumstances" and reported everything to Turkul.

In early September, Spodin was summoned to Paris to sum up the interim results, while Naletov and Krivosheev were instructed to continue monitoring the park. In mid-September, the leadership of the ROVS

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began to suspect that the operation had reached an impasse. It was not only possible to carry out a terrorist attack, but even to find out where and why Trotsky disappeared so suddenly. The militants were firmly convinced that no one knew about their stay in Royan.

However, they were wrong. It was Turkul who leaked information, or, more simply, he blabbed about the operation to his acquaintance and drinking buddy, a Drozdov officer, in respect of whom there was a serious suspicion that he worked for the French counterintelligence.

Shatilov, who was jealously watching the progress of the operation, collected information through his own channels about who was sent to carry out the attack and why the militants were withdrawn from Royan. He was indignant that such an operation was mediocly failed.

The terrorists who returned from Royan wrote reports that were contradictory and aimed to absolve themselves of all responsibility. According to Spodin, the operation was doomed to failure from the very beginning. Naletov confirmed this version, stating that the operation was poorly led and this was one of the reasons for the failure. True, he considered Spodin responsible for it, who, in his opinion, treated the task carelessly. Naletov even believed that Trotsky had only "dreamed" with Spodin and that he had called a whole group from Paris in vain. He also reported that on September 10 (after Spodin's departure) he was being followed. He managed to break away from her, but twice more he noticed that he was being watched. After the last separation from the police, Naletov returned to his house and, according to him, remained locked up for five days.

Spodin, on the contrary, claimed that he did not notice any surveillance in Royan. The town is small, and the detectives had nowhere to disguise themselves. Spodin noted that if the police had been aware of the events, they could have detained the militants, since they had been carrying weapons with them lately. However, this did not happen.

Naletov and Krivosheev, in addition, reported that another group of Russian officers were operating in Royan, allegedly on assignment from some other organization to assassinate Trotsky. These people behaved, according to the militants, in an amateurish manner and could create additional interference. It was not possible to really find out who they were and where they came from.

What actually happened in Royan after Spodin's departure, and what in the reports of the militants of the ROVS can be trusted and what not? Did Trotsky finish his vacation in Royan, or was he warned by someone and fled?

On September 14, Turkul sent his man to Royan to revise the operation on the spot. The trustee was a close friend of Naletov. It is possible that the version about the intervention of the French police could come from Turkul, who was influenced by this person. The General firmly adhered to this version.

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and even managed to convince the incredulous Shatilov of this. If Turkul, Fok's man, deliberately insisted on the version of interference from the French police, and there were none, as Spodin claimed, then Turkul and his patron probably had something to hide. Here it is appropriate to return to the already mentioned note by Slutsky addressed to Yagoda. This is all the more curious since we are talking about the appearance on the stage of members of the French Masonic lodge.

"A little later, the prominent Freemason Dr. Zilberstein," wrote Slutsky, "was approached by a former officer of the guards of the Kexholm regiment, now an official of the prefecture of Paris, Paris Vladimir Alekseevich. He said that an offer had been made to him to take part in the assassination attempt on Trotsky. Zilberstein categorically advised Paris not to take part in this matter.

According to the materials of the archival file, it is clear that the conversation between Zilberstein and Paris was of a confidential nature and lasted quite a long time. Paris complained to Zilberstein that an unexpected proposal had been made to him, there was no one to consult with, and he was in difficulty. Having learned what the matter was, Zilberstein strongly objected to any participation in it by Paris. According to Zilberstein, if Trotsky's assassination will benefit anyone, it will only benefit the Bolsheviks, against whom Trotsky is waging a stubborn struggle. If the attempt on Trotsky fails and it is found out that Paris participated in it, this will turn against the Masonic lodge. This fact will be used to compromise the whole Freemasonry and, in particular, the connection of Paris himself with the Freemasons.

Paris fully agreed with Zilberstein and expressed the opinion that this provocation against him was most likely organized by Zavatsky-Krasnopolsky, an officer who had left the EMRO and became an agent of the territorial organs of the French counterintelligence.

So, in the operation started by the ROVS, it seems that the trace of the French police is emerging. But not only him. It can be assumed that since the Freemasons were involved in the case, did they not find a way to warn Trotsky about the danger threatening him and frustrate the ROVS plan? It is no coincidence that he "fell through" through the ground!

The results of the action were summed up by General Fok, who personally reported this to Miller. He informed the chairman of the ROVS that "in the summer of 1933, Trotsky was treated in Royan. M.M. also came there. Litvinov. It was decided to remove both. However, both cases failed. Trotsky was protected by four rings of protection. It is almost impossible to penetrate such dense protection ...

... The police made one arrest, and Fok's people had to urgently withdraw from the area of their activity. They were followed for 3-4 months. They have taken refuge in a safe place and everyone is silent. 10 thousand francs were spent on the operation "(a considerable amount at that time).

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As you can see, Fok tried to embellish something, stubbornly defended the version of interference from the French police and, obviously, withheld part of the funds allocated for the assassination attempt. It is possible that the police acted on the orders of an influential person, who, in turn, was only an instrument of powerful forces.

The leak of information about the planned terrorist attack against Trotsky gave rise to the Russian-language newspaper Common Cause, published in France, in October 1933 to publish a short article beginning with the question: "Is it true that an attempt on Trotsky's life was being prepared in France? .. »

Vasetsky N.A. Trotsky, experience of political biography. - M., 1992. - S. 295.

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## Operation Duck

As is known, in 1929 L.D. Trotsky was expelled from the USSR and in 1932, by the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, he was deprived of Soviet citizenship for "counter-revolutionary" activities.

Once outside the Soviet Union, where he lost the struggle for power with Stalin, Trotsky was by no means resigned to the fate of an outcast. Relying on political supporters in different countries (according to information, in the mid-1930s there were several hundred active Trotskyists), blinded by hatred for his opponent, for a long time he was abroad a symbol of opposition to the dictator, a mouthpiece of opposition to Stalinism.

The activities of Trotsky and his supporters were not limited to criticism, sometimes justified, of the events in our country. This criticism, seemingly directed against Stalin personally, was, in essence, a total reproach to everything Soviet. It was largely thanks to the Trotskyists that a phenomenon developed abroad that became known as anti-Sovietism, which for many years damaged the then domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, as well as the international workers' and communist movement. The most striking and tragic fact is the participation of the Trotskyists, together with the anarchists, in the putsch in Barcelona against the government of the Popular Front in May 1937, the suppression of which cost a lot of blood.

Western intelligence agencies have always been actively "developing" the Communist parties in their countries. The Trotskyists were a fertile agent base for intelligence. Many of them had previously been members of the communist parties themselves, then left or were expelled from them, retaining personal ties in that environment. A typical example is the Spaniard Julian Gorkin, a former communist, one of the leaders of the Trotskyist POUM party in Spain, a writer and translator of a number of Trotsky's works. By received

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According to reliable information from the French intelligence services, Gorkin was a longtime FBI agent. Upon arrival in France in 1938, he offered his services to the Director General of the French counterintelligence DST, Mr. Vibo, declaring that he had a large intelligence network in many countries of the world, including the USSR and "even the NKVD." Vibo accepted Gorkin's proposal.

Trotsky did not confine himself to denouncing, through the press, the authoritarian system that was taking shape in the USSR. He walked on. Thus, in the manifesto of the ÿU International (1940), compiled by him personally, it was said: "Preparation for the revolutionary overthrow of the Moscow caste is one of the central tasks of the ÿU International. This is not a simple or easy task. It will require heroism and sacrifice." He was echoed by his son, Lev Sedov, who carried out various assignments from his father in France. Among Trotsky's supporters inside the USSR, by his own admission, was Yakov Blyumkin, a terrorist fighter who killed the German ambassador Mirbach and worked in the NKVD system until 1929, when he was found to have links with Trotsky and shot.

As is known, work on Trotskyist organizations was imputed in the 1930s to intelligence as one of the areas of work. In the late 1930s, Stalin gave the intelligence officers the task of destroying Leon Trotsky in detail and regularly about all the affairs of Trotsky and his associates abroad. The order was carried out on August 20, 1940 in Mexico, where Trotsky lived as a political emigrant. This is our story.

It is not easy to write on this subject. There is a serious objective reason for this.

Intending to describe in as much detail as possible the main thing about the action, we discovered that the materials of interest to us were far from completely preserved in the SVR archive. In at least two cases, it was established that the documents were partially destroyed, and this happened much later than the events themselves, in the 50s. Found only a few documents that appeared between August 1940 and the end of 1941. In addition, due to careless observance of the rules of office work, they were scattered over many dossiers. Therefore, individual episodes had to be restored bit by bit. Nevertheless, the information given in the essay is reliable, it is the result of painstaking work on the search, analysis and generalization of surviving documents and evidence beyond doubt.

Operational measures in the "Duck" case, which is how the action against Trotsky was coded in the NKVD, took more than two years. Dozens of agents and proxies from different countries were selected and used, special assignments had two residencies - in Paris and New York. A specially created headquarters operated in the Center.

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Most of the foreigners directly or indirectly involved in the operation had no doubt that Trotsky was "the enemy of the working people of the whole world." All of them were related by common political views, unconditional faith in communist slogans, programs and ideals. This was the basis of their deep sympathy for the USSR, their readiness to help the Soviet people in every possible way, personifying in their minds the most consistent fighters against the growing strength of fascism, for genuine democracy and a better future. Their boundless sympathy for the USSR sometimes manifested itself in the most unexpected forms, such as the decision of parents to name their children after Sanchez-Stalin or Juliya-Sovetina. Or take our case, where a mother, knowing the danger her son was in, blessed him to commit a terrorist act in the name of an idea to which they were both adherents.

Faced with this extraordinary phenomenon, do you think how one should treat people who participated in a pre-planned murder, an act condemned throughout the civilized world? Stigmatize them as criminals, or pay a belated tribute to their courage and loyalty to the commitments they freely assumed?

We deliberately left out of the essay what is connected with Trotskyism as an ideological and political trend, with the activities of Trotsky himself, with the history and tragic consequences of the struggle organized by Stalin against the Trotskyists in the USSR and abroad. Our goal is to tell about the highly secret operation "Duck" carried out by intelligence, initiated personally by Stalin.

well

Can you name "the object with which L. Trotsky was killed?" Ice ax And to answer the question: "What did L. Trotsky not like?" It turns out, vodka. The appearance of such puzzles in the crosswords of Moscow newspapers of the 1990s seems to suggest that the reader may know or be able to find information of this kind, as well as information about the life, work and tragic fate of this famous Russian political figure. Basically, it is

There is.

Over the past decades, mountains of paper have been written about Trotsky. The world saw fundamental research and countless magazine and newspaper publications, often with a mass of factual inaccuracies and distortions. In the late 1980s, this topic was widely covered in the Russian press. Let's note one feature. When it came to the circumstances of Trotsky's death, our authors referred mainly to foreign sources, along the way delicately and sometimes angrily complaining about the lack of domestic ones.

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Bearing in mind that "better late than never", we will now try to remove to a large extent the "veil of mystery" from the events of 1940 in Mexico.

Stalin's order to the leadership of the NKVD on the liquidation of Trotsky, we confidently date March 1939!. In pursuance of this order, on July 9, 1939, intelligence drew up a "Plan of undercover operational measures in the "Duck" case", which was reported to Stalin and, as we now know, was approved by him no later than the first days of August 1939.

The fate of this document is peculiar. For 16 years it was in Beria's personal archive and was returned to intelligence from the USSR Prosecutor General's Office at the end of 1955.

"As a result of reviewing all the materials available in the 5th department of the GUGB on the "development" and preparation for the liquidation of the "Duck", it was established that (previously) the people involved in this case cannot be used?

The present plan involves the recruitment of new people and will be built on a new foundation.

Purpose: elimination of the "Duck".

Methods: agent-operational "development", active group.

Means: poisoning food, water, explosion in the house, blowing up a car with tol, direct blow - suffocation, dagger, blow to the head, shot. Possible armed attack by the group.

People: On-Site Organizer and Leader Vol.

Together with Tom, "Mother", "Raymond" leave for the country ... "

The plan included a few more individuals slated for use in Mexico. In a general form, methods for studying the immediate environment and the situation around the Ducks residential building were determined. Attached was the cost estimate: 31,000 US dollars. dollars for 6 months.

The document was signed by P.M. Fitin, P.A. Sudoplatov, N.I. Eitingon, without mentioning their positions and military ranks. On the last sheet there is a note: "Otp. in 1 copy. Printed by Sudoplatov.

Briefly explain:

Fitin Pavel Mikhailovich was the head of foreign intelligence at that moment, Sudoplatov Pavel Anatolyevich - his deputy.

Tom - Eitingon Naum Isaakovich, born in 1899, a Jew, from a family of employees. In May-June 1917 - a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. Member of the CPSU (b) since 1919. In the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD since 1920. He graduated from the Oriental Faculty of the Military Academy. Since 1927, in intelligence work, including from illegal positions, in China, France, Germany. In 1936-1939 - deputy, then resident of the NKVD in Spain. He spoke French, German, Spanish and English.

"Mother" – Caridad Mercader, born in 1894, Spaniard, comes from a well-known bourgeois family, her father was once

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Ambassador of Spain to Japan. She broke up with her family in the 1920s and joined the Communist Party. At home, she participated in the Civil War, was wounded during an air bombardment. One of her four sons died defending Madrid. To work with the Soviet foreign intelligence attracted in early 1937 by Tom. Later she led an undercover group in France.

"Raymond" - Ramon Mercader, born in 1914, her son, an active member of the Communist Party. During the war, he was a battalion commander. Has a front wound. In 1937, with the consent of his mother, he began to cooperate with Soviet intelligence. At the end of the same year, he was transferred to France for illegal

position. He was supplied with Belgian documents in the name of Jacques Mornard and at the beginning of 1938 was connected to the "development" of local Trotskyist organizations.

The documents found in the archives of the Foreign Intelligence Service testify that the preparation of the action against Trotsky began even before the receipt of the leader's written instructions.

At the disposal of the NKVD in Moscow was a group of former participants in the war in Spain. The choice fell on two of them - "Felipe" and "Mario", proven, reliable people. As early as April 1938, they left Novorossiysk for the United States on a Soviet ship, disembarked without complications, and established contact with the New York residence. In June, the Felipe was sent to Mexico, and a few months later, the Mario. They were provided with documents, money, conditions for two-way communication. Focused on subsequent work along the "Trotskyist line", they had to gain a foothold in the country, familiarize themselves with the situation and wait for contact with a representative of the Center.

However, unforeseen events soon followed. In the autumn of 1938, a group of senior intelligence officers was arrested in Moscow. They were accused of spying for various foreign intelligence agencies. Among those arrested were Sergei Mikhailovich Shpigelglas, deputy head of the 5th department of the GUGB, and resident Petr Davydovich Gutzeit, recalled from New York. The first one at the Center prepared and arranged the business trip for Felipe and Mario, the second one worked with them in the USA.

Intelligence faced a painful question: what to do with the Felipe and Mario? At first, communication with them was interrupted, but then it was decided to call them to the USA for their subsequent return to the USSR. In July 1939, Felipe arrived safely in New York. However, "Mario" did not succeed: when crossing the border, due to a carelessly executed document, he was arrested. Through the efforts of the New York residency, "Mario" was released, after which he was expelled back to Mexico.

In January 1940, Felipe arrived in Moscow and reported on the results of his and Mario's one-year stay in Mexico. So

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The content of his report was somewhat unexpected. He provided quite detailed information about the system of internal and external round-the-clock security of the Ducks house, about the procedure for admitting visitors there, about the reclusive life of the owner of the house. It became obvious that "Felipe" violated the instructions and, without waiting for the representative of the Center, began, as he stated, "under his own responsibility" to look for people to be used for "special" purposes. He established and consolidated trusting contacts with several influential people of the left orientation, who had wide connections in various public spheres and among Spanish emigrants, discussed with them the selection of the necessary performers. Concrete candidacies arose, outlines of the action plan appeared.

Having studied this report and assessed the situation (there were no signs of the mythical issuance of NKVD secrets by Spiegelglas and Gutzeit to foreign intelligence officers), the Center decided to return Felipe to Mexico, where he had to wait until communication with Tom was restored. In mid-February 1940, Felipe was already in New York, after some time he was transported to Mexico.

We return again to 1938, to France.

It has already been mentioned that "Raymond" was assigned to work among the Trotskyites. To a large extent, he was successful, he acquired acquaintances in this environment. Their number increased by the end of the summer of 1938, when the "founding congress of the IUT International" was held near Paris, which was attended by delegates (and there were only two dozen of them!) from a number of countries, including the USA.



By this time, the combination previously planned by the Center and the New York residency to organize the acquaintance of "Raymond" with people from Trotsky's immediate circle was being completed. The point is the following. The family of Samuel Agelov, a native of Russia, a US citizen, a wealthy businessman, and a homeowner, lived in New York. He had three daughters. They were convinced anti-Soviet women, active members of the local Trotskyist organization. One of them, Ruth, an employee of Trotsky's secretariat, was at the same time a liaison with his associates in the United States. Her sister Sylvia, an "old maid", studied philosophy and specialized in psychotherapy. She was received in a friendly manner at Trotsky's house, where she did technical work from time to time (Sylvia knew three foreign languages).

Of course, this family did not remain outside the field of view of intelligence. Through an ingenious combination, an acquaintance of the confidant of the residency, Ruby Weill, with Sylvia was organized, which soon grew into friendship. Young women, both office workers, rented an apartment for two in New York, spent freedom together.

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new time. "Unexpectedly" Ruby finds herself heiress to a significant sum of money. To celebrate, it was decided to jointly make a tourist trip to Europe.

On June 29, 1938, the friends arrive in France on a comfortable ocean liner.

On June 30, Ruby meets with "Raymond", they clarify the next steps.

On July 1, in the restaurant of the Parisian hotel where the tourists are staying, Ruby and Sylvia have a "random" meeting with "Raymond" - an "old acquaintance" of the Weill family.

On July 11, the Parisian residency reports to the Center that "Ruby's presence has already begun to interfere with the rapprochement between the Raymond and Sylvia," so she was sent to London, from where she should depart on July 13 for New York on the Queen Mary liner.

On August 16, the Center informs New York: "She performed well the task entrusted to her (Ruby. - Auth.)."

"Raymond" really got close to Sylvia. Frequent meetings followed, trips around the country, entertainment, joint recreation. There was talk of marriage. But Sylvia could not stay long in France. She returns to the US in the hope that she will soon be reunited with her fiancé. There is an intense correspondence between them.

In addition to "Raymond" from France, "Mother" was to be transferred to Mexico, as well as Tom, who arrived there in early August under the guise of a Canadian businessman. A route was planned for their passage through the United States, which involved obtaining American entry visas. "Raymond" failed in this case: due to some inconsistency in the Belgian documents, he was denied a visa to enter the United States. Then he was urgently provided with new documents - a Canadian foreign passport and an identity card in the name of Frank Jackson. Without further complications, "Raymond" obtained an American visa and left France via Italy on September 1, 1939, of course notifying Sylvia of this. (A little running ahead, we will inform you that when meeting with the "bride", "Raymond" told her that he was forced to purchase new documents for himself, because he, as a Belgian citizen, was threatened with an inevitable draft to serve in the army Sylvia believed this legend and supported it in the future.)

September 1, 1939 - the day of the German attack on Poland, the beginning of World War II. Panic gripped Europe. Some countries declare their entry into the war, others declare mobilization, introduce a state of emergency, and the internal regime is tightened everywhere. France is no exception. They introduce the strictest police control over foreigners, the military authorities requisition many hotels. Americans, British, Canadians, other foreigners under the protection of their diplomatic missions in organized

they are transferred to their homeland in the normal way. For this purpose, several American sea transports are sent to France.

The current situation seriously hampered Tom's position. He was expelled from the hotel, his Canadian passport became useless without the necessary additional documents. The residency began to look for ways to solve the problems that arose.

However, on September 8, a telegram signed by Beria unexpectedly arrives from the Center in Paris, where it is ordered to temporarily suspend activities in the "Duck" case; "Mother" should not be sent to Mexico ("let her settle down in Europe, where it is more convenient for her"), but Tom should arrive in Moscow and wait out the unfavorable times there. What prompted the adoption of such a radical decision ~ is not known exactly. Most likely, it was the result of nervousness, uncertainty in connection with the arrests among the leadership of the NKVD. But the most surprising thing is that the People's Commissar's directive was not carried out. "Mother" soon left for Mexico, Tom did not return to Moscow, but temporarily took refuge in the Soviet embassy, since the residency had a chance to get a new travel document for him.

Thanks to the decisive and courageous actions of the intelligence apparatus in Paris, in a short time, Tom received a genuine Iraqi passport, on which he arrived in New York at the end of October, and left for Mexico a month later.

Thus, the main participants in Operation Duck gathered in the country of destination.

Before leaving the USA for Mexico, Tom received from the Center a very unusual instruction-parting words in the form of a telegram dated November 11, 1939, where paragraphs 1-4 dealt with current issues, and paragraph 5... However, read for yourself.

"Continue your scientific work... Keep in mind that any research work, especially in the field of agriculture, requires patience, thoughtfulness and the ability to expect results. When preparing for harvest, remember that the fruit must be fully ripe. Otherwise, the taste of the fruit will be bad and your scientific work will not reach the goal. If there is no certainty, it is better to wait for full maturation. So that a sudden storm does not destroy your plantations, find or create a suitable and reliable greenhouse in which to engage in research work. Do not make ill-conceived experiments, go to obtain results for sure, and then you will really make a valuable contribution to science, but always in such a way that your experiments do not affect your health and the health of your

assistants."

The document bears a note by Sudoplatov: "The entire 5th paragraph of this directive was written by comrade Merkulov", an insert about health was made by comrade. Beria.

For us, this message serves as confirmation that the top leadership of the NKVD was closely involved in the Duck case. The dossier on this case was kept by P.A. Sudoplatov.

In connection with the outbreak of war in Europe, it was necessary to rebuild the communication scheme with people in Mexico. France was excluded from the previous plan, and an intermediary point was organized in the USA. Pavel Panteleymonovich Pastelnik, a special worker of the Center, was sent to the Consulate General in New York (according to the documents of P.P. Klarin). Several agents and proxies were handed over to him for communication. It was envisaged that mail correspondence on the New York-Mexico line and back would be conducted in cryptography, using individual ciphers.

Little is known about the half year from December 1939 to May 1940. During this time, couriers were sent to Mexico twice to transfer money and orientation of the Center to Tom. On May 21, "Mother" unexpectedly flew to New York from Cuba with a letter from Tom, which indicated that she

has been identified in Mexico and is therefore temporarily on its way to the United States. "With Raymond," Tom reported, "the situation is no better either, I will send him to New York after a while. "Development", unfortunately, is going slower than we would like. I have a number of problems..."

At the end of May 1940, all the major news agencies of the world reported on the further development of events in Mexico.

At about 4 am on May 24, about 20 people in the form of police and military personnel attacked Trotsky's fortified house, surrounded by high stone walls with electric wire. They quietly disarmed and tied up the policemen of the outer protection, called the duty officer - it turned out to be an American youth Robert Sheldon Hart - he opened the gate and let the attackers into the yard. They seized and isolated several guards in enclosed spaces, turned off the sound alarm. A group of attackers rushed to the house, took up positions opposite Trotsky's bedroom from two sides and opened crossfire from light machine guns and small arms. Trotsky and his wife managed to slide down from the beds, hide under them and remain unharmed, which became known after the attackers hurriedly left the territory. Some of them left in two cars parked in the yard with the keys in the ignitions. An incendiary projectile and an explosive device were thrown into the house. The latter did not work, but Trotsky and his wife were able to put out the fire that had begun. Sheldon left with the attackers.

In the course of the investigation that began, newspaper information was supplemented with details, assumptions were put forward and discussed regarding the instigators and perpetrators, the hype acquired a pronounced anti-communist orientation.

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On June 4, a courier from Mexico returned to New York with Tom's letter.

On June 8, signed by Beria, a special message is sent to Stalin and Molotov.

"On May 24, 1940, Trotsky's home in Mexico City was attacked. The American newspaper World Telegraph covers the circumstances most fully. Here are excerpts (followed by a description of events similar to the above. - Auth.).

On the merits of what happened, we received a report from our man from America. A copy of the report is attached."

Attached is the following text:

"a) You know in detail about our misfortune from the newspapers. A report will be given to you when I or Felipe get out of the country.

b) While all the people are safe, and some have left the country.

c) If there are no special complications, in 2-3 weeks we will start correcting the error, because not all reserves are exhausted.

d) To complete the case, I need another 15-20 thousand (dollars), which must be urgently sent.

e) Taking full responsibility for this nightmarish failure, I am ready to leave at your first request to receive the punishment due for such a failure. May 30. Volume".

The special message was accompanied by an intelligence note with proposals for an answer to "our man in America": to instruct Tom to get out of Mexico if he was in any way decrypted and he was in danger. Felipe and Mario are guided by the same. Inform Tom that 5 thousand (dollars) are being sent to him, the rest of the amount, if necessary, will be sent from New York in installments.

On June 10, when the cipher telegram with these instructions was transmitted to New York, the amount of money sent was increased to 10 thousand (dollars) in the text and an addition was made: "Greetings from comrade. Beria.

Thus, the failure of the May action in Moscow was perceived as temporary, the leader was energetically encouraged and expressed the hope that the mistake could be corrected.

The investigation that began in Mexico was led by Colonel Sánchez Salazar, the head of the secret service of the national police, a high-class professional. His agents quickly found a rope ladder, an electric saw, an ax, a crowbar, two pistols, and a lot of cartridges not far from the crime scene. A set of police uniforms was found in one of the abandoned cars. The colonel thought: it is impossible to keep a secret, into which about 20 people are privy. And he turned out to be right. Numerous police agents scattered throughout the capital worked tirelessly. And here is the first success. Accidentally overheard a conversation in a cafe and identified a person who

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to whom "a friend of his" wanted to buy a police uniform. After finding the latter, both were detained. Strictly interrogated, searched, studied the circle of their acquaintances and found one of the participants in the attack - a young Mexican Nestor Sanchez, a university student. Under the weight of the evidence, Sanchez told everything he knew. His testimony, together with other materials obtained during the investigation, allowed the police to identify almost all the participants in the attack. They were immediately wanted.

The organizer and leader of the assassination was the famous Mexican artist David Alfaro Siqueiros. A staunch anti-fascist, he at one time was a member of the Communist Party, was the commander of a brigade of the Republican army in Spain. He was distinguished by decisiveness in actions and personal fearlessness. He was married to Angelica Arrenal, whose two brothers Leopold and Luis, also artists, were his closest friends. This group was joined by another painter, a Mexican of Indian origin, a favorite student of Siqueiros, Antonio Pujol. In addition, the names of about 15 men who were direct participants and several women "involved in the case" became known to the authorities. It turned out that many of them were members of the communist parties in the past, some volunteers participated in the Spanish Civil War. It should be emphasized that these people were neither agents nor proxies of the NKVD intelligence before. They were picked up by Siqueiros only to participate in this particular case. The Center began to learn about them with the appearance of names in the Mexican press in connection with the investigation and subsequent trial.

It should be noted that, despite the frantic zeal, Salazar did not manage to detain the most important participants in the action. Minor persons were arrested, with the exception of Siqueiros, and the brothers Arrenal, Pujol, "Felipe" and "Mario" were able to leave the country in time. Salazar lamented especially bitterly about Felipe, whom he rightly considered one of the organizers. There was a detailed description of his appearance, an identikit was made, his pseudonym "Felipe" became known, to which another was added - "French Jew" (based on Nestor's testimony), but the efforts of the police were in vain.

... The time has come to uncover another tragic story that has been left unexplained for decades.

As the reader knows, Robert Sheldon Hart, who opened the gate for the attackers at home on May 24, left with them. The police were also looking for him, and a month later they found his corpse on a small farm in the suburbs of the capital. Two versions have emerged. Salazar claimed that Sheldon was an agent of the GPU, liquidated by his own for fear that he could tell too much if he fell into the hands of the police. Trotsky, however, was convinced of Sheldon's loyalty and considered him another victim of Moscow's agents.

The head of the secret police was right.

Archival documents testify that Robert Sheldon Hart was a person attracted by the NKVD residency in New York and was listed under the pseudonym "Cupid". He was sent to Mexico and given the conditions of communication to establish contact. Who contacted Sheldon in Mexico and assigned him the task, we do not know for sure.

Why did this man's life end so tragically? The answer is Eitingon's testimony of March 9, 1954: <...during the operation, it was revealed that Sheldon was a traitor. Although he opened the door of the gate, however, in the room where he led the participants in the raid, there was neither an archive nor Trotsky himself. When the participants in the raid opened fire, Sheldon told them that if he knew all this, he, as an American, would never have agreed to participate in this matter. This behavior served as the basis for the decision to liquidate it on the spot. He was killed by the Mexicans.

Only in October 1940 did the police manage to find and arrest the last participant in the attack, Siqueiros, who was hiding far from the capital. During the investigation, he did not deny that he was the leader of the group, but stated that the purpose of the attack was not to kill Trotsky, but only to destroy his archives. This action was also supposed to cause a "psychological shock" and use it to protest against Trotsky's residence in Mexico. He categorically denied involvement in the cause of the Communist Party. The accusation of Siqueiros in the murder of Sheldon was dropped due to insufficient evidence. He did not give any significant information about the associates. And soon something happened that few people foresaw. By order of the newly elected President of Mexico, Avila Camacho, who appreciated Siqueiros as an outstanding artist, the glory and pride of the nation, he was released on bail. He was "recommended" to urgently leave the country, which he did.

The reader has the right to ask what factors influenced the decision to storm the house in May 1940? Let us again refer to Eitingon: "For a long time, nothing worked with the introduction of "Raymond" into Trotsky's entourage, so it was decided to organize an armed raid on his house. The necessary people were selected through Siqueiros to carry out the raid. Eitingon himself did not meet with all the participants in the operation and carried out all the work through Siqueiros ... "®

Despite the paucity of information, the Center analyzed the events of May 1940. In the conclusion drawn up, in particular, it was said: "The Mexican police managed to uncover all the circumstances of the preparation and commission of the assassination, as well as to identify many perpetrators. In preparation for the operation, apparently, was

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made a number of mistakes. People intended for secondary roles (obtaining and storing weapons, clothing, etc.) were selected without sufficient verification, conspiracy was violated ... "This conclusion from a professional point of view seems to be correct.

While they continued to deal with the raiders in Mexico, the Center and the New York station were looking forward to new operational information from Tom. At the end of June, "Raymond" came to New York for 10 days. It is known that he received money and a spare passport for Tom, but it is not known (archival materials are missing) what information he delivered and what instructions from the Center were sent through him to Tom. With "Raymond" Sylvia followed to Mexico. Soon, "Mother" went there too. At the end of July, Tom signaled by conditional letter that they were "all right."

Information that soon arrived from Mexico was doomed to become sensational. Newspapers all over the world reported that on August 20 an attempt was made on the life of Trotsky. He was severely wounded and died the next evening. The attacker was arrested at the scene of the crime.

Every hour brought new details. It turned out that the killer was a foreigner from among the political supporters of the Russian exile. He was personally known to Trotsky and his wife, enjoyed their trust, had free access to their house. On the evening of August 20, he asked

host to view an article prepared by him about the activities of one of the Trotskyist organizations from the USA. They retired to the office, where everything happened: Trotsky was crushed by the strongest blow of the ice ax to the back of the head, uttered a loud cry, tried to join the fight. The guards who appeared began to severely beat the assassin, found him with a pistol and a knife. The police arrived, and the victim and perpetrator were taken to the hospital under heavy guard. On the way there, the foreigner handed over to the head of the medical carriage a letter in French, the contents of which soon became public.

The author of the letter called himself a Belgian citizen, Jacques Mornard, provided information about Belgian parents, about his studies in Belgium and France, about his interest in the political activities of the Trotskyists, about acquaintances with some representatives of this movement. One of them was a member of [U Internationale (surname not given), who suggested that he go to Mexico and get in touch with Trotsky. From him was received a Canadian passport in the name of Frank Jackson and money for the trip. Further, the author of the letter sets out in detail the motives for the murder: as a result of personal acquaintance with Trotsky, he gradually began to become disillusioned with the theory and practice of Trotskyism. And after Trotsky expressed his intention to send him to the Soviet Union to commit sabotage and terrorist acts, including against Stalin, he took a decision

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decision to eliminate this figure, who also objected to his marriage to Silvia Agelova.

Date - August 20, 1940. Signed - Jacques.

Here is the place for the next special message to Stalin and Molotov of September 19, 1940, signed by Beria.

"The NKVD is sending you a letter, translated from English, found by the Mexican police in the pocket of the arrested Jacques Mornard. The letter was obtained by agents.

The letter is accompanied by a translation, which is signed - Jackson.

Of course, Stalin was immediately informed about the successful implementation of the plan approved by him in the "Duck" case. However, the NKVD considered it necessary, apparently, as they would say now, from ambitious motives, to make an additional written report. At the same time, they did not particularly care about the accuracy of the information; it no longer had practical significance. The reader, of course, drew attention to the "blunders" that penetrated into the special message: in fact, the letter was in French; the arrested person handed over the letter to the authorities, in his pockets they found something completely different; the signatures are mixed up - "Jackson" instead of "Jacques".

The course of events after the arrest of "Raymond" gradually became clearer. From the scene of the crime, he was taken to the territorial (district) department of the Metropolitan Police. A criminal case was opened and an investigation was started, which was headed by the same Colonel Salazar. Exhausting interrogations followed, confrontations, including with several participants in the attack, and other investigative actions. In chronological order, all the actions of "Raymond" were restored in detail, thanks to which he became a member of Trotsky's house: meeting with Sylvia in Paris, continuing contact with her in New York, leaving for Mexico in October 1939, Sylvia's arrival there in January 1940 (from January to March she served as Trotsky's secretary, "Raymond" brought her and took her from work every day in his car), acquaintance and establishment of warm relations with Trotsky's old friends Margarita and Alfred who were visiting Trotsky Rosmer. As Sylvia's fiancé and friend of the Rosmer spouses, "Ray Monde" was received by Trotsky and his wife. According to the entries in the visitor's book, "Raymond" visited their house 12 times, staying there for a total of about 4 and a half hours.

With the involvement of the Belgian envoy, the legend of "Raymond" was completely exposed and it was proved that he was not a Belgian subject, Jacques Mornard. The investigation required

sincere recognition, which, however, was not received either then or later. Measures of moral, psychological and physical influence began to be applied to the prisoner. This was recorded later, in August 1946, in an official memorandum submitted to the courts by his lawyer. There, for example,

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it was said that immediately after the arrest, being in an unconscious state due to the wounds inflicted by the guards, "Raymond" was sent to the police station, where the torture continued for several weeks. During the preliminary investigation, he was kept in the basement for 7 months, "being the object of unheard-of bullying and humiliation. Due to isolation, the document testifies, he was on the verge of losing his sight." In March 1941, he was transferred to the city prison, where he was kept for 3 years. They took me for a walk once a day for 20 minutes in conjunction with the warden.

By the day "Raymond" was arrested, Tom and "Mother" were in Mexico City. With the expectation of a safe exit to the city after the campaign, "Raymond" had prepared documents for leaving the country in advance. On the day and hour of the operation, Tom and "Mother" were waiting for him in a car near Trotsky's house. There is evidence of Eitingon about what happened next (from the prison recording of a conversation with him on March 5, 1954):

"At about 10 pm (August 20, 1940) Mexican radio reported the details of the assassination attempt on Trotsky. Immediately after this, Eitingon and "Mother" left the capital. He went to Cuba with an Iraqi passport... There he received a Bulgarian passport and went to Europe. Upon arrival in Moscow, he reported verbally to Merkulov and Beria. I didn't write any reports.

According to the surviving fragmentary documents, Tom and "Mother" stayed in Cuba for some time, then left for the USA, where, together with the New York residency, they carried out the necessary organizational work in the interests of the imprisoned "Raymond".

First of all, the prisoner was provided with solid legal support. His first lawyer was Ofelia Dominguez, a Cuban and brilliant lawyer. She acted under the legend of a distant relative of the accused. Contact was made between "Raymond" and two reliable, specially instructed agents in Mexico City. They, in turn, were connected through intermediaries with the residency in New York. This communication chain operated successfully until the end of 1943, when, after the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Mexico, a foreign intelligence station was established there and channels of communication with Raymond were transferred to it.

During the entire period of "Raymond's" imprisonment, starting from 1941, various options were considered for releasing him from prison and illegally exporting him abroad. He himself always took part in the discussion. However, every time something prevented the adoption of a final decision. In the meantime, a paradoxically favorable situation was developing. So, in the spring of 1945

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"Raymond" went to the city to see a dentist, accompanied by his lawyer. Without finding a doctor, they remained in the city all day. The trip was repeated after 2 days, this time the prisoner walked freely without the accompaniment of a lawyer, visited shops. And the new year, 1946, he was allowed to meet at the apartment of a friend, a former prisoner, with whom he became friends in prison. One agent involved in the case expressed bitter and sharp reproaches to our workers on this occasion, accusing them of indecisiveness, excessive reinsurance, senseless spending of big money, and so on.

After a lengthy and complex legal process in the lower courts, in May 1944, the federal district court of Mexico City issued a final sentence of 20 years in prison (the highest penalty in the country). Several subsequent appeals

rejected. Even an application from 1954 for bail on bail (which is provided for by local law) due to the expiration of 2/, the appointed time was rejected. Motivation: "Jacques Mornard showed no regret for his crime and therefore it is dangerous to let him go free." One of the highest judicial authorities said in a confidential conversation: "The only way to release is his full recognition in everything." An attempt to challenge the decision on this application was also unsuccessful.

"Raymond" had to serve in Lecumberry Prison, as they say, "from start to finish", more precisely - 19 years 8 months and 14 days. During this time, he fell ill with severe typhoid fever, suffered several heart attacks, in one case there was a partial paralysis of the right side of the body and limbs, digestion was disturbed, and his teeth were catastrophically destroyed.

Time took its course. The Great Patriotic War ended victoriously. The cold war has begun. I.V. died Stalin ("Raymond" expressed his condolences through his contacts). The 20th Congress of the CPSU was held, "enemies of the people" began to return from prisons and exile, and Trotskyists among them. Mexico did not experience any particular shocks. Presidents were re-elected on time, and political life went on at a measured pace. Except that from time to time the calm was broken by bursts of press interest in the "world-famous prisoner" of Lecumberri prison.

For a long time, many were intrigued: who really was Jacques Mornard, who pretended to be a Belgian? The Trotskyists were especially zealous. In the end, they managed to establish: the convict was the Spaniard Ramon Mercader. Several former members of the Spanish international brigades identified him from a photo, recalled a front-line wound in his right forearm (Salazar checked: everything matched). The final clarity was brought by the Mexican criminologist, who found

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found in the Spanish police archives from the fingerprint of Ramon, who was arrested in 1935 for communist activities in Barcelona. Information about his family was obtained: mother, brothers, sister, places of their stay and other details.

Interest in the case of "Raymond" was shown not only in Mexico and not only by the Trotskyists. At the end of 1944 and at the beginning of 1945, generalized final information was received from our agents in London - documents of the British and American counterintelligence (code name - "The Friedman Case") about their active, deep and effective "development" our events in Mexico. It turned out that in 1941-1943 censorship in Great Britain and the United States intercepted about 20 of our letters on the New York-Mexico line and back. They opened the cryptography and partially individual ciphers. As a result of this and other undercover and operational measures, the enemy became aware that the release of Trotsky's killer from prison was being prepared; of different nationalities, which are led by intelligence agents from under the cover of the Soviet missions in New York and Mexico City. They were called by their names: Lev Tarasov (L.P. Vasilevsky), Pavel Klarin (P.P. Pastelnyak), M.A. Chaliapin, G.B. Ovakimyan, Vasily Zubilin (V.M. Zarubin).

By the time this information was received from London, the Mexico-USA postal and courier line was already closed, our service did not suffer any casualties, although we had to take additional security measures against a number of people and adjust the communication system with Raymond.

With regard to the materials of the Friedman Case, we note two points.

There was very close cooperation between the US and UK intelligence agencies. At the same time, the British did, perhaps, the most important and most labor-intensive work - deciphering the intercepted letters.



After the Americans "leaked" information on this case to the press in 1946, the following phrases appeared there: body organs".

Communication with "Raymond" through the residency in Mexico City generally operated smoothly. He constantly received the necessary moral support and material assistance. Some difficulties arose in 1947-1948, but here a chance came to the rescue, in the literal sense of the word happy: for intelligence, the problem of further communication with "Raymond" was completely resolved, and for him ... but let's tell everything in order .

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Since about 1946, a modest employee of the municipality, Roquelia Mendoza, visited her ne'er-do-well brother in the capital's prison. During one of her visits, she met "Raymond". They became friends, mutual sympathy arose, which grew into a great feeling. The woman began to regularly come to "Raymond", supplying him with food, medicine and other necessary things. When the need for money arose, Rokelia persuaded her mother to mortgage a piece of land and their small house in order to receive a mortgage of \$ 2,000. who became her husband.

The end of the prison term was approaching. By agreement with the Czechoslovak authorities, a passport was prepared for "Raymond" in the name of a citizen of this country. All technical issues were agreed with the Mexicans, bearing in mind the need to prevent premature publicity of the day and hour of his release and route. We secured the consent of the Cuban authorities to provide assistance, since it was planned to send the Raymond on a Soviet ship from Cuba.

May 6, 1960 "Raymond" was released. On the same day, he flew to Havana on a Cuban airline. The Mexican authorities showed a high degree of tact towards the expelled "undesirable foreigner", which, however, fully met their national interests. On May 7, "Raymond" was already on board the ship heading from Havana to the Soviet port. Two weeks later, in Moscow, he met Roquelia, who had arrived.

June 25 in the Central Committee of the CPSU in the name of N.S. Khrushchev was sent a KGB memorandum with information about the release of "Raymond" and with proposals for his award, granting citizenship of the USSR and resolving issues of material and financial support. It says about "Raymond":

"Because of his boundless devotion to the cause of communism and the Soviet Union during the investigation and trial, as well as for almost 20 years in prison under the conditions of an unceasing campaign of threats and provocations against him, he showed courage, steadfastness and high ideological spirit inherent in a real communist, and kept secret his connection with the state security organs of the Soviet Union.

On May 31, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was signed with the following content: "For the fulfillment of a special task and the heroism and courage shown at the same time, assign comrade. Lopez Ramon Ivanovich? title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. The Decree was not published in the press.

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On June 8, the award was presented to the intelligence officer in the Kremlin by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev.

... It is rightly said: "Assessments of the past should be correlated with the realities of the past". One way or another, in the course of a long and tough investigation, exhausting hearings in the courts and many years of imprisonment, efforts to identify the initiators of the assassination attempt did not

gave. As the Western historian Isaac Levin noted, "his (Ramon Mercader's) real name and identity have not been established. The perpetrator remained faithful to his role to the end... No one was able to document the participation of Soviet organs in the assassination of Trotsky."

Raymond lived in the Soviet Union until 1974. He became a KGB pensioner and received a four-room apartment in Moscow. The couple began to study Russian. They adopted two children - a boy of 11 years and a seven-month-old girl. "Raymond" began to work at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, studied the history of the Spanish Civil War. Roquelia was an announcer for the Spanish edition of Moscow Radio for about two years. She traveled to Mexico three times, visiting her elderly mother and relatives. "Mother" came to Moscow twice to visit from France. She died in Paris in 1975.

It was difficult for "Raymond" and Roquelia to get used to the new conditions of life. Ignorance of the language limited the circle of communication. The resolution of some household issues sometimes grew into a complex problem. Both endured the local climate especially hard. In autumn and winter they were constantly pursued by colds. Therefore, a change in climatic conditions was required. Cuban friends learned about Mercader's problems and expressed their readiness to host him and use him in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a consultant on issues of labor education for persons serving prison sentences. And so it was decided. In November 1973, Rokelia and her children left for Cuba. The husband was expected to arrive later. However, six months later he fell ill and was admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of lung cancer. After some treatment, he decided to go to his family and in October 1974 arrived in Havana, where he was very warmly welcomed.

In Cuba, he happened to live only 4 years. In August 1978, he was admitted to a Cuban hospital with a relapse of a lung disease. October 18, 1978 "Raymond" died. The urn of his ashes was buried in the Moscow cemetery. This was the will of the deceased.

The family of "Raymond" retained the pension established for him (with payment in foreign currency): Rokelia - for life, children - until the age of majority. Roquelia and her daughter returned to Mexico, the son remained in Cuba, graduated from a nautical school, worked in the trade

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fleet, started a family. Roquelia outlived her husband by 11 years. She died after a serious illness in 1989.

This concludes our story about one of the most "high-profile" cases of Soviet intelligence in the pre-war period.

There is evidence that this is not Stalin's first such order. A document dated 1946 was found in the archives of the SVR, which states: "...before 1940, several attempts were made to liquidate Trotsky. The organization of the case was such that at present it is impossible to say who exactly was involved in this case at that time, where these people were and to what extent they were informed about the essence of the case and its organizers. Of course, such attempts could not be made without Stalin's sanction.

This wording confirms the considerations set out in the previous footnote.

Both were shot in 1938, both were rehabilitated in 1956.

Vsevolod Nikolaevich Merkulov was the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

In 1954, Eitingon was under arrest in Moscow's Butyrskaya prison, where an operative from the Center conducted an informal interrogation and conversation with him. The information presented is based on a recording of a conversation with Eitingon, compiled by an operative. Subsequently, being released and rehabilitated, Eitingon did not make any changes to the information about Sheldon's fate.

From a recording of a conversation with Eitingon on March 5, 1954 in the Butyrka prison. It was possible to find out that the Americans exerted strong pressure in this matter. In the event of early release of "Raymond", they intended to demand his extradition "for violating American laws." He was probably referring to his entry into the United States on a fake Canadian passport.

Upon the arrival of "Raymond" in the USSR, in agreement with him, it was decided to name him as recorded in the Decree. All Soviet documents were issued to him in this name.

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## End of ROVS

After the completion of Operation Trust, which was carried out by the intelligence and counterintelligence of the Cheka-OGPU in 1922-1927 to prevent and constrain the sabotage and terrorist activities of the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS) against Soviet Russia, and then the USSR, the leadership of the ROVS again activated the transfer of well-trained groups of militants to the territory of the USSR, each of which acted autonomously. The ideologist and direct organizer of this work was A.P. Kutepov, who, after the death of Wrangel in 1928 and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich in 1929, became the sole leader of the white movement abroad.

Due to the fact that Kutepov took effective conspiracy measures when terrorists were brought into the territory of the USSR, the leadership of the OGPU decided to organize new operational games with the ROVS on behalf of the supposedly anti-Soviet organizations operating on the territory of the USSR. One of these legendary organizations, the "North Caucasian Military Organization" (SKVO), was successfully set up by the representatives of the ROVS in Romania, Generals Shteifon and Gerua, which made it possible to open the channels for the transfer of militants, to reveal their connections and strongholds in the North Caucasus, the Kuban and in the Don region. In turn, the Chekists managed to bring well-trained agents abroad and infiltrate the branches of the ROVS not only in Romania, but also in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

More difficult was the operational game directly with the headquarters of the ROVS on behalf of the VRNO ("Internal Russian National Organization", created from among former officers with the participation of OGPU agents). According to the leaders of this operation, V.R. Menzhinsky and A.Kh. Artuzov, direct access to Kutepov and his inner circle seemed more than problematic. That's why

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it was decided to initially introduce VRNO into the field of view of the editor of the journal Struggle for Russia, S.P. Melgunov, who maintained close ties with the head of the office Kutepov S.E. Trubetskoy. It was known that Melgunov not only received information about Russia from Trubetskoy, but also sent his magazine to Russia through Kutepov's people.

In 1928, an OGPU agent, former colonel of the tsarist army A.N., was sent to Paris as a representative of the VRNO. Popov, who, through General P.P. Dyakonov, a former military attaché of tsarist Russia in London, who had collaborated with Soviet intelligence since 1924, met with Melgunov and briefed him on the situation in Russia, the goals and objectives of the VRNO, and the need to expand ties with white émigré organizations abroad. At one time A.N. Popov informed Melgunov that General Dyakonov was the VRNO representative in Paris and asked him to arrange a meeting with Kutepov.

Kutepov agreed to meet with Popov, but was categorically against the participation of Dyakonov, whom, as it turned out, he did not trust, and this had a negative impact on the further development of the operational game. Despite the fact that subsequently a regular exchange of information was established between Melgunov and VRNO through Dyakonov and General G.G. Karganov, it was not possible to develop it. To a large extent, this was the result of Popov's unfortunate behavior when meeting with Kutepov. The goals and objectives of the VRNO set out by him,

the positions held by its members in state structures, including in the army and the OGPU, unwittingly reminded Kutepov how he had fallen for the "Trust" bait, especially after Popov's statements that their organization, in the name of retaining personnel, strongly opposes the terrorist and sabotage acts on the territory of the USSR. Listening to Popov, Kutepov decided to himself: this is the second Yakushev, and took a wait-and-see attitude.

Doubting the authenticity of the VRNO, Kutepov carefully studied and analyzed the information received from this organization, which was processed and reported to him by General Karganov.

So, on April 25, 1929, in his next letter to Melgunov, intended for Kutepov, Popov reported: <... the political situation in the USSR has aggravated to such an extent that we are now on the eve of a period of open actions of the population against Bolshevism ... Three years ago we did not yet think about open battles, but now they are on the order of the day, and not so much thanks to the activities of our organization, but because of the huge upsurge of the people's anti-Bolshevik element. In 1929 we intend to hit the wrong hands for the first time. The combat plan of action was developed by us objectively and quite seriously... In view of the seriousness of the moment, we insist on the implementation of the following measures by you:

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1) creation of an illegal crossing on one of the borders of the northwest or on the borders of the southwest of Russia;

2) sending to us through the established transition point your representative, who enjoys your full confidence and has experience of illegal work;

3) the representative sent by you must have samples of literature published abroad by Russian nationalist emigration and separatists, and must have sufficient information about the situation in Europe;

4) we would like to see a representative who is sufficiently competent and competent to develop the tactics of struggle ... We also intend to use his arrival to reinforce the point of view of a part of the staff members who consider it already possible ... to start the first combat performances .. Your representative can receive a wealth of information material... This material will help you to conduct a strong campaign to unite the national forces of emigration on the platform of struggle for Russia. We have seen and still see in your person the center that is obliged to take upon itself the unification of Russian youth, more precisely, the Russian emigration..."

The information received from Popov was partially confirmed by the reports of the ROVS militants, who were thrown into Soviet Russia on an individual basis, about the dissatisfaction of the peasants with collectivization, the protests of the population in certain cities against unemployment and difficult living conditions. Similar information came to the ROVS and through the channels of the North Caucasian Military District, legendary by the Chekists.

At the same time, the militants who were thrown in did not manage to carry out the terrorist actions planned by Kutepov against Stalin, Bukharin, Menzhinsky, Krylenko, and the leading employees of the OGPU, since the intelligence received comprehensive information on this issue in a timely manner and on July 19, 1928 sent it to the leadership of the OGPU detailed special report No. 232700. The militants explained their failures by strengthening the protection of senior officials and state institutions after terrorist attacks in the OGPU hostel on Lubyanka, in the House of Political Education in Leningrad, etc. With perseverance and perseverance, Kutepov continued to take measures for the practical implementation of the in 1927, on the outskirts of Paris, Choigny, of the aforementioned plan to bring in militants to carry out terrorist acts. This, in turn, raised the question of carrying out an operation to neutralize Kutepov before the leadership of the OGPU.

Based on information about Kutepov's lifestyle, an operation was developed to kidnap him, the implementation of which was entrusted to the head of the Special Group under the chairman of the OGPU, Yakov Serebryansky. The operation was scheduled for Sunday, January 26, 1930, since, according to intelligence data, Kutepov

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On that day, at 11:30 a.m., he was supposed to attend a memorial service on the occasion of the death of Baron Kaulbars in the Gallipoli Church in Paris on Rue Mademoiselle, a 20-minute walk from his house.

The day before, on January 25, one of the employees of the task force handed Kutepov a note in which he was assigned a short meeting on the way to the church. At the same time, it was taken into account that Kutepov always went to important meetings related to the undercover and combat activities of the ROVS alone. After waiting for some time for the "courier" at the tram stop on Sevres Street, Kutepov continued on his way to the church. On the Rue Oudinot, he was intercepted by a task force, who introduced himself as members of the French police, and taken out of town in a car. However, it was not possible to deliver him to Moscow and, as planned, to bring him to justice, because on the way Kutepov, according to the testimony of the participants in the operation, died of a heart attack. The measures taken by the police and personally by the head of counterintelligence of the ROVS, Colonel Zaitsev, to find out what happened to Kutepov did not give positive results. The inner circle and the leadership of the ROVS were at a loss. General Shteifon, who was in Paris at that time, who visited Kutepov's apartment at 3 pm, wrote on January 27, 1930 to General Gerua in Bucharest:

"Yesterday, unexpectedly, under unclear circumstances, A.P. disappeared. (Kutepov). He went out to church in the morning, did not intend to go anywhere, did not make appointments with anyone, and agreed with his wife that after dinner (at one in the afternoon) they would go to the city with the whole family.

Shortly before that, in one of the hotels in Berlin, there were representatives of the VRNO, Colonel Popov and Colonel de Roberti, who arrived in 1918 Kutepov's chief of staff in Novorossiysk, who arrived from Moscow in early January 1930 from Moscow. On the eve of their departure, they sent a letter to General Shteifon, whom they met in Moscow in 1929, with a request to convey an invitation to Kutepov to come to Berlin to discuss issues of deepening cooperation between the VRNO and the ROVS. Initially, on behalf of Kutepov, the head of counterintelligence, Colonel Zaitsev, went to Berlin, in a conversation with whom Popov and de Roberti insisted on a meeting with Kutepov on January 16-18.

On January 17, in the evening, the first conversation between Kutepov and representatives of the VRNO took place. At it, Popov and de Roberty, in contrast to the position taken in 1928, raised the question of sending several groups of reliable officers of the ROVS to the USSR to prepare uprisings in the spring of 1930 and again declared that they would like to see General P. P. Dyakonov as a representative of the VRNO at the EMRO in Paris. The next day, during a breakfast organized by Kutepov in a restaurant in honor of the guests, de Roberti, left alone for a while with the general, informed him that Popov and he were acting on the back of

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to the OGPU that no underground organization of the VRNO exists and that an assassination attempt is being prepared on Kutepov. Kutepov accepted de Roberti's information very coolly, and during breakfast in the presence of Popov, who did not know about de Roberti's betrayal, did not betray the feelings that overwhelmed him.

On the way from Berlin to Paris, Kutepov told Zaitsev in detail about de Roberti's revelations, and upon arrival in Paris informed S.E. Trubetskoy and his secretary Lieutenant M.A. Cretan. After Kutepov left for Paris, Dyakonov, without his consent, left for Berlin and discussed with Popov and de Roberty the conditions for maintaining communication and exchanging information.

In Berlin, they were caught by the news of Kutepov's disappearance, but on instructions from Moscow, Popov and de Roberti left Berlin only in February, thus confirming that their arrival in Berlin had nothing to do with this incident. Moreover, in their letters from Moscow addressed to Zaitsev, they expressed fears for their future fate, since they were not sure that their meetings with Kutepov would not become the property of the OGPU, and therefore asked them not to write to them temporarily.

The OGPU soon became aware of de Roberti's betrayal. He was arrested and after a short investigation in May 1930 he was shot.

The operation carried out by the OGPU to kidnap Kutepov dealt a heavy blow to the white movement. Depression, panic, distrust of leaders, mutual suspicions of cooperation with the state security agencies of the USSR were typical not only for the members of the Russian All-Military Union, but also for the part of the white emigration that supported it for a number of years after the disappearance of Kutepov.

Kutepov's successor as chairman of the ROVS was Lieutenant General Evgeniy Karlovich Miller, a professional military man who graduated from the Academy of the General Staff in 1892. From 1898 to 1907 he was on military-diplomatic work in Belgium, Holland and Italy. Participated in the First World War, being the chief of staff of the 5th Army. In August 1917 he was appointed representative of the Headquarters at the Italian Headquarters. In 1918, after the landing of British troops in Arkhangelsk, he became the commander-in-chief of the white troops in the North, and in 1920 he headed the Northern government. After the evacuation of the British troops from Arkhangelsk, he left for Finland, from where he moved to Paris, where he first served at Wrangel's headquarters, and then was at the disposal of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. In 1929 he was appointed deputy chairman of the ROVS.

At the headquarters of the ROVS, Miller entrusted all information work to Trubetskoy, and appointed Lieutenant General N.N. Stogov and his assistant - General P.A. Kusonsky.

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As Kutepov's deputy, Miller was not admitted to the combat work of the ROVS and was not informed about this side of the organization's secret activities. Therefore, Miller began his activities with inspection trips to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in order to deal with the practical activities of the ROVS on the ground and revive intelligence work. This was also due to the fact that many generals and senior officers of the ROVS considered Miller to be an office worker incapable of a decisive struggle against the Soviet regime. However, as Miller entered into the affairs of the ROVS, calling various kinds of "haphazard assassinations, attacks on Soviet institutions and arson of warehouses" with small pinpricks, he set a strategic task for the ROVS: organizing and preparing major actions against the USSR of all forces subordinate to him. Without denying the importance of carrying out terrorist acts, Miller paid special attention to the training of personnel for the deployment of a guerrilla war in the rear of the Red Army in the event of a war with the USSR. In anticipation of open hostilities against the USSR from the West, he created, under the leadership of General N.N. Golovin in Paris and Belgrade courses for the retraining of officers of the ROVS and training in military sabotage for new members of the Union from among emigrant youth.

However, the plans and practical steps for their implementation by General Miller and his associates became the property of Soviet intelligence in a timely manner. Thanks to the data obtained through agents in 1931-1934, it was possible to capture and neutralize 17 terrorists of the ROVS and NTSNP, abandoned in the USSR, and to open 11 secret points. A great contribution to this work was made by the illegal agent Leonid Leonidovich Linitzky in Belgrade, the employees of the Paris and Berlin residencies of the INO OGPU. Soviet intelligence agents managed to prevent the terrorist acts planned by the ROVS against the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov in Europe and his deputy L.M. Karakhan in Iran.

In the early 1930s, Soviet intelligence installed auditory control equipment at the headquarters of the ROVS in Paris, which since May 1930 was located on the first floor of house number 29 on the Rue de Colise. The house belonged to the family of the agent of the Parisian residency, Sergei Nikolaevich Tretyakov. A tall, stately man, always elegantly and tastefully dressed, who knew several European languages, the former owner of a solid capital in Russia, Tretyakov was a welcome guest in emigre circles and was on close terms with Kutepov. Former chairman of the Kostroma manufactory, chairman of the Moscow Exchange Committee, former minister of the Provisional Government (of the last period), Tretyakov, on a personal instruction from Kerensky, kept in touch with the French military mission. In 1918 he emigrated to France, from where at the end

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In 1919 he returned to Russia and for 10 months served as Minister of Trade in the government of Admiral Kolchak. Returning to Paris, Tretyakov worked in various émigré organizations, including being deputy chairman of Torgprom. Realistically assessing the situation, Tretyakov understood earlier than others that there was no return to the old Russia. On the basis of disappointments, aggravated by a break with his wife, he tried to commit suicide. In 1929, Tretyakov was brought into cooperation with Soviet intelligence. Initially, information was received from Tretyakov on the subversive activities of Torgprom and other emigre organizations. In 1933, he was given the task of "development" of the EMRO and its 1st department. At the suggestion of the Deputy INO OGPU Shpigelglas, Tretyakov returned to the family-owned house and occupied the second floor - just above the premises rented by the headquarters of the ROVS. The Tretyakov family lived on the third floor. This allowed the Parisian residency to install microphones for eavesdropping in the offices of Miller, the head of the 1st department, Shatilov, and in the office of the ROVS. The equipment for receiving information was located in Tretyakov's apartment. Beginning on January 12, 1934, a technical channel for obtaining information was launched, which turned into years of hard work for Tretyakov. Almost every day, while Miller, Shatilov, and Kusonsky were at work, he put on headphones and recorded the conversations that took place in their offices. The information received from Tretyakov, which was originally codenamed "Petka", and then "Information of Our Days" (IND), allowed the intelligence and counterintelligence of the OGPU, and then the NKVD, to more fully control and suppress the subversive activities of the ROVS, to identify the channels of infiltration of terrorists and their names, the fact of Miller's cooperation with the French and Japanese special services, the establishment of close contact between the ROVS and the NTSNP, Miller's meetings with Baidalakov and Poremsky and other leaders of the NTSNP, at which specific issues of interaction between these two anti-Soviet organizations in the fight against the USSR were discussed. Thanks to Tretyakov's information, it became known that the representative of the ROVS in Romania, Colonel Zholondovsky, who was in charge of bringing in the terrorists, hid the failures from the leadership of the ROVS until the information about the arrest of terrorists and their names did not appear in the Soviet press. Interesting in this regard is Tretyakov's information about the failure of the Romanian Zholondovsky canal, as set out in a special message from the INO to the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR:

"The INO of the Main Directorate of State Security received information that the leader of the terrorist work of the ROVS in Romania, Regiment. Zholondovsky declares that the NKVD ... completely defeated the entire British intelligence service, conducted from Romania, and the entire Romanian line of Zholondovsky. According to Zholondovsky,

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all the organizations of all intelligence services have been destroyed. Zholondovsky was impressed by the publication in the Soviet press of the real names of the two executed terrorists in Kharkov... Zholondovsky declares that it is now impossible for Romania to work of a terrorist nature, but at the same time he considers it necessary that the ROVS again carry out a terrorist act along some other line against Comrade Zhdanov or Comrade Postyshev. Gene. Abramov ... and Captain Foss ... believe that now the Romanian line does not exist and that Zholondovsky was deceiving everyone. He spent the 5 thousand francs received from the ROVS on his personal

needs, leading an indecent way of life, and on bribes to Muruzov (one of the leaders of the Romanian special services). According to Abramov and Foss, all the sendings of people to the USSR by Zholondovsky were carried out with British money, and the account was represented by the gene. Miller..."

After the failure of the Romanian channel, Soviet intelligence was interested in the question of where and through whom the ROVS would continue to transfer its terrorists to the USSR, and the answer to this question was received from Miller's closest associate, who was in charge of intelligence work, General Nikolai Vladimirovich Skoblin, who collaborated together with his wife N.V. Plevitskaya with Soviet intelligence since 1930. Skoblin was born on June 9, 1893 in Nizhyn in the family of a retired colonel. In 1914 he graduated from the Chuguev military school and was sent to the front with the rank of ensign. For bravery and military merit, he was soon awarded the Order of St. George and the golden St. George weapons. A man of rare military talents, Skoblin, despite the lack of a higher military education, rose to the rank of commander of the Kornilov division and received the rank of major general during the World War and the Civil War as part of the White Army. After the flight of the Wrangel army from the Crimea, Skoblin, while in Gallipoli, married the famous Russian singer Nadezhda Vasilievna Plevitskaya in June 1921 and after moving to Paris did not take an active part in the affairs of the ROVS, remaining the honorary commander of the Kornilovites. According to the INO OGPU, a year after the recruitment, Skoblin "became one of the best sources ... quite clearly informed us about the relationship in the leadership of the ROVS, reported details about Miller's trips to other countries." The tours of his wife made it possible for Skoblin to carry out inspections of the peripheral divisions of the ROVS and provide Soviet intelligence with operationally significant information. With the help of Skoblin, the Kutepov combat squads were liquidated, the idea of generals Shatilov and Turkul to create a terrorist core in the ROVS for use on the territory of the USSR was compromised. Ultimately, Skoblin became one of Miller's closest assistants in the intelligence line and his chargé d'affaires of the central ROVS organization. When some members of the ROVS began to express suspicions about

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cooperation between Skoblin and Soviet intelligence, Miller strongly defended him.

This circumstance was used when the question arose of conducting an operation against Miller, who, through his representative in Berlin, General Lampe, established close contacts with the fascist regime in Germany.

On September 22, 1937, at the invitation of Skoblin, Miller went with him to a villa in Saint-Cloud, near Paris, where Miller's meeting with German representatives organized by Skoblin was to take place. At Miller's villa, a task force of Chekists was waiting, which captured him and transported him via Le Havre on a ship to the USSR. After an investigation in Moscow, Miller was put on trial and shot in 1939. As it was possible to establish, Soviet intelligence officers Ieorgy Kosenko, Veniamin Grazhul and Mikhail Grigoriev took part in the operation to capture Miller. The operation was supervised by the deputy head of the INO S. Shpigelglas, who had come from Moscow. This operation was not without losses for intelligence. Leaving for a meeting with Skoblin, Miller left an envelope with a note to General Kusonsky and asked him to open the envelope if something happened to him. As soon as it became clear to Miller's entourage that he was missing, Kusonsky opened the envelope with the following note:

"I have today at 12 o'clock. 30 min. a meeting with General Skoblin at the corner of Jasmin and Raffet streets, and he was to take me to a meeting with a German officer, a military agent in the Baltic countries, Colonel Shtroman and sg. Werner, who is here at the embassy. Both speak Russian well. The meeting was arranged at the initiative of Skoblin. Maybe this is a trap, just in case I leave this note. General E. Miller. September 22, 1937 G."

It was getting closer to night. Kusonsky and Kedrov decided to send for Skoblin. Unaware of Miller's note, Skoblin, who arrived at the headquarters of the ROVS, denied that he had made an appointment with Miller,



but after Kusonsky introduced him to the note and offered to go with him to the police, Skoblin, taking advantage of the confusion of Kedrov and Kusonsky, disappeared. The measures taken by the police to search for him yielded nothing. Skoblin was smuggled by our intelligence on a specially chartered plane to Spain. According to available information, he died in Barcelona during the bombing of the Francoist aircraft. N.V. Plevitskaya was arrested as an accomplice and sentenced by a Paris court to 20 years hard labor. On October 5, 1940, she died in the Central Prison in Rennes.

Shpigelglas, Kosenko and Grigoriev were arrested in 1938-1939 and shot in 1940. In 1956, all were posthumously rehabilitated. Grazhul in 1946 was dismissed from the state security agencies due to illness, in 1956 he died in Moscow.

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Sergei Nikolaevich Tretyakov continued to cooperate with Soviet intelligence until Nazi Germany occupied France. In August 1942, the fascist newspaper Lokal-anzeiger and the émigré newspaper Novoye Slovo published a report that Tretyakov had been arrested by the Gestapo. In 1944, he was executed as a resident of Soviet intelligence in Paris.

After Miller's abduction, General Abramov became the head of the ROVS, who was replaced a year later by General Shatilov. None of them managed to preserve the EMRO as a capable and active organization and its authority in the white environment. The last operation of the Soviet intelligence on Miller was the end of the EMRO. And although it finally ceased to exist as an organization with the outbreak of World War II, Soviet intelligence, having disorganized and decomposed the ROVS, deprived Nazi Germany and its allies of the opportunity to actively use about 20 thousand members of this organization in the war against the USSR.

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The unique path of L.L. Linitsky

The autumn of 1935 in the Russian colony of Belgrade turned out to be extremely theatrical. In the "Russian House"! Chaliapin himself spoke. The audience was delighted, and long after his departure there were talks about the famous singer. Later, a Russian drama troupe from Prague visited the city. Yes, and their local artists pleased with successful performances.

On December 11, the opera Natalka-Poltavka was performed on the stage of the Russia House. The hall was full. Taxis drove up, cab drivers drove up, many traveled on foot.

The taxi doors opened, and an elegant couple got out: a man in a gray coat, about 35 years old, above average height, with a black mustache, and a slender, beautiful woman of about 30 years old in an expensive coat. They were Dr. Leonid Leonidovich Linitsky, a rising star in the local medical world, and his wife Ekaterina Fedorovna. They quickly walked into the vestibule to the cloakroom. The bulk of the audience was already in the hall. While the Linitskys were undressing, they were greeted by the head of the local ROVS, General Barbovich. "Young people, hurry up, otherwise we might be late," kissing Ekaterina Fyodorovna's hand, he sang in his hoarse bass. Climbing the stairs, Madame Papescu, the leader of the National Labor Union of the New Generation (NTSNP), a plump woman who was accompanied by a tall, prim captain Komarovsky, waved to them.

- Kate! Here are the tickets, go, and now I'm following you.

Ekaterina Fyodorovna hurried into the hall, and Leonid Leonidovich, finding a free hanger, hung up his clothes and also hurried upstairs.

When he got up to the foyer, two men in civilian clothes blocked his way. The third one stood a little apart. One of them is in Serbian

language said: "Mr. Linitsky, you are under arrest." "What a joke, who are you?" trying not to betray his excitement, asked Linitsky. A third, short man replied: "Serbian secret police."

Linitsky tried to protest. However, two thugs quickly twisted his hands, handcuffed him and led him down the stairs. A belated spectator ran towards them, out of breath. Leonid Leonidovich recognized her as his patient, sixteen-year-old Vera Vitkovskaya. He raised his hands, showed the handcuffs and threw a short phrase: "Vera! Tell Kate. And nodded towards the hall. Half an hour later, Dr. Linitsky was already in the dungeons of the counterintelligence of Colonel Iovanovich, who enjoyed a bad reputation in Serbia.

Vera quickly found the doctor's wife and told her what had happened. Ekaterina Fedorovna left the hall, dressed and rushed to hail a taxi. In a matter of minutes she was home. The children slept, she sent the servants away to rest. She quickly melted the stove herself, pushed aside the window sill, where there was a hiding place, and in it was the mail prepared for the Center. She took out a large bag and threw it into the fire. She closed the window sill again, took some papers out of the desk, and threw them into the oven too. She walked across the room, examined the closet, sighed and began to stir the burning papers. Then she threw a few logs into the firebox, sat down in an armchair and covered her face with her hands.

She woke up from a knock on the door: "Open! Police!"

The search lasted three hours. They literally turned everything over, but found nothing. The officer in charge of the group demanded to know where the espionage information was, threatened to hang everyone. Embracing the children, Ekaterina Feodorovna sat on the sofa and repeated: "There is some kind of mistake here, I have no idea what you need."

After a search, an ambush was left in the apartment. Two hefty guys settled down in the living room and ordered no one to leave the house.

The next morning, the Russian colony of Belgrade already knew that a Soviet intelligence organization was uncovered, which was led by Dr. Linitsky, a member of the board of the Gallipoli Society of the ROVS, one of General Barbovich's close associates and the head of the National Labor Union of the new generation of Baidalakov.

There was a commotion at the top of the colony. In the days that followed, the press added fuel to the fire. The activities of the ROVS and the NTSNP were practically paralyzed. The leaders everywhere imagined Soviet agents.

The Serbian secret police arrested all of Linitsky's active assistants (and there were 10 of them), including Ekaterina Fedorovna, who worked as a secretary in the residency.

An illegal residency in Belgrade was established in the early 1930s. It carried out the task of infiltrating the White émigré formations and obtaining information about sending terrorists to the territory of the USSR and about the organizations and groups that were engaged in the implementation of these actions.

The arrest of the residency employees occurred through the fault of Deputy Resident Sh. Out of careerist motives, having decided to "distinguish himself" in front of the Center, without the permission of the resident, he carried out an operation to open a safe in the apartment of the NTSNP leader Baidalakov, photographed the documents available there. Sh. involved two familiar Yugoslavs in the operation, one of whom, as it turned out later, was an agent of the local counterintelligence.

The participants in the operation were caught red-handed. After being tortured and beaten, Sh. handed over all members of the residency. Counterintelligence that same evening arrested the resident and many of his employees.

The failure caused great damage to the residency. But at the same time, he seriously shocked those white émigré circles that were engaged in activities hostile to the USSR. From Paris it was reported: "In connection with the arrests made in Belgrade, panic reigns in the center of the ROVS."

Who was Dr. L.L. Linitsky?

He was born in 1900 in Ukraine, in the city of Akhtyrka, in the family of a commander of a hundred of border guards. Father was constantly in the service on the Far Eastern border. The family mostly lived in Akhtyrka and Kharkov, and visited their father only from time to time, since the situation and living conditions on the border did not allow them to stay there for a long time. During the First World War, a veteran of the Russo-Japanese War, Knight of St. George Captain Linitsky was sent to the front, where he fought heroically, commanding a cavalry regiment, and died in battle.

At the beginning of 1917, at the age of 16, Leonid voluntarily left for the war from the 7th grade of the gymnasium. After completing training in the training team with the rank of junior non-commissioned officer, he is sent to the front.

Arrival of A.F. Kerensky, who was then Minister of War, into a division dramatically changed the life of Leonid. As an active participant in the disruption of the rally at which Kerensky was supposed to speak, he was arrested. He faced the death penalty. But the matter was limited to the fact that he was sent to a penal regiment.

The disintegration in the army increased. The guards began to scatter around the houses. Linitsky, as a minor, managed to get a leave, and in October 1917 he came home. He graduated from high school as an external student.

During the occupation of Ukraine by the Germans, Linitsky participated in raids on German posts, carried out subversive work against the invaders with his peers. In one of the operations he was wounded.

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After recovery, he entered the natural department of the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of Kharkov University. After graduating from the first course, he returned to Akhtyrka for the holidays, but did not get there, but joined one of the units of the Red Army and went to the front. Participated in battles when the Red Army retreated to Kursk under the onslaught of superior White forces. In August 1919 he was wounded again. In addition, an old wound has opened up. The medical commission, deeming him unfit for military service, dismissed him from the army.

In August 1920, having healed, Leonid again volunteered for the front. There he was enlisted in the reconnaissance department of the 13th Army and he began to undergo training for being thrown behind enemy lines. Once, on business, the young man was sent to the headquarters of one of the divisions. But when he arrived at the place, there was a fierce battle with the whites who had broken through. Linitsky picked up a rifle from the dead man and joined a group of Red Army soldiers who were on the defensive on the outskirts of the village. During the battle, Leonid was seriously wounded. The Red Army tried to hide him in the floodplains, but did not have time.

What happened next, Leonid Leonidovich wrote in his autobiography: "September 5/18, I was already in the hands of the whites, who first of all cracked my skull open with a rifle butt and again left me lying on the spot. Then they nevertheless picked me up and sent me with their wounded to Sevastopol, and from there on a steamer to Constantinople, and they themselves did not really know who I was and what. He had no documents in his pockets. According to the regulations that existed at that time, employees of intelligence departments who were intended to be thrown behind enemy lines had an appropriate document, which was embedded in the heel of a boot or disguised in clothing. Such a document was hidden in the heel of the boot and Leonid. From the bloody, torn clothes of the seriously wounded man and from other signs, it was impossible to recognize him as a red scout, and he passed for his own.

So, together with hospitals, on ships, with stops in Constantinople, Gallipoli, he was taken to Yugoslavia. "The transfer to the camp of the enemy has taken place," the scout thought. "Well, who needs me now – the war is over." The tasks that were set by the reconnaissance department of the 13th Army naturally disappeared. There was an idea to make my way home. After the hospital, Linitsky, weakened and exhausted, began to think about how to earn a living. He tried to stay away from the military formations of the Whites, although they provided food and clothing there. There was a danger of exposure. In conversations with soldiers and officers, the questions "where did you serve?", "Who is the commander?" etc. were common, and this could lead to failure. Therefore, Linitsky decided to enter the construction site. They accepted him as a laborer, then moved to the factory, where, as Leonid Leonidovich later wrote, he received a real work hardening. Here

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However, at the factory, he met his future wife Ekaterina Fedorovna, who became his faithful assistant throughout his later life.

All this time, Linitsky thought about establishing contact with his own people. However, there was no opportunity for this. He decided to establish contact with progressive Yugoslav organizations. In 1927, he organized a strike of workers at the factory, during which there were calls for support for the USSR. For this he was fired from his job.

Leonid Leonidovich managed to enter the medical faculty of Belgrade University, from which he graduated in 1931. He worked in various medical institutions, then went into private practice.

However, the thought that it was necessary to look for a way to contact his own people did not leave Linitsky. Later he recalled: "Repeatedly made attempts to contact comrades in Moscow and sent all sorts of ingenious letters. Finally, I succeeded, and I began to work in our glorious intelligence service.

Thus, in the early 1930s, Leonid Linitsky became involved in intelligence work from illegal positions through the INO. In those years, a number of white émigré and nationalist organizations carried out extensive work to send militants to the USSR to carry out sabotage in transport and industrial enterprises, terrorist acts against executives. This caused great damage to the country, and therefore the task of exposing and neutralizing their

activities.

The instructions of the Center emphasized: "The task is to paralyze all the active actions of the militants by carefully "development" and revealing their activity and connections on the territory of the Union ... we must concentrate our attention on terrorist-minded elements of the emigration, undercover to identify their intentions and connections. This work is very painstaking, perhaps ineffective from the very beginning, but necessary. There are no other ways."

By this time, Leonid Leonidovich occupied a respectable position in society. A doctor who had a private practice was considered a respected person in Yugoslavia. He was given access to high society, he was familiar with white generals and officers, senior officials of the state apparatus of the country, employees of foreign embassies.

Starting intelligence work alone, Linitsky subsequently created a workable residency that fully controlled the activities of the main White émigré organizations in Yugoslavia and regularly received information from Paris, where the center of these organizations was located.

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Penetration into the leading circles of the white emigration in Yugoslavia took place skillfully, without haste. An important role was played by the profession of Leonid Leonidovich, who was often invited to the homes of the leaders of emigrant organizations.

In messages to the Center, Linitsky wrote: "Today I was summoned to the Union of Disabled People by General. Skvortsov on the case. By the way, for about a month and a half I have been a doctor of the All-Yugoslav Union of Russian Military Disabled Persons and especially a doctor of the Belgrade branch of this union."

In the personal file of Linitsky, invitations from the National Labor Union of the New Generation and some other organizations are preserved, in which it is reported: "We have the honor to invite you to a meeting ...", etc.

Gradually, Leonid Leonidovich managed to infiltrate the most dangerous for the USSR organizations and institutions involved in secret work. The information he received about sending combat groups and individual terrorists to the USSR made it possible to inflict a serious blow on these organizations in Yugoslavia, and in some areas completely paralyze their activities. Thus, the Druzhina organization ceased to exist, which was engaged in sending militants through the territory of Romania. She acted in close contact with the Romanian intelligence and was under the special patronage of the representative of the ROVS in Romania, General Gerua.

Since the terrorists transferred to the USSR were arrested and put on trial, as reported in the press, there were fewer and fewer people who wanted to try their luck in the field of armed struggle against the Soviets. Therefore, some organizations, seeing the futility of this case, began to move away from terrorist activities.

Station staff used various methods to obtain data on the transferred terrorists. Linitsky's father-in-law Drakin was introduced into the local fascist organization, which was financed by the Germans Draper and Janson, who had connections with Hitler. Drakin managed to obtain photographs, biographical information on terrorists and agents from among the emigrants, who were preparing to be transferred to the USSR

The leadership of the INO often noted the successful work of Leonid Leonidovich. In the personal file there are such entries: "For a successful operation, I ask for orders to reward Comrade Linitsky"; "The material is quite interesting. On the merits of the previous assignments, there is an answer to most of them." Other evidence of a high assessment of the activities of the residency and its leader has also been preserved.

Archival documents also contain data on the provision of assistance to his mother. The resolution of one of the leaders of intelligence states: "I would like to draw your attention to the excerpt from the letter of his mother enclosed by Linitsky. The old woman is reduced and is

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in a hopeless situation. It is clear that such letters are very often discordant with our promises. Linitsky is not in a panic, but he earnestly asks us to help the old woman.

For my part, I ask you to "press" Kharkov so that she is reinstated in the service. In the meantime, it is urgent to send her 500 rubles.

In addition to obtaining information in the usual way, the residency carried out several acute measures to obtain especially valuable documentary materials. We are talking about secret seizure of documents from the safes of some leaders of the ROVS and NTSNI. In the safes of these individuals, especially important materials were stored, often relating to contacts with the intelligence services of Western countries, plans for upcoming operations on the territory of the USSR, and some other important documents.

After the arrest of the members of the residency to investigate the circumstances of the case, the leadership of the ROVS created its own special investigative commission headed by the former tsarist senator Tregubov (the official investigation was conducted by the Serbian secret police). The conclusion of the commission of inquiry, drawn up in 1937, provides data on how the scout gradually penetrated the leading bodies of the white emigration and how he got

secret information. These data correspond to the actual state of affairs, and therefore it is not without interest to present them here.

"Linitsky's main task," the report noted, "was to collect information about the IV department of the ROVS, especially about his secret work, and we must do him justice, he systematically begins to implement this task. On May 3, 1933, he fills out a questionnaire for enrollment as a member of the Belgrade branch of the Gallipoli; July 26 of the same year fills in the second same sheet. None of these lists contains the signatures of the guarantors or any indication of their identity. Even if we admit that he entered the Gallipoli society on May 3, then on May 17, that is, two weeks later, he is already mentioned in the minutes of the board meeting, on June 21 of the same 1933 he is co-opted into the board, on January 3, 1934 ... becomes a full member of the board, in which position he held until the day of his arrest.

And further: "Simultaneously with the rapid advance to the local Gallipoli center, Linitsky first joins the group formed by Lieutenant Colonel Kozubsky for the study of the USSR and, for the "development" of topics, goes to Captain Komarovsky in the office of the Main Directorate of the department, and after Komarovsky refused to do reports to them from the Gallipoli people, Linitsky replaces him, and under the pretext of collecting information for these reports, begins to visit Komarovsky more often and even take materials from him to his house.

In November 1934, Linitsky was entrusted with the duties of secretary of the board of the Belgrade branch of the Gallipoli.

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tsev, which he carried until December 10 of the same year. However, the obviously advantageous position of the secretary, which not only makes it possible to know all (even confidential) correspondence of the society, but also allows you to openly get acquainted with many papers in the office of the GU department, prompted Linitsky to continue to call himself such after leaving the post of secretary, due to which not only many officers, but even the military agent Colonel Bazarevich considered him to be a secretary. Bazarevich wrote in his own hand that Dr. Linitsky had been working in the second room of the Chancellery for the last 7-8 months before his arrest "as secretary of the Belgrade branch of the Gallipoli Society." Thus, this Bolshevik agent managed to create an exceptional position for himself in the Belgrade center of the ROVS.

One of Linitsky's sources was the deputy head of the Technical Department of the EMRO, Captain Komarovsky. Komarovsky in many cases knew about the transfer of militants to the USSR and shared this information with Linitsky, and sometimes gave him secret assignments of an undercover nature.

The Center recommended to Linitsky at the trial not to link his activities with Soviet intelligence, but to act under the banner of an independent political organization fighting against the terrorist activities of individual leaders of the white emigration. It was necessary to outline such a line of defense for the defendants in order to emphasize that they acted out of love for the Motherland, did not harm Yugoslavia by any of their actions, and they tried to bring information about the terrorist activities of individual White Guard groups to the attention of their state and the world community. It was also important in the course of the trial to expose the true role of the ROVS and the NTSNP, to show how much harm they inflicted on Yugoslavia with their terrorist activities. Such a line was supposed to show the public of Yugoslavia that the leaders of white émigré organizations were using the territory of their country for provocative purposes.

The leaders of the ROVS and the NTSNP sought to influence the course of the investigation in their own way. It was important for them to accuse Linitsky and his group of espionage and to cover up their terrorist activities, to reassure the white émigré community. Presenting the case in such a way that the Linitsky group was working against Serbia, collecting espionage data about this country, they hoped to deflect the blow from themselves.

At the trial, Linitsky was charged with collecting information about the strategic railways being built in Yugoslavia, about the supply of military materials from Germany, photographing the bridge, and obtaining data on the number of Russian officers serving in the Yugoslav army. , in copying the secret acts of Yugoslavia.

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During the investigation, the detainees were treated extremely cruelly. They were beaten, tortured, trying to get information that would confirm the group's involvement in espionage activities. Leonid Leonidovich tried at every opportunity to morally support his comrades, took the blame for everything on himself, at face-to-face confrontations he made it clear which line they should follow during interrogations.

The arrested members of the group clearly followed the line pursued by the resident, and in their testimonies confirmed that they worked against the ROVS and the NTSNP for ideological reasons, that they did not commit any illegal actions against Yugoslavia. This was true, and the investigation, no matter how hard they tried, could not incriminate them with espionage.

Along with this, Linitsky carried out another action, which in many respects mixed up the cards of the organizers of the process. During the investigation and during the trial, he named among the members of his organization several of the most odious white émigré figures from whom he received information (this was actually the case, but with one exception - they did not know that they were dealing with a Soviet intelligence officer ). He named Captain Komarovsky, who was suspected of having links with British and Polish intelligence, as the real head of the organization.

This turn of events dramatically changed the situation. The leaders of the ROVS began to conduct their own investigations, which seriously agitated the White émigré organizations not only in Yugoslavia, but in other European countries.

Information about the terrorist activities of the ROVS and the NTSNP also reached the League of Nations. Responses appeared in the press, which spoke of the need to bring to justice the opposing side, that is, white terrorist organizations.

The resulting situation complicated the position of the prosecution. The materials of the investigation were sent not to the court, but to the Ministry of Justice, then to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and after that they were considered by the Council of Ministers. As a result, it was decided to transfer the materials to the court only for 4 people, among whom was Captain Komarovsky. The court found Linitsky and his assistant guilty only of stealing documents from a safe and carrying out propaganda harmful to Yugoslavia.

Leonid Leonidovich was sentenced to 2 years 8 months hard labor, the deputy received 1 year in prison, Drakin - 6 months, captain Komarovsky was acquitted, but he was asked to leave the country.

The decision of the court increased the strife among the leaders and confusion among the rank and file members. The leaders of terrorist organizations and groups began to have suspicions about each other, they saw "red agents" everywhere. Even Senator Tregubov was forced to conclude: "... except for the revealed spy line

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Linitsky, there should be another, more conspiratorial intelligence organization of the Bolsheviks, whose duty is to cover prominent figures of the local Russian emigration.

Therefore, it is necessary to recommend to the ROVS organizations not to lull themselves with the fact that the Linitsky spy group has been liquidated, and to redouble their attention and caution, remembering that the enemy does not sleep and his reconnaissance tentacles imperceptibly penetrate our environment and tenaciously entangle it.

The process seriously shook the foundations of white émigré organizations engaged in terrorist activities and actually paralyzed their activity.

The families of Linitsky and some other members of the residency were transferred to Austria. The expulsion procedure was accompanied by the use of violence and cruelty. A group of women was brought to the border and, at gunpoint, forced to follow to the Austrian territory. Shots were fired from the Austrian side, the group was detained and sent back to Yugoslav territory. This procedure was repeated several times. Exhausted people were exhausted and could no longer move on. Then the police took them to the border in the mountains, showed them the direction where to go, and they themselves got into cars and left. A few hours later, the group reached the Austrian settlement, then reached the railway station and arrived in Vienna by train, where they were met by employees of the Soviet embassy. After some time, the deportees were sent to their homeland.

As for Leonid Leonidovich, he completely served his term. However, when only a few days remained before his release, information was received about the preparation of a terrorist act against him. The order of the leaders of the émigré organizations not to let Linitsky out of Yugoslavia alive forced the Center to take protective measures. While still in prison, the USSR embassy handed him a notice of admission to Soviet citizenship. On a private plane, Linitsky was transported to one of the European countries. A few days later he was in Moscow.

But Moscow met the scout unkindly. It was 1938. Leonid was informed that his mother had been arrested in 1937 and shot as an "unconfessed Polish spy". The scout was offered to go to Kharkov, where his family lived, and get a job in a hospital.

Leonid Leonidovich worked first in the city hospital, then before the start of the war in a military hospital. At his request, the mother's case was retried, and in 1940 he was informed that she had been repressed on a false denunciation and fully rehabilitated.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Leonid Leonidovich was again invited to work in foreign intelligence. He was offered

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work behind enemy lines. Without hesitation, he agreed. Training began for him and his wife in skydiving, radio engineering, demolition, and other tricks necessary to work behind enemy lines. The scouts took their baptism of fire in the summer of 1942, during the rapid advance of the Germans on Stalingrad. I had to participate in bloody defensive battles along with the retreating units of the Red Army. Then the intelligence leadership decided to use Linitsky to work in Yugoslavia, where a broad partisan movement was unfolding. In connection with the fact that Ekaterina Fedorovna was soon to give birth, it was decided to send Leonid Leonidovich to the task of one.

The scout was thrown out with a parachute on the territory of Yugoslavia. Together with the partisans, he fought, made heavy marches and at the same time obtained information and reported it to the Center. Among the partisans, he met acquaintances with whom he worked at the factory, his former patients and, of course, friends with whom he served time in prison.

Intelligence work L.L. Linitsky in Yugoslavia continued until the liberation of the country. During the fighting, he was shell-shocked, but did not leave his post. At the end of April 1945 he returned to Moscow.

In 1946, Linitsky again went abroad to work from illegal positions. In connection with the beginning of the Cold War and the unfolding arms race, the task of obtaining intelligence information about the plans and practical activities of the alleged enemy was very acute.



Leonid Leonidovich worked in several countries and successfully coped with the tasks set. Recently, he had to work in difficult climatic conditions. Old wounds made themselves felt, but Leonid Leonidovich did not even think about treatment, he continued intelligence work with even greater energy, successfully solving complex operational problems. tasks.

However, poor health let the scout down: in 1954, Linitzky died suddenly of heart failure. The document, signed by the leadership of foreign intelligence, stated: "Our valuable illegal worker, Colonel Leonid Leonidovich Linitzky, died in the line of duty ... He devoted himself to work completely, putting public interests above personal ones. Ready to take on any task.

Thus, a talented intelligence officer, a wonderful person, a faithful son of his Fatherland, passed away.

Center of Russian white emigration in Yugoslavia.

eleven

In the flames of the Spanish war

The Spanish Civil War in 1936-1939 gave rise to an extensive historical, journalistic and memoir literature in many countries of the world, including the Soviet Union. The main aspects of the Spanish problem have been studied in sufficient detail and thoroughly by historians and political scientists. Some prominent Soviet state, political and public figures, as well as military leaders who took direct part in the battles and served as advisers in the republican armed forces, shared their memories of those significant events. And yet it is hardly possible to consider this topic exhausted. In particular, information about the work that was done in Spain by Soviet foreign intelligence has not yet been retrieved from archival repositories and made available to the general readership. Now the time has come for this.

As is known, an agreement on mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations was reached between the republican leadership of Spain and the USSR back in 1933. But in fact, the embassy of the USSR in Madrid began to function only in August 1936, when Spain was already engulfed in the Civil War. In accordance with an interstate agreement, the Soviet Union undertook not only to provide the Spanish government with military and military-technical assistance, but also to send its specialists to work "as advisers in the highest headquarters of the Republican army and in other institutions." By the latter, both sides meant, first of all, the security agencies. In September 1936, with the sanction of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, in fulfillment of the official request of the Spanish side, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR established its representation at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Spain, which, in the official

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correspondence was referred to as residency. This body was headed by Alexander Mikhailovich Orlov!. Naum Markovich Belkin became his deputy.

The main duty of the residency, operating under the cover of the Soviet embassy, was to provide the leadership of the USSR with intelligence and counterintelligence information on the entire spectrum of Spanish problems. As for interaction with the Spanish Ministry of Internal Affairs, this meant providing Spanish partners with advisory and other assistance in creating and organizing the activities of their own state security agencies.

A.M. Orlov and N.M. Belkin quickly established direct contacts with the Spanish leadership: Minister of Defense Prieto, ministers of the interior and justice, their deputies, as well as senior officials at all levels in the security service (Seguridad). For two s

For half of the war years, these posts were held by many figures who differed significantly from each other in political convictions and preferences, business and personal qualities. They treated the Soviet Union in different ways and assessed its help, role and significance in the Spanish epic. But almost all of them were distinguished by a lack or low level of professionalism and, as a result, an underestimation of the active work of the Francoist special services and the foreign intelligence services that supported them. There was also an acute shortage of trained and, most importantly, reliable local personnel. In such a complex and volatile political and operational environment, Soviet intelligence officers had to deal with numerous delicate problems on a daily basis with their Spanish colleagues and, in parallel, acquire sources of the necessary intelligence and counterintelligence information.

The Spanish Republicans at the end of 1936 did not have at their disposal any state body, which, even with a very big stretch, could be called foreign intelligence. However, the idea of creating such a body, born in the Spanish Foreign Ministry, was readily taken up by the Soviet resident and his deputy. With their assistance, already at the beginning of 1937, a special information service of the Foreign Ministry was launched with branches in a number of European capitals. It was named the Diplomatic Cabinet, with the task of "gradually establishing awareness in different countries, mainly among journalists and

plomatov".

A few months later, a variety of political, economic and military information began to arrive from Spanish foreign missions. Of greatest importance were the data on the build-up of the military potential of Germany and Italy and on their military-political plans in Europe and in the world. Especially re

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Work proceeded successfully in France and Czechoslovakia. Until the end of the war, the Spanish friends fraternally shared the information they had obtained with their Soviet colleagues and mentors.

Cooperation between the NKVD of the USSR and the Spanish security agencies went far beyond contacts between their representatives in Madrid, Valencia and Barcelona. Up-to-date information about the secret plans of Germany, Italy and other states regarding Spain, obtained by Soviet intelligence as a whole, was used to guide the Spanish leadership. Various operational activities were also carried out, aimed at facilitating the Spanish friends in their struggle against the Francoists. For example, on the territory of France, Soviet intelligence officers helped the Spaniards in organizing meetings with agents working in the territory occupied by the Francoists.

In accordance with the personal sanction of I.V. Stalin dated January 19, 1937, Soviet intelligence officers, together with their Spanish colleagues, organized the transfer to Spain of several hundred Russian internationalist volunteers from France, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Russian emigrants predominated among them, including former White Guards who left Russia after 1917. The selection of candidates, their primary check, training and instruction were carried out by the Unions for the Return to the Homeland, which were officially registered public organizations in the countries mentioned above. This contingent of international brigades was used with great efficiency as leaders and instructors of military affairs in training centers, seniors in reconnaissance and sabotage groups, fighters guarding important facilities, as well as military translators.

A lot of work on the Spanish line was carried out in France by the illegal residency under the leadership of the prominent Soviet intelligence officer Ya.I. Serebryansky. The operation to ferry French planes to Spain has already been mentioned in the essay on France. In August-September 1936, with the help of agent Bernadette, 20 French military aircraft were purchased, including several of the latest design. Specially selected and trained pilots successfully overtook this aircraft from Paris to Barcelona on several flights. The whole complex and risky operation from beginning to end was kept secret from the French

authorities, as well as from the "all-seeing eye" of the German and Italian intelligence agencies, who worked closely with the Francoists.

Here are two more facts. The Ernst group in France mined seven German transport ships en route to Spain with a cargo of arms and ammunition for the Francoists. After the explosions, these ships sank in the open sea. Agent F., acting alone in one of the European ports, disabled

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engines of German transports equipped to sail to Spain, pouring mercury into them.

After the fall of the republican regime, Soviet intelligence officers made a feasible contribution to saving a number of Spanish colleagues from imminent physical reprisal and alleviated the desperate situation in which some of the fighters and commanders of the international brigades found themselves.

The Spanish republicans did not inherit institutions from the previous political regime that would professionally deal with issues of ensuring state security. At first, they did not feel a conscious need for them, often confusing and mixing up the usual struggle against criminal and other antisocial elements with the suppression of subversive activities and counter-espionage. After lengthy and complex discussions, the Soviet representatives managed to convince the local leaders of the need to create a specialized counterintelligence department under the Ministry of Internal Affairs with branches in regional centers and large cities. Along with this, the system of counterintelligence services for the headquarters and formations of the republican army was also formed and debugged at an accelerated pace. In order to protect the international brigades from penetration into their ranks by enemy agents, a special department was formed in the city of Albacete with its grassroots structures in the military units of foreign volunteers. An important and purely Spanish element of the created counter-intelligence system was a specialized unit within the Seguridad, which received the code name "information department". It was vested with the right to arrest and investigate. A detachment of 100 armed police officers was assigned to him as a rapid reaction task force.

Already at the beginning of 1937, this joint work of Soviet and Spanish colleagues began to bear the first fruits. In a number of cities, the underground Francoist organizations "United Spain" and "Spanish Falange" were uncovered and neutralized, a network of German and Italian agents in the army, navy and police was revealed. Information about their subversive work was used by the Prime Minister in an address to the people, and was widely covered in the local press.

During the entire period of the war, the Spanish counterintelligence officers waged a fierce and sometimes bloody struggle with the agents of the Francoist special services, which were called the "fifth column". By the way, this term, born during the Spanish Civil War, has firmly established itself as a common noun and has become international. It should be noted that the "five-columns" operating in the rear of the Republicans were well organized, their operations were distinguished by audacity and ruthlessness. For example, in the summer of 1937 in Cartagena, the ship of the line Jaime I was blown up and sunk.

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blican navy. On January 10, 1938, an artillery ammunition depot located in an underground tunnel of the Madrid Metro was destroyed. A huge explosion completely destroyed the facility, killing 173 people, including all employees and warehouse workers. A few days later, the Francoists gleefully reported on the radio about this sabotage, noting that it was carried out by their agent - the secretary of the office of the warehouse, "who died a heroic death in the performance of the assignment." On the Central Front, an underground organization of doctors from military hospitals was exposed, who had massively amputated the limbs of wounded soldiers, and

especially officers, in cases where such a surgical intervention was not at all caused by a medical necessity.

Sniper shooting by "five-columns" from the roofs of houses at military personnel, signaling with rockets at night during the bombing of Soviet ships by Francoist aircraft, which were unloading in Cartagena and Alicante, became commonplace.

The testimonies of numerous accomplices of the enemy who were neutralized in a timely manner testified that the "fifth column" had agents in state institutions, military structures, political parties and trade unions. That is why the Francoists knew quite a bit about the situation in the republican leadership, about its military-political plans and plans.

The young Spanish counterintelligence, relying on the advisory assistance of Soviet representatives, sometimes delivered tangible blows to the "fifth column", but was not able to completely defeat it until the end of the war. The "five-columns" retained their underground warehouses of weapons and military equipment, a printing house and a radio station in Madrid. Before the troops of General Franco entered the capital, they occupied the main strategic points of the city.

The work of the Soviet representatives with the Spanish partners contributed to the security of the citizens of the USSR, whose number in Spain at that time reached several hundred. Sometimes it was about their life and death in the truest sense of the word. In particular, the Francoists seized the crews of two Soviet steamships sunk by them, took four of our pilots prisoner. Measures were taken to rescue them, but they did not give positive results even with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross, until the Spanish friends, at the request of the residency, offered the Francoists to exchange Soviet hostages for a group of agents of the "fifth column", sentenced to death for espionage and awaiting the execution of the sentence.

In Soviet memoirs, the most complete coverage was given to the practice of using partisan methods during the Spanish Civil War. The very idea of reconnaissance and sabotage activities in the Francoist rear came from the Soviet Union.

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Union and was implemented by the Spanish partners with the active assistance and direct participation of the employees of the NKVD of the USSR. Memories on this topic, left by some "Spaniards" of that era, can now be supplemented with information from the archives of Russian foreign intelligence.

Already at the end of 1936, a school was organized under the republican security agencies to train commanders of reconnaissance and sabotage groups and detachments for operations behind enemy lines. Later, three more such closed educational institutions were created. The selection of Spaniards and volunteers of other nationalities for training was carried out quite carefully. The greatest contribution to the organization of work along the "D" line was made by the staff of the residency Lev Petrovich Vasilevsky and the military intelligence officer Ilya Grigoryevich Starinov. The first was a senior adviser to the special department of the Madrid Front. After returning from Spain, he continued to work in Soviet foreign intelligence. After his retirement, he devoted himself to literary work. In particular, he wrote a fascinating story about a prominent Soviet intelligence officer G.S. Syroyezhkin, who was also a residency officer in Spain.

I.G. Starinov not only taught at the above-mentioned schools a technical support course for sabotage units, but also took a direct part in the manufacture of explosive devices and special-purpose equipment. The fighters of special groups and detachments rightly considered him a "co-author" of a number of operations, as a result of which the Francoists lost 22 railway echelons with military equipment and manpower. During the Great Patriotic War, he served in the central headquarters of the partisan movement. In the 70s he taught at the Red Banner Institute of the KGB of the USSR. Became a candidate of technical

Sciences, professor, prepared more than 40 scientific papers. Among specialists, his monograph "Partisan War" is well known.

Reconnaissance and sabotage units soon operated on all fronts. They obtained valuable military and military-political information, seized "languages", disabled important facilities, undermined railway and highway bridges, disrupted communication lines, and destroyed enemy military equipment and manpower. The archives have preserved many reports on the operations carried out. We confine ourselves here to excerpts from the Resident's report on this topic to the Center dated December 9, 1937:

"The work carried out in the rear of the "D" led to a serious disruption of individual sections of the rear of the Francoists and significant material and human losses. Continuous and consistent actions of our "D" groups, their use of the most diverse, rapidly changing and constantly improving methods, our coverage of almost all decisive sectors of the front, the advancement of "D"

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actions in the rear caused great panic in the fascist ranks. All intelligence reports and our agents speak of this, this is also confirmed by a number of official materials known to us (newspaper articles, fascist orders, radio broadcasts).

This state of the fascist rear, the constant tension of the Francoists, the fear of the "tricks of the red dynamites" that constantly haunts them, sometimes exaggerated and inflated by all sorts of rumors, we consider the main achievement in the "D" work.

We know for sure that in order to combat sabotage, the fascists are forced to keep significant military forces and armed groups of phalangists in the rear. All, even insignificant, objects are heavily guarded. In August 1937, the commander of the Southern Fascist Front, General Chiappo de Llano, issued an order declaring martial law in the provinces of Seville, Huelva and Badajoz. The activities of the fascist command related to the implementation of this order provide for the diversion of significant military forces from the front.

In addition to the NKVD, work along the "D" line was also carried out by representatives of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. They started sabotage activities a little later, and its scale was smaller. In the fall of 1937, the Spanish leadership, in agreement with the Soviet side, decided to unite the entire "partisan economy" within the 14th special corps, which was subordinate to the General Staff of the Republican Armed Forces. At the same time, the institute of advisers to the NKVD and the RU General Staff of the Red Army was preserved. At the end of 1938, a new reorganization took place, carried out without taking into account the critical remarks of the Soviet side: reconnaissance and sabotage groups and detachments were reorganized into companies and attached to separate military formations at their places of deployment at the front. This led to the dispersal of the forces of the partisan units and their use mainly for solving problems in the front line. Operations in the deep rear thus faded into the background, and soon ceased altogether. In time, this reorganization coincided with the strengthening of opinion in the highest echelons of the political leadership and the military command of Spain against the further deployment of guerrilla warfare. The supporters of this position managed to prove the need to "slow down the partisanship", because the more powerful the blows to the rear of the Francoists became, the more fiercely they took countermeasures, which led to an increase in losses in the troops and increased repression against the civilian population. Moreover, some figures openly declared that this type of struggle is foreign and in no way suitable for Spanish conditions. They strongly opposed the creation

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large detachments for long-term use in the deep rear, limited to authorizing only short raids of small groups in the front line.

There were other difficulties in relations with the Spanish partners, which were based on both objective circumstances and purely personal mistakes and blunders of Soviet instructors and advisers. For example, there was a strict ban on the staff of the residency to take personal part in combat operations behind enemy lines. Nevertheless, it was often violated, although such cases, as a rule, became known after the return of the "guilty" from the raids or their death. Although very rare, "misconducts" took place, one of which the resident reported indignantly to the Center on September 9, 1937:

"Excellent qualification of K.P. Orlovsky? known, but politically it is little developed. He let us down badly: instructing 17 German communists before the operation, he promised them 100 pesetas per person for a successful job. Naturally, they were outraged by the bribery, and we hardly managed to make amends."

As noted above, Soviet foreign intelligence in Spain was represented by the NKVD and RU General Staff of the Red Army. They exchanged military and operational information obtained on the spot, consulted on problems that arose, and coordinated their actions in matters related to maintaining relations with their Spanish colleagues. The merit in establishing such comradely interaction belongs by right to A.M. Orlov and N.M. Belkin (from the NKVD) and Yan Karlovich Berzin and Grigory Mikhailovich Stern, who were the first chief military advisers. Archival documents and memoirs of many "Spaniards" testify that it was these four who showed a sincere and fundamental interest in business cooperation, in creating an environment conducive to joint operational activities. So, in December 1937, a slightly damaged German Heinkel-111 high-speed bomber made a forced landing on the territory controlled by the Republicans. In the course of complex and lengthy negotiations with the Spaniards, Prime Minister Negrin and Minister of Defense Prieto were persuaded to transfer this aircraft to the Soviet Union. It was dismantled into parts, packed in boxes and sent by sea to the USSR,

It cannot be said that relations between Soviet intelligence officers and Spanish partners have always been trouble-free and cloudless. First of all, they were sometimes adversely affected by the political and ideological heterogeneity that was characteristic of the Spanish republican leadership in general, in particular the Popular Front. In his message to

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As early as December 29, 1936, a resident of the Center, for example, noted: "The advice that we give to the central apparatus of state security, and all our assistance in the form of instructions and operational guidance, have not yet reached the places. There, political parties create their own counterintelligence agencies, they are led by local committees of the Popular Front.

On April 22, 1937, he touches on this topic again: "The fight against counter-revolution and espionage has rapidly increased, but it has become extremely difficult politically. Each party considers it its duty to protect the spies who are its members, thus trying to whitewash itself.

Anarchists and Trotskyists were especially zealous in this respect. There was such a case: one of the leaders of the Madrid police obtained irrefutable evidence that his subordinate was a Francoist agent who stole the cipher documents of the headquarters of the Madrid Front. Since the traitor was in the anarchist party, they defended him with a mountain and did everything so that he avoided the deserved punishment. Moreover, in their newspapers, the anarchists published a photo of his whistleblower with the call: "Know how to remember the faces of provocateurs!"

Difficulties in relations with Spanish partners also arose due to the incompetence and irresponsibility of some senior officials of the local special services. With the help of the residency, for example, the procedure for regularly informing the Minister of the Interior in the form of secret reports and bulletins of the Seguridad was established. One of these documents reported on the discovery in Valencia of a large underground group of Francoists and on the operational measures that were proposed to be carried out to neutralize it. What a shock the Spanish counterintelligence officers and their Soviet colleagues experienced when their report was published in the press at the direction of the minister himself! The resident ended his report to the Center about this emergency with bitter words: "As a result, the planned operation was failed. And the Minister of the Interior passed it with impunity. Such are the customs here ..."

Unfortunately, complications also arose due to certain ill-conceived actions of the Soviet side. So, in a special report of the NKVD on Spanish affairs dated March 27, 1937 addressed to I.V. Stalin stated: "The employees of our residency are directly involved in the interrogations of the most prominent spies - the Germans and Italians, the sanction against which is already a foregone conclusion." As you can see, this course of action was recognized as normal. However, such interference could not but cause dissatisfaction among the employees of the Spanish investigative authorities. The realization of this came only after some time, and this practice was stopped.

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The scouts made mistakes in accurately informing the Center and the Spanish leaders. For example, one late evening, a station officer in Albacete reported that a major sabotage had been committed at the local airfield. Without verifying the accuracy of this information, the deputy resident sent a telegram to Moscow, and there, on its basis, they compiled a special message addressed to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and K.E. Voroshilov. In Valencia, Minister of Defense Prieto was roused from his bed, by order of which a police detachment was urgently transferred to the emergency area by truck to search for and detain saboteurs. It soon became clear that there was no emergency, but only an isolated explosion of several old artillery shells in one of the warehouses. This incident infuriated Prieto and did nothing to improve his relationship with his Soviet colleagues. Such incidents were very painfully experienced by the staff of the residency and were assessed self-critically. In particular, in the report on the work for 1938, Naum Isaakovich Eitingon, who replaced A.M. Orlov as a resident, wrote: "I believe that it is necessary once and for all to put an end to fraud and teach our workers to tell you things as they really are. Once again I emphasize how dangerous it is to fantasize instead of deeds."

The service library of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia in Yasenevo holds a unique book - "Espionage in Spain", published in Barcelona by the "Unity" publishing house in 1938, and its translation in Russian, but under a different title - "Spanish Trotskyists in the Service of Franco ". Its author, Max Rieger, calls himself a member of the Socialist Party, an ordinary soldier, and then the commander of a machine-gun company of an international brigade. According to him, he fought at the front for 15 months, and with this publication he intends to "give the reader the human truth about the heroic struggle of the Spanish people and, with official documents in hand, expose his traitors on the territory of the republic itself." We must pay tribute to the author: his book contains a lot of factual material, mainly about the unseemly activities of the organization of the Spanish Trotskyists (the United Marxist Workers' Party - POUM), which is of historical value even today.

Apparently, the reader of that time could not help wondering how an ordinary International Brigadier, who was almost always at the forefront of the front, managed to collect such essentially secret data, process them and coherently present them. It arose among researchers of our days, and the answer was found in archival intelligence documents: the materials for the mentioned book were collected by A.M. Orlov. Their literary processing belongs to the pen of a professional journalist, a confidant of the residency. The publication itself was one of the active measures of Soviet intelligence against international Trotskyism.

This, of course, is not the place to analyze the reasons why Trotskyism was declared by the leadership of the CPSU(b) and the USSR to be a hostile ideological and political trend. However, it must be borne in mind that the Spanish Civil War coincided with the height of a broad campaign against Trotskyism in the Soviet Union and in the international communist movement. It is quite logical that work against the "foreign" supporters of this trend was included in the list of tasks facing the Soviet foreign intelligence in general and the Spanish residency in particular. And it must be admitted that the activities of the small, but active and aggressive POUM objectively created many grounds and reasons for this. Numerous facts testify that the Trotskyists openly allowed themselves to demand the dispersal of parliament and the overthrow of the government of the Popular Front, allowed attacks on the prime minister: "Franco is a fascist. Negrin is also a fascist." Their arsenal included such methods as spreading provocative rumors, supporting defeatist sentiments, and sabotaging the formation of a regular army. The Trotskyists were especially embittered about everything connected with the Soviet Union. Their press organs constantly held the palm in all anti-Soviet campaigns of those years. For example, here are the texts

leaflets:

"Spanish workers! Do not trust the help of the USSR. Think carefully about the real aims of these newfound "friends."

"Down with interference in Spanish affairs by Germany, Italy and the USSR! They are all trading in our people!"

The leaders of the republican government and the Popular Front paid almost no attention to such antics, motivating their passivity by the fact that the POUM was a small organization that did not have a broad social base. Only the Communist Party of Spain expressed concern. But its activists were usually objected to: the KPI and POUM are communist organizations, so sort out your own strife. And this connivance ended in May 1937 with a bloody anti-state rebellion in Barcelona, which was inspired and organized by Trotskyists and anarchists. For three days, government troops fought heavy battles with the rebels in the capital of Catalonia. About a thousand people died, and there were almost 3,000 wounded. Only after that, on June 16, by order of the Minister of the Interior, almost the entire composition of the Central Committee of the POUM, headed by Andreas Ninomb, was arrested. An investigation has begun. The party was not outlawed, but its party committees and press organs were closed, archives seized and sealed. In September 1937, the security forces seized a Francoist resident and uncovered his extensive network of agents, which also consisted of members of the POUM. Several protracted trials were held, but the defendants received almost

symbolic

punishment. The main result of all these measures was that the POUM ceased to exist as a political organization even before the end of the Civil War.

And about one more delicate side of the Soviet-Spanish cooperation through the special services. When the Soviet Union began to provide republican Spain with wide and varied assistance, the Soviet mass media began to report daily on the course of hostilities in that country, on many internal and international aspects of the Spanish problem from a specific angle. First of all, the names of the leaders of the Spanish communists were mentioned: Dolores Ibarruri, José Diaz. And people could not help but get the impression that it was the CPI that was the only leading political force, the main inspirer and organizer of the popular resistance to the Francoists. In reality, however, this was not entirely the case. In no case should one underestimate the truly heroic merits of the communists, their consistency in the fight against the fascists, patriotism and selflessness, however, their role in the system of the multi-party Popular Front, the degree of influence on state affairs



were unjustifiably exaggerated and overestimated by the Soviet side. Naturally, all departments, including foreign intelligence, were obliged to strictly and rigorously adhere to the line set by the leadership of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and focus on the KPI.

In the initial period of the war, the major political parties of the Popular Front created their own intelligence and counterintelligence services, as well as entire security paramilitary units. In a report to the Center dated January 10, 1937, the resident, in particular, noted that the communists were being assisted in organizing their own intelligence and counterintelligence and that this work was considered a priority. The residency workers led the guard brigade for members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KPI, although officially this was not part of their duties in accordance with the Spanish-Soviet agreements and agreements on the interstate line. Special reports on the actions of reconnaissance and sabotage groups and detachments in the Francoist rear, compiled according to Soviet instructors and advisers, were sent personally to the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and ... to the military commission of the Central Committee of the KPI, which could not be classified as an organ of the system we are the Spanish state apparatus.

Using their capabilities and personal authority, Soviet instructors and advisers, in accordance with the instructions of their leadership, sought to promote and secure key positions in local special services, primarily members of the Communist Party. Meetings of the heads and employees of the residency with prominent figures of the KPI were held, as a rule, without observing elementary requirements

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conspiracies, they were known, perhaps, by everyone who could be interested in it. Such a demonstration of "special" relations with the Communist Party could not but irritate other top Spanish leaders and aroused their corresponding opposition. By July 1937, the "honeymoon" (according to A. M. Orlov) of friendship between socialists and communists was over. Communists began to be expelled from important state institutions, including law enforcement agencies. All this, as well as the deterioration of the situation at the front every day more and more negatively and painfully affected the state of interaction with the Spanish partners.

In order to judge as objectively as possible about the work of Soviet intelligence officers in Spain, one must remember and take into account the fact that they acted in conditions when mass unreasonable repressions were carried out in their homeland, tried and physically destroyed "enemies of the people", exposed "spies" "foreign states, branded "renegades", "deviators", etc., etc. This information reached Spain not only through official channels. People were nervous, unsettled, sometimes in a state of deep depression. Here are a few such everyday situations.

The families of the group of military advisers suddenly, without explanation, stopped being paid the due allowance. It turned out that these commanders fell under suspicion, since before leaving for Spain they were received and admonished by M.N. Tukhachevsky. A specialist who worked as the director of a military plant in Barcelona learned in a roundabout way that his wife had been arrested in Moscow.

The residency received instructions from the Center to take in "development" the stenographer of the trade mission T., since she had previously allegedly maintained friendly relations with M.N. Tukhachevsky, to establish surveillance over a residency officer who was familiar with the arrested Trotskyist in the past. It was also proposed to take under control the Polish General Karol Swierczewski, an international brigade officer, because he was allegedly in an "unhealthy mood" in connection with the arrest in Moscow of three representatives of the Polish section of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on charges of espionage. And the resident reported:

"The head of the group of Polish internationalists has an embittered, hostile mood. He openly expresses doubts about the plausibility of the charges brought against the detainees.

accusations. He has known these people for 20 years and does not believe that they can be enemies of the people." Yezhov's ax thoroughly walked through the staff of the residency, who returned to their homeland at the end of the business trip. Some did not wait to be taken to the dungeons. In particular, on the report of Inna Natanovna Belenkaya about her work in Spain there is a note made in 1938: "Subject to arrest. She was not arrested, because committed suicide." This brave intelligence officer has been working illegally for many years.

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in Germany, Austria and China. In Spain, she conducted undercover work, assisted Spanish colleagues in investigative activities. She was distinguished by integrity, independent character and directness of judgments.

In July 1938, the residency suffered another serious blow: he unexpectedly left his post and disappeared with his wife (a staff member of the residency) and teenage daughter A.M. Orlov. A month later, the Permanent Mission of the USSR in Paris received a letter from him addressed to People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Yezhov. In it, the fugitive explained that his act was due to his unwillingness to be subjected to unreasonable repressions in his homeland, as had already happened to many of his colleagues and friends. Naum Isaakovich Eitingon was appointed acting head of the foreign apparatus in Spain. He served in intelligence since 1920 and spoke four foreign languages. He was an illegal intelligence agent in China, the USA and a number of European countries. Upon his return from Spain in 1940, he led the operation to eliminate L.D. in Mexico. Trotsky. In 1953 he was sentenced to 12 years in prison for "treason", and after his release he worked in the "International Book". In some foreign and domestic films of recent years, N.I. Eitingon is portrayed as a rude and stupid bigot with a sadistic streak. However, people who knew him, on the contrary, noted Eitingon's broad erudition, courage and determination, and a highly developed sense of responsibility.

Having taken the leadership of the residency in a critical period for her, N.I. Eitingon provided a solution to the main operational problems that kept multiplying and multiplying.

In general, the foreign apparatus continued to function more or less normally, although after the flight of A.M. Orlov, nervousness persisted, which hindered the initiative and the completion of previously begun cases. It was not possible to avoid large expenses. In particular, the implementation of the plan to create a deeply secret agent reserve for the future on the eve of the visibly impending war between the USSR and Nazi Germany was terminated. This project was codenamed "New Set". Its essence was as follows: to select from the fighters of the international brigades about 70 people who had experience of underground work and proved their reliability and loyalty in a combat situation, train them properly in a special school near Barcelona, and then send them to various countries (mainly way European) as illegal immigrants to settle as a backlog of intelligence for wartime. By the summer of 1938, this work was in full swing, but in November of the same year it was put to an end on the grounds that such "enemies of the people" as A.M. Orlov, heads of foreign intelligence I.Z. Passov and S.M. Spiegelglass. The last two were shot. On November 23, 1938, the deputy commissar of the internal

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of them cases of the USSR L.P. Beria. But during the Great Patriotic War, such a reserve for Soviet foreign intelligence, apparently, would be very useful.

From the middle of 1938, the interaction of the Soviet foreign intelligence with the Spanish partners began to gradually curtail. For some time, the functions of an intermediary between the Spanish Ministry of Internal Affairs and the residency were assumed by Prime Minister Negrin, who delegated specific contacts to his son. With the approach of the front line to Barcelona, it was necessary to send en masse released instructors and advisers, as well as to assist in the evacuation of employees of other Soviet institutions. On instructions from Moscow,

secret transfer to the USSR of a large group of leading figures of the KPI and material assets belonging to the party. In all these events, the participation of the Parisian residency was invaluable.

From January 1939, Soviet intelligence officers continued to perform their duty in fact in front-line conditions. The residency's radio station was moved from Barcelona to the outskirts, and then to the open field. But thanks to the personal courage, high skill and dedication of radio operator Nikolai Ilyich Lipovka, reliable communication with the Center was uninterrupted. This modest employee later, in the 1940s, went abroad twice and worked in the central intelligence apparatus until his retirement.

In February 1939, the residency of Soviet foreign intelligence in Spain ceased to exist. One can evaluate its efforts and their results in that period in different ways, but one cannot fail to pay tribute to the "Spaniard scouts," as they proudly called themselves. They were high-class professionals, each of them left his mark in the history of the national intelligence service. Now they are no longer with us, but their reports, letters, other documents, memories of veterans who knew them personally remained. They belong to history. Eternal them  
memory.

Undoubtedly something else. The intervention of the Nazis and Italian fascists in Spain was the eve of World War II in Europe. The duel between Soviet intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers was of international importance, reaching far beyond the borders of Spain. Hence the special acuteness and tragedy of the Spanish events, the attention to the history of the confrontation between the secret services on the Iberian peninsula, which has not weakened until recently.

! There is every reason to believe that by the mid-30s A.M. Orlov was one of the most qualified employees of the middle management of the intelligence service of that time.

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He was born in 1895 in the Belarusian city of Bobruisk into a Jewish family. His real name is Feldbin. There is a version that Stalin offered him the name Orlov, who knew him personally. In the bodies of the Cheka-OGPU - since 1920. Having a law degree, he began to work in the Economic Department, from 1925 he served in the Transcaucasus, a year later he transferred to the VINO OGPU - to intelligence. Since 1926, his trips abroad began - France, Germany. These trips were successful. It was possible to acquire valuable sources of information, to obtain useful materials of a scientific and technical nature. In 1933-1936 he worked as an illegal immigrant in Austria and Great Britain. He took part in the recruitment process of Philby (together with other operatives) and a number of other persons who later became valuable agents of Soviet foreign intelligence. By the way, Orlov met Philby in France in 1937-1938, when both of them were dealing with Spanish issues.

Orlov's escape to the West in July 1938 is a unique case in the history of Soviet intelligence, when for more than 30 years it was not determined what this departure was: an ordinary betrayal with all the usually serious consequences, or an act of self-preservation, as the intelligence service tried to convince Orlov himself.

The escape clearly damaged intelligence. Some agents known to Orlov were withdrawn, mothballed, or simply left without contact. The residency in Spain turned out to be demoralized, and only the high-willed qualities of the newly appointed head of Eitingon and the courage of the operational staff made it possible to adequately complete the planned work. Almost the entire staff of the intelligence service, especially the leadership, suffered a severe blow of a moral and psychological nature. For a long time there were fears that the most valuable agents and many secret activities would be deciphered. We add that together with Orlov, 68 thousand dollars disappeared from the cash desk of the residency.

Many years have passed. Nothing dangerous for intelligence happened. In 1953, after Stalin's death, Orlov published in the United States the book *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes*. In 1969 and

In 1971, an operative from the New York residency managed to meet with Orlov. There were extensive conversations. The former resident in Spain assured that he did not give out serious information that could really damage Soviet intelligence and the Soviet Union to the enemy. The available materials allow us to believe that Orlov did not become a traitor, a traitor to the Motherland, he turned out to be a victim of a deep human tragedy. Orlov told our operative worker that a professional intelligence officer, which he undoubtedly considered himself to be, has a sacred duty to remain silent in order to protect those who entrusted their lives to him.

By the time of his appointment as Deputy Resident in Spain, 43-year-old N.M. Belkin already had solid life and operational experience. He was attracted to intelligence work in 1924, when he was on a business trip in Arabia through the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Then he worked in Yemen and Persia. In 1931 he was registered as an intelligence cadre.

In 1933-1934 he performed tasks from illegal positions in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. After a six-month stay in Uruguay, where he recruited a valuable agent, he was sent to Berlin and assigned to work with Arvid Khar

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nakom - "Corsican", who later became an active participant in the famous "Red chapels".

Being by nature an energetic, sociable, purposeful person, speaking Arabic, French, Spanish and English, Belkin was the best suited for difficult work in war conditions. And he justified the hopes placed on him: he was a skilled organizer, successfully performed numerous tasks - consultative work with the heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, constant working contacts with representatives of the Spanish counterintelligence services at all levels, leadership of special departments in the army, communication with the periphery, etc. .d., etc.

After Orlov's flight, his deputy was recalled to the Center in August 1938 and six months later he was dismissed from the NKVD "because of the impossibility of being used." He began to work in the Radio Committee. In the spring of 1941, in his former service, Belkin was "remembered": material was prepared for his arrest as an "enemy of the people." In particular, they intended to accuse him of the fact that while working in Berlin "he was friends with the man who arranged the plane for Pyatakov to fly to Trotsky in Norway." Fortunately, this document was not approved. "The People's Commissar found that the data was not enough" – such was the resolution of the chief of intelligence on this paper.

With the outbreak of war, Belkin was drafted into the army, he became a senior political officer of the Central Military Hospital, but soon, at the initiative of the NKVD leadership, he was recalled to continue his former service in intelligence. An interesting report by Belkin dated October 20, 1941 addressed to Art. Major of State Security Sudoplatov: "On this date, I arrived at your disposal in accordance with your order." (You can't refuse the author's sense of humor ... And this is at a critical period in the defense of Moscow!)

In December of the same year, through the 4th Directorate of the NKVD, Belkin was sent to Iran to work "along the Kurdish line". There, in March 1942, he died of typhus.

The letter "D" in the official correspondence of the Chekists denoted reconnaissance and sabotage activities of partisan units on the fronts and rear of the enemy.

Vasilevsky L.P. Spanish chronicle of Gregory Grande. - M., 1974. Instructor on the line "D", during the Great Patriotic War, the famous partisan, Hero of the Soviet Union.

He took an active part in the European communist movement in the 20-30s. He was elected a member of the Central Committee of the KPI. For a long time he lived in the USSR and was General Secretary of the International of Red Trade Unions. In Moscow, he became close to L.D. Trotsky, acted as his personal secretary. In 1935 he founded the POUM in Barcelona.

### The beginning of Max's battle path

Early September 1936. Spring in Argentina. In the largest port in the South Atlantic, Buenos Aires, everyday working life goes on. Some ocean-going vessels are being unloaded, are being loaded, or others are already preparing to leave the port and enter their intercontinental routes. The docks are noisy and busy. A young man, looking no more than 25 years old, of medium height, dark-haired, in discreet light clothes, with a small suitcase in his hands, with a cheerful gait, climbs aboard a Greek ship leaving for Belgium. This is not a passenger, but a cook's assistant, hired for one flight - "there". He has a passport of a distant, almost exotic country for Latin Americans - Lithuania.

On September 25, the Greek cargo ship arrived in Antwerp. The captain paid off the assistant cook (it will forever remain a mystery how he coped with these duties), who was in a hurry to catch the Paris Express. In Paris, having met with some, as it might seem from the outside, people already familiar to him, he received recommendations from them and went straight to the Spanish embassy. A Spanish entry visa appeared on his Lithuanian passport, and he himself received a free air ticket for a flight from Toulouse to Barcelona.

This flight took place on October 5, 1936. Before the departure from Toulouse, the French border guards ordered the passenger to sign a declaration that he was going to Spain "at his own peril and risk." It was possible to understand the service people at the border: the flow of tourists to this country had dried up for several months, there was a war going on there, and only those who "really needed" went to Spain.

The further route ran through Valencia to Madrid, where the "Argentine Lithuanian" was accepted, again on the recommendation that he had already in Argentina, by one of the leaders of the Spanish Committee.

unist party. After the first interviews, when the request of the newcomer to be sent immediately to the front was completely rejected and it turned out that in addition to Spanish, French, Polish and Lithuanian, he was fluent in Russian, the conversation about his "employment" moved to a different plane.

We simply do not know the details of further negotiations, but we are aware of the results for sure. A man from Argentina was introduced to the employees of the representative office of the NKVD of the USSR under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic, established in Spain under an interstate agreement immediately after the start of the Civil War. Since that time, the fruitful work in the Soviet foreign intelligence service of Iosif Romualdovich Grigulevich began, stretching for many years.

What preceded such a bold step - the arrival of I.R. Grigulevich to Spain, what was his life path like before? Let us turn to the "questionnaire", autobiographical and other information about

German

I.R. Grigulevich (hereinafter we will refer to him by his operational pseudonym — Max) was born in May 1913 in Vilnius in the family of a pharmacy employee. Parents are natives of Lithuania, by nationality Karaites'. The son was always proud of belonging to this small nation.

The family spoke three languages: Lithuanian, Polish and Russian. In 1922, Max went to study at the gymnasium in Panevezys, in his father's homeland, where the family moved after the end of the First World War. In 1926, my father lost his job and, after unsuccessful attempts to find a job again, was forced to emigrate to Argentina in the hope of gaining a foothold there and bringing his family with him.

By 1928-1929 Max's acquaintance with the members of the underground organization of the communist youth of Lithuania, which operated in the gymnasium, dates back to 1929. Gradually the young man becomes its active participant. Enhanced self-education with the help of the rich book fund of the gymnasium library, the involvement of young underground workers in the activities of the political circle, the very situation in Lithuania at that time - everything influenced the formation of Max's worldview in a completely specific direction. "It was then that I began to gain mind-mind," he will write later in his autobiography.

In 1929, at the request of the police, Max was expelled from the gymnasium as an "active communist", which in those conditions meant receiving a "wolf ticket". So that her son could study again, the mother decided to leave for Vilnius, where her sisters lived, and soon Max again found himself in his hometown, but on the territory of another state - Poland. He continued his studies at the Vytautas the Great Gymnasium. Established contact with the Communist Youth Union of Western Belarus, became its activist. Since 1930 - a member of the Polish Communist Party, a year later he became a member of the Lithuanian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Western Belarus. Gradually, Max gained experience with people,

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mastered the skills of the underground. But it was difficult to compete with professionals from the Polish youth police. On February 25, 1932, Max and a group of his comrades were arrested for anti-state activities. In the well-known city prison Lukiszki, which still stands in the very center of Vilnius, lengthy interrogations, provocative proposals from the jailers, and threats followed. Most of those arrested held firm. The authorities did not have serious evidence of their guilt, several guys were released pending trial, but the process nevertheless took place. Max and one of his comrades in May 1932 were sentenced to 2 years of probation in prison. The relatively mild sentence was due not so much to the lack of hard evidence as to political considerations. It was more profitable for the Polish authorities only to intimidate young Lithuanians than to agitate the influential Lithuanian public, which could accuse the Pilsudski regime of infringing on the freedoms and interests of the national

minorities.

In August 1933, the prosecutor's office suggested that Max leave Poland. We had to decide what to do next. His mother had died the year before. There are no relatives left. After consulting with friends, he decided to go to Paris, traditionally one of the centers of Polish emigration. Warmly saying goodbye to his comrades, he left for Warsaw. There he received the addresses of the turnouts in Paris, money for the trip, a French visa, and in October 1933 he left Poland.

I spent a little less than a year in France. He was at the disposal of the representative of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party Modzalevsky (later - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic). He entered the school of social sciences, worked in a Polish-language magazine published by the MOPR, and mastered French quite well.

As a recent prisoner of the bourgeois dungeons, he was often sent to speak at meetings of Polish and French workers. Max also participated in rallies along with prominent public and political figures, among whom were Henri Barbusse, Jacques Duclos, Edvard Gieriek, Charles Rappoport, and others. Max entered one of the Polish party groups, organized a small cell among sympathizers of the Communist Party Lithuanian migrant workers. He kept in touch with old friends in Panevėžys and Vilnius, sent fresh political literature there.

Meanwhile, the father persistently called his son to Argentina. Modzalevsky did not object to his trip, and in August 1934 Max arrived in Buenos Aires.

Once again - a new country, people, mores, customs. A military regime is in power, the democratic movement is persecuted, the Communist Party is underground (local political police

called the "Special Section for Combating Communism"). Having settled down with housing,

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Having tried several professions - a radio equipment salesman, an insurance agent, a journalist - Max gets in touch with the leadership of the Communist Party, and he is sent to the illegally operating national section of the MOPR. Then they are elected to the executive committee and the editorial board of the organization's monthly magazine.

With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, a broad international movement to help the Republicans unfolded. Max decided that his place was among the volunteers of the international brigades fighting fascism. Having coordinated this step with the leadership of the Communist Party, in October 1936 Max ended up in Madrid, where he was placed at the disposal of the representative office of the Soviet intelligence service in Spain. The head of the residency was Shved, an experienced intelligence officer, an energetic and determined person. He became Max's first intelligence mentor.

First of all, it was decided to provide Max with other documents. He chose for himself a name and surname typical for Latin American countries and became, as indicated in the identity card he received, an Argentinean, a journalist by profession. This disguise turned out to be successful: due to traditions, common language, Latin Americans have always been closer to the Spaniards compared to representatives of other nationalities, and hence greater mutual understanding and trust.

...Spring day in 1976. Max's Moscow apartment on Kutuzovsky Prospekt. Another friendly meeting imperceptibly turns into an evening of memories. The anniversary date is not far off: 40 years since the beginning of the Spanish war and the same number since the first steps of Max in Soviet intelligence. He always sincerely loved Spain, had a lot of friends in this country. He certainly perked up when it came to that time, about the events in which he happened to participate, supplemented the stories of friends with curious details (he had an excellent memory), spoke warmly about his colleagues in the distant 30s. In his usual ironic style, he liked to repeat that in Spain he graduated from the "elementary school" of intelligence, the student was diligent, but not always obedient, at times he got too carried away and complicated tasks, he received mostly decent grades, although there were "deuces."

In the autumn of 1936, the military situation near Madrid escalated. The capital became a front-line city. Almost all diplomatic missions unanimously, apparently in collusion, demanded that the authorities grant extraterritoriality to a large number of buildings where employees and supposedly citizens of these states live. This demand was, of course, excessive. The practice of diplomatic relations provides for the inviolability of only the diplomatic missions themselves and their territories. However, the inexperienced Spanish leaders agreed, and as a result, about 70 large

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capital houses were crowned with flags and coats of arms of various states and thus became extraterritorial. Some buildings were even guarded by the police.

Seguridad knew for sure that these so-called "hostels of citizens of foreign states" were in fact hiding places for the most diverse opponents of the Republic, who formed the backbone of the "fifth column" organized by the Francoists. The government, however, did not allow the security services to take any action against them for fear of diplomatic complications.

The situation is strange: the enemy is known, but it is impossible to oppose him. And the security service risked invading two buildings that were under the auspices of the mission ... Finland.

In early December 1936, at a secret meeting in Seguridad (Max was present), a plan of operation was developed. On the night of December 4, the Seguridad special squad penetrated Finnish houses. Those who settled in the first house offered armed resistance, the second was taken "peacefully". I was struck by the number of guests in both houses - about 2,000 people, including 450 women and children. And not a single Finn, not a single foreigner! But a whole arsenal of weapons, along with a workshop for the manufacture of hand grenades. Those arrested were escorted in buses to places of detention. During the interrogations, the most curious details were revealed. It turned out that from each guest the Finns received from 150 to 1500 pesetas per month. In addition, meals were charged. Finnish diplomats did a good job on their assistance to the "fifth column".

A similar action was carried out with respect to several buildings under the patronage of the Chilean embassy. The counterintelligence officers knew that one of the embassy employees served as a liaison between the Francoists who had settled in their homes and the underground in the city. We decided to capture the messenger red-handed during his regular secret meeting with the underground worker. The operation was a success, and Seguridad obtained important documents compromising the Chilean diplomatic mission. That same night, several Chilean buildings were seized and numerous arrests were made among their occupants.

The head of Seguridad, despite the arbitrariness he admitted, was not punished: the results of these two actions turned out to be too convincing. Nevertheless, the arrested escaped with a slight fright. The fact is that the conservative Prime Minister Largo Caballero, an indecisive and cowardly man, most of all afraid of international complications, ordered to stop the investigation and all the detainees - and this is about 2000 obvious "five columns" - to be deported to France. Moreover, the prime minister

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strongly forbade holding such events in the future. The only thing left for the security service was to passively monitor the houses inhabited by "foreigners". However, sometimes "for preventive purposes" water, electricity, gas, telephones were turned off there.

Only with the advent of the left socialist Juan Negrin to the post of prime minister in May 1937, the actions of the secret services of Republican Spain began to take on a character that was more in line with the extremely difficult situation that was developing in the country.

So, during a search in one of the houses, which was taken care of by the Turkish embassy, they found 100 boxes with rifles that belonged to a fascist organization.

Counterintelligence invaded the Peruvian Consulate General and a five-story building protected by the flag of Peru. In one of the apartments, a radio station, ciphers, and spy material ready for transmission were seized. All this economy belonged to the large Francoist organization "Spanish Falange". About 800 regime opponents hiding there were arrested. Access to the diplomatic mail of the Czechoslovak chargé d'affaires was organized through an undercover operational combination and documentary evidence of his connection with the Gestapo agents was obtained. The results of the operation were reported to the Prime Minister of the republican government Negrin. The diplomat was declared "persona non grata" and expelled from the country.

An important milestone in the "Spanish" biography of Max was his participation in the suppression with weapons in the hands of the rebellion in Barcelona in May 1937. The Anarchist and Trotskyist parties (POUM), which had their own military formations, withdrew their units from the front, brought them into Barcelona and on May 2 tried to seize power. Already on May 3, Max, as part of a special squad of 10 Seguridad employees, arrived in Barcelona. Their tasks were to immediately stop the bloodshed, locate and, if possible, arrest the leaders of the rebellion and the commanders of the rebel military units. This was partly done on the first day, and finally on the next, with the support of the reinforcements that arrived. Not without incident. Under the hot hand in the turmoil in two hotels were arrested foreigners - representatives of various, mostly democratic, organizations from other states.



The detainees were not treated very politely. There was a big scandal. Having figured it out, they apologized to the victims, among whom was Willy Brandt, the future Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Time passed. Fulfilling various assignments of the residency, Max gradually acquired operational experience and professional skills. Very soon, a valuable ability of a scout was revealed - the ability to make the necessary acquaintances, to win over people. He equally easily found a common language with a peasant from the hinterland, and with

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front-line officer, and with an intellectual aristocrat. Given these qualities, he was sent to important areas of intelligence work. At first he was an adjutant "on international assignments" of the political commissar of the 5th regiment known throughout the country, later he took a similar post under the chief of staff of the Madrid Front, then he entrenched himself in the state security apparatus.

Extraordinarily bright, compressed into a colorful string of amazing events associated with Max's stay in Spain, fit into 10 unforgettable months.

...Max left us several dozen pages of autobiographical notes prepared in the 60s and 70s. He intended to publish this material, but nothing appeared in print. This essay uses some of the details from Max's notes. But this is only the beginning of the story about an amazing person.

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The Karaites are considered the descendants of the Turkic tribes that were part of the Khazar Khaganate, defeated by the Kyiv princes in the 10th century. They live mainly in the Crimea, as well as in the Trakai region of Lithuania, where they were resettled at the end of the 14th century as prisoners of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. They speak a language belonging to the Kypchak group of Turkic languages.

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Handsome "Francesco"

The foreign office knows how to keep secrets. Some documents of the 1930s concerning negotiations between British leaders and the top leadership of fascist Germany, including directly with Hitler, are still kept in the secret archives of the British Foreign Office. The British do not want indiscreet eyes to penetrate the evidence of their policy of colluding with Hitler and pushing Germany to march to the East. Meanwhile, many of these documents can be found in the archives of the SVR of Russia. Within days of British Foreign Secretary Simon's secret meeting with Hitler in 1935, Stalin was reading the full transcript of the negotiations. And let the reader not be surprised - the Soviet intelligence received this secret document ... in the British embassy in Rome. The British had a practice of sending all important foreign policy documents to their

embassies.

Documents from the British embassy were handed over to the Roman residence by "Francesco", who collaborated with Soviet foreign intelligence for 13 years. Thus, even before the appearance of the famous "Cambridge Five", the Soviet leadership's awareness of Britain's foreign policy was very high.

And it all started in 1924. Diplomatic relations were established with Italy, and a Soviet embassy arrived in Rome, which included a foreign intelligence station. The Center set before her the difficult task of focusing on acquiring agents capable of obtaining documents from the diplomatic missions of the main capitalist countries. Resident N.I. Kaminsky decided to start by studying the capabilities of persons already known to intelligence. He drew attention to Alfredo Alegretti, who entered the position of clerk at the Russian embassy

in 1904, where he served until its transformation into a Soviet representative office. The Italian employee was kind to Russia and its new regime. In 1921, he helped members of the economic delegation of V.V. Vorovsky. Alegretti knew the local employees of the foreign embassies in Rome well. Through him, the residency acquired several useful sources of documentary information in foreign embassies. Most valuable among them was an Italian clerk at the British embassy in Rome, whom we will simply refer to as "Francesco." It was a middle-aged man with the face of an ancient Roman. The women liked him and they called him handsome.

In the description of "Francesco" dated January 15, 1925, the resident indicated: "Once a week he gives documentary materials from the British Foreign Ministry. An average of 150 sheets. From day one, he knows who he's working for. Collaborates with us solely because of the money and does not hide it. He set himself the goal of becoming a rich man, which is what he aspires to. Simple and frank. He greatly appreciates his friendly attitude and trust. Honest at work. Tries to justify the remuneration received. Very careful and precise in work. All in all, a reliable source that doesn't cause much trouble."

The directive of the Center, sent to the residency at the beginning of 1925, stated: "England is now the organizing force of a probable attack on the USSR in the near future. A continuous hostile cordon is being created against us from the West. In the East - in Persia, Afghanistan and China - we see a similar picture. De jure recognition of the USSR, according to Chamberlain, should be used for diplomatic pressure by a united front. Your task (consider it striking) is to provide documentary and undercover materials revealing in detail England's plans in this direction. M.A. Trilisser (at that time head of foreign intelligence) stressed the need for a particularly careful attitude to the source giving us documentary materials. Now this source is dearer to us than ever."

"Francesco" has since become one of the most protected sources of residency. Until the end of 1937, he received secret correspondence from the British Embassy with the Foreign Office, many telegraph messages, as well as some valid diplomatic and consular ciphers and codes.

In 1927, out of 1406 materials received by the residency and sent to the Center, 634 were received from Francesco. At this time, the residency in Rome was headed by A.A. Rigin is an experienced intelligence agent who, using the favorable situation for "Francesco" in the embassy, has achieved even more in his information return. However, due to a slanderous denunciation at the end of 1928, Rigin was recalled from the country. Proceedings carefully conducted by a member

collegium of the OGPU G.I. Boki ended with Rigin's full acquittal, but he was not returned to the country. Rigin's wife, Zinaida Aleksandrovna Letavet (also a staff member of the INO), continued to work in Rome. In April 1929, she obtained permission from the Center to resume work with Francesco. The documents obtained by Francesco only in 1929 amounted to several archival volumes. Among them, of great interest are Chamberlain's letters about the meeting with Mussolini in Florence, where he went on a private visit on April 2, 1929. there have been recent developments in Italian politics, there is no reason to fear that it will take an aggressive form in the foreseeable period of time." During the conversation, Chamberlain expressed his satisfaction with the improvement in relations between England and Germany. "Only the future," noted Chamberlain Duce, "will show whether Germany will accept its current role or whether it will once again resort to arms and stake everything on luck in a new war. If trouble comes, it is from there. Germany is still dangerous," continued Chamberlain, "and she is only ready to suggest that her good behavior be constantly bought by new concessions. Germany can start with

territorial claims to Poland, then he will carry out the Anschluss of Austria and raise the question of the Italian Tyrol.

In 1929-1932, Erdman was a resident in Rome.

The requirements of the Center for Francesco's information, especially for the telegraph, were growing. January 20, 1930 The Center requests telegrams about Germany, conferences in The Hague, the League of Nations. May 20, 1930 The Center asks to send documents on Central and Eastern Europe, the USSR, France, the League of Nations, etc.

From the beginning of 1933, the Roman residency was headed by P.M. Crane-lion. Work with "Francesco" was conducted by his deputy I.A. Markov. In the certificate prepared by them at the end of 1933 about "Francesco", it was said that he gives "all incoming and outgoing correspondence of the embassy, including cipher telegrams. Undoubtedly, it can be used by an illegal apparatus, which must be done under the conditions of normal diplomatic relations between the USSR and Italy."

It was only in 1934 that important materials were obtained and sent to the Center, such as cipher telegrams from the Foreign Office about the trips of Eden, then British Deputy Foreign Secretary, to Paris, Berlin and Rome, where he held negotiations on the attitude towards rearmament. Germany. Documents were received with assessments by the British Embassy of the prospects for Germany's new foreign policy; documents on Polish-German agreements and prospects for relations between them; about Japanese-German relations. In April 1934, a very important and alarming message was received from Rome.

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providing information about the rapprochement between Germany and Japan, as well as their preparation for war against the USSR.

In the information received from the British embassy, an important place was occupied by the issues of the revival of the German military machine and the preparation by Hitler of aggressive plans with the obvious connivance of England, which sought to satisfy Hitler's territorial claims at the expense of the interests of the countries of Eastern Europe, and above all the USSR.

The channel for obtaining such important information should be preserved at all costs and securely concealed. Therefore, Zhuravlev continued to insist on handing over Francesco to illegal immigrants. He reported to the Center: "In the near future we will pick up material on the technique of our illegal immigrant coming here. It is necessary already now to outline a specific candidate and inform us in order to select the nature of the cover for her in accordance with this candidacy.

In the spring of 1934, he reminded the Center: "It is necessary to organize an illegal group during this summer. The influx of foreigners is very large, some Germans came here up to 100 thousand. We offer a modest cover - study.

Finally, the Center made a decision. The choice fell on M.M., who already had experience in illegal work. Axelrod.

Moses Markovich Axelrod was born in Smolensk on December 26, 1898. From 1916 he lived in Moscow, studied at Moscow State University. In 1918-1921 he served in the Red Army. Then, after graduating from the Institute of Oriental Studies, he left for Saudi Arabia. Axelrod spoke German, French, Italian and Arabic, and read in English. Upon his return in 1928-1929 he worked in the INO. At the end of 1928, he took part in the negotiations on the conclusion of the Soviet Yemeni treaty in Sana'a.

At the end of 1929 Axelrod was sent to work illegally in Cairo. With an Austrian passport, he arrived in Istanbul, where Zhuravlev was working at that time. There, in Istanbul, a personal acquaintance of the scouts took place. That is why, heading the Roman residency, Zhuravlev

recommended Axelrod as head of the illegal residency to work with "Francesco".

The decision to transfer "Francesco" to an illegal immigrant was carefully worked out at the Center and the residency, the points of his biography and activities were clarified. In the description of the source, Zhuravlev noted: "Serves in the British Embassy for 18 years. Extremely careful. Fear of failure by the British. Shows no fear towards Italians. It is likely that he is their informant. Believes in our extremely careful attitude to his work and to the source

in particular".

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In 1927, the Italian police arrested Alfredo Alegretti on charges of attempting to recruit a member of the French embassy. He was sentenced to five years in prison for espionage. The investigation failed, however, to establish for whom he worked. To what extent did this arrest jeopardize "Francesco", with whom Alegretti knew?

There were also good reasons to believe that "Francesco" did not work alone and that he had an assistant at the embassy. All these questions were to be clarified by Axelrod.

On September 25, 1934, Axelrod crossed the Swiss border using an Austrian passport in a different name. In Rome, he sought out a leading specialist in Arabic history and agreed to organize joint scientific work. "They received me very well," Axelrod wrote. "They are flattered that a foreigner has come to them to study such a subject for which they cannot find enough people at home. And since I understand something about this, and since I really will be studying (it's impossible otherwise: there are too few of us to be able to skimp), a completely legal position will soon be created for me, which, with any check, will give a positive result".

On October 8, the first meeting between Zhuravlev and Axelrod took place on the observation deck of Borghese Park. They discussed in detail the position of Axelrod, the issues of cover and future work with "Francesco".

On November 25, Axelrod reported: "I am negotiating with Academician Nollino about writing a dissertation work under his supervision. To summarize: I consider the situation more or less established, and I think that in the middle of next month, in any case, not later than Zhuravlev's return, work can begin. My legend is not unquestionably Aryan. In the certificate of graduation from the gymnasium, "Jewish religion" is indicated. Questions about religion are quite common here. I answer: "free thinker".

In December 1934, to help M.M. Axelrod was sent an illegal agent Lee, who had previously worked as a signalman for an illegal resident in Switzerland, I. Poretsky (Reiss). As it turned out later, this was the only, but fatal mistake of the Center in such a thorough preparation of Axelrod's residency. The failure of Poretsky through Li, which followed a few years later, led to the failure of Axelrod. Such is the harsh specificity of the organization of the work of intelligence officers, especially illegal immigrants. Li was a member of the Communist Party, emigrated from Germany, broke ties with the organization on the recommendation of intelligence and was considered a renegade. Poretsky knew her from 1920 in Leipzig.

The center offered to rent a small apartment for Li, set up a photo lab there, and teach her how to take good pictures.

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"Reckoning with the worst option of failure," said M.M. Axelrod, it's better to risk Lee's apartment than yours. When meeting with Lee, observe maximum secrecy.

On January 28, 1935, Francesco was handed over to Axelrod for communication. The latter introduced himself as a businessman who would come twice a week from Milan on business and keep in touch.

A month later, Zhuravlev reported: "Axelrod has been working with Francesco for almost 3 weeks. They had 4 or 5 dates. On February 10, we stopped personal meetings with Axelrod. Communication is maintained through Lee. Photographing is also done in her apartment."

Axelrod began with a clearer organization of work with "Francesco". The agent told him that he had access to the file of the British ambassador in Rome, Drummond, naming the numbering of the most important cases. Later, he brought his letters, but they were of no interest, since they were mostly personal, not political content.

According to "Francesco", a representative of the Intelligence Service, sent "to restore order", worked at the embassy for several months. "Francesco", incidentally, mentioned that he himself is connected with representatives of local intelligence, whom he informs about the personnel of the embassy and certain individuals. To a cautious question whether they were interested, for example, in information, he replied: "Of course, yes." Axelrod did not deepen the subject.

At the beginning of March, Moses Markovich left for Switzerland. P.M. met with "Francesco". Zhuravlev. He asked me to pick up all the fresh materials, especially telegrams, about German armaments, Simon's trip to Berlin, and so on.

In April Axelrod returned to Rome. The center instructed him to get, with the help of "Francesco", the current cipher tables for the English codes. "Francesco" managed to pick up Drummond's reports sent to the Foreign Office on May 28 and June 4. Axelrod suggested to "Francesco" to select the most interesting of them in the future.

When Zhuravlev was informed that "Francesco" was also supplying documents to the Italians, he recalled how the plenipotentiary had once quoted to him the Italian minister's statements about the policy of England, in which there were whole phrases from the documents received from "Francesco".

In a letter to M.M. The Center suggested to Axelrod that, perhaps, Italian intelligence regulates the flow of information transmitted to him by "Francesco". The Resident objected to this assertion, referring to the fact that "Francesco" takes a number of precautions when meeting, and often expresses quite sincere dismay at the possibility of failure.

He imagined the position of "Francesco" as follows: another person works at the embassy, "Francesco" is a liaison for the Italian

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Russian intelligence, and maybe a resident. Working mainly for her, he gives us something in secret from her. Archival materials do not provide an answer to the question why the residency could not organize a check of "Francesco" directly at the British Embassy.

At the end of 1935, the Center informed Axelrod: "The question of the regulation of us by the Italians should be reconsidered and, perhaps, in favor of Francesco, since recently the agent began to give fresh material, quite relevant, and almost did not miss the order numbered documents.

Sometimes the Center had to restrain Axelrod's activity. The directive of October 27 stated: "Between September 24 and October 14, you held 16 meetings with Francesco. They should occur no more than 2-3 times a week."

The effectiveness of Axelrod's management of Francesco's work was evidenced by the following statement from the Center dated November 15, 1935: "Documentary materials have been received

British Foreign Offices, reports of British ambassadors accredited in the capitals of the great powers, minutes of secret meetings and cipher telegrams. Total sent comrade. Stalin - 101 documents, among them the minutes of the meetings of Simon with Hitler in Berlin, Eden with Litvinov in Moscow, Eden with Beck in Warsaw, Eden with Benes in Prague and Eden with Mussolini in Rome. Since January of this year. By March 15, only 23 materials had been sent to the Central Committee.

Of particular value were the minutes of the secret meeting between British Foreign Secretary Simon and Hitler in Berlin, which took place in early 1935, on the eve of the Stresa conference. At this meeting between Simon and Hitler, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, a conspiracy was reached regarding the level of German armaments that England could consider acceptable to herself, provided that her interests in Europe and the colonies were guaranteed by Hitler. This collusion affected the position of Great Britain at the Stresa conference, at which its participants - Great Britain, France and Italy - gathered to discuss the situation in Europe that had developed as a result of Germany's violations of the military provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Having condemned these violations in general terms, the British delegation, headed by Simon, spoke out against the imposition of sanctions for violations, thereby nullifying the declaration adopted at the conference. The way to recreate the armed forces was open to Hitler.

However, the significance of the British Foreign Secretary's secret meeting with Hitler went far beyond the mere issues discussed at the Stresa Conference. It actually meant a new stage in England's policy towards Germany. For the first time, top British leaders personally made it clear to Git

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Leru that Great Britain is by no means opposed to the revision of the Versailles system by Germany and the realization of its territorial claims in the east of Europe. This was the first step in the policy of "appeasement of the aggressor", which led the world to a catastrophe.

The meeting with Simon was followed by further personal meetings with Hitler of British leaders: the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, in November 1937, who bluntly told the Führer that England viewed Germany as a bastion of the fight against communism, recognized the vital importance of its interests in Europe and ready to discuss with Hitler the program of an Anglo-German agreement on the widest range of questions. Then on September 15 and 22, 1938, personal meetings with Hitler of the British Prime Minister Chamberlain followed, during which the fate of Czechoslovakia was decided. The information of the Roman residency was invaluable.

At the end of 1935, the Center allowed M.M. Akselrod to come to Moscow for a couple of weeks. New tasks were set for the residency: to ensure regular receipt of reports from the British ambassador and consuls in the USSR, as well as from the naval and aviation attaché in the USSR, to study the possibilities of obtaining sealed diplomatic bags, and also to include the work of British intelligence in documentary coverage. .

Axelrod also had to find out the real position of "Francesco" in the embassy and establish who his assistant was. It was planned to gradually switch to a direct connection between the illegal residency and the Center, bypassing the "legal" one.

In mid-January 1936, Axelrod returned to Rome via Vienna, where he spent three days with his family. Upon arrival, he immediately contacted "Francesco".

The entry of German troops into the Rhine zone in violation of the Locarno agreements caused Axelrod serious concern. He assessed the prospects for the development of the international situation very pessimistically. On March 25, 1936, in a personal letter to his curator at the INO, Fanny Zarhi, Moses Markovich wrote: "Is the game worth the candle with the League? What advantages have the League and the Franco-Soviet pact added to us? We are compelled to defend Versailles endlessly, and

the transaction is clearly being done behind our back and at our expense. For me, this is not a matter of principle, but a matter of tactics, a matter of expediency."

Zarhi answered (with the consent of the head of intelligence): "There was and partly continues to exist another danger - a four-power pact, that is, the possibility of an agreement between the Western powers at our expense and knocking together a single bloc against us with subsequent intervention. Our diplomacy must first of all eliminate this danger and at all costs weaken it, which it succeeded, albeit partially, by signing a pact with France and Czechoslovakia.

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Francesco's materials became more and more relevant. On April 7, 1936, the Center reported: "The annual report on Germany is interesting. It is translated and will be fully used in the information instance. Drummond's notes to the report on German expansion sent by past mail will also be used.

In May-June, work with Francesco continued to be intensive. The meetings were sometimes daily, sometimes twice a day. Due to the June session of the League of Nations, Axelrod's vacation was postponed. On July 3, he reported: "During the reporting period, we met with Francesco every day without exception. His assistant is now left alone at the embassy and works round the week. The result of the work is about 100 materials, of which about 20 messages are telegraphic."

In the "legal" residency for all 15 years of work with "Francesco" there was no translator from English. The selection and translation of materials lay entirely with Axelrod, who, upon arrival, did not yet have a sufficient command of this language. There was never enough time. Materials were given sometimes only for an hour and a half, including the time of receipt and return. Nevertheless, the resident coped with the task.

For an emergency call to Axelrod for a meeting with "Francesco", the latter was given Lee's phone. "Francesco" told her, for example, that the patient was ill, needed an operation, and the professor had to come urgently. Lee informed Axelrod about this by a prearranged signal.

Axelrod's relationship with "Francesco" deepened. This was facilitated by joint trips outside the city, visits to Paris together. In a relaxed atmosphere, "Francesco" became more outspoken. He revealed to Akselrod one more of his "secrets": he confessed that he had not served in the embassy for five years. After the arrest of Alfredo Alegretti, whose connection with "Francesco" was known to the British embassy, he noticed that they began to follow him. Without waiting for his dismissal, he decided to retire of his own accord. His friend continued to work at the embassy, through whom he obtained documents.

"Francesco" also told the resident that the intelligence officer with whom he is connected, in addition to England, deals with Russia. However, "Francesco" avoided detailed questions, saying: "This is not fair: after all, I myself do not know anything about you and do not seek to extort your secrets. What do you care about my way of working? We receive material. We are now working harder, more often and better than before, and the rest is none of your business."

In August, Axelrod agreed with "Francesco" that he would hand over a sealed diplomatic bag. On October 25, 1936, he reported: "Finally, we managed to get the long-promised bag. It was handed over to Zhuravlev, who processed it. From whole

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From the data series, I conclude that the bag was given only to us, but did not get to the Italians. That was the risk."

"Francesco" reported that his friend had access to all the rooms of the embassy, except for the ambassador's office. The seized materials are stored in two cabinets. One is in the office, the other is at the archivist. All locks have been changed. Ciphers and codes are stored in a special cabinet, where, in addition to the keys, there is also a digital combination that his friend does not know. The only favorable period for receiving them is summer, when the commandant gets a month's leave and a friend spends the night at the embassy.

The third year of Axelrod's stay in Rome has begun. It was time to think about a replacement. The candidate was already in mind. The center asked: "In the capacity of a student, a merchant, etc. - Should he come to you?"

Axelrod recommended studying as a cover, asking if he had any talent (painting, music, knowledge of archeology, etc.).

The new residency, in his opinion, should consist of three people, including a radio operator, and have independent communication with the Center (there is a note in the document against this proposal: "Will Abel fit?").

Lee Axelrod recommended a transfer to another job.

In 1936, Axelrod sent 1,239 different information materials, 473 telegrams, to the Center, about half of them from the Foreign Office.

January 20, 1937, sending a selection of materials on the countries of the East, Axelrod noted that "England is terribly afraid of the growth of the fascist danger, in particular in Abyssinia, Iraq and Egypt." He recommended informing the authorities on this issue, which "may turn out to be an important card in our politics."

In the spring of 1937, the Center outlined a number of important decisions regarding work in Italy. P.M. was summoned to Moscow for consultation. Zhuravlev.

On March 17, the head of the department of the Center wrote to Axelrod: "The trip to the periphery forced me to make some adjustments in assessing the general situation. It is absolutely impossible to remove you from the area where you are sitting. Your country will play one of the first roles in the coming events. You are perfectly legalized, you know the language and the work that we must reorganize if we do not want to be left with bare hands at a difficult moment. You are sent an assistant who speaks English and knows the underground work. Zhuravlev's most valuable political agents will go over to you. We'll try to get you a radio. A year after the arrival of the assistant, I will not object to a second consideration of the issue you raised.

At the same time, "Francesco" raised the issue of awarding him an order on the 20th anniversary of October. Motives - 13 years of impeccable

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service, as well as the need to have a document stating that he was also an underground worker (in case of a regime change in the country).

The center replied: "We will think about this issue. Maybe make some kind of diploma for the award. We had no precedents."

On May 24, 1937, "Francesco" resumed work, handing over almost the entire embassy mail that arrived in mid-May.

In a letter dated June 7, 1937, the Center noted that Francesco's capabilities were normal, some of its materials were relevant and of interest. At the same time, it was reported that Axelrod's future assistant, Yuz, would be delayed for five months in Canada, where he



an exchange of documents is to take place, and that he is advised to direct his efforts towards the study of such subjects as the art and architecture of Italy.

And at this time, the unexpected happened. In Switzerland, an illegal immigrant Reiss became a non-returner, for whom Li had previously worked as a liaison. Li turned out to be "exposed", the Italian police began to look for her.

Axelrod was summoned to Moscow. The residency in Rome knew nothing of Lee's failure and the possible threat to Axelrod. Nevertheless, the Center, without explaining the reasons, announced that Axelrod would not return to Rome, and instructed Zhuravlev to send his things to Moscow. An Italian employee of the embassy was sent for them in a car driven by Deputy Resident I.V. Markov. At the time of the transfer of things, the latter was arrested and released only three weeks later. Markov had to urgently leave the country.

Thus, Axelrod's illegal residency was forced to end its work, having managed in the three years of its existence to obtain for the Soviet leadership a large amount of valuable documentary information that revealed the secret plans of Germany, England and other Western European states.

Soon Zhuravlev was also forced to leave the residency. Communication with "Francesco" was temporarily cut off, the main agents of the residency were mothballed for security purposes. It was necessary to figure out what specifically became known to the Italian counterintelligence as a result of Lee's failure, whether Axelrod and other employees and connections of the residency fell into her field of vision.

Gradually the situation cleared up. The residency was headed by an experienced intelligence officer D.G. Fedichkin. He managed to ensure the secret restoration of communication with the most valuable sources of the residency, including "Francesco". Again, the most interesting information went to the Center, revealing the plans of the Western powers.

The Residency in Rome timely informed the Center that Mussolini, under Hitler's pressure, finally agreed to the Anschluss of Austria. On the intentions of Nazi Germany to capture Av

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the line and the creation of a "fifth column" for this purpose in the form of various kinds of pro-fascist organizations, the Roman residency reported even earlier. But the main place in Fedichkin's information messages throughout 1938 was occupied by the Czechoslovak question. The documentary materials of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs relating to the Munich agreement were sent to Moscow in two collections and reported to the Central Committee of the party. Some of the documents from these collections were included in a special summary for Stalin and Molotov. The documents transmitted by "Francesco" from the British embassy demonstrated the readiness of England to hand over Czechoslovakia to the aggressors.

This is how the Italian residency worked during a difficult period for it after a forced change of leadership.

Moses Markovich Akselrod worked for some time in the central intelligence apparatus, then became one of the leaders of the Special Purpose School. And then he, like hundreds of other honest intelligence officers, was overtaken by a cruel and unfair wave of repression.

The work of "Francesco" was interrupted by the war.

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A postman was walking down a quiet street in Rome...

The Roman residency began to operate in 1924, shortly after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Italy. The conditions for intelligence work in the country at that time were not easy. On the one hand, revolutionary sentiments still persisted among the population, and on the other hand, since 1922, the fascists have been in power.

Soviet foreign intelligence paid special attention to Italy after Hitler came to power in [Germany. It became clear that these countries were potential allies.

In early January 1933, a new resident arrived in Rome - Pavel Matveyevich Zhuravlev. Prior to that, he headed residencies in Kaunas, Prague and Istanbul. In addition to Zhuravlev, there were only two employees in Italy - in Rime in Milan, who acted under the guise of the Soviet-Italian company Petrolea.

It was very difficult to make acquaintances in Italian political circles and among employees of state institutions, since these people adhered to predominantly fascist views and were hostile to workers in Soviet missions. It was easier to establish contacts among representatives of the business world: the residency was helped by the fact that Italy during the period of Mussolini's rule maintained active trade relations with the Soviet state. The Italian special services actively carried out preventive work among employees admitted to classified information, and sent provocateurs to the operatives of the residency. We had to strictly observe the conspiratorial methods of work. The residency relied on the acquisition of sources of information through third parties, on behalf of a third country. However, even in this situation there were people who hated fascism and dared to help Soviet intelligence.

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The category of those who agreed to cooperate for ideological reasons included an agent under the pseudonym "Student". The scout who kept in touch with him in the prewar period

minal:

"The Italian worked with us honestly and with interest, being a convinced anti-fascist. He believed that working for the Soviet Union was a blow to fascism. He was an outstanding journalist who had extensive connections in party, political and administrative circles, including some important ministries. Interesting in appearance, with a pleasant face, slender, well-mannered, erudite, he knew how to behave in society and liked women.

We met with the "Student" 2-4 times a month, depending on the importance of the information he obtained. Meetings were usually held after dark. I picked him up at a designated place in my car, and we drove to a country restaurant or cafeteria, where we talked. Sometimes I came in order to pick up the material and set the time and place of the next meeting. When we had a long conversation, we first agreed on when we would meet again. This was done in case of unforeseen circumstances, in which the meeting would have to be quickly curtailed.

Both of us understood that the Italian counterintelligence was not sitting idly by. One should especially be wary of the OVRA - the so-called Voluntary Society for the Suppression of Anti-Fascists. This special service of the fascist party was engaged in the introduction of agents into student circles, state institutions and the mass media. It was in this milieu that the "Student" moved, and incautious statements on issues of domestic and foreign policy could bring suspicion on him. I repeatedly reminded him of this, he agreed, but rather out of politeness, in his heart, apparently, believing that I was exaggerating the danger.

Counterintelligence surveillance of the Soviet embassy and its staff was regular. Stationary surveillance posts operated in nearby houses. It was possible to meet suspicious persons in places frequently visited by foreigners, for example, on the Palatine Hill, where there are many architectural monuments, among which it is convenient to lay caches. With all this in mind, before each meeting with the "Student" I was carefully checked.

In his verbal reports, "Student" named many names, firms, institutions and organizations. You can't remember everything - you needed a phenomenal memory, and the situation didn't always allow you to write it down. There were no portable recording equipment in those days. I had to resort to a little trick: in the pocket of my trousers I kept a stub of a pencil and a small notebook. I train

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I tried to write down surnames or hard-to-pronounce words without taking my hand out of my pocket, and did it imperceptibly during a conversation, sometimes even on the go. It turned out, of course, at random, but sometimes the initial letters were important, by which one could remember the whole word.

It was interesting to work with this agent, but I seriously prepared for each conversation in order to competently answer questions and set new tasks. In addition to the information notes and oral communications that "Student" prepared for us, he transmitted quite a lot of documentary materials received from typists of one ministry. He managed to attract them to work as a result of combinations carefully developed with the help of the residency.

The positive effect of the Roman residency was achieved when, when performing specific tasks, the scouts acted flexibly and unconventionally, and took justified risks.

One such example was Operation Postman. A scout who took part in this event recalls: "The residency learned that the Japanese military attache was receiving a lot of correspondence at his home address (his apartment and office were in the same building), including from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, through the local Postal office. Diplomatic couriers came to him only once every six months. Diplomatic mail from Japan was brought to the diplomatic mission in Switzerland, and then from there it was sent by registered parcels in the usual way to embassies and missions in other European countries. And only the most secret mail, in which there were ciphers, codes and re-encryption tables, was delivered by diplomatic couriers.

In order to gain access to the information of the military attache, it was necessary to involve one of the post office officials or postal peddlers.

First of all, we established the frequency of delivery of correspondence. I managed to find out which of the postmen works on the section of the street where the diplomat lives. The house of the Japanese diplomat served Paolo. Under the conditions of increased attention of counterintelligence to Soviet institutions, it was far from safe to approach a simple postman. What kind of relationship can an embassy employee have with a mail carrier?

It was decided to act through assistants. The choice fell on Pietro Capuzzi, an Italian anti-fascist. He worked on the affairs of the residency and the Center as an agent D-36.

Pietro Capuzzi collected valuable information, attracted several sources for cooperation. Its work was first supervised by the resident's assistant I.A. Markov, then P.M. Zhuravlev and, finally, D.G. Fedichkin.

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In order to get acquainted with the postman, it was decided to rent an apartment for Capuzzi on the side of the street where the diplomat lived. The area was quite prestigious, and we had to wait for a free apartment to appear. When the apartment was rented, the residency arranged for regular letters to be sent to this address. In the end, Pietro's acquaintance with the postman took place. Capuzzi began to pay attention to him in every possible way: invite him for a cup of coffee, present souvenirs for the holidays. They became friends. One day, Capuzzi told the postman in great secrecy that his best friend suspected that his wife was cheating on him with Mr. M (he gave the name of the diplomat - the Japanese military attaché), and he would like to get evidence. Paolo sympathized with the "friend." Then D-36 asked him to show the letters addressed to Mr. M. in order to find letters from his wife by the handwriting on the envelope.

"friend" and familiarize yourself with their content. At the same time, he assured that the letters would not have traces of opening. After hesitating, Paolo agreed. The scout returned the first letter from the general mail without opening it. It, according to him, "did not arouse suspicion," but handed the postman a reward for the service. In the future, Paolo did not hesitate to comply with his requests, making sure that it was safe.

In the meantime, the operatives had to stubbornly master the technique of making casts from wax seals, with which part of the diplomat's correspondence was supplied. The casts were sent to Moscow in a special shock-proof package, and after some time they received perfectly executed metal seals and a corresponding set of different sealing wax, which made it possible to process the sealed envelopes confidently and quickly. Thus began this daring but carefully thought-out operation. The level of conspiracy was quite high, which ensured the durability of the operation. In general, with interruptions caused by the change of residents, it lasted seven years. Only the beginning of the war and the conscription of Paolo into the army interrupted her.

During the operation, a large amount of valuable documentary information was obtained, mainly of a military nature, directly affecting the security issues of our country. Here are some of the Center's assessments:

"The source materials — notebooks or brochures — are monthly bulletins published by the General Staff of Japan and contain data on the political and economic situation in different countries, reports on individual military issues, most often reports on the Red Army in China, as well as orders on personal composition of the army, copies of encrypted and open telegrams, etc. Military reports and bulletins are of the greatest interest.

"Most of the materials received from the source were of great value, as they related to military installations and

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preparations by the Japanese on the Soviet Far Eastern border.

In July 1939, the head of the 5th Directorate of the Red Army sent P.M. Fitin the following assessment of the materials received from Capuzzi:

"The material received from you about the air forces of the USSR was compiled according to the press and undercover reports. It can be seen from the material that the Japanese agents receive some more information about the work of our design bureaus, about the decisions of the People's Commissariat of Defense, secret meetings, and so on. However, Japanese intelligence has detailed data on the work of the Far Eastern aircraft factories only for 1936. This material is valuable to us, as it gives an idea of the scope and results of the work of Japanese agents in the USSR.

Pietro Capuzzi remained a wrestler for the rest of his life. Having lost contact with our intelligence at the beginning of the war, he joined the units of the Italian Resistance and became one of its heroes. After the war, it became known that he fell into the hands of the Gestapo and was shot.

Not always everything went smoothly and flawlessly in the activities of the officers of the Roman residency: there were arrests of agents and expulsions of operatives.

There were also embarrassing failures. So, once a place was chosen among the ruins on the Palatine Hill for an operation to transfer money and a ciphered letter. It was a niche in the brick wall of the structure, invisible from the outside. It was a square hole half a meter deep at the level of the shoulders of an adult, convenient for laying and removing small items. A flat metal box from American cigarettes with money and a letter was placed in the hiding place. The bookmarking was carried out flawlessly.

Unfortunately, the box was found in a hiding place by teenagers who were destroying the nests of swallows. Having pulled it out, the nest-seekers began to examine the contents of the box with interest. Behind this occupation

caught by a passer-by. Seeing in the hands of teenagers a significant amount of money in American dollars and some papers, he took them to the police. Immediately, the Italian counterintelligence joined this case. The box was put back in its original place, and, conducting continuous monitoring of the hiding place, they found the person who had seized the attachment, set him under surveillance, revealing connections, places of meetings with Soviet people. Everything told about it became known only after a closed trial in this case.

In April 1937, P.M. Zhuravlev was summoned to the Center with a report on the work of the residency, which, in particular, said:

"Until now, work in Italy has been limited mainly to diplomatic intelligence on foreign embassies and military equipment.

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scientific intelligence in the field of chemistry, radio, aviation and shipbuilding, which actually began 7 months ago after the organization of a point in Milan. Henceforth, Zhuravlev noted, the main task of the residency in Italy should be to reveal the anti-Soviet activities of the political and intelligence centers of Italy. After discussing the report, the head of foreign intelligence approved a corresponding resolution, which provided for expanding the work of the residency, covering it with new facilities, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the leadership of the fascist party, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, intelligence, the Ministry of War and the General Staff. In diplomatic intelligence, it was proposed to concentrate the main efforts on the Polish and German embassies.

However, Italy's counterintelligence also intensified its work. On October 26 of the same 1937, the Italian police detained an assistant to the resident, I.A. Markov at the moment when he was supposed to pick up the things and books of Axelrod, who was recalled to Moscow because of the possibility of the failure of the illegal resident Axelrod.

With no direct evidence against Markov, the Italian police released him. But the continuation of the intelligence work in Italy was out of the question. With the departure of I.A. Markov to Moscow, the Center instructed to mothball the work of the residency.

In November 1937, Zhuravlev reminded the Center that the residency had already been mothballed for a month and that he was only holding control meetings with valuable agents. At the same time, the resident raised the issue of replacing the leadership with the residency in connection with the possibility of deciphering it. On December 17, 1937, an answer was received: "In connection with the situation that has arisen in you, we agree with the idea you expressed about the need to change the leadership of your residency. We recommend mothballing the network and leaving for the Union. For the time being, hand over the residency to Platon (D.G. Fedichkin. - Auth.), an experienced agent who arrived in Rome in December 1936

of the year".

Despite the difficulties, by 1939 the Italian residency had established an intelligence network that included people who obtained important secret documents. The Center received materials on Germany's armament plans, reports from ambassadors from Tokyo and Washington on the question of Japanese-American relations, on Eden's trip to Paris, Berlin and Rome, on Polish-German agreements.

Based on the materials of the Roman residency, messages were regularly sent to the leadership of the Soviet Union on topical political issues.

The most eloquent evidence of the high results of the work of Soviet political intelligence in Rome was a telegram to the Center dated June 19, 1941, with an almost exact indication of the timing of the German attack on the USSR.

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In the American Citadel

America in the first half of the 1930s was recovering from a severe depression. The New Deal, proposed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, put the country on its feet and helped to strengthen its economic strength. Many Americans at the time professed isolationism. But there were also those who attentively watched the dramatic events taking place in Europe, in particular Hitler's rise to power in Germany.

In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the United States created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the current CIA. It was led by General W. Donovan. Known as an expert on Russia, he had a hand in American aid to Admiral Kolchak's formations.

In the United States itself, the police apparatus kept order in the country and, together with counterintelligence, kept a vigilant eye on foreigners, primarily those who arrived from Germany, but also from the Soviet Union.

What was the foreign intelligence of the Soviet Union doing in the Western Hemisphere at a time when its main, not so significant forces were chained to Europe and the Far East? Judging by archival materials, intelligence paid attention to the United States as a potential ally in the fight against a common enemy - international fascism, as well as a country with an advanced economy and the latest technology. Intelligence was interested in data on the attitude of the ruling circles of Washington and the American public to the development of ties with the Soviet Union. No less importance was attached to obtaining information about US relations with countries

"axes".

Some US political circles were sympathetic to the emergence of a socialist state on the world stage. "Recognition of the Soviet government!, with which we have not maintained any relations since 1918," noted the presidential aide

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Charles Bohlen, was at least indirectly or partially motivated by the US government's concern about Japanese aggression in Asia and Hitler's rise to power in Germany. In his memorandum to President Roosevelt in September 1933, Cordell Hull (U.S. Secretary of State) highlighted the Japanese question as a factor in favor of recognizing the Soviet Union.

However, there were forces in America that tried to slow down Soviet-American business ties. F. Roosevelt's predecessor Hoover declared in 1931: "To tell you the truth, the purpose of my life is to destroy the Soviet Union." His opinion was shared by representatives of the conservative layers - the so-called "isolationists", and they were not going to easily give up their positions. Anti-Soviet sentiments in the United States were fueled by the German secret services through a large colony of German emigrants.

The British secret services, in turn, tried to discredit the friends of the new Russia and sow American suspicions about her. The SVR archive contains information obtained by Philby, according to which the British, through their agents in the States, spread rumors discrediting the USSR and representing it as a potential aggressor. According to British agents, the war between Germany and the USSR was to begin in the near future by delivering a "preemptive strike" by the Russians on Germany from the region of southern Poland.

Soviet intelligence took steps to identify specific disseminators of disinformation and curb its negative consequences for Soviet-American relations.

At the same time, intelligence solved the problem of obtaining information about the latest achievements of the United States in the field of science, technology and weapons. In this regard, foreign intelligence acquired in the United States sources of information about new types of American weapons being developed in design bureaus or supplied to the troops to equip them.

One of the first Soviet illegals on the American continent was a scout known only by his pseudonym, Charlie. His name has not been preserved in the archives of the SVR. In 1938, he was recalled to the Soviet Union, repressed, and his personal file, apparently, was destroyed. But in the information dossier it was possible to find traces of his activities. Charlie managed to establish business contacts with engineers, technologists, representatives of various companies, officers of flight and naval units. Only in the first two years of work, Charlie obtained important information about rescue vehicles for submariners, data on aircraft engines, the characteristics of two types of tanks, an aircraft sight for bombers, structural details of seaplanes, information about diesel engines for various purposes, and oil refining. In the early 30s, the scout managed to get a report from the American scientist Goddard

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"On the results of work on the creation of a rocket engine on liquid fuel". The document was reported to Marshal Tukhachevsky and was highly appreciated by him.

But the multidisciplinary and systematic work of foreign intelligence in America began around 1933-1934. The Soviet embassy in Washington and the consulate general in New York became the main cover for Soviet intelligence officers.

In 1934, Boris Yakovlevich Bazarov, an experienced resident of illegal intelligence, left for the United States through Austria and Bulgaria. He was an outstanding person who left a noticeable mark on the history of intelligence.

Prior to his trip to the USA, he worked successfully for a number of years in the Balkans, in Austria and Germany. He was fluent in Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian, French and German. He spoke good English.

B.Ya. Bazarov was born in 1893 in Belarus, served as an officer in the tsarist army. He began working in foreign intelligence in 1921.

Under his leadership, young illegal intelligence agents I. Akhmerov, N. Borodin, A. Samsonov operated in the United States, who later became high-class professionals.

The illegal residency of Bazarov successfully interacted with the "legal" one, which was headed by P.D. Gutzeit: both groups carried out joint "developments", interacted when sending information to the Center, performing tasks from the intelligence leadership.

Petr Davydovich Gutzeit was born in 1900 in Ukraine. At the age of 20 he joined the party, three years later he was sent to work in the OGPU. For more than 10 years he worked in the central intelligence apparatus and in 1933 he was appointed as a resident of the "legal" residency in the United States.

Years passed in hard work, in constant concern about organizing meetings with contacts, about assessing the information obtained and sending it through intelligence channels. This full-blooded life of professional intelligence officers was cut short in 1938, when Bazarov and Gutzeit were recalled to Moscow almost simultaneously. They were convicted "for espionage and treason" and sentenced to death. Unfounded accusations against intelligence officers were dropped only in 1956.

The recall of two residents to Moscow had a negative impact on the work of the residencies: it was necessary to urgently redistribute the sources of information among the operatives, and part of the informants to be mothballed "until better times." It became more difficult to keep in touch with the Center. I.A. Akhmerov, however, successfully served as the head of an illegal intelligence group. A talented scout, by this time he had acquired the necessary experience. Akhmerov unobtrusively, as if by itself, established contacts with the right people, knew how to win them over and call them to a frank conversation,

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catch new information in a conversation and immediately evaluate it. He was proactive and inventive in his work, showed attention and restraint in relations with colleagues. In residency, he enjoyed unfailing respect.

By this time, the residency had acquired several valuable agents who had direct access to police officers, influential business and government circles, including the president's entourage. Akhmerov established contacts with a number of them, began regular secret meetings, and checked those who aroused suspicion. According to his report, a decision was made to purge the agent network. At the same time, new promising recruitments were made, including in the State Department.

Many of Akhmerov's agents held anti-fascist views and cooperated, feeling sympathy for the Soviet state, which they regarded as a real force capable of stopping aggression. Sources "Rita" and "Valet" transmitted to the residency information about the situation in the United States, the political situation in the country and the state of its economy, maintained contact between Akhmerov and the "legal" residencies in Washington and New York. "Erich" came to meetings with documents and copies of State Department cipher telegrams covering various aspects of Washington's relations with the USSR, as well as Germany, Japan and other countries. He also provided important information about the Munich conspiracy, Japan's plans to invade Soviet territory, and data on US arms exports. Aron collected data on the Department of Defense, the secret police, and the US counterintelligence service. "Nomad" regularly informed the residency about the state of affairs in the Ministry of Defense and about the military policy of the Washington government, etc.

Akhmerov showed particular interest in "Ada". He was so carried away by his devoted assistant that he raised the question of marrying the intelligence officer Elena Ivanovna before the intelligence leadership, a rare case for those times, and even for the present. "Ada" was a foreigner. But the "good" was still received. Since then, Elena Ivanovna has not been separated from her husband either in joy or in sorrow. However, as you know, there are no roses without thorns. As soon as the young began a life together, as in the middle of 1939, Beria's instructions followed - to immediately leave for Moscow. Beria, having received the intelligence officer in his office, accused Akhmerov of treason and that he had allegedly been recruited.

Although the accusations of espionage fell away as groundless, Akhmerov was under suspicion for a long time and was subjected to "checks" for more than two years, being listed in the intelligence reserve. The rich possibilities of the scout remained unrealized until the war began. After the German attack on the USSR, Akhmerov again found himself at the forefront of the "invisible front".

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After Akhmerov was recalled to Moscow, the main burden of obtaining intelligence information fell on the shoulders of the head of the "legal" residency, G.B. Ovakimyan, a talented Soviet spy.

Hayk Badalovich Hovakimyan had been in the United States since 1934 under the guise of an Amtorg employee and a post-graduate student at the New York Institute of Chemistry. Previously, he was an intelligence officer in Germany and proved himself to be a skilled collaborator. He attracted valuable sources of information to work with the Soviet residency, who for a long time transmitted documentary materials.

He was born in 1898 into a peasant family. He received a good general education, having graduated from the Moscow Higher Technical School and defended his doctoral dissertation in the field of chemical sciences. He knew German, Italian and English.

Energetic and decisive, Hovakimyan acquired numerous new sources of information in the United States. His purposefulness and ability to convince attracted more and more new people to him.



assistants. The sources acquired by Ovakimyan obtained documentary information about the technology of processing sour oil, the production of lubricating oils and aviation gasoline, synthetic rubber, polyethylene, about certain types of chemical warfare agents, dyes in the defense industry, about the latest chemical equipment, about the achievements of radio engineering and about many other things.

Hovakimyan reported to the leadership of foreign intelligence that he was taking the necessary measures to carry out the tasks, but there were not enough staff to ensure the increased volume of intelligence activities.

The Center responded to the request of the resident and sent Semenov and Ershov, who had engineering training, to the States. With a carefully crafted cover story, they entered graduate school at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. However, it took time for them to become familiar with the situation, acquire professional skills and be able to get involved in intelligence work. At the same time, the Center demanded from Hovakimyan, without reducing the effectiveness of his work, to reduce meetings with contacts to a minimum, to increase the level of secrecy in all parts of the residency.

On some days, Hovakimyan had up to ten meetings with various agents, and he returned home completely exhausted. This inevitably blunted vigilance.

In early 1941, Hovakimyan was detained by American counterintelligence while receiving documents from the Oktana agent and ended up in prison. The agent with whom the resident worked showed cowardice: during one of the attacks of excruciating fear, he appeared at the FBI and confessed to

everyone.

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Hovakimyan had nothing to hope for, except for a miracle. And it happened: after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the intelligence officer was released from prison on the orders of President Roosevelt and left for his homeland. Having reported on the work done and the circumstances of the failure, having survived the explanations with Beria, which almost ended in arrest, Hovakimyan, nevertheless, remained in the central intelligence apparatus, became the head of the department, then the deputy head of intelligence. In 1947, during the reorganization of intelligence, Ovakimyanu, as a result of bureaucratic delays, could not find an appropriate position for a long time. Tired and irritated by this red tape, he submitted a letter of resignation. "Let him go," Beria said dismissively. "We have a lot of them." Thus ended the career of a top-class scout.

In the spring of 1941, V.M. Zarubin. Having solid experience of work in Western Europe and China, he faced in America with a new situation for him, which had to be calmly sorted out. But he didn't have the time he needed to do that. Zarubin did not immediately understand the peculiarities of the work of the American residency, before which the Center put forward new requirements and tasks. Zarubin's wife Elizaveta Yulyevna, a talented scout, helped her husband get into the course of numerous and varied cases as soon as possible. An urgent decision was required by the contacts with whom Hovakimyan had worked before his detention. Of the 35 active agents, in agreement with the Center, it was decided to mothball 21. The measure was forced and unpleasant. Vasily Mikhailovich entrusted 14 information sources to the care of the young promising intelligence officer Semenov. Is it too much for a young employee? The FBI kept a close watch on him, trying to block his activities. But the indefatigable, energetic, quick-witted Semyonov was not discouraged by this, and, when required, he carefully and carefully moved away from outside surveillance. This was done only when necessary, so as not to provoke the FBI to take more drastic measures.

Scouts A.S. Feklisov and A.A. Yatskov at first could not make a significant change in her work. Feklisov was given the limited task of providing radio communications between the residency and the Center. Yatskov was supposed to deal with issues of Russian

emigration to the United States, although by that time this problem had lost its former relevance. Only later, when Soviet intelligence turned to the secrets of the production of nuclear weapons, both intelligence officers, under the guidance of an experienced, thoughtful resident L.R. Kvasnikova found themselves and achieved brilliant results, going down in the history of Soviet intelligence as participants in the "atomic espionage."

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Moscow asked Zarubin if he had the opportunity to lobby for the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition with the participation of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, as well as the extension of the Lend-Lease (military aid) law granted to the British to the Soviet Union.

The resident, who was not accustomed to succumb to difficulties, painfully thought about what to do in order to solve these problems. The most active operatives were practically taken out of the game by the efforts of the FBI. A significant part of the residency is frozen. There were no influential connections or approaches to them were still difficult. Nevertheless, Zarubin informed the Center that he would complete the assigned tasks, no matter what the cost.

The smell of gunpowder of a war unprecedented in its scale was clearly felt in the air ...

Despite the difficult situation, determined by both external and internal factors, foreign intelligence achieved tangible results in the United States in the prewar years. Its employees were able to uncover the foreign policy plans of the American leadership in connection with the approaching war in Europe, to predict which side the United States would take if Hitler became the initiator of unleashing aggressive wars.

The foreign intelligence residency in the United States also made a great contribution to the production of scientific and technical information necessary to strengthen the country's defense capability. Only in 1939-1940, for example, in America, more than 450 important information documents on more than 30 thousand pages, 955 drawings and 163 samples of various technical innovations were received. The most important among them were information about the technology for the production of synthetic gasoline, drawings of a mill for cutting gun barrels, drawings of the latest destroyer, and other valuable information.

Such was the real contribution of the American security forces to the preparation of the Soviet Union for the inevitable battle with fascism.

! November 17, 1933

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Yakov Golos

Yakov Golos is a name few people know in our country, even among professionals in the special services. Perhaps partly because he did not suffer the tragic fate of Richard Sorge or the fate of the heroes of the Red Chapel, who received the martyr's crown. The well-known American historian D. Dalin in his book "Soviet espionage" names Yakov among the three most prominent agents of Soviet intelligence in the United States, who, thanks to their intelligence, energy and dedication, played an important role in this service in the prewar years. At the same time, with all the abundance of foreign literature on the activities of Soviet intelligence, Golos is hardly mentioned in it. He has not yet found a worthy place in the gallery of heroes of Russian intelligence.

Who is Mr. Voice?

We find the answer to this question in the documents of the SVR.

Top secret

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER

OF STATE SECURITY OF THE USSR TO THE COMMISSAR OF THE STATE  
SECURITY I RANK comrade. MERKULOV

REPORT

I ask for your sanction to submit for the award of the Order of the Red Star of our out-of-band agent Comrade Golos.

Having begun active cooperation with us in 1930, over the past 13 years Comrade Golos has established himself as a person devoted to our cause. Knowing perfectly well the situation in the host country, Comrade Golos persistently and successfully overcame the great difficulties that he encountered in the course of fulfilling urgent tasks of the NKVD-NKGB

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USSR Tov. The voice is characterized by a skillful approach to people and initiative. He worked not only as a spotter, installer and group leader\*, but also as a recruiter, and attracted to our work a number of persons who are valuable sources of political and economic information.

At present, we are setting new responsible operational tasks for him.

Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR, Commissar of State Security

3rd rank

(Fitin)

November 24, 1943

The document briefly, but quite succinctly characterizes the activities of the intelligence officer. However, before they had time to make a decision on him, a new message arrived - this time about his death.

Top secret

Certificate from cipher telegram No. 1111 from New York dated November 27, 1943.

"Klim" reported that on November 25, 1943, he died of a heart attack, "Sound".

Award note

In connection with the death of Golos, we will not be presenting for a government award.

Kozlov

December 4, 1943

To some, this might seem like a suitable pretext to put an end to the Voice case. But it would be a big mistake to believe that intelligence services have forgotten about the merits of Golos in the fever of everyday affairs. No, they remembered him and tried to help his relatives.

\* Specific terms meaning persons reporting data on candidates for possible recruitment, clarifying their biographical, official and other data, as well as the leaders of a whole group of agents.

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Top secret

## CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE MOSCOW CITY COUNCIL

### WORKING DEPUTIES

comrade Bobrovnikov N.I.

The State Security Committee received a letter from a citizen Golos S.S. pension for her husband, who died in November 1943 while performing a special task. In her letter, Count Golos S.S. raises the question of improving her living conditions.

Considering the great merits of her husband Golos S.S. before the Soviet state, the State Security Committee petitions to satisfy the request of Mrs. Golos S.S.

Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee

S. Belchenko August 28, 1958

According to reports, Golos Yakov Naumovich (aka "Sound") was born in 1890 in the mountains. Yekaterinoslav in a working-class family. In his youth he joined the RSDLP. In 1907, on the instructions of the local party organization, he organized an underground printing house. He spent two years in exile in Siberia, then fled and went to the USA through Japan.

In 1915-1919 he was a member of the US Socialist Party, belonged to its left wing. In 1919, he was the secretary of the "Soviet Russia Technical Assistance Society" created with his participation, which aimed to send engineers, mechanics and other specialists, as well as samples of machines, machine tools, etc. to Russia. The arrival of Yakov Naumovich in the Soviet Union in 1926 was associated with the provision of this assistance. Golos worked in Kuzbass as a manager of a coal trust in the city of Kemerovo. In December 1927, he moved to Moscow and began working in the editorial office of the Moscow News newspaper as the head of the department of technology and rationalization. In 1929 the Voice returned to the USA.

Participation in the revolutionary movement was of decisive importance for the formation of the views of Golos and determined, in general, his life path. Former FBI counterintelligence officer Robert Lamfer, who later worked on the Golos case, described him in his book The War Between the FBI and the KGB (1986) as a "revolutionary burnt to the bone."

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The voice was married to a US citizen, a native of Vilna. In 1936, he sent his wife and child to the USSR so that his son could study in a Soviet school and receive a Soviet upbringing. In 1937, his wife received Soviet citizenship, worked as a librarian, lived in a village near Moscow at st. Zagoryanka.

The first mention of the name Golos in operational intelligence materials dates back to 1930. He is already referred to as "our trusted man in the USA". Documentation of operational relations with Golos in the form of a report addressed to the head of the Foreign Department (INO) of the OGPU A.Kh. Artuzov took place in January 1933. During this period, the INO did not have a permanent residency in the United States, but some intelligence activities were carried out.

Thus, in a number of cases, illegal intelligence agents were sent to America for their own legalization and documentation, or to solve the same tasks in the interests of intelligence in general. One of our illegal spies who periodically came to the USA was Hardy, who was the first to establish operational contact with Golos.

He was involved in the organization of communications through illegal channels, issues of documentation and cover for illegal immigrants. He was also given the task of obtaining American legalization documents. Golos at that time headed a small travel agency "World Tourist" in New York and could be useful for work.

In the mid-1930s, our residency in the United States, through agent "Brien", received reliable information from the FBI that Golos was the object of special surveillance. It seems that the reason for this observation was his participation in the work of the "Committee for the Relief of Spain". The travel agency Golos was used to send volunteers to Spain, who were selected with the active participation of the US Communist Party and other left-wing organizations. This was reported to the head of intelligence A.A. Slutsky. The report raised the question of its further use in our work. Slutsky's resolution: "In general, we, as a rule, avoid people who are actively working in the party, but since we have been associated with Sound for a long time, we can use it carefully."

Despite increased attention to Golos by the FBI, at the end of 1937 he once again traveled to Moscow with a passport in a false name to celebrate the anniversary of the October Revolution. In Moscow, Golos met with Slutsky, who talked to him about the situation in the United States and the prospects for further work.

The situation was seriously complicated in October 1939, when the FBI raided the premises of the World Tourist Company. The formal reason for the search was Golos's violation of the law on the registration of foreign agents. The essence of the violation was that the World Tourist company received from Intourist

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money to advertise tourism in the USSR and nothing more. But American counterintelligence seized on this occasion.

In a letter sent to the Center, the residency assessed this situation as follows: "In connection with what happened, a fundamental question needs to be resolved: should "Sound" run away immediately, without appearing at the Grand Jury? or don't do it. It's too late to run away, but it's still possible. We offered him to leave here, but he refused."

The Center decided not to insist on Golos leaving the United States. In court, he was forced to plead guilty to violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act in order not to irritate the judges, and was sentenced to up to 12 months suspended prison terms and a \$1,000 fine.

In the summer of 1937, the resident of foreign intelligence in New York, P. Gutzeit, described the intelligence officer as follows: "... recruited by my predecessor. When, I don't know exactly. Through him, separate tasks were also carried out: "installations", inquiries, a "development" of a number of Trotskyists was carried out. "Sound" was in touch with a source in one of the important ministries "Brian". When the residency needed trusted and dedicated people, we turned to Zvuk, and they selected the right people. There have been no failures in all the years of our relationship with him. He never aroused any suspicion or doubt. Characteristic of "Sound" is that he sent his wife with a 12-year-old child to the USSR, where the son could receive a real communist education. "Sound" did not receive any salary from us. However, when, due to the deteriorating financial situation of his company, he was unable to pay the salaries of his assistants, I, leaving the United States, ordered to give him 100-150 dollars a month.

A very laconic and at the same time bright characterization is written in a calm and businesslike tone. It is hard to imagine that P. Gutzeit wrote it not in the quiet of an office, but in a prison cell, falsely accused of treason and subjected to moral and physical pressure.

The Golos file contains a certificate on him as a foreign agent, dated January 1937 and signed by the captain of state security Tomchin (at that time it was quite a high number).

a rank roughly corresponding to the current colonel). On this certificate in April 1938, in a sweeping handwriting of Lieutenant of State Security Raisa Sobol, an addition was made: "The source "Sound" was known to the following persons now arrested by us: Samsonov, Tomchin, Karin, Lebedinsky, Livent-Levint, Berlin."

It will not be long before the other hand will rewrite this list, adding to it the name of Sobol herself. And already another lieutenant of state security, Pshenichny, will write that "Sound" is interested

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Enemies of the people popped in: Passov, Shpigelglas, Grappen, Kaminsky, Sobol, Gutzeit.

The year was 1939, the situation urgently demanded the resumption of intelligence activities in the United States, the restoration of its illegal foreign apparatuses, and the Center put G.B. Ovakimyan tasks on using the possibilities of the Voice. On the other hand, it was necessary to deal with the agents who remained after the arrest of the "enemies of the people". This task fell on the shoulders of young employees in the Center, who came to the NKVD bodies through party recruitment, having just graduated from intelligence school, and, as it was believed, were still "green" and did not see

live agent.

Nevertheless, this did not prevent one of them from declaring that Golos was a hidden Menshevik and Trotskyist who joined the Communist Party in order to corrupt it from within. Another blamed Yakov Naumovich for being "developed" by American intelligence services in connection with the "Committee for Relief to Spain." Two young employees were especially zealous, who insisted that Golos should be urgently isolated from all residency affairs, recalled to the Union and arrested. Fortunately, there were also sane people in the Center who stopped the zealous operatives.

In the first years of work with Ya.N. In the voice, no one particularly wondered through whom exactly he was getting the documents. In the reports, these sources were referred to only in a general way: "one clerk from the passport office" or simply "clerk from New York", etc. The scale of this work can be judged from the following message from the residency, dated October 1939: "Recently, through Zvuk, we obtained 10 blank forms with the signature and seal of the municipality, which serve to obtain metrics by which you can issue passports of American citizens, as well as the same certificates without a signature. More than 70 naturalization certificates for people of various nationalities, 27 birth certificates, on the basis of which one can also obtain passports".

At the same time, documentation work was only part of what Golos did for intelligence. Only when the Center began to deal with the legacy of the "enemies of the people" did it suddenly become clear what a colossal work Golos had done and, consequently, how much he knew about the affairs of the Soviet special services.

As of July 1940, they counted about two dozen people whom Golos either hired or "developed" with the aim of attracting in the future. His people were infiltrated into German and other organizations in the USA. "Brien", as already noted, worked in one of the key ministries, "Olfen" provided information on weapons issues, there were reliable sources among Trotskyist organizations in the United States, in nationalist associations, a number of persons performed auxiliary functions: carried out

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surveillance, "installations", secret extraction of secret documents, etc.

Of course, not all of them were equal in their capabilities, but among them were also valuable sources of important information, including those close to the White House, leading employees of a number of major departments, American and British intelligence services.

In the summer of 1940, Golos established contact with "Rond", who held a responsible post in one of the government offices. He was a prominent specialist in his field, who also had solid connections in government spheres. But most importantly, he was a man with great sympathy for the Soviet Union, a staunch anti-fascist who, long before the USSR and the USA became allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, decided to actively help the Soviet Union. A group of sources soon formed around Ronda, working in a number of important military and economic government institutions. In fact, he became a group leader, and his assistants became one of the most effective informants. The merits of "Ronda" were noted by the Soviet government. He was informed that he had been awarded the Order of the Red Star. The award itself, of course, was not presented for reasons of secrecy and was kept in the agent's personal file in Moscow.

There is an interesting statement about Yakov Naumovich Golos of the residency, which at the beginning of 1941 established contact with him: "He has a lot of people in touch. Some of the agents associated with the "Sound" and giving messages are not known to us, with the exception of nicknames. He was given the task of covering in detail his entire network.

When organizing work with Golos, the Center and the residency took into account the possibility that he might be in the FBI's field of vision. There were more than enough reasons for this: membership in the Communist Party, constant trips to Moscow, business connections of the World " with Soviet organizations, and finally, active participation in the activities of the "Committee for Relief of Spain". In the reports of the operatives, anxiety about this was repeatedly expressed.

Back in 1939, Harry, an employee of the "legal" New York residency, noted in his report: "Over the past 2 years, I have met with " Sound "500 or 600 times. On another day, 3-4 meetings could be held with him. This was due to the fact that he performed a very wide range of tasks and, in fact, was the main agent of the residency for 10 years. Regardless of the results of the investigation (on the case of the registration of World Tourist as an agent of a foreign power), we must proceed from the fact that he burned out for a long period of time for our work in America.

Since 1939, work with Golos was conducted by G.B. Hovakimyan. He was a very temperamental and persistent scout. He knew how to achieve his goals. Working with Golo

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Som he significantly improved. But Hovakimyan's main profile was scientific and technical intelligence. He paid the most attention to her. Therefore, he preferred to transfer the Voices to his deputy Luka for communication. However, in April 1940, Luca reported that, in his opinion, Golos was the "Achilles' heel" of the residency, and in the event of an accident with him, much of what had been created would crumble to dust. He noted that Golos recommends people in all areas of work, although there is talk in the residency that, according to data received at one time, he is registered with the American counterintelligence as an "NKVD agent." On this basis, Luke considered it necessary to "mothball" Golos and prepare a replacement for him. However, Hovakimyan was forced to continue working with Golos until his arrest and deportation from the United States in the spring of 1941.

of the year.

From the FBI documentary materials subsequently received by the residency, it is known that the first contact between Golos and Ovakimyan was recorded on February 18, 1941. The surveillance report noted that Ovakimyan was an "identified agent of the GPU." In a little over a month, which remained before Ovakimyan's arrest and his subsequent expulsion from the United States, the FBI recorded several more of his meetings with Golos.

Here we come to the key question of who "brought the outdoors", that is, the FBI officers who carried out surveillance, to the meeting on February 18, 1941 - the resident or Golos himself. After so many years, it is unambiguously impossible to answer this question. We can only proceed from the fact that, judging by the operational reports of the FBI, Golos was monitored even before

fixing by counterintelligence of his contact with our representative. Golos himself noted that he was being watched by the FBI. One of the reports of the detective Leonid, in particular, says: "The outdoor police continue to follow the Sound. He often asks me if everything is all right with us, since he has never noted such close observation of himself. Leonid, judging by his reports, limited himself to reassuring the Voices - everything is normal with us, they say. Whether Leonid himself was under surveillance remains unknown.

As subsequent events showed, during this period in the residency there was a simplified idea of the activities of local counterintelligence ("spies are snooping around, a tail has appeared for someone, it is enough to outwit the spies, break away from the tail - and everything will be in order"). The effect was that our scouts were mostly young workers, without sufficient professional experience. Almost all of them came to intelligence after the mass purges of 1937: the connection between generations was broken and they had to learn only from their own mistakes. True, US counterintelligence was also not yet the powerful organization that it became a decade later, but high-class professionals have already begun to appear in it.

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At the end of 1941, the Center instructed the gradual unloading of Golos from the sources of information he had in touch, transferring them to group agents and personnel officers of the intelligence apparatus. The reorganization was necessary from the point of view of secrecy.

It must be said that the question of directing the work of Golos created certain difficulties from time to time. Previously, Golos, as a rule, was in touch with the resident. After the arrest and subsequent expulsion from the United States in the spring of 1941, Ovakimyan had a pause, and then with the arrival of V.M. Zarubina contact was restored. Zarubin was an experienced illegal intelligence agent, but he did not immediately find himself in the new role of a resident of a "legal" residency. As an employee of the Soviet embassy in Washington, he was torn between New York and Washington, trying to manage both points. Despite his position as an employee of an official Soviet institution, Vasily Mikhailovich restored contacts with people with whom he had previously worked while in the United States in an illegal position. With all the responsibilities and the pace that he took, apparently, it was difficult to maintain secrecy.

The voice was soon handed over to Leonid, a young employee of the New York residency, who, as noted later, due to the lack of operational qualifications, a sufficient level of education, political training, knowledge of local conditions and language, could not direct the work of "Sound", as the situation demanded it. Indicative in this regard is an excerpt from the report of Leonid himself: "I did not receive proper guidance in working with 'Sound'. Under such conditions, meeting with him was torture for me. As for the 'Sound' itself, in the process of working with him I systematically learned a lot of useful things from him both in terms of studying the country and in matters of working with agents. It was he, and not the leaders of the residency, who taught me these questions."

Apparently, the Center understood these difficulties and tried to help overcome them. That is why in April 1943 the head of intelligence P.M. Fitin sent a personal letter to Golos, which was of great importance to the latter. Unfortunately, the text of Fitin's letter has not been preserved, but there is an answer from Golos in the file.

"Dear comrade Victor!?"

I want to assure you and the rest of our friends that I am doing everything in my power - and even a little more - to use the current political situation in the interests of our organization. I have learned to work here in all conditions - favorable and unfavorable - and you can be sure that I will make the most of the current situation.

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... Among the difficulties, I must also note that some of our people are disoriented by the current alliance between our countries and do not see the need to help us. They naively believe that in order to receive something, we must ask for it openly.

We see these difficulties and are doing everything in our power to overcome them, and I can assure you that we will do our best to use the existing environment to our advantage. If you look at the work done so far, I think you will see that we are getting a lot. But that doesn't mean we can't get more. Personally, I am not satisfied with the results and try to improve them every day.

My best wishes to all my friends. I send you congratulations on the Day of the First of May".

The Center continued to insist on speeding up the restructuring of the work of the residency with Golos. In November 1943, V.M. Zarubin, at the direction of the People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov, met with him twice and discussed a plan for reorganizing his group, and in essence transferring his entire network to us. This was motivated by the need to increase the secrecy of work with sources.

The Resident, of course, tried to "sweeten the pill", talked about how highly appreciated the work of the Voice deserves, but the main hope was that the "Sound" would obey the order. Yielding to pressure, the Voice said that he would do whatever was necessary, but at the same time expressed personal resentment at the fact that we, as he believed, were "taking away" people from him to transfer to someone else.

Yakov Naumovich died suddenly on November 25, 1943. The sudden death of the head of a whole group of like-minded assistants could not but excite the leadership of foreign intelligence. It was necessary to hastily find a worthy replacement for Yakov Naumovich Golos. But it was not so easy to solve this problem, since there was a lack of a reserve of leaders of out-of-cord points in intelligence. In order to avoid undesirable consequences from the protracted pause in the selection of the team leader, it was decided to freeze, temporarily stop contacts with the most important information sources. The scouts who worked with him were recalled to their homeland.

Merits of Ya.N. Voices in front of Soviet intelligence can hardly be overestimated. He honestly and disinterestedly fulfilled his duty, worked hard to study people of interest to intelligence, checked their reliability, attracted them to cooperation. From valuable sources of information acquired by him, Golos received important information on economic, military, political, scientific and technical issues. The information transmitted by him was taken into account in the development of relations between the USSR and the USA, the implementation of the Soviet

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the government of the foreign policy, strengthening and increasing the efficiency of the Soviet economy, the defense potential of the Soviet Union. The activity of the Voice was so multifaceted that it is difficult to reduce it to one aspect. The trace left by Yakov Golos in the history of foreign intelligence is so significant and impressive that individual miscalculations cannot cast a shadow of doubt on him. Russian intelligence officers will always honor this name and be proud of it.

' "Sound" is the operational pseudonym of Ya Golos. 2 Instance in the American court. 3 "Viktor" is the operational pseudonym of P.M. Fitina.

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"Paper factory"

Not all paths led our intelligence to success... In one of the archival files, attention was drawn to an extract from the plan of work of the foreign intelligence station in the United States, dating back to the beginning of the 30s, which, in particular, said: "<...in the presence of this agent and its connections, we consider

further penetration into the State Department along the lines of both "legal" and "illegal" is inappropriate.

Both the station and the Center considered such an informed agent at that time to be "Leo", who received information, according to him, from the sub-sources of "Willy" and "Daniel".

"Leo" was born in 1876 in Germany. While still a young man, he emigrated to the United States and took up journalism. He came to the attention of the residency in 1933 as an active journalist and was attracted to cooperation on a material basis by an illegal intelligence agent V.B. Markin.

"Leo" took part first in the activities of the left wing of the Socialist Party of America, and then in other parties, but did not stay in them for a long time. His political face remained very uncertain, and his ideological positions were confused.

But the sources he acquired seemed to work, and not bad. The residency in the middle of 1934 assessed the reconnaissance capabilities of Willy and Daniel as follows:

"'Willy' gives copies of the reports of US ambassadors, consuls and military attachés in Europe and the Far East addressed to the State Department. The material is of great value. May issue cabinet orders on foreign policy and military intelligence activities.

"Daniel" works in the same institution as "Willy", recruited with the assistance of the latter. Gives copies of verbatim records of conversations of the Secretary of State and his assistants with ambassadors of other countries. The material is of great value."

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In February 1934, the residency raised the question of the need to transfer Leo's sources to direct contact with us. At the same time, she noted that the political activity of "Leo", his connection with leftist groups could attract the attention of the American authorities and lead to undesirable consequences. In addition, communication through "Leo" deprived the residency of the opportunity to conduct a thorough check of the sources themselves.

Despite the laudatory reviews of the residency, the Center also considered it necessary to carry out a thorough check of "Leo", "Willy" and "Daniel". Even a superficial acquaintance with State Department directories gave rise to the suspicion that "Daniel" was in a position that did not give him access to the documents he was handing over. On the other hand, "Willy's" official position gave him direct access to cipher correspondence and the archives of the State Department. On this basis, the verifiers first came up with the idea that "Daniel" was created by the imagination of "Leo" in order to increase the reward received from us. And in the presence of "Willy" then not doubted.

Perhaps the fact that a deeper check at that moment was difficult had an effect. According to Willie, US Ambassador to Moscow William Bullitt allegedly informed the State Department that the content of his reports was becoming known in Moscow. In this regard, the heads of departments of the State Department were supposedly questioned about possible channels of information leakage in Washington, and "Willy" himself was instructed to conduct a thorough investigation in the department he headed. "Leo" stated that, according to "Willy", American intelligence services could be involved in checking suspicions about the leak.

However, the residency plan, approved in December 1934, strongly emphasized the need to check the sources of "Leo".

From a professional point of view, this plan had one very significant drawback. Focusing on "Willy" and "Daniel", he did not foresee any activities in

in relation to "Leo" himself, who was clearly the key figure in this triangle, and in order to deeply understand his sub-sources, it was necessary first to understand "Leo" himself.

The work was entrusted to the 32-year-old intelligence officer I.A. Akhmerov, who arrived in the United States in April 1935. By the time he arrived in the US, he already had experience in illegal intelligence work in Turkey and China, where he acquired several valuable sources, in particular among the representatives of Japan in China. The abilities of the young intelligence officer, brilliant knowledge of the English language attracted the attention of the intelligence leadership to him and contributed to his assignment to work in the United States as an assistant to a resident of an illegal residency.

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However, the real test of "Leo" and his sub-sources unfolded with the arrival in the summer of 1935 of a new resident of the illegal residency, B.Ya. Bazarov. At 42, Bazarov was already an experienced intelligence agent, he had about 10 years of illegal work in the Balkans and Austria behind him. Bazarov had experience in recruiting. One of his outstanding achievements is the recruitment of a cryptographer for the English Foreign Office, which he carried out together with the famous illegal intelligence officer D.A. Bystroletov.

Bazarov outlined his impressions of the first contacts with "Leo" in the very first mail dated June 5, 1935. Here is the letter:

"“Leo” met me not only coldly, but simply with hostility. His considerable independence in work became clear to me. According to Akhmerov, “Leo” was more likely to supervise Davis-Markin (the operative with whom “Leo” was in touch. - Auth.), than the latter to him. He always wears the mask of a super-busy journalist: he is always in a hurry, disrupts assignments and meetings, gets confused in the presentation, contradicts himself, he doesn’t remember much, he doesn’t know.

Several times he was caught sitting at home while he said he was leaving for Washington. What is worth one story with “Daniel”, now giving materials, now afraid to give them, now sick, then passing notes to “Leo” through “Willy”, now wanting to have a direct connection only with “Leo” and, finally, now having opened up - we are talking with "Leo" about the fact that he used to work for the French, but they paid inaccurately and therefore, they say, he left them - this whole story is dark, like an autumn night.

"Leo" tries to give the impression that his work with us is, by the way. However, it seems that we give about half of his budget, while his work for us takes about one-sixth of his time. On the other hand, he describes himself as a person dedicated to our movement, a dynamic, through and through journalist who feels simply sick without a newspaper. A caring father, considers every cent, a man obligatory in personal relationships, with a certain inclination to warmth, demanding attention, loving praise. Proceeding from this, and remembering that we have only one modest piece of paper about him in the Leo case, I will accumulate everything about him so that later, on the basis of the accumulated data, I can draw the most correct conclusion.

As a result of first impressions, I adopted a certain tactic in relation to "Leo". On the one hand, I establish impeccable comradely relations with him, showing myself as an impeccable friend, without a shadow of a doubt in his honesty, revolutionary spirit, I discuss all issues of working on his sources, as with an equal. On the other hand, I press it without hesitation, straight ahead. At first, from my conversation, he had something like a grimace of nausea on his face, but now it seems to have become less noticeable, although it is still far from a radiant smile.

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The letter from Resident Bazarov, which is very different from many dry operational documents written in similar situations today, gives a vivid sketch of what happened, conveys the atmosphere of those years, the artless, but in its own way quite businesslike style of work of intelligence officers of that era.

In order to check, Bazarov tried to clarify with "Leo" the circumstances of his acquaintance with "Willy" and "Daniel". The agent's confused explanations boiled down to the fact that he met them in a Washington club. Bazarov came to the conclusion that "Leo" was trying hard to hide from us the real circumstances of his acquaintance with "Willy" and "Daniel".

Summing up the six months of his work with Leo, Bazarov reported to the Center at the end of November 1935:

““Leo” categorically does not agree to the transfer of “Willy” and “Daniel” to us, stating that this will mean the cessation of work ... We will need to come to “Willy” and “Daniel” through the head of “Leo”, collecting on them the most saturated installation material. It is to this task that I have subordinated all my work.”

Despite all the doubts and difficulties that accompanied the work with "Leo" and his sub-sources, during this period they nevertheless provided quite up-to-date information from the State Department, which made it possible to consider them valuable sources. However, over time, some roughness began to appear. In May 1936, Akhmerov, who replaced Bazarov during his vacation, reported that in the materials of "Willy" there were, from his point of view, some implausible information, and sometimes simply naive reasoning.

During 1935, the residency scrupulously collected and verified all the facts that "Leo" reported about "Willy" and "Daniel", as well as about the organization of his work with them. The check showed that "Willy" was at work, while, according to "Leo", he was on vacation. On a couple of occasions, "Leo" was found to be at home on certain days while he said he was traveling to Washington to meet "Willy".

At the beginning of October 1935, "Daniel" transmitted material received by the State Department about the conversation of the US ambassador in London. Bazarov was able to establish for sure that the ambassador was on vacation in the United States during this period and returned to England only at the end of October. "Leo" explained this contradiction by the fact that the ambassador came to America for a short time and soon returned back to England.

Bazarov repeatedly noted that "Willy" gave documents with an incorrect signature. For example, it was known from the newspapers that one American diplomat had been transferred from Paris to Damascus, but "Willy" kept on handing over materials signed by him from Paris for a long time to come. Leo's explanations for this were unconvincing.

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Looking for ways to get direct access to "Willy" and "Daniel", Bazarov moved meetings with "Leo" to Washington. This was legended by the fact that Bazarov had an independent group in Washington, where he was forced to spend most of his time. Communication with "Leo" in New York remained with Akhmerov. "Leo" was very excited by this circumstance, however, he could not object to such a variant of communication and, in the words of Bazarov, tried to put on "a good face in a bad game." Shortly thereafter, "Leo" reported that the State Department was conducting an extensive search for persons suspected of espionage. In this regard, "Willy" and "Daniel" allegedly demanded meetings outside of Washington - the first in Baltimore, and the second in Philadelphia. Bazarov noted with obvious sarcasm: "The more Leo fails in front of me and understands this himself, the more heaven and earth take up arms in Washington against everyone who is engaged in our work, and, apparently, the day is not far off when, according to Leo's invention, all employees of the State Department will turn into detectives. Bazarov's observation of "Leo" in Washington showed that when, according to him, he rushed between Baltimore and Philadelphia, receiving materials from "Willy" and "Daniel", he simply flew to Washington from New York by plane.

Monitoring of the State Department showed no signs of increased internal surveillance of its employees. The regime at the State Department was really strict, but about half of the employees could freely take out official documents under the pretext of working on them at home. As for "Willy", his mode and degree of workload almost completely ruled out the possibility of secret correspondence of materials at work, and

then reprinting them on a typewriter at home. "Willy"'s organization of the day and his caution contradicted "Leo's" version that he brought him reprinted materials to the hotel and could travel to other cities to meet with him. Shortly after the rescheduling of the meetings in Washington, Bazarov reported that "Leo" was completely confused as to which of the materials he was transmitting came from "Willy" and which from "Daniel."

In March 1936, after three months of delays and delays, "Leo" finally arranged for Bazarov to meet "Daniel" in New York. In his report, Bazarov noted that "Leo" took this step only after an agreement was reached on which issues could be raised during the conversation and which not.

During this meeting, "Leo" was very worried, he showed special concern about whether "strangers" were planted in the restaurant. Bazarov came to the conclusion that "Leo" was not worried about the police agents, but about possible assistants to the Soviet resident. Outwardly, "Daniel" was a typical American of Anglo-Saxon origin, a thin brown-haired man of average height. At first, he kept

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Xia, embarrassed and timid, without any aplomb, looked around all the time, lowered his voice to a whisper, and on the whole gave the impression of a petty official.

After a conversation on general topics, Bazarov began to question "Daniel" about his official duties, the structure of the department, the situation at work, expressed a general assessment of the materials received, and indicated what interests us and what does not. "Leo" did not interfere with the conversation and even helped to clarify some points. "Daniel" said that he was in charge of the work of the shorthand bureau. He employs 8 stenographers, who are involved in recording conversations between senior officials of the State Department and foreign ambassadors. He works in an office with two other employees. He prepares materials for us by transcribing hastily transcribed copies of the transcripts when they are in his proofreading room, and then retypes his notes at home on a typewriter. After the processed record is handed over to the interested person, "Daniel" can no longer return to it. According to "Daniel", all work, regardless of the degree of its readiness, is collected from the performers and locked in cabinets at 3.30 in the afternoon. Work in the evening excluded.

During the conversation, it turned out that "Daniel" knew in general terms the range of issues that were raised in the materials allegedly received from him, but was poorly informed about the essence of political problems. Daniel's strong addiction to alcohol was revealed, he ordered one cocktail after another. Visibly intoxicated, he began to call a spade a spade. He talked aloud about the kind of espionage that reigns in the State Department, that everyone is especially afraid of German espionage and, in his opinion, he could be mistaken for a German spy. Despite a number of alarming moments, Bazarov, however, did not have a suspicion that before the meeting, "Leo" and "Daniel" had conspired among themselves.

The Center fully shared Bazarov's doubts about Leo's sub-sources and was well aware of the difficulties faced by the residency during his verification. The intelligence leadership in October 1936 informed the resident:

"We reaffirm our decision that, until the relationship with Leo is clarified, work with him should be continued, despite his shortcomings and double-dealing... The materials of "Willy" and "Daniel" in the form in which to which you give them, of course, are of great interest. In view of this, we ask for the time being to remove the question of a rupture and build the work of the residency on finding direct approaches to agents.

In November 1936, Bazarov managed to establish from American directories that "Daniel" did not have access to the documents that he transmitted, since he worked in the financial department of the State Department.

In the same directory there was a photograph of "Willy" and his address. The "installation" carried out showed that a man lived in this house, whose appearance had nothing to do with the appearance of a person who had previously been shown to him as "Willy" at Bazarov's insistence.

At the beginning of 1937, taking into account the accumulated information about the dishonesty of "Leo" in almost everything related to working with his sub-sources, Bazarov came to the conclusion that it was necessary to present an ultimatum to "Leo" in the form of a categorical demand for a personal meeting with "Willy".

"Leo" lived in Manhattan and occupied two floors in a four-story building. The windows of his apartment overlooked the street. To monitor "Leo", the station managed to rent two apartments in the house opposite, from where everything that happened in the apartment of "Leo" was clearly visible.

In mid-February 1937, on the eve of the next meeting, Leo was under round-the-clock surveillance, which was conducted for 60 hours. It turned out that, contrary to the statements of "Leo", he did not go to Washington during this period. During the observation period, he left the house only once for 4 hours. For three nights, work was going on in his office, in which all members of the family participated, and the wife and son "Leo" alternately typed something on a typewriter. When giving us the materials, "Leo" repeated the usual lie about his trip to Washington and meetings with sources.

Surveillance was resumed at the end of March, on the eve of a new meeting, and gave the same results.

Based on the observation data, the Center made a preliminary conclusion that "Leo" is an unusually talented compiler. The use of information from open sources, the extraction of new data from them, their analysis and generalization often give amazing results. Many intelligence agencies do not neglect this method. But such work is considered only an addition to the main one - undercover and operational. Work with "Leo" could be continued, but, of course, on different terms.

In the opinion of the residency, the erudition of "Leo" was not so high that he could independently fabricate all the material from beginning to end. He, apparently, had some documentary information, but he finalized it. All this needed to be clarified before a final decision was made.

After persistent demands from the residency, in February 1937, "Leo" finally agreed to organize a meeting between Akhmerov and "Willy." Akhmerov carefully prepared for the meeting, developed the tactics for holding it, questions that would make it possible to find out the real face of "Willy".

The same "Willy" whom "Leo" had already shown to Bazarov in Washington a few months ago came to the meeting. He was a man of about 40 years of age, of medium height, swarthy, with deep-set eyes. From his speech it could be assumed that he was an American of German origin. "Willy" gave the impression of an ordinary official.

The results of the meeting exceeded all expectations. The careful preparation of the meeting, the perseverance and ingenuity of Akhmerov, who conducted it, allowed the residency to get a convincing answer to the main question: the "Willy" shown was not the person that "Leo" passed him off as. During the meeting, it turned out that "Willy" is not well versed in politics, does not understand the issues that were covered in the materials transmitted to us. He did not know the names of the employees of the State Department, whom he should have known in his position, and he gave fictitious names of the rest of the employees. He gave the name of a male secretary, when the station knew for sure that the secretary of the department supposedly headed by "Willy" was a woman. "Willy" showed an inexplicable ignorance of the order of registration and

passing documents in the department, features of their details. He did not even know the names of most of the American ambassadors in the major countries.

Akhmerov, having established the truth about the agent, did not go to expose "Leo" and "Willy", since such a task was not set before him at that time. According to Akhmerov, "Leo" himself realized that his deception had been exposed.

During the meeting, the station staff managed to get a good look at "Willy", and it soon became clear that the person shown to Akhmerov was completely different from what "Leo" had passed him off as.

In April 1937 B.Ya. Bazarov reported that after repeated delays on the part of "Leo", Akhmerov finally met with "Daniel". During the meeting, it turned out that this was not at all the person whom "Leo" showed to Bazarov. "Daniel" knew nothing about politics and was not interested in it. For the purpose of verification, Akhmerov touched on the issues that were covered by the source in the materials, and it turned out that he was not oriented in them. In response to persistent questions from Akhmerov, he insisted that he was a clerk to whom stenographers were subordinate. When asked who his boss was, he hesitated and finally refused to give a last name, saying that he would not give names or talk about personalities, as he had previously agreed with "Leo".

Akhmerov's report noted that during the conversation with "Daniel", as in the conversation with "Willy", "Leo" constantly intervened, prompted "Daniel" answers to questions, and corrected him.

In order to check, Akhmerov asked if "Daniel" knew William Kelly, the head of the Eastern European Department, which included the Soviet Union. "Daniel" was not familiar with Kelly, and Akhmerov

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the impression was that "Daniel" did not know at all about the existence of this responsible State Department official.

According to Akhmerov, "Leo" should have come to the conclusion as a result of the meetings that the Soviet intelligence officers were convinced that the "Willy" and "Daniel" shown to them were dummy persons.

In general, the work of I.A. Akhmerov on the preparation and holding of these three meetings deserves high estimates.

As a result of the meetings on July 2, 1937, the Center instructed to break with Leo. Akhmerov was asked to take measures to exclude any hostile actions on the part of "Leo" in relation to the residency and his possible attempts to "install" Akhmerov. At the same time, the Center instructed to intensify the independent work of the residency in the State Department, using proven and reliable agents.

Such was the path of "Leo" - from political vacillation to fraud. In his person, foreign intelligence faced a sophisticated falsifier. Americans even have a special term for this type of fraud - "paper mill". Of these "paper mills," former CIA Director Dulles wrote: "Their information is often plausible, well reasoned, and superbly framed. It has only one drawback - contrary to the claims, it does not come from the original source.

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The struggle of intelligence for the security of the USSR in the countries of the Middle East

Russia's relations with the countries of the Middle East, especially with Iran and Turkey, go back centuries. The southern neighbors of the Russian state have always been in the sphere of its increased attention and diplomatic activity. As for Afghanistan, it became an object of our country's political interests after it gained state sovereignty in 1919. This was facilitated by the desire of the progressive Emir Amanullah to establish friendly relations with Moscow, as opposed to the traditional influence of England.

Great Britain, like Russia, spared no effort to assert its positions in Iran and Afghanistan. Ultimately, the case ended with the actual division of Iran into zones of influence: the northern provinces of the country came under the control of Russia, the southern provinces - of England.

In the 18th-20th centuries, the line for Russia's access to the Black Sea, determined by Peter the Great, constantly ran into resistance from Turkey, which was supported by the leading European powers. This led to protracted wars and complications in Russian-Turkish relations, which were mostly unfriendly.

Western states in their policy in the East invariably acted in an anti-Russian vein. Little has changed in the geopolitical strategy of the West since the establishment of Soviet power.

Eternal political interests began to dress up in new ideological clothes: the thesis about the need to fight the "communist threat" was added. Nevertheless, until the end of the 1930s, Turkey, under the leadership of Atatürk, took a loyal position in relation to the USSR, interstate relations developed normally.

On the eve of World War II

position, however,

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It turned out that Türkiye was more and more inclined to support Nazi Germany.

From the very beginning, the Soviet government considered the eastern vector in its foreign policy a priority and focused intelligence on purposeful work against the intrigues of those Western powers that sought to use the countries of the Middle East region for anti-Soviet purposes. The residencies in Kabul, Tehran, Ankara, Istanbul and other cities in the 1930s carried out intelligence work in two main areas: infiltrating foreign special services and opening the communication channels of anti-Soviet nationalist organizations and white emigration with the hostile underground on the territory of the USSR. After Hitler came to power in Germany and the emergence of his plans for a "march to the East", another important direction emerged – opposition to German intelligence, which had launched an active activity in the countries of the region.

In the early 1930s, the issue of the Basmachi, whose gangs carried out bloody raids on the Central Asian republics from the territory of Afghanistan, was still acute. Emir Amanulla, who occupied positions friendly to the USSR, tried to the best of his ability to limit the freedom of action of the leaders of the Basmachi and prevented the expansion of actions hostile to the USSR. However, Nadir Shah, who seized power in 1929, did not take serious steps to stop the activities of the Basmachi, and their movement acquired a significant scope.

Under these conditions, the Center decided to focus the efforts of the residencies in Afghanistan on the decomposition of the Central Asian anti-Soviet emigration and the neutralization of the plans and actions of Western intelligence, mainly English, which maintained close ties with the leaders of the Basmachi movement. The headquarters of the Turkmen-Uzbek emigrant organization "Committee of Happiness of Bukhara and Turkestan" ("Anjumane saadat Bukhari va Turkestan"), for example, was located in Peshawar and, naturally, was controlled by the British.

The bandit formation led by Ibrahim-bek was especially active and cruel. Basmachi not only carried out destructive raids on the territory



Central Asian republics, robbed and killed their inhabitants, but also literally mocked the Afghan population of the regions bordering the USSR.

In order to eliminate the gangs of Ibrahim bek, the residency in Mazar-i-Sharif developed a plan of operation. With the help of a reliable agent, Ibrahim Bek was given an appointment in a remote and narrow mountain gorge in the Afghan Pamirs. There, food, fodder and military equipment were to be handed over to the Basmachi - such was the legend that Ibrahim-bek believed. From the USSR, a Red Army detachment arrived at the meeting place and ambushed. During a short battle, all the bandits, led by the leader, were killed. After the death of Ibrahim-bek

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the bandit formation broke up into small groups and ceased to pose a danger.

From 1930 to 1934, the Kabul residency was subordinate to the plenipotentiary representation of the OGPU in Tashkent, and this circumstance had a negative impact on its activities: it clearly could not cope with the tasks set. Residents changed frequently, and each new leader sought to accuse his predecessor of incompetence. It was not possible to create an effective agent network. In October 1935, the residency in Kabul was reassigned directly to the 5th department of the GUGB, and he was appointed as a resident for the well-recommended head of intelligence in the Afghan city of Meimen, bordering the USSR.

Gradually intelligence work in Kabul began to improve. Agents appeared that successfully covered the activities of the British, Japanese and - which was especially important on the eve of the war - the Germans who were actively working in Afghanistan. Interesting information began to come in about the plans and intentions of the Afghan leadership, which was put under pressure by fascist Germany in order to force them to abandon their traditional neutrality and take anti-Soviet POSITIONS.

In 1935, after some interruption, contact was restored with "Maryam", one of the most useful and trusted agents in Afghanistan. The fate of this beautiful, intelligent, educated and well-bred woman is truly amazing. Many bitter trials fell on her lot. During the years of the Civil War, she lost her husband and ended up in Tashkent, where she volunteered to help local Chekists. She met an Afghan diplomat and soon married him. Naturally, after that, there were no secrets for the OGPU in the Afghan consulate. However, according to the Afghan laws of that time, a government official married to a foreigner could not remain in the public service and had to resign. The husband "Maryam" was no exception, and after some time he and his wife returned to Kabul, where he engaged in commercial activities.

His brother, Ali Mohammed, the future influential minister of the court under Zahir Shah, was also carried away by the Russian beauty. Unexpectedly, the husband of "Maryam" died under unclear circumstances. There were persistent rumors that he had been poisoned. Ali Mohammed, being a high-ranking government official, also did not have the right to legal marriage with a foreigner, and "Maryam" became his wife unofficially.

The Minister of the Court was close to the Shah and enjoyed his full confidence. "Maryam" also quickly became a home in the family of Zahir Shah, often treating his family with dishes of Russian cuisine - pancakes, pies, dumplings. Often the monarch would visit Ali Mohammed's house, and "Maryam" would prepare his favorite dishes for him.

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A midwife by profession, "Maryam" more than once gave birth to the Shah's wife and earned her cordial disposition. These relations allowed "Maryam" to keep abreast of many events hidden from the eyes of an outside observer. Very interesting information came from her, often it was information received through Ali Mohammed. With the help of Maryam, the residency repeatedly carried out actions of influence and resolved delicate issues.

"Maryam" continued to provide intelligence assistance to the best of its ability, even in old age. She was sure that in distant Afghanistan, where fate had thrown her, she continued to serve the Motherland. "Maryam" was a real patriot. In the 1960s, scouts stationed in Kabul occasionally visited "Maryam" at her mansion in the center of the city. The decoration of the house was purely Russian and resembled the atmosphere of the noble estates of the 19th century. She was proud of the fact that she had built a Dutch stove with her own hands and lined it with tiles. With a grin, she said that there was not a single stove-maker in all of Afghanistan, and she had to take this role upon herself.

Having lived most of her life in Afghanistan, "Maryam" was well versed in the national character of the Afghans, which helped a lot in practical work.

In 1935-1941, the Kabul residency managed to acquire a number of sources with great informational capabilities. One of them was "Salih", who collaborated with Soviet intelligence for 42 years. He held various, including senior, positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, at one time headed the cipher department of the ministry, transmitted ciphers and all incoming and outgoing encrypted correspondence, reported a large amount of valuable information, and provided significant assistance in the preparation and implementation of active measures. Salih recruited three agents and handed them over to the station for communication.

At the end of the 1930s, the situation in the world became seriously complicated. Nazi Germany was preparing for a war with the Soviet Union and, taking into account the territorial proximity of Afghanistan to Central Asia, it noticeably intensified intelligence work in Kabul, seeking to expand its sphere of influence. The Germans provided Afghanistan in 1936 with a loan of 27 million marks for the purchase of German goods, and supplied military equipment. The country was flooded with German "advisers", "consultants" and "experts", German agents penetrated the main public and private institutions and enterprises.

Under such conditions, counteraction, neutralization and disruption of the subversive activities of Hitler's intelligence on the territory of Afghanistan became the main direction of work of our residencies in Afghanistan. 15 Abwehr intelligence officers worked in the country, with Witzel ("Patan") and Rasmus ("Karlmai") at the head of the residency.

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The final assessment of the efforts of the Kabul residency was given by the war: the Germans never managed to use Afghanistan for anti-Soviet purposes, to turn it into a springboard for hostile actions against the USSR. Throughout the war years, this country maintained a loyal attitude towards its northern neighbor, the Afghan leadership followed with sympathy the heroic struggle of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders. Deliveries of Afghan agricultural goods within the framework of trade agreements made their own, albeit modest, contribution to solving the problem of providing the USSR with food and raw materials.

Iran in the 1930s was one of the objects of the systematic expansion of fascist Germany, which well understood the importance of this country adjacent to the USSR, which was also rich in oil. The Germans, with the connivance of Reza Shah Pahlavi, infiltrated key positions in Iranian institutions, the economy and the trans-Iranian railway, which is of strategic importance. As instructors, they worked in the army, gendarmerie and police. Their agents launched an active activity aimed at turning Iran into a springboard for espionage and sabotage work against the USSR. The growing threat of German aggression required redoubled efforts in the fight between Soviet intelligence and German agents in Iran.

In many cities of Iran, the Germans managed to create a number of pro-fascist groups that could play the role of a "fifth column" during the war. Of these, saboteurs were recruited for transfer to Soviet territory. Hitler's intelligence acquired agents among Iranian statesmen and politicians, many of whom were educated in Germany. These people worked energetically in favor of the Axis countries.

However, the far-reaching plans of the Nazis, aimed against the Soviet Union, were not destined to come true: basically, they were promptly identified by our intelligence and neutralized. During the war, the Germans failed to use the territory of Iran for aggression in the Caucasus. Since repeated attempts to convince the Tehran authorities to take decisive measures against the subversive activities of Hitler's agents in Iran proved fruitless, it was decided to temporarily send Soviet and British troops into this country. The Soviet units were to occupy the northern regions of the country, while the British units were to occupy the southwestern ones. London supported Moscow's initiative and agreed to a joint action. For a long time it was not possible to find a common language on this issue with Washington, which spoke out against radical measures in Iran and offered to persuade the old Reza Shah to stop the activities of the German agents and establish close relations with the allies,

However, the relationship of the ruling elite with the fascist powers, especially with Germany, by that time had already gone too far.

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co. Of no small importance were the personal sympathies of the Iranian Shah for Hitler. In addition, the allies faced the difficult problem of organizing the transportation of goods to the Soviet Union via the trans-Iranian railway, organizing its protection from attacks by tribes hostile to Tehran, whose sheikhs were bribed by German agents. In the end, the Americans withdrew their objections to the Soviet-British action in Iran, and the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition took advantage of the new situation.

The Soviet Union took these steps in self-defence in strict accordance with Article 6 of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921. In September 1941, Soviet divisions entered the northern regions of Iran. After the successful implementation of this operation, I.V. Stalin wrote to W. Churchill: "The deal with Iran, indeed, turned out well."

In the prewar years, Soviet intelligence achieved some success in thwarting the plans of anti-Soviet nationalist organizations based in Iran. We are talking about the Dashnaks and Musavatists, who were engaged in espionage and sabotage activities in the Transcaucasian republics, throwing agents and terrorists into their territory. The residences in Iran, by obtaining documentary information, contributed to the exposure of their agents and the defeat of the underground in the Caucasus.

Work against the white émigré and nationalist organizations in Iran was associated with significant difficulties. The Dashnaks and Musavatists coordinated their actions with Western intelligence services and received materiel and weapons from them. In some cases, they tried, by setting up their people, to misinform Soviet intelligence and even organize terrorist acts against its employees.

A prominent place among the sources of the Tehran residency belongs to the agent "Brave". He had authority in the circles of the Dashnak leadership, which resorted to his services to communicate with his supporters in other countries, including on the territory of the USSR. tion "Dashnaktsutyun". Based on the information received from him, from 1936 to 1939, the state security agencies arrested three Dashnak emissaries abandoned in the USSR, who had special assignments. Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, Smelyi reported on the connections of the Dashnak leadership with representatives of German intelligence in Iran, Mayer, Gamota and Schultz. By 1935, the residencies in Iran managed to infiltrate more than 10 agents into the leading centers of the Dashnaks and Musavatists.

Working creatively, often taking risks, the Tehran residency carried out a number of successful operations in the 1930s. An example might be

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live operational combination, carried out under the leadership of resident Andrei Makarovich Otroshchenko. It reflects the style and methods of intelligence work of those years.

A.M. Otroshchenko came to intelligence in 1931, already having experience in counterintelligence. In March 1931, he was sent to the city of Mashhad as a deputy resident, and in 1934 he headed the residency. In August 1937 he was appointed as a resident in Tehran and worked there until December 1939. Under his leadership, the residency has achieved notable success. Subsequently, A.M. Otroshchenko became the head of the department for the countries of the Near and Middle East. He belongs to a galaxy of outstanding Soviet intelligence officers who were able to combine justified and reasonable risk with deeply thought out and prepared operations, acted boldly and decisively.

At the end of 1937, a local resident turned to the Soviet embassy with a request to help him accept Soviet citizenship and leave for the USSR. A.M. Otroshchenko made it clear that in order to get the right to return to her homeland, it is necessary to provide her with all possible assistance. The visitor agreed to this. Among the acquaintances of "Semyon" (this pseudonym was given to the new agent) was a man from the Japanese Embassy, where he was in charge of sending and receiving diplomatic mail. It was decided to take it into "development".

"Semyon" said that the embassy employee, "Zhuk", likes drinking and cards, keeps a mistress, which requires a lot of expenses, and constantly has problems with money. On instructions from the residency, "Semyon" told his friend that a Czechoslovak businessman allegedly wanted to meet him. "Zhuk" replied that, as an employee of the Japanese embassy, he had no right to enter into contacts with foreigners. But nevertheless he asked for what purpose the Czechoslovak businessman wants to get to know him. "Semyon" explained that for a good reward, "Zhuk" could characterize some Japanese diplomats, other embassy employees, including those whom the residency suspected of belonging to Japanese intelligence. "Zhuk" refused, noting that a person interested in such issues is unlikely to be a businessman.

Faced with such a reaction, "Semyon" tried to exert the necessary influence on the mistress of the "Beetle", whose demands were constantly growing. In the end, "Zhuk" itself was forced to cooperate with intelligence. He asked Semyon to tell him that he was ready to provide all possible assistance to intelligence. The resident replied that the agent would have to hand over the diplomatic bag for one and a half to two hours with a guarantee that it would be returned undamaged. Although "Zhuk" did not doubt that the embassy's mail would be opened, the desire to make money prevailed. Thus, Soviet intelligence had access to secret documents of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

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The information received through this channel helped to reveal the anti-Soviet plans of the leadership of the Land of the Rising Sun.

By the beginning of the 1930s, the residency in Istanbul stood out for its activity and effectiveness in fulfilling the tasks of the Center. It faced three main tasks: "development" of foreign White émigré and anti-Soviet nationalist organizations, penetration into foreign intelligence agencies and obtaining political information. The residency managed to achieve significant success in highlighting the problems of paramount importance in the region: the internal political situation in Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, the activities of the Polish and Romanian intelligence services in Turkey. Intelligence data convincingly testified that fascist Germany was striving to strengthen its positions in the Balkans, intending to use these countries as an outpost in a future war with the Soviet Union.

In the first half of the 1930s, the residencies in Turkey managed to acquire several well-informed sources. So, in 1932, the Pajama agent, an employee of the Japanese embassy, began to cooperate with Soviet intelligence. For several years he passed copies

cipher telegrams and official documents of the embassy. Agent "Chineser" regularly provided copies of cipher telegrams from the British Embassy, "Hayar" shared valuable information about the activities of emigre organizations, as well as the degree and nature of cooperation between Turkish and Polish special services.

The wave of mass repressions of the late 1930s also reached the Soviet special services of the Middle East region. Many residencies in Iran and Afghanistan were liquidated, and sometimes 1-2 employees worked in the residency in Istanbul. Many valuable agents came under suspicion of treachery and connections with foreign intelligence services. The weakened intelligence network could not fully satisfy the needs of the Center for information, while the threat of German aggression became more and more obvious.

Nevertheless, in the prewar years, Soviet intelligence in the countries of the Middle East contributed to the development and implementation of the foreign policy of the USSR in this region and the strengthening of positions in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. Documentary information obtained by the residencies, including cipher correspondence, made it possible not only to identify the plans and intentions of Germany, England, France, Romania, Poland, Japan and other states in the Near and Middle East, but also to warn their actions in a timely manner. against the USSR.

The residencies achieved the expulsion of a number of German agents from the countries of the Middle East. Operations were carried out to frame Soviet agents for German and British intelligence in order to misinform and frustrate their plans.

In general, the residencies in the Middle East successfully coped with the tasks assigned to them. tasks.

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At that time in the Far East

The main task that faced the Soviet foreign intelligence residencies in the Far East on the eve of the Great Patriotic War was not to overlook Japan's attacks on our country, to prevent the opening of a second front against the USSR in the East, and thereby exclude the possibility of a simultaneous war with Nazi Germany. and militaristic Japan.

The formation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932 was interpreted by the ruling circles of Tokyo only as the first major step towards the preparation of aggression against the USSR. This strategic orientation was contained in a number of important documents received with the help of our agents. It consisted in the fact that at first it was envisaged to conquer China, Mongolia, and only then, having secured the rear, move on the USSR. The Harbin resident reported Japan's plans regarding the USSR to the Foreign Department of the OGPU as early as 1925, two years before Moscow became aware of the memorandum of Japanese Prime Minister G. Tanaka, which eventually provided for the establishment of Japanese dominance in the world .

A new starting point for residencies in the Far East was the unleashing by Japan in 1937 of a full-scale war against China. The possibility of a Japanese attack on the USSR was directly linked to the rapid defeat of China, with the inability of its very heterogeneous government to organize a proper rebuff to the aggressor, and therefore the foreign intelligence stations closely followed the attitude of various factions of the Chinese leadership towards the war. The Soviet Union had plenty to worry about. The pro-Japanese group led by Wang Jingwei, a former member of the government of Chiang Kai-shek and a member of the Central Executive Committee of the ruling Kuomintang party in China, as the Shanghai residency reported to Moscow, taking advantage of the difficult position of the central

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the Chinese government and failures on the fronts, in October 1937 she advocated negotiations with Japan and "concluding peace on any terms."

At the secret meeting, Wang Jingwei raised the issue in such a way that if the head of the Central Chinese government, Chiang Kai-shek, did not accept Japan's "peace" proposals, he would seek his removal.

Through undercover methods, it was possible to establish that Chiang Kai-shek had a different attitude to the problem of the war with Japan. He was clearly aware that peace with Tokyo on Japanese terms would mean a new outbreak of civil war in China, the collapse of the policy of the Central Government and its inevitable removal. Therefore, he rejected Japan's "peace" proposals and decided to continue the fight, proceeding from the fact that in this situation China objectively needs the USSR in the fight against Japan.

Our residency was able to obtain information about the meeting of China's top leadership on December 14, 1937, at which Chiang Kai-shek publicly called the USSR "the only ally of China in the war with Japan" and stated that "now all China's hopes for England and America have burst". After some pro-Japanese figures were removed from the government, it became possible to hold talks between Chiang Kai-shek and his political rivals, the communists Wang Ming, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, on joint military operations against the Japanese.

Thus, fertile ground was created for the development of foreign intelligence work. Especially since the Kuomintang leadership showed a readiness to establish contacts with us and establish cooperation through the special services.

At the same time, work was carried out effectively to frustrate plans for a surprise attack by the Kwantung Army, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union, on the USSR and the MPR. The build-up of military operations by the Japanese in China, along with the incessant anti-Soviet provocations, created threats for our country in the Far East. Suffice it to say that in 1939 more than 170 Japanese agents were identified in the region and a little less in the first half of 1940.

Thanks to the information obtained by the residency in Harbin about bringing the Japanese troops, numbering 350,000 soldiers and officers, to combat readiness and putting their air defense system into operation, the events near Lake Khasan in 1938 did not come as a surprise to Moscow. The command of our groupings was also informed in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River in 1939, having received information about the preparation of Japanese troops for an attack on Mongolia. It is difficult to belittle the value of the information obtained by foreign intelligence: the defeat of the Japanese troops forced not only the Kwangtung command to resign

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The army in full force, but also the Japanese cabinet of ministers in power, complicated the development of Japan's military alliance with Germany and Italy and called into question the idea of a "blitzkrieg" in the Far East.

All this prompted the Japanese government to start implementing the "southern version" of the strategic plan of military operations and to propose to Moscow on April 7, 1941, to conclude a non-aggression pact with the condition that the Soviet Union sell North Sakhalin to Japan. Since the Soviet side categorically refused to discuss this proposal, the negotiations ended on April 13, 1941 with the signing of a neutrality pact!

But the agreement on neutrality did not solve all the problems of ensuring the security of the Soviet Far East. Japan remained the most dangerous adversary there on the eve of the war. With this in mind, the efforts of the residencies in China were directed by the Center to reconnaissance penetration into Japanese facilities, especially into the special services, military headquarters, and the exposure of their activities hostile to the USSR. As the Japanese troops advanced deep into China, a number of residencies were tasked not only with obtaining military-strategic and military-political information, but also with assisting in the creation of partisan detachments and sabotage groups from the Chinese.

In the event of a war between Japan and the USSR, the Center set up illegal residencies in Harbin and Shanghai, and sent illegal immigrants equipped with radios to some other cities. The use of the Center's couriers was also envisaged, and other measures were planned to obtain intelligence information in the conditions of the war with Japan.

In total, there were 12 "legal" residencies - in Chongqing, Lanzhou, Harbin, Shanghai, as well as in the cities of Xinjiang - Urumqi, Ghulja, Chuguchak, Shara-Sume, Hami, Kashgar, Khotan, Aksu. In a crisis situation (constant anti-Soviet provocations, active actions on the part of the Japanese special services), an operational staff was operating in the territory occupied by the Japanese - in Shanghai, Harbinei in Manchuria. Relatively favorable conditions for reconnaissance work existed in Xinjiang, but since 1941 the duban (governor) Shen Shicai, who had switched to anti-Soviet positions, began to interfere there.

It would not be an exaggeration, however, to say that in September 1939 the center of gravity of all intelligence activities moved to the temporary capital of China, Chongqing, where 34-year-old A.S. Panyushkin. This was due to the extremely difficult international situation, characterized by the German attack on Poland and the outbreak of war in Europe, the conclusion in July 1939 of the Anglo-Japanese agreement (the Arita-Craig agreement) - the English version of the "Far Eastern Munich".

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At the same time, among the members of the Chinese government, the number of supporters of "appeasement of the aggressor" by the immediate conclusion of peace with Japan on any terms increased, in connection with which the danger of China's capitulation increased. Even among the supporters of the continuation of the war with Japan, led by Chiang Kai-shek, hesitations began, and they also began to incline towards making peace with Japan, but on terms acceptable to China and with the mediation of the United States and England. More and more clearly the task of both our embassy and the main residency was outlined: to keep the central administration of China in positions of active resistance. Diplomats and operatives of the residency were constantly working on this problem.

Understanding that in order to obtain up-to-date and priority information on the entire range of problems of interest to the Center, valuable sources are needed among state, political and public figures of the country, A.S. Panyushkin and the operational staff began to vigorously establish useful contacts. According to the recollections of eyewitnesses - veterans of intelligence, there was not a single day when the chief resident did not conduct "conversations of influence" with any of the authoritative figures of the Kuomintang. The goal is to find allies interested in Japan not being able to persuade China to capitulate.

Against the backdrop of the armed clashes that began in 1939 between the Kuomintang troops and the armed forces of the CPC, the question of the addressees of our military supplies, which each of the warring parties tried to use for their own purposes, acquired exceptional importance. In this regard, A.S. Panyushkin constantly reminded statesmen and politicians, including Chiang Kai-shek and his entourage, that the USSR was providing weapons to China to fight the Japanese aggressors, and not to unleash an internecine civil war, that the ruling circles should draw unambiguous conclusions from this, because otherwise In this case, Moscow will be forced to stop its material and military assistance.

Nevertheless, the Chief Resident, who understood more than anyone else the importance of our military assistance to China, was against its suspension. He believed that this could contribute to the surrender of Chiang Kai-shek, since without weapons, the Chinese troops would not be able to resist the modern Japanese army. In the spring of 1940, in particular, he sent a telegram to the Center with a recommendation to urgently provide additional assistance to China with weapons in order to avoid its possible surrender. Soon an answer came with a proposal to invite Chiang Kai-shek to Moscow and report on the size of our new shipment of weapons.

The chief resident managed to establish trusting relationships with a number of progressive and liberal-minded individuals who stood

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on the positions of strengthening friendship with the USSR, continuing the anti-Japanese war and cooperation between the Kuomintang and the CPC. They were aware of what was happening in the highest echelons of power and, to a certain extent, could influence the adoption of responsible decisions on various aspects of domestic and foreign policy. Among them, especially useful were Marshal Feng Yuxiang, one of Chiang Kai-shek's deputies in the military committee of the Central Government, Sun Yat-sen's son Sun Fo, Chairman of the Parliament and Chairman of the Sino-Soviet Society for Cultural Relations, Sun Yat-sen's widow Sun Qingling and others

Not without the direct participation of A.S. Panyushkin, whose recommendations were repeatedly resorted to by Chiang Kai-shek, our military advisers managed to convince the Central Government to take effective measures to disrupt the offensive of the Japanese troops, for which an operational plan for the defense of the city of Changsha was developed. After this operation, which lasted about 20 days, the Japanese lost 30 thousand soldiers and officers. The losses of the Chinese troops were much smaller. The success achieved in the defense of Changsha raised the fighting spirit and mood not only of the leading circles, but also of the broad masses of the people of China.

By 1940, there was a real danger of an aggravation of the confrontation between the Kuomintang and the CCP in Northern China and a rapid growth of capitulatory sentiments in the leadership of the Kuomintang in favor of ending the Sino-Japanese war. Therefore, the ambassador had to use every opportunity - legal and unofficial - to prevent the outbreak of a civil war and a break in cooperation between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong. The chief resident, in conversations with influential statesmen and political figures, including Chiang Kai-shek, focused their attention on the inadmissibility of a civil war, disastrous for China, the search for ways to resolve differences and peaceful agreements on all contentious issues.

In 1941, the strained relations between the Kuomintang and the CCP escalated into open war. After the Kuomintang troops attacked the 4th New Communist Army in January, Chiang Kai-shek announced its dissolution. Under the prevailing conditions, the residency in Chongqing sharply intensified its efforts to create a United National Front.

With the permission of the Center, long before the attack of the Kuomintang troops on the 4th New Army, the residency transmitted to Zhou Enlai reliable information about the intentions of Chiang Kai-shek to demand that the CPC withdraw this army from the Shanghai region and about a possible military operation against it. In order to avoid a sharp aggravation of relations between the parties, the residency urged Zhou Enlai not to consider Chiang Kai-shek the main culprit of the clash, but instead

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sharpen efforts on exposing pro-Japanese elements within the Kuomintang who opposed the creation of the United National Front of China.

The main "legal" residency quite fully and timely informed the Center about the main problems of China's domestic and foreign policy, about the position of Chiang Kai-shek and his entourage in relation to the USSR, Japan, USA, England, France, the activities of the Americans, British and Germans in China, pro-German and pro-Japanese groups in the government and the Kuomintang, about the struggle between the Kuomintang and the CPC, as well as within the Kuomintang itself. In May 1941, Moscow was informed of Hitler's impending attack on the Soviet Union, and in June 1941, she received the operational plan of the German military command on the main directions of the advance of the fascist troops, received from the Chinese military attaché in Germany.



This was how other foreign intelligence stations in China acted before the start of World War II. The operational staff actively assisted Soviet diplomacy in supporting the United National Front as one of the most important factors in deterring Japan from armed action against the USSR, in preparing conditions in northwest China to counter the Kwantung Army in the event of a Japanese attack on the USSR and in obtaining comprehensive information about the military-strategic plans of Tokyo.

The main burden of intelligence work fell on the Chungking residency. Only six operational officers were part of this residency, but what! This is a prominent intelligence diplomat A.S. Panyushkin, and one of the future leading intelligence officers L.M. Miklashevsky, and others.

The work of scouts is highly appreciated by the Motherland. For achievements in intelligence work, at the end of 1942, the Order of Lenin was awarded to A.S. Panyushkin, were awarded state awards of the USSR and all other employees of the Chongqing residency - L.M. Miklashevsky, P.I. Kulikov, V.A. Zhunev, V.S. Smirnov, F.M. Shcheglov.

History of diplomacy. - T. TU. - M., 1975. - S. 174.

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### Fight for an independent China

A significant contribution to the provision of large-scale assistance to the Chinese people, leading a long struggle for integrity and national independence, was made not only by the armed forces of the USSR, but also by its intelligence, which, as dryly stated in one of its documents of those years, remained for a long time "not only as an information body for the top leadership of its country, but also as an active conductor of the decisions it needs." The Soviet policy towards China was based on the desire to preserve China as a single indivisible whole, and the multinational Xinjiang, other provinces and regions where militaristic groups of separatists operated as its integral parts. It was these tasks that were a priority in the activities of foreign intelligence residencies in China, of which there were 17 by 1927.

The leading countries of the West and Japan behaved differently, complicating interethnic relations in the country in every possible way and supporting the separatist forces, trying to suppress the struggle of the Chinese for national liberation with their hands. In 1925 and early 1926 alone, Japan, the USA, England, and France provided one of the militaristic groups in Northern China with about 220,000 rifles and carbines, 70 million rounds of ammunition, as well as artillery pieces, tanks, and aircraft. Military instructors and employees of the secret services of Japan, England, and other Western powers were constantly in the troops of local militarists.

The Soviet government once supported the national armies of Marshal Feng Yuxiang and General Hu Jingyi, who declared their desire to fight for the deliverance of China from colonial domination and against the Japanese henchmen Zhang Zuoling and Wu Peifu. But, expressing its readiness to provide military assistance to the national armies, the Soviet Union quite definitely expressed negativity

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a positive attitude towards the separatist sentiments of some Chinese military leaders.

Foreign intelligence invariably actively opposed the persistent attempts of the special services of a number of states, primarily Japan, to create a number of puppet states like Manchukuo on Chinese territory.

Let's turn to specific facts. Back in 1923, the operational staff of the residencies operating in Northern China did not go unnoticed by the plans to create Japanese

special services in Northern Manchuria of the "special Muslim region", the intentions of the Japanese to deploy for this purpose intelligence work in the Muslim movement in Soviet Central Asia and provoke protests against the Chinese authorities of Muslims who fled to the northeastern provinces of China from the central regions of Russia during the period of the Civil War.

At the forefront of neutralizing Japan's separatist plans was the residency in Harbin. In an effort to put the work of the Japanese in the use of Muslims under her control, in the same year she created a fictitious Far Eastern Muslim Committee. Negotiations with the committee were conducted by the Japanese consul in Harbin. Through this legendary body, the residency was constantly aware of the many activities of the Japanese in the use of Muslims, was able to vigorously oppose them, and ultimately forced them to abandon the implementation of their plans.

Another success of the Harbin residency was the extraction of documentary evidence that Tokyo had plans to create an "Independent Manchurian Republic" in Northeast China in 1928. In August, the Harbin residency informed the Center about the negotiations between the Japanese and their protege Zhang Xueliang, during which the following conditions were put forward:

1. On the territory of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, a buffer state is formed under the protectorate of Japan under the name "Independent Manchurian Republic".
2. Japan undertakes to promote the inclusion of Outer Mongolia in the new buffer state.
3. The new Manchu government renounces active action against the government of China proper, but at the same time undertakes to fight against the communist movement.
4. The new Manchu government undertakes to pursue an aggressive policy towards the interests of the USSR in Northern Manchuria.

If the local separatists refused the above proposals, Japan threatened to create in Manchuria such a political and economic situation that would lead to its subsequent occupation.

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The documentary materials obtained by the foreign intelligence residencies through undercover means testified that the secret services of Tokyo had plans to seize another large area inhabited by the Mongols from China! In 1930-1931, the Japanese military mission in Harbin was actively engaged in the implementation of these annexationist plans. According to the information received, the Japanese were persistently pushing the Mongols to start armed uprisings against the Chinese demanding autonomy for this region.

A special place in the plans of the leading Western countries and Japan was occupied by Xinjiang, which is of exceptional strategic importance and rich in minerals. England and Japan in the 1930s considered this outskirts of China as a springboard for the fight against the USSR. Oppositionists who fled from the USSR took refuge there, primarily the Basmachi, who periodically raided the border settlements of the Soviet Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan.

The political situation in Xinjiang in the early 1930s remained unstable. The province was ruled by the protege of the central government, Wu Zhongxin, whose cruelty aroused the hatred of the entire local population. In April 1933, in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, the power of the protege was overthrown, after which the government was headed by the former chief of staff of the Xinjiang military region, Shen Shicai. However, the new protege of the central government did not have enough strength to fight the Dungans supported by the Japanese, and this prompted him to turn to the government of the USSR for help. Based on the need to ensure the security of their own borders, the government of the USSR granted the request

Shen Shicai, temporarily bringing troops into Xinjiang and helping with weapons, which led to the liquidation of the Dungan uprising and the gradual restoration of normal life in the province.

The consolidation of Shen Shicai's position, not without Soviet assistance, caused a painful reaction in London. Using consular offices in Xinjiang as a cover, the Intelligence Service sought to strengthen the political and economic influence of England in the region under the pretext of preventing the "penetration of communism" into India and Afghanistan. In 1936, the British secret services attempted to seize Xinjiang from China. The Soviet residency in Urumqi uncovered the plot of a pan-Islamist organization to overthrow Shen Shicai's government and create an "independent" state. The operational staff of the residency managed to obtain a British intelligence document, which stated the main task of the activities of pan-Islamist organizations in the region: to subjugate Xinjiang to England and from

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here to direct the main blow against the USSR Thanks to the exhaustive information received in a timely manner, the Chinese managed to eliminate the conspiracy.

In 1939, the British agents were preparing an uprising of a local regiment manned by the Kirghiz, but thanks to the information received by the residency in a timely manner, this action was prevented. On the basis of residency materials, the secretary involved and several employees of the British consulate in Kashgar, who had to leave Xinjiang, were compromised.

In the 1930s, Japan posed the greatest danger to both the USSR and China. An analysis of intelligence materials for 1934 and the first half of 1935 showed that the Japanese showed exceptional interest in Xinjiang and continuously intensified their intelligence work there. This was evidenced by numerous data on the use of agents from Muslims and Russian white émigrés for intelligence purposes, the sending of intelligence groups under the guise of Japanese and Sino-Japanese geological expeditions to Xinjiang; calls on the local population to wage an uncompromising struggle against the government of Shen Shicai; persistent influence on the personnel of the Uyghur division stationed in Kashgar and figures opposed to the government in Urumqi; the appearance of Japanese agents in Kashgar and Ghulja. Our residencies in Xinjiang timely obtained intelligence materials about Tokyo's support for the Dungan separatists of the generals of the Ma brothers, who were oriented towards Japan and sought to create a "great Dungan state of the North-West" in the region.

The materials available in the archives of the Foreign Intelligence Service make it possible to recreate a picture of one of the major actions of the Xinjiang separatists against the government of Shen Shicai and the role of foreign intelligence services in supporting the rebels. The leader of the rebellion was the former commander of the 6th Uyghur division, Mamut Sijan, who did not believe in the help of the Uyghurs from the USSR ("Moscow helps only the Chinese, not the Uyghurs!") and was dissatisfied with his unpromising, as it seemed to him, position among others. military leaders. "We have nothing to fear," said Mamug Sijan in his inner circle. "I have received a very pleasant message from the English consul. In the event of an uprising, we can move to the border, where we will immediately be given assistance with weapons and aircraft. Such a statement could not be qualified as empty boasting, since the British consul in Kashgar, from the first days of his stay, showed special attention to Mamut Sijan, considering him as a genuine Uyghur leader in contrast to the Chinese military and civilian governors.

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Having secured such support, Mamut Sijan, as can be seen from the telegram of the residency from Urumqi to the Center dated April 1, 1937, entered the Yangi-Gissar fortress, where he intended to put forward an ultimatum to the Urumchi government with a promise to raise the people to an armed

fight and go to the mountains in case of rejection of his demands. At the same time, he made attempts to get in touch with the Japanese, who, according to Sijan, "are waiting for an uprising in order to advance their troops with the intention of helping in the coming to power of the Islamic government."

The subsequent events date back to July 1937, when the rebels, having gained a foothold in Yarkand and adjacent settlements, were intensively engaged in the mobilization of the population and campaigned under the slogan "War for Islam, against the Urumchi government and the influence of the USSR in the south of Xinjiang." At first, they freely occupied a number of cities (Merket, Yangi Gissar, Faizabad), where they executed government officials and replenished their forces with people, horses, fodder, food. The British and Japanese worked closely together, divided spheres of influence among themselves, joining forces in the fight against Moscow.

By that time, it was becoming quite obvious that the rebellion of Mamut Sijan could not be of decisive importance for the south of Xinjiang, even if it was supported by the population of several counties, since it was not difficult for government troops to eliminate the uprising. However, Dungan separatists appeared behind the rebels of the 6th division. Thus, the commander of the 36th division, Ma Hongshan, and the chief of staff, Bai Zili, began to provide assistance to the rebels with ammunition and food, striving to capture the entire southern Xinjiang. In the operational situation that changed in this way, the British consulate in Kashgar, through its agents surrounded by Ma Hongshan, launched an intensive agitation of the population of the region for the formation of an "independent Islamic state".

What countermeasures did our residency take under those conditions? The method of introducing verified agents into Muslim circles to expose and neutralize the actions of British and Japanese agents fully justified itself. Equally effective were the discrediting of Ma Hongshan and his entourage, who acted on the orders of the Japanese, who sought to destroy Chinese power, as well as the promotion to leadership positions of opponents of the separatist policy of the rebels. As a result, by October 12, 1937, the infantry brigade of the 36th division went over to the government troops. Ma Hongshan, with a small column and property stolen from the population, fled to India, from where he continued sabotage against China. In Urumqi itself, it was possible to quickly uncover a secret organization that set itself the task of overthrowing the government, killing the governor

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Nator, tear Xinjiang away from China and completely isolate it from the outside world.

Subsequent events showed that Shen Shicai began to gradually prepare the ground for a break with the USSR. After 1938, having strengthened his position, he began to remove progressive and pro-Soviet figures from the government and administrative apparatus. In 1940, according to a station from Urumchi, Shen Shicai, before appointing any of those who arrived to this or that position after studying in the USSR, personally received candidates, and the conversations sometimes took on the character of interrogations. By 1941, Shen Shicai completely severed the friendly economic and cultural relations of Xinjiang with the USSR and began to openly draw closer to the USA and England.

Significant assistance from foreign intelligence was provided to the Chinese during the liberation war (1937-1945), when organizing sabotage against Japanese troops. Subversive work was carried out mainly through Chinese partisan detachments, which were supplied with money, weapons and ammunition.

A great deal of work on the creation of reconnaissance and sabotage groups from the Chinese, their transfer to the territory controlled by the Japanese, was carried out by the residency in Hankow. Particularly successful was the operation of the detachment under the command of agent Si Che in Pinglu County. Its number reached 1 thousand people, armed and equipped with funds received from the residency. This detachment attacked the garrisons of the Japanese, in one of the battles they defeated a battalion of their troops. Later, the partisan detachment merged with the 8th People's Revolutionary Army of China.

The multifaceted large-scale assistance provided by the USSR to the Chinese people for decades also affected the sphere of joint intelligence activities at the end of the 30s, and the intelligence of the central government located in Chongqing showed interest in establishing contacts and establishing cooperation with Soviet intelligence. . In April 1938, during negotiations with the Soviet representative, the head of the 2nd Division of the Military Committee (Chinese internal intelligence), General Zhang Zuoling, raised the question of the desirability of cooperation between Chinese and Soviet intelligence in order to carry out the following work:

1. The Chinese give us materials on white emigration, foreigners and Trotskyists, and we tell them the names of Japanese agents known to us.
2. The Chinese will send us the Japanese ciphers, and we will set up their decoding in Moscow and transfer their content to our partners.
3. For joint work against Japan, our station in Shanghai and the illegal Chinese station will be connected directly or through a liaison.

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The Soviet side carefully considered the Chinese proposal, signing an agreement at the government level on some issues of joint struggle against the Japanese.

On the basis of the agreement reached in 1938, a Joint Bureau was created on an equal footing to conduct joint intelligence work against Japan (headed by General Zhang Zuoling, his assistant was a Soviet representative). The joint bureau consisted of three departments: the 1st department was engaged in the organization of the reconnaissance network, the training of personnel and the study of operational equipment; 2nd department - information, processed undercover messages; 3rd department - economic. The costs of maintaining the agent network in the amount of 20 thousand US dollars per year were distributed equally between the contracting parties.

In May 1938, the 7th Department of the Main Directorate of State Security sent to the Joint Bureau under the cover of the RU Red Army, first one, and then the second operational worker. At the end of 1938, they reported that Chinese intelligence had set up seven illegal residencies that were active in Ningxia, Hankou, Tientsin, and Hong Kong. Some information came from the stations in Beijing, Qingdao and Jinan. Communication with the residencies was maintained by radio and through messengers.

From these residencies, Chinese intelligence received information about the deployment of Japanese troops, their transfer, preparations for combat operations, including Japanese air raids on Chinese cities.

At the same time, our operational officers noted, the work of Chinese intelligence suffered from serious shortcomings: the organization of training agents for being sent to the Japanese rear remained weak, gross violations of conspiracy rules were allowed in the Joint Bureau itself, as well as in residencies. Negligence and irresponsibility often led to failures and other undesirable consequences. The deciphering of intelligence reports was very slow, as a result of which reports on the preparation of Japanese air raids sometimes came to the leadership after the raids.

During the period of work in the Joint Bureau, the Chinese tried to develop and recruit Soviet intelligence officers. Subsequently, the Chinese side, limiting its contribution, began to demand from us the transfer of secret writing recipes, ciphers, operational equipment for direction finding of illegal radio stations of Japanese spies, and other specific materials. Gradually, the Soviet representatives had to be recalled, and cooperation with Chinese intelligence began to have an episodic character.

As is clear from the foregoing, the residencies not only provided the Center with information about Japan's intentions in the military, political and economic fields, but also undertook con

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specific actions to neutralize and frustrate Tokyo's further attempts to disintegrate China, which by the 1940s was divided into several parts. The activities of the foreign intelligence residencies in China objectively contributed to the efforts of the patriotic circles of this country to create the necessary conditions for the unification of the state and the achievement of a final victory in the struggle for their freedom and independence in 1949.

'  
Now Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) of the People's Republic of China.

2 The Dungans are the largest group of the Hui people. They live in the Ningxia Hui and Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regions, in the Gansu Province of China. They practice Islam. Repeatedly opposed the Chinese authorities; After the uprising of 1862-1877, some of them moved to the territory of modern Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

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Under the rays of the rising sun

A young man - let's call him "Abe" - from an ancient impoverished samurai family, having received military training and a specialty, dreamed of making a career and getting rich. It seemed that fate gave him a chance for this.

In 1918, taking advantage of the chaos of the Russian Civil War, Japan attempted to seize the Russian Far East by force. An expeditionary force was sent to Primorye.

The young officer "Abe" also landed as part of the headquarters of the Japanese troops in Vladivostok. He conscientiously fulfilled his duties and bore all the hardships of the war. For participation in hostilities and operations against partisans and underground fighters, he received a military order.

At the same time, "Abe" studied the manners and customs of the local population and tried to understand the events taking place in Russia.

On October 25, 1922, after successful battles with the Japanese, units of the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army and partisans entered Vladivostok and the invaders had to hastily evacuate. Together with the Japanese, the remnants of Kolchak's army, the Cossack units of Ataman Semyonov, detachments of General Kappel, and others left for Manchuria, Korea and Japan. Hundreds of thousands of former Russian citizens ended up in Manchuria. The masses of Russian emigrants attracted the attention of the leaders of the white emigration in Europe. Their representatives rushed to China in order to create a united front of emigrants to fight against Soviet Russia.

At the same time, with financial assistance and under the control of the Japanese, emigrant organizations were created in Manchuria: the Brotherhood of Russian Truth (BRP), the Bureau for Russian Emigrants (BREM), the Labor Peasant Party (TKP), the Siberian circle", "Russian Fascist Party" (RFP) and others.

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eastern regions and Eastern Siberia, the creation in this territory of the state under the protectorate of Japan.

A significant part of the Russian emigration in the Far East has become a fertile environment for the work of Japanese and other intelligence services. Agents were recruited from it, militants were recruited into detachments and sabotage and reconnaissance groups sent to the territory of Russia to continue the armed struggle against the Soviet authorities and fulfill the tasks of Japanese intelligence.

In the directive of the INO OGPU, sent to the residencies in the Far East in September 1930, in particular, it was said: "... it is desirable to receive from you periodically brief reviews ... of the moods and plans of the White Guard groups. Reveal, through a deeper analysis, the real background of certain activities of the "white leaders", specifically focusing on the partisan commanders, taking into account their specific work in preparing sabotage and terrorist acts... Reveal the threads of communication with Europe - which directives come from there, who is interested in their implementation, etc. You should always try to find out who is behind this or that white faction. It is necessary to identify among the hostile emigration English, French and especially Japanese agents.

... After the evacuation from Primorye, "Abe" served in one of the units of the Korean Army! in Seoul. He trained agents and reconnaissance groups from among Russian emigrants, Koreans and Chinese, sent them to the Primorsky and Amur regions for reconnaissance, interrogated defectors from the USSR

From the mid-1920s, Abe was instructed to maintain official contact with the newly opened Consulate General of the USSR with the task of collecting intelligence information under the pretext of assisting Russian diplomats in various everyday and economic issues, and identifying Soviet intelligence officers.

At meetings and in conversations with employees of the Consulate General, he did not hide what he was doing, showed a willingness to provide services, spoke frankly about his financial difficulties and, counting on decent commissions, offered his services to the consulate as an intermediary in the sale of inherited from the royal mission land plots.

In 1927, Ivan Andreevich Chichaev, an employee of the Foreign Department of the OGPU, was appointed Consul General of the USSR in Seoul. He decided to use Abe's willingness to cooperate with the Soviet people. During one of the conversations, a Japanese officer agreed to comply with a confidential request related to the purchase of some limited editions in the city. "Abe" brought the necessary materials and received a small amount.

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Chichaev and "Abe" were soon imbued with mutual trust. "Abe" began to transfer documents from the General Staff of Japan, the headquarters of the Korean and Kwantung armies, the Main Gendarmerie Administration, the police, the General Government of Korea, military intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. Among the documents received was the program of Japanese military expansion and the struggle for world domination, developed in 1927 by the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, General Tanaka Giichi, later widely known to the world as the Tanaka Memorandum.

This document of special importance and secrecy read: "... in order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China, all the other countries of Asia and the countries of the South Seas will fear us and capitulate to us...

With all the resources of China at our disposal, we will proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe. But seizing control of Manchuria and Mongolia is the first step..."

The memorandum also envisaged a war with the Soviet Union. "Our national growth program seems to include," Tanaka wrote, "the need to recross

our swords with Russia on the fields of Mongolia in order to seize the wealth of Northern Manchuria"?,

The threat to the Far Eastern regions of the USSR from Japan was growing, and Moscow increasingly felt the need for reliable information about Japan's practical actions to penetrate North China, Manchuria and Mongolia. Therefore, the residency of the INO OGPU in Seoul received the following instruction from the Center: "In further work, pay special attention to revealing any facts of preparations for aggression against the USSR in general and Soviet interests in Northern Manchuria, Mongolia and the Far East in particular."

Along the way, the Center gave an assessment of some of the information obtained by the residency. "Among the materials you sent," the letter from Moscow said, "there were very interesting documents... a report of the 2nd Division of the General Staff on the Manchu-Mongolian question, the translation of which you sent. Such documents are very important and they must be photographed."

"The same applies to the translations you sent about Semyonov, about spies and provocateurs, because strict documentation is also required here."

On the instructions of the residency, "Abe" recruited officers of the headquarters of the Korean Army "Chon" and "Tur", employees of the Main Gendarmerie Directorate "Saya" and "Li", serving

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The Korean Governor-General "Maka", his brother "Kim", the soldier "Kang", who later became sources of valuable documentary information.

From the characteristics of the "Tour" given to him by the resident G.P. Kasparov in 1935: "Recruited in 1932... Regularly gives a large amount of materials, exclusively originals. He gave many valuable materials on Japanese intelligence in the USSR, Japan's preparation for war, Japan's foreign policy, and so on. The main groups of materials obtained are: 1) secret reports and journals of the General Staff and other central bodies, 2) reports and operational documents of Japanese bodies in Manchuria - the headquarters of the Kwantung Army, the Harbin military mission and other military missions, 3) reports and others intelligence and operational-strategic materials of the headquarters of the Korean army, 4) descriptions of maneuvers, manuals for combat training, etc. War Department materials.

Of particular value to Moscow were the mobilization plans of the Korean Army from a number of pre-war years, handed over to us by "Tour" and "Chon", as well as materials about the failures threatening Soviet intelligence agents in Manchuria, China and Korea, about the reconnaissance by the Japanese of the territory of the Soviet Far East. East.

What led "Abe" to cooperate with Soviet intelligence?

E.M., who supervised its work in 1930-1932. Kaluzhsky later wrote that "Abe" in frank conversations with him "speak very critically about the officers and gendarmes as stupid and loafers, recount episodes that characterize the backwardness of the officers, their everyday decay, etc. He repeatedly returned to the question that ... he has to obey and receive instructions from people who are below him in abilities and development.

During the time of communication with the Soviet intelligence officers, "Abe" became very "Russified". This was expressed in some trifles: he preferred to wear European clothes, willingly drank vodka and even played the guitar at home - an activity that is completely unusual for a Japanese.

It should be emphasized that, despite his undoubted intelligence and great resourcefulness, "Abe" was distinguished by excessive self-confidence, was convinced of his ability to find a way out of any situation.

provisions."



In 1932, Japan created the puppet state of Manchukuo in northeastern China, proclaimed its "independence" and actually occupied Manchuria. The main Japanese services that implemented the program of the Tanaka memorandum were located in Manchuria: the headquarters of the Kwantung Army, the Embassy of Japan, Japanese military missions, etc. The cities of Harbin, Mukden, Port Arthur, Dairen (Far, Dalian) became the centers of Japanese activity. , Tianjin. On the borders with the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, a powerful military group began to be created, which received the name of the Kwantung Army.

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The situation in Manchukuo was the object of close attention of Soviet intelligence. Back in 1926, a resident in Harbin reported to the head of the INO OGPU M.A. Trilisser: "Residency of the INO OGPU in Northern Manchuria, with its center in Harbin... conducts regular and systematic work on perusal of diplomatic and other secret mails of a number of Japanese institutions. The Japanese General Staff, the Japanese military missions in China, the Japanese armies: in the Kwantung region (Port Arthur), Korea (Seoul), China (Tianjin) and others have entered the scope of our intelligence."

However, some of the important Japanese institutions in Manchuria remained beyond the reach of the residency. Therefore, the intelligence leadership decided to seek the transfer of "Abe" from Seoul to Harbin. And in the early 1930s, "Abe" moved to Harbin, having previously enlisted the recommendations of Major General Iwasa, head of the Main Gendarmerie Administration of Korea, and Colonel Takeda, chief of staff. His new official duties included the following: collecting political information and compiling intelligence reports for the Japanese command, processing messages from Russian agents, maintaining contact with the Japanese military mission and the police, working with emigrant organizations as an "adviser", ensuring movement around on the territory of Manchuria, agents and reconnaissance groups sent by the Japanese to the Soviet Union.

With the appearance of "Abe" in Manchuria, the flow of information to the residency increased so much that in February 1934 the resident asked the Center to send additional translators: "The operational load of the residency is growing. We have been especially hard on the Japanese sector... In order to unload at least a little, we are forced to use "Pan" at a colossal risk... we called in an interpreter from Mukden and even a worker from Tianjin for several days.

The Center received information about Japanese agents, their work in Soviet institutions, intelligence on Soviet territory, the formation of military units from emigrants, and Soviet citizens who were being monitored by Japanese counterintelligence. Abe warned that the Japanese had recruited a member of the military intelligence station, which made it possible to thwart planned large-scale political and diplomatic provocations. Based on the materials of "Abe", several Japanese provocateurs were exposed, who, acting under the guise of representatives of Soviet intelligence, created an "intelligence network" of patriotic Russians, and also penetrated underground cells of trade unions and party organizations of employees on the CER. From "Abe" there were reports about the facts of the Japanese recruiting of Soviet agents from among the Chinese and Koreans, who were sent by the intelligence department of the OKFV to Manchuria.

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Information from Abe about the position of the Japanese military during the negotiations on the sale of the CER was literally worth its weight in gold for our country: the Soviet delegation was able to successfully resist the persistent and unreasonable demands of the Japanese to reduce the price of the railway.

With the help of Abe, our residency managed to carry out a number of operations to compromise and expel from Manchuria the most active leaders of the white emigration - agents and accomplices of Japanese intelligence, to prevent the Japanese from creating any significant military formations from emigrants.

"Abe" obtained documentary information about the arrival and deployment of Japanese troops in Manchuria, their weapons and technical equipment, readiness for military operations against the Soviet Union. This information became more and more important.

The residency gave "Abe" the following characterization: "very clever, resourceful, certainly requires a serious attitude towards himself. He works with us for two reasons – money and adventurism. At the present time, he is very interested in keeping in touch with us, partly because of habit, and most importantly, because he needs money for his numerous relatives. In the sense of conspiracy, he is often extremely careless. He likes it when they are attentive to his personal affairs... He is very skillful in making connections in Japanese institutions..."

In 1935, the residency assessed the results of Abe's work as follows: "It provides valuable information and documentary material on the gendarmerie, the Japanese military mission, and the work of white emigrants ... This most valuable source among the Japanese was for a long time our only Japanese agent..." By this time, the residency already had a number of new reliable sources in the gendarmerie, other Japanese institutions, and in circles of hostile emigrants. The most active among them were "Osipov", "Friedrich", "Par", "West", "Brown", "Tok", "Rudolf". Let's talk about some of them.

"Osipov" - a native of Odessa, ended up in Manchuria in 1923. Until 1928, he was interrupted by petty trade, worked as a driver. Recruited in 1928. The residency, deciding on its use, tried to get him a technical job in the Japanese gendarmerie. There was just a place for the driver of the car. Having shown himself to be a loyal, disciplined and diligent worker, "Osipov" achieved the appointment of an employee of a special (political) department of the gendarmerie, which carried out work against Soviet institutions and citizens. In 1929, "Osipov", on the instructions of the gendarmerie, sorted out documents and materials seized during a Japanese-organized raid by white emigrants on some consulates of the USSR in Manchuria. This circumstance was used by our intelligence to carry out a special action: among

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Consular documents "turned out to be statements" by Japanese provocateurs – Shapakidze, Karnaukh, Golubev, Chistokhin, Shabalin and others (about 20 people in total) about their restoration to Soviet citizenship. According to the denunciations of these agents, the Japanese shot or kept in prisons many patriotic Russian emigrants. The provocateurs were compromised in the eyes of the Japanese, and they suffered a well-deserved punishment.

Subsequently, "Osipov" from the gendarmerie was seconded to "Abe". With the help of "Abe", "Osipov" managed to establish close contacts with the head of the gendarmerie, Colonel Saso, who began to provide him with his patronage. This gave "Osipov" access to a wide range of materials, from which, in particular, the picture of a sharp increase in contradictions within the white emigre organizations and their fierce struggle among themselves for Japanese aid became clear, the strategic plans of the Japanese in relation to immigrant groups. The essence of these plans was expressed by the leader of the Japanese military, General Araki, in a conversation with the head of the Russian Fascist Party, Rodzaevsky: "The Japanese will appreciate and support the RFP insofar as the latter will be able to penetrate into the thick of the population of the USSR and lead the civil war of the discontented people against the Soviet regime at the right moment. ".

In the summer of 1936, "Osipov" moved to Tianjin, where Colonel Saso was transferred. Later, the former head of the group of Russian gendarmes K. Voronin moved there from Harbin, who suspected "Abe" and "Osipov" of collaborating with Soviet intelligence, which he repeatedly reported to the Japanese. The Voronin group in Harbin was known for systematically engaging in blackmail, torture and extortion against Soviet citizens, rich emigrants and foreigners under the guise of fighting Soviet intelligence, and gradually became so insolent in these crimes that the Japanese were forced to expel the entire group from service. and send them out of Manchuria. In this regard, at the end of 1936 in the English

In the Tianjin sector, Voronin and members of his group clashed, in which Voronin, who concealed most of the loot, was killed. The case was investigated by the Chinese authorities, but Osipov was involved as a representative of the Japanese gendarmerie. The residency reported to the Center on the results of the investigation:

"1. The position of "Osipov" in the local Japanese intelligence service has become so strong that all the work of Colonel Saso on whites, Soviets and foreigners is now passing through the hands of our assistant.

2. The local Japanese police and gendarme authorities quarreled to death with the British police and the authorities of the English concession. The quarrel has gone so far that these British authorities are now rendering no assistance to the Japanese in their struggle against the

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mole" Chinese, white and Soviet, located on the territory of the British concessions.

3. The local Japanese authorities (consulate, headquarters of the Japanese troops, gendarmerie, police, etc.) were completely compromised in the eyes of not only the local, but the entire foreign colony in China, because From the published official communiqué of the British police, it was quite clear that the riots on the spot were organized by the Japanese.

4. The local official Chinese authorities clashed with the Japanese ...

5. Among the local white emigrants, distrust of the Japanese was caused, because in fact, they clearly saw what the Japanese are capable of with respect to their friends.

In 1938, "Osipov" worked in a special department of the Japanese police. In this regard, the residency reported that "the entire network of Japanese agents is currently subordinate to Osipov." Thus, all reports of agents pass through us ... and we are aware of all the work of Colonel Saso on white émigrés, Soviet citizens and foreigners.

"In early September of this year. Saso intends to send "Osipov" to Shanghai to recruit new agents from among the white émigrés, who are supposed to be deployed at all railway junctions and in cities where foreigners live (with the exception of Shanghai and the southern bank of the Yangtze River).

The position of "Osipov" was strong, his ability to assist our intelligence expanded significantly, but in the same 1938, at the direction of the Center, the residency stopped contact with him due to the fact that suspicion fell on him as a person ... verbo - a bathroom repressed in 1938 by a scout. In 1945, during the hostilities in central China, Osipov died.

"Friedrich" - a former officer of the Kolchak army, and then one of the detachments of General Kappel, came to Manchuria in 1926 from the interior of China. He worked in a special (political) department of the gendarmerie in Harbin. Collaborated with Soviet intelligence since 1930. Back in 1929, before the start of cooperation, he warned of a planned raid by the White Guards and the Japanese on the Consulate General of the USSR in Harbin. Subsequently, he gave information about the sending of spies and white bandits by the Japanese to the territory of the USSR, about Japanese agents on the Chinese Eastern Railway, provocateurs in the colony of Russian emigration, about the preparation by the Japanese and white emigres of hostile actions against Soviet institutions, the seizure of diplomatic mail and the abduction of Soviet employees of the Consulate General, about the creation by the fascist party of a group of militants to commit terrorist acts against seconded Soviet representatives.

In 1936, Friedrich was arrested by the Japanese on suspicion of having links with Soviet intelligence. The investigation was conducted by the group of K. Voronin.

He steadfastly withstood the interrogations accompanied by cruel tortures. After being released from arrest, Friedrich was taken by the residency to Tianjin, and then to Shanghai.

"Brown", a former Kappel officer, colonel of the Chinese army, awarded the highest Chinese military order, has been in Harbin since 1923, cooperated with Soviet intelligence since 1927, when he became completely disillusioned with the white movement. Our residency described him as an educated, resolute, courageous person, undemanding to living conditions, putting work in the first place in life, and enjoying confidence in Chinese and white émigré circles. A devoted, valuable source of information, always procuring impeccably accurate materials.

"Brown" actively worked in such white organizations as the "Brotherhood of Russian Truth", "Squad of Russian Falcons", "Russian All-Military Union", was respected in the leadership of the Amur Cossacks and among the Semenovites. He received information about the activities of these organizations, attempts by the Japanese through Semyonov to form armed Cossack units for a future war against the MPR and the USSR, about the preparation of sabotage and reconnaissance gangs and their access to Soviet territory, about sending individual Japanese intelligence agents to the USSR. One of them, Klyuzhin, who was repeatedly sent by the Japanese to the Soviet Union under the guise of a treasure hunter left behind by merchants and industrialists who fled Russia, was given the following task: "The main purpose of the trip to the Union should be to create subversive terrorist groups, mainly in the Far Eastern Territory. and in Siberia. These groups must now carry on organizational and preparatory work and come out actively only with the outbreak of war. Pay special attention to the creation of such groups or cells in transport with the task of carrying out acts of sabotage by blowing up bridges, tunnels, destroying grain elevators, disrupting traffic, etc." Klyuzhin was recommended, "using the connections he already had, to select for the time being only the leaders of the groups, give them detailed instructions and give them tasks to gather the relevant people around themselves. Establish appearances and passwords with group leaders. At the same time, during the briefing for Klyuzhin, the Japanese hypocritically emphasized that Japan allegedly "does not have any aggressive intentions against Russia."

At the same time, back in August 1933, the residency established that "at the beginning of July, Colonel Ishimoto, an active member of the military party, a personal friend of General Araki, arrived in Harbin with the task of drawing up a plan for using local Russians. military in the event of military clashes between Japan and the USSR The command of Ishimoto is considered ... as a herald of close military events. In your circle

"Colonel Ishimoto said that the Japanese military party categorically insists on an armed demonstration against the USSR, which should be held in the near future." During his stay in Harbin, "Ishimoto was mainly busy developing a plan for a military campaign in Mongolia and against the USSR. This plan included two main points: 1) the occupation of Mongolia along Urga? inclusive, and 2) in the event of active resistance from the USSR, launch military operations in Transbaikalia, the Amur and Primorsky regions.

The routes of movement of Japanese troops were determined, intensified preparations were carried out in the areas of planned military operations: a large number of vehicles, artillery supplies were concentrated, airfields were being prepared, roads were being repaired, etc.».

Information from "Abe", "Osipov", "Brown" and "Friedrich" allowed the residency to report to Moscow in September 1934: "The course of events showed that we basically coped with the first group of tasks: we almost accurately predicted the course of events, we got to the coverage of the work of the "special" political department of the gendarme department, which was completely unknown to us before; provided a timely warning to local organizations, and this literally

saved them from a colossal failure, did not allow the Japanese to seize equipment and documents on the spot - and this saved our government from big troubles; groped for the true idea of the Japanese about our intelligence and prevented a big failure along the line of military intelligence officers.

The political "purges" and repressions against intelligence officers that took place in the Soviet Union in 1937-1939 influenced the fate of "Abe", "Osipov", "Friedrich", "Brown" and many other sources of residency in Harbin, who were groundlessly accused by the Center of betrayal and subversive work against the USSR. The center instructed the residency to cut off contact with them and generally drastically reduce the number of agents. From a letter from the Center to Harbin dated January 1939: "You should in no way be embarrassed by our order to cut off contact with a large number of agents - this is required by the existing circumstances."

The position of the Center could not be shaken even by the documentary materials of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army and the gendarmerie transmitted by "Abe" and "Li" recruited by him in Seoul, as well as their information about the arrests of our agents by the Japanese, about the sending of provocateurs, saboteurs and terrorists to us, subsequently fully confirmed. The threat of physical liquidation loomed over "Abe", because in the report of intelligence chief Fitin addressed to Beria dated September 3, 1940, "Abe" was turned into "the most important figure of Japanese intelligence agencies in Manchuria", whom Japanese intelligence not only framed us "to misinform our bodies, but also

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was able to penetrate through it into almost all channels of our intelligence work in Manchuria and Japan. "Abe" was accused of being "formally the most valuable" agent of the Far Eastern sector and the "ancestor" of all Japanese agents, in fact, he was engaged in recruiting spies in favor of Japanese intelligence. So, for example, he recruited a former INO resident in Seoul, Kaluzhsky... an employee of the Harbin residency Novak... he was directly involved in the recruitment of many other former INO employees in the Far East for Japanese intelligence."

At the same time, according to the new intelligence leadership, he "delivered us a number of valuable materials and even warned about the impending arrests of our agents, who, thanks to this, managed to leave Manchuria in advance, delivered some lists of the recruited Chinese agents of the border detachments and OKDVA. .. on my own behalf, without informing my superiors about this, doing it solely because of material interest "(Fitin's report addressed to Beria dated November 26, 1940).

Terror against foreign intelligence led to the fact that she was left without the most valuable sources in the Far East just at the moment when she needed them most, when the preparation of the Japanese militarists for war against the USSR was being completed.

... In August 1945, Soviet troops victoriously entered Manchuria. Among other Japanese, he was captured and sent to one of the Siberian camps "Abe". Foreign intelligence found him among hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, a new investigation was carried out on his case, which completely refuted the accusations made earlier against him, recognizing them as unfounded and far-fetched. The value of the information he provided was confirmed, which helped to ensure the security of our country on the Far Eastern borders for a long period.

! This was the official name of the Japanese troops stationed in Korea, which since 1910 was a colony of Japan.

2 The memorandum was intended for the young Emperor Hirohito, who

who drank to the throne in 1926. The program proclaimed in it, which among the militarists was called the "positive policy of Tanaka", was consistently carried out by the Japanese governments until the defeat of Imperial Japan in World War II. After the surrender of Japan, the memorandum appeared as document No. 169 of the prosecution against

meetings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo in 1946-1948, which tried the main Japanese war criminals.

3 Currently Ulaanbaatar.

4 That was the name of trade union organizations at that time.

Head of foreign intelligence in the 1930s OH. Artuzov with his wife

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P.M. Fitin

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P.A. Sudoplatov, deputy head of foreign intelligence in 1930-1946.

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A.G. Deutsch, illegal intelligence agent, one of the founders of the "Cambridge Five"

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A.M. Orlov, resident of the illegal residency in London in the early 1930s.

Theodore Malley, an employee of the illegal station in London

I. Reif, illegal intelligence officer of the London residency in the 1930s.

Kim Philby

Donald McLean

Guy Burgess

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"DECLASSIFIED\* | TOP SECRET

Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation 10

ENGLISH-GERMAN TALKS IN BERLIN,

This document is the property of the Government of His Majesty King Veliko  
Britain.

- GOOD.

Recordings of conversations about Anglo-German conversations,  
which took place in the chancellor's palace in Berlin on March 25 and 26, 1935.

Present:

From Great Britain: Sir John Simon, Foreign Secretary. Mr Eden, Lord Keeper  
print.

Sir Eric Phipps, His Majesty's Ambassador to Berlin.

- Mr. Strang, Foreign Office. -N Wigram, Foreign Office.

From Gershania:

Herr Hitler, chancellor and "leader".

Recordings of conversations at the Anglo-German negotiations on March 25 and 26, 1935.

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organizers of operation "Duck"

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B.M. Afanasiev L.L. Linitsky

YES. Bystroletov - master of disguise

P.D. Gutzeit, one of the first foreign intelligence residents in North America in the 1930s.

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G.B. Ovakimyan B.Ya. Bazarov, illegal spy

G.I. Rogatnev, head of the "legal" residency in Rome.

1939-1942

I.A. Markov

Pietro Capuzzi, Italian

an anti-fascist who actively helped M.M. Axelrod, foreign intelligence station, illegal spy in Rome

ME AND. Serebryansky

im enne L.P. Vasilevsky, commander of the Madrid international reconnaissance and sabotage detachment

S.A. Vaupshasov (left) and N.A. Prokopyuk ~ participants in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)

I.G. Starinov, aka "The Demoman"

A.M. Rabtsevich

In the mountains of the Sierra Guarrama on top of the "Dead Woman".

Left (1st row): commander of a reconnaissance and sabotage detachment

L. Vasilevsky, commissar of the Galars detachment Perez Peregrin, senior adviser of the 14th partisan corps G. Syroezhkin and the fighters of the detachment. September 1937

One of the premises of the Special Purpose School in the prewar years

V.Kh. Sharmazanashvili, the first head of the SHON

G.I. Mordvinov, Foreign Intelligence Officer in the Middle East

A.M. Otroshchenko

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Home of the State: POLITICAL

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under the Council of People's Commissars

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(Belsky)

N.S. Tishchenko

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Z.P. Roshchin E.M. Kravtsov, foreign intelligence officer in the Baltics

S.I. Ermakov

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3.I. Voskresenskaya-Rybkina, Deputy Resident in Finland,

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Erich Takke, illegal spy

Yunona Sosnovskaya-Takke (Chingor), an employee of an illegal residency in Germany

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The famous "Martha"

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P.M. Zhuravlev, intelligence resident in Rome

in 1933-1938, head of the German department of the central intelligence apparatus

A sketch of the "underground connections" of the "Red Chapel" from 33i

lucid report of the main department of imperial security © December 1542.

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A sketch of the scheme of "underground connections" of the "Red Chapel" from the final report of the German Main Directorate of Imperial Security on the case of this organization

Arvid Harnak, Corsican by Harro Schulze-Boysen, Petty Officer, 1942

Countess Erika von Brockdorf, an active member of the Red Chapel

Hans-Heinrich Kummer Adam Kukhof, writer-playwright, member of the Red Capella group

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Ib Reb RE and OWL, SECRET. 9

Kim Si

3" and "Starpins".

A ,a I Idtochnak Keeping a katerval T / IX-fOt "Korsikavets" Officer of the High Command of the German -.| According  
to the gene- | armya told TITIENS that at the beginning

algod-b his year, Germany will start a war about

RA ariv! mt. Sozhetsky. Union. Preliminary Gaizer TITSIEN-| goy k aktsaa will be a military occupant of Ru-A. iniii, and I  
am soaked for the best time.

/X-40 | "Korsakan" I. In the army, Russian literature is prohibited, and from "yata" Russian literature, even such as Tolstoy  
L.N. and Dostoevsky.

2. GOERING about two weeks ago

Vazad gave instructions to stop deliveries to the USSR, and only five days ago, under pressure from firms demanding  
raw materials, Vazad agreed to continue deliveries.

yy-41y |! "Corsican" I. In circles grouped around the Herrey Club, the opinion is growing that Germany will lose the war  
and in connection with this it is necessary to come to an agreement with England in America in order to turn weapons to  
the east.

"Corsican" 2. At the German aviation headquarters, orders were given

from the words "Star- | Wife start on a large scale of the database

given" ,| vadnye pbkheti vad soviet ter- ratorium vo tOS on the entire border strip. In the field of reconnaissance flights

VKKH-CHKBTSYA I am also Leningrad.

3. Goering's position is more and more inclined towards concluding an agreement with America and Auglia.

4. GOERING ordered the transfer of the "Russian abstract" of the Ministry of Aviation to the so-called active part of the aviation headquarters, which develops and trains military operators.

G-41g. | "Corsican" I. The military economic department of the Ikpersky statistical office learned from the military command of the armed forces

OKM) an order to draw up maps of the flushing of the USSR,

Calendar of messages "Corsican" and "Sergeant"

1 CONTROL

OFD. "A & DEPUTY BEGINNING 5 DEPARTMENT OF NPO USSR 2From June

I AM A MAJOR GENERAL

2/A | { Rem tadarnyu plasha

I ask for your order to install

connection with our illegal radio station, on

walking in her. (our code for this station (\* 02 2%. It is desirable to have a city as a point of contact) All materials on radio exchange will be received from this radio, please resend

us. ~

HEAD OF THE 1st DEPARTMENT OF THE NKGB OF THE USSR

(FITYAN

Note by the head of the 1st Directorate (intelligence) of the NKVD - NKGB P.M. Fitin to Major General Panfilov, Deputy Head of the 5th Directorate of the NPO of the USSR, with a request to establish radio communication with the Berlin residency

Owls.secret. copy. behind.

EXTRACT FROM BERG'S MESSAGE,

"No anodes. I take out the power source. Hans calls

to no avail. We try to do everything." Berg.

The extract is correct: Military engineer 2nd rank -Leontiev. June 23, 1942

Note: Hans is the radio operator of the "Corsican" - "Sergeant" group.

VOI SR

Making copies without R SECR

Secretariat of the NKVD ATS Ex. at 4 \_

Duo STATE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE UNION S.E. R. October 2

Comrade STALIN Comrade MODOTOV

The head of the Czech military intelligence, Colonel MORAVETS, told the NKVD resident in London the following:



The common misconception that HESS arrived in England unexpectedly is vevern. Long before the completion of the flight, HESS had a correspondence on this subject with Lord GAKMILTONOY. In this correspondence, all issues of organizing the flight were discussed in detail. However, GAMUZHLOTOY himself did not take part in the correspondence. All Pyasya HESSA not the name of GAUKHILTOP was not hit in the head - in the "Intelligence Service" half-chapter, where the answers to GROSS were also compiled on behalf of HAMILTON. In this way, the British managed to replace HESSA in Ayaglir. Colonel MORAVE also declared that he had personally seen the correspondence between HESS and HAMMILTON. t z The same letters contained arguments sent: m proposals on the need to end the wars between k. "zhet. Molotov England and Germankey. MORAVE stated that an- 20-1 Ex. NEVA Glitchians, therefore, have the writings of the PEP doçk: ialkhorok, linking %3-Secret.NEVD In conclusion Colonel with the guilt of HESS and other Nazi

leaders in preparing an attack on the USSR. isp. t.LONEYU - Management. NKVD USSR and PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS Stalin UNION SS?.

Molotov (L. BERIA)

o a t aren

Telegram from London dated 21.10.1942

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Master of aerobatics

In the brilliant cohort of the first generation of Soviet spies-illegals, Dmitry Alexandrovich Bystroletov occupies a prominent place. Sea navigator, doctor of law and medicine, master of painting, photography and impersonation, polyglot and writer. To reveal the operational activities of the Soviet intelligence officer D.A. Bystroletov, we cannot, archival materials about him will never become public, since they contain data of the highest secrecy. YES. Bystroletov himself spoke about himself on the pages of his literary work "The Feast of the Immortals". So let's use Bystroletov's fictitious dialogue with a journalist.

"I found Dmitry Alexandrovich Bystroletov in the office of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Medical and Medical-Technical Information of the USSR Ministry of Health. The scientist was sitting at the table in front of two tall piles of typed articles and abstracts, quickly reading the Russian translation of their titles and the corresponding foreign text on pasted-in photographs, verifying, shortening or adding something. One stack grew, the other decreased. Then the clever girls silently carried away the edited material and replaced it with another. A tall man with a white professorial beard worked like an automaton, but there were mountains of folders in front of him. all remained the same.

Finally he raised his head.

- The Institute receives from all over the world about two thousand scientific foreign journals in various sections of our specialty. I check the correctness of other people's translations, where the language or topic is unfamiliar to the translators or the meaning is too complicated, I do the translation myself.

How many titles do you check per year?

— There are several types of materials processing at the institute. If we count everything together, then about 90,000. In addition, I mark up almost

2000 scientific articles in journals in dozens of countries and advise translators. I am here as a living guide.

- How many languages do you know?

Quite a lot, but the scientific literature that interests us is printed in only twenty-five languages. I receive material for processing or review in English, German, Dutch, Flemish, Afrikaner, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, French, Italian, Spanish, Romanian, Portuguese, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian, Greek and Turkish. However, knowledge of languages is not enough here, it is not enough to master the most complex scientific terminology in these languages: you need to be a specialist in the field enough to understand the issues discussed in the article and, when translating, choose the right words and terms.

— Yes, you really are a living guide! What is the official title of your position?

- No way. I am engaged in literary work for myself and do not hold any position at the institute: I do not appear every day, but only when materials are accumulated that are subject to language editing.

— Are you satisfied with your work, Dmitry Alexandrovich?

The old man is silent. Smiling. His face is getting younger.

- Are you satisfied? .. Yes, I simply could not live without her! And do you know why? When the eyes run over the titles in different languages, a magic ribbon of memories moves in parallel in the head! After all, in all these countries I once visited ...

He pauses.

“And I experienced a lot of things there that cannot be forgotten.

I hurriedly took out my pen and notebook. Happily accepted:

— Of course! The editors know that you worked abroad in our Soviet intelligence service for a decade and a half. That is why I have been sent to you to record the conversation. Please tell us what you could tell our readers? For example, how one becomes a scout, how one lives in a foreign underground. And, of course, I would like to hear some examples of your own work.

Dmitry Alexandrovich thinks.

“I was warned of your arrival. Everything is agreed. But I can only speak under one indispensable condition. German

and the Italian fascists were destroyed during the last war. But imperialism as an international system is alive, and its fosterlings are once again waging a bitter, secret and open struggle against our Motherland. Therefore, in my story, I must be careful - I will tell about the essence of several operations, but without naming either names or dates. So it will be calmer. And it's better for you: you represent by no means a scientific and historical magazine and a truthful display of everyday life  
For

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your readers are more interested in the exact listing of dry facts. I will talk about the Soviet people, devoted to the Party and the Motherland, always ready to sacrifice themselves in the struggle, where they do not ask and do not give mercy.

- Fine. I understand this. To begin with, please tell us how you became a scout?

- Everything turned out naturally. I graduated from high school in the south, under the whites. In order not to serve in Denikin's army, he fled to Turkey together with revolutionary-minded sailors. In Constantinople he graduated from a college for European Christians and was sent to study in Czechoslovakia. In Prague, he received a doctorate in law, and later, under a false name, became a doctor of medicine at one of the oldest universities in Europe. In Berlin and Paris, he studied at the Academy of Fine Arts and took lessons from graphic artists. For several years I worked in our embassies and trade missions, where I was offered to help in the difficult and glorious work of the underground struggle against the enemies of the Motherland.

It happened in the mid 20s. More precisely, in April 1925, the First Congress of Proletarian Students took place in Moscow. The embassy sent me on a business trip as a representative of foreign students, and this is how I came to Moscow as a "foreigner".

In Prague I was warned that a very important person would be talking to me in Moscow. And indeed, I was taken to the former Dolgorukov mansion, where in a small room on the sofa lay a tired, sleepy middle-aged man, dressed, and next to him, on a chair backwards, with his hands on the back, a younger, dark-haired man was sitting and smoking. oblique. There was another chair and I was asked to sit down. I did not know who these people were and what they wanted from me, but I felt that they were big bosses and that my future fate depended on the conversation. Then I was told that Artur Khristianovich Artuzov was lying, and Misha Gorb, the then leaders of our intelligence, was sitting. I was in my 25th year, I was handsome and dressed in my best suit, which was especially striking against the background of sweatshirts and slippers of Moscow students. Humpback's face showed obvious hostility. He looked at me and began to look sullenly into the corner. Artuzov, on the contrary, began to examine me and my suit with visible interest, not hiding a benevolent smile.

- Well, let's get acquainted. Tell all about yourself. Don't pull, but don't crumple either. I want to know what environment you came from.

I told everything honestly and directly about my origin, about my adventures in emigration. The hump frowned and finally grew gloomy. Artuzov, on the other hand, laughed at the story about the comical episodes of my life. I ended my story about myself like this: "I ran not out of fear of the front, but because of the feeling that I had nothing to fight against the whites. But I am not a coward, not a pacifist, not a vegetarian!"

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After listening, Artuzov turned to Gorb:

- All right, all right, Misha, we'll check everything, everything is in our hands. But we will get our comrade to work. Let's test it at work, and then we'll see. The hump was silent. Where do you think you could work for us?

"I don't know..." I began, but seeing that timidity would not make a good impression, I added, puffing out my chest: "Where it's more dangerous."

Artuzov opened his eyes and, without moving, began to examine me from head to toe. The hump, too, stared with one eye. We looked at each other. We looked again.

- At the forefront of the attack! The work of a recruiter is the most risky of all: he said the wrong thing, turned the wrong way - and for everything there is an immediate retribution! A dog's life, you know - in the evening you don't know if you'll stay until the morning, in the morning you don't know if you'll make it to your bed.

I answered:

- It suits me!

"It will do," Artuzov decided.

The hump nodded.

- Yes, he has something that, for example, I am completely deprived of - personal charm.

- Let's check in the case, learn a little and let it go on top, you understand, Misha, on top. Arthur Khristianovich raised his hand and wiggled his fingers in the air. Then he turned to me and finished: - Let's see what you're worth!

And they looked: a few years later, for the performance of a task of great operational importance and the exceptional perseverance shown, I received an honorary military weapon with the inscription: "For fearlessness and ruthlessness."

- Thank you. Everything is recorded. And yet, Dmitry Alexandrovich, how does a Soviet person become a scout? What is needed for this?

An elderly man with a professorial beard did not answer immediately.

- I'll start with the minor and end with the main, the main. To be a good intelligence officer, you need to know a lot, that is, work hard every day on yourself in the area that has become your specialty in intelligence. Learn multiple languages. The recruiter must not only be smarter and more cunning than the recruited person, he must also see further, understand the general situation more clearly and deeply. In a word, to be a cultural and very modern product of the very bourgeois world for the destruction of which he works. This is the first and smallest. Now the second, more difficult: the scout must be an actor, but not like in our best theaters, but a thousand times more perfect, more knowledgeable and the type of person he wants to present himself to his audience.

In the theater, the viewer sees the artist on the stage from afar and only an hour or two, and may even notice an awkwardly glued mustache or a wig that has moved a little to one side. If an actor is out of sorts or unwell, he

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plays its role this time worse than yesterday and tomorrow, and that's it. But the recruiter goes to the goal along the edge of a sharpened knife. He constantly lives among his spectators, who are as sensitive and attentive as counterintelligence officers and the police. For any mistake, you can pay with your life, because it is the little things that cause the first suspicions, later suspicions entail verification and surveillance, and if it came to this, then the recruiter died. I took three photographs with me, and if you like, print them along with the text of the conversation - let the readers look and make sure the thoroughness of the forgery.

The scout must sincerely believe in what he says, otherwise he will definitely be false. He must first get used to the role, then completely reincarnate. I explain with an example. Once I was allowed to come after three years of foreign underground for one week of rest to my mother. And she take it and tell me that the day today turned out to be incredibly hot. I then pretended to be Brazilian for a long time and therefore immediately broke out: "Incredibly hot?! Eh, mom! You live in my homeland, in Brazil, then you will know what the heat is! I saw the frightened eyes of an old woman and caught on.

And in England one day a girl casually said that at night she heard me mumbling in her sleep. I remembered the captain of Kuprin Rybnikov and forced my comrades to listen to my delirium after I inhaled anesthetic ether. He breathed and passed the exam: he spoke English!

But what was this ruthless self-destruction worth? Months of painful compulsion to think in a foreign language! And the change of "masks": after all, the recruiter has a lot of them, and often he changes them several times a day ... And now the main thing, the most basic, the difficulty that they do not face

scouts of bourgeois countries: when an American works in France or a Frenchman in America, then everyone remains himself as a human person - both countries are bourgeois, there is no need for internal breakdown. And the most difficult thing falls away from them. And the Soviet intelligence agent must change everything in himself: habits, tastes, way of thinking, uproot everything, everything, except for one thing - devotion to the Party and the Motherland! He is constantly alone among the enemies, and these two words — the Party and the Motherland — remain for him the only link, for life and death, inextricably linking him with the past and the future. Psychologically, this is hard and difficult - this is not a calm acting split, but a painful voluntary surrender of oneself to reproach, everything except the hot fire of love, loyalty and devotion burning in the chest. One must love the Motherland very much and be infinitely devoted to the Party in order not to become dogged by such a life! Complex reconnaissance techniques can be mastered and one can get used to constant danger, but it is impossible to get used to violence against oneself. Only in internal burning is salvation and the guarantee of success and the final victory of the Soviet intelligence officer over his opponent. Only

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the fire of devotion and love burns all temptations, fear and fatigue! Yes, I will now read to you the words of the authority, which in this case you must believe:

“The Soviet intelligence officer is the purest and most perfect example of a special human nature. This, I think, is the most important distinguishing feature of the Soviet intelligence officer, much more important than his professional qualities and the practice of intelligence art. We can say that he is a kind of final and highest product of the Soviet system, the embodiment of the Soviet way of thinking.”

- Fabulous! To whom do these inspired words belong? - I EXPLAINED.

- A man who hated communism, Soviet power and our country in an animal way - the chief of American intelligence, millionaire Allen Dulles.

Everything is recorded! - I said. – Continue!

— The internal preparatory reconstruction is followed by the external one. It is physically more dangerous, but psychologically easier. I will tell several episodes in which I had to play the role of an impudent gangster from Singapore and a Japanese spy, a cheerful good man, a Hungarian count and an arrogant psychopath, an English lord. For each role, first of all, you need a passport. They bought all the count's papers for me, and the only thing that was required of me was to carefully study 950 books on the history, literature and art of Hungary, take pictures at Hungarian resorts and carefully study the external signs of local life, and also observe characteristic features of the behavior of local aristocrats at the races, in theaters and in the church.

During a very solemn religious procession, I suddenly stepped out of the crowd with such an idiotic air of a religious fanatic that the cardinal noticed me, smiled and made a gesture of blessing. The comrade successfully filmed this scene. And the cardinal was listed on the papers as my own uncle, and since then I always carried this photograph in a suitcase when I went to an operation on the count's passport.

The English passport was given to me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sir John Simon himself: he saw me once and briefly, but this was enough for such an experienced old man as Sir John to unmistakably recognize in me a person of his circle: it was in this way that the clerk, as it were, is passing an examination for maturity.

Yes, Sir John! I passed a truly incredible exam! Just listen: in the mid-30s in Berlin, the Nazis attacked my trail. The comrades subordinate to me were taken abroad out of caution, and I went to dinner with the wife of a high-ranking official with whom I was connected (he was not in the city at that time).

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was). Knowing that the Gestapo Sturmbannführer insistently asked for lunch, I walked, thinking that I was probably going to the last dinner party in my life. At the table, the Nazi says: "Count, we know that someone's intelligence agent is working in the environment of the owner of this house! - I froze: the end! "Therefore, I am asking you to help find and destroy it!"

Damn it, there are three and a half million inhabitants in Berlin, and in order to find me, our enemies turned to me for help! Life is sometimes more colorful than cheap novels!

- Awesome! And what was the end of the matter?

- Trying my best to keep calm, I promised to think over the matter and give interesting details the next day, got up and immediately booked a table for dinner the next day at the best restaurant in Berlin. And early in the morning with the first plane flew to Paris.

But about buying a passport for the role of a killer from Singapore, it is worth telling in more detail - this is the plot for the film!

Before the war in Europe there was a port with the rights of a free city, in which the consular corps played the role of a diplomatic corps, and its doyen was at the head. At that time, he was a majestic gentleman, in whose appearance the posture and every little thing - from a monocle in his eye to white leggings on his shoes - emphasized his belonging to the impregnable and strict world of impeccable conservatism. I was sent to him because our intelligence had learned that His Excellency the Consul General of Greece was a swindler and a major agent of an international gang of drug dealers and that he was connected with the League of Nations Geneva Anti-Drugs Committee, for a good half of the members of the committee belonged to the same band. This Greek was called Henry Gabert, he is a Jew from Odessa, and there is no need to be afraid of his majestic appearance.

Gabert occupied a large mansion in an old garden. The footman in livery respectfully let me into the house, informed me, and pushed the door aside. In the corner of a vast office, at a huge business table, sat a man, as if he had descended from the caricatures of the Kukryniksy. He nodded majestically at me and began to write something. I sat on the end of the chair. Doyen spoke in English: "Whatever?" "Your Excellency," I also began in English, "help a compatriot: they stole my briefcase, and in it my passport." "Your name?" I named an international name without nationality - say, Alexander Gallas. "Um... Where were you born?" I named the city in the country where the mayor's office burned down with the entire archive. Doyen frowned. I took out a pot-bellied envelope with dollars. "For the poor of this beautiful city, Your Excellency!" But the doyen squinted at the money with disgust and muttered with displeasure: "I don't do charity work, it's none of my business. Does anyone know you in our nearest

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embassy? No? In some other of our embassies? Also no? I thought so! Look, young man, I don't like all this. Go wherever you like and apply for a passport elsewhere. Farewell!"

Without getting up, he casually nodded his head, took some paper from the table and began to read it.

"Did it break? Gotta take the risk! I thought. - Well, go ahead! I suddenly pushed my writing set away noisily, rested my elbows on the table, and stared insolently at the dumbfounded gentleman. He grunted in a rough bass voice in the best American thug slang: "I'm going from Singapore to Geneva, you understand, huh?"

Doyen's face changed, he was silent for a minute, contemplating the change in the situation. Finally, he answered: "From Singapore to Geneva, it's shorter to go through Genoa!"

I took out an American cigarette and struck a small wax match with a green head directly on the paper that His Excellency had just been reading. He lit a cigarette and squealed from the corner of his crooked mouth: "They figured it out for me too! In short, but more dangerous for me and for you, Consul.

Doyen turned pale. He glanced timidly at the door and whispered: "Singapore has been in a mess recently..."

I almost burst out laughing - the word "mess" did not fit the monocle! And then all the newspapers wrote about the "mess": in the afternoon in the city center, an English colonel, the head of the Singapore police, was shot in the back of the head. The killer fled, and later it turned out that he was an American, an opium dealer and a Japanese spy, and that the colonel was on the trail of his crimes. "Do you know who shot the officer?" - "What is the question!" - "Who?" - "I!!!"

Sweat broke out on His Excellency's forehead. The monocle fell out. With a trembling hand, the doyen took out a handkerchief and began to wipe his face.

"Why darken the brains? I growled. - I don't like such conversations, understand? I need a linden and, moreover, at once: I'm leaving for Geneva at night, and there I'll rake the linden from ours onto concrete, understand? I'm finishing your lousy one, and then I'm going to Paris and New York. Yes, you do not drift, Consul, and her life will be no more than two days! It's clear here, and I'll give you a telegram from Geneva for your reassurance!"

Doyen bit his lip, sighed, and began to fill out his passport book. "Come on and the king! I demanded, having received a brand new passport in my hands. - And shtob with a ribbon, all over the form!

On the table of the Consul General there was a beautiful frame with a photograph of the King of Greece, twined with a national ribbon. "I will put the king in a suitcase on the very top for the customs officers, let them feel it, bastards!" The doyen looked at me with hatred and dutifully handed over the framed portrait.

I took a pistol out of my jacket pocket, put it on the table in front of the consul, carefully hid the frame with the ribbon in my jacket pocket.

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ka, he put the pistol in the back pocket of his trousers, explaining: "Well, now the king is in the pocket, and the booze is in a warm place. It's time to break off!"

To complete the picture, I also wanted to spit on the carpet, but refrained: you can go too far, for this spitting they won't praise me in Moscow.

Doyen left the table to lead him to the office door. "Let me thank Your Excellency for the generous help to a poor compatriot! I sang respectfully in my most tender and cultured voice. "Our country can be proud of such representatives!" Doyen swayed as if from a blow: "What? Oh yes... Yes... Yes, sir! He came to his senses, mastered the situation, playfully took me by the waist. "I am flattered by your coming, sir! I hope you will not forget my house if you visit us again, sir!" There was only one step left to the door. The servant was waiting on the other side, and the door was already beginning to open. Suddenly the doyen turned and slashed me at point-blank range with a question in the purest Russian: "Are you from Moscow?!" He dug into my eyes. "A?" I couldn't resist being surprised. But the reaction of a scout is faster than that of a pilot. Having accidentally dropped the "a" sound, I immediately came up with a further phrase that begins with the English word "ay" (that is, "I"): "I don't understand Polish! What would you like to say, Your Excellency?" Doyen pressed his fingers to his temples: "Excuse me, forgive me... This is from overwork... Farewell, sir!"

Thus, the polished gangster helped the elegant Singaporean assassin and Japanese spy firmly establish himself on European soil. I went to Geneva and from there gave the dean a telegram, and

then he lived with this passport for many years, successfully carried out several operations - the role of a Japanese spy fully justified itself.

— Dmitry Alexandrovich, just now you said: "I am firmly entrenched on European soil." But isn't a passport everything?

- No, it provides the legal side of the issue and therefore opens up opportunities for the next stage - "setting roots in the local soil" - legalization.

It is quite simple to provide a legal appearance of existence for the rich - you just need to know where the material base is located, that is, the lands of the Hungarian count and the English lord, and then from there arrange regular transfers of money to them through completely legal channels, and everything takes on a rather natural form: the count could look after the women, lord, to be treated for as long as they needed to work. Of course, a thorough check would reveal the artificiality of such a basis, but the recruiter is not a resident and not an employee of the service apparatus: they really need a solid justification for their permanent stay in one place, in the circle of the same acquaintances and "friends", and the recruiter - like a bird: flew in, pecked and flew away again. If you managed to pick the fruit - well, if not - you ran away forever, if you caught - you died, it's such

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it's a specialty. The recruiter risks too often and too much, and if the recruitment fails, he will not be saved by the most solid disguise.

- Dmitry Alexandrovich, you want to say that the recruiter does not have a permanent place of residence, and he moves from country to country?

"There is a permanent place of residence, but it is located in a country against which the intelligence officer never works, has a reliable cover and can calmly explain to the police the reasons for his location here and give exhaustive information about his material support. Here, for example, was the basis for the existence of a Dutch businessman.

I advertised in a respectable bourgeois Berlin newspaper that a foreigner who wanted to set up a trading company was looking for technicians from any branch of light industry. Our agents checked those who responded. A certain Borukh Davidovich was appointed "director", and together with him I went to Amsterdam to organize a company for the wholesale trade in textile raw materials (woolen rags). The landlord of one of the "workers" of the brothel next to my apartment, the banker and businessman Israel Pollak, gave me great help. He gave me recommendations to the Amsterdam Bank and the Chamber of Commerce: I became a member of the latter with a deposit of three hundred guilders and opened a trading office. With the help of the Amsterdam Jews, Borukh Davidovich entered their religious community and established business ties.

The company began to buy high-quality woolen rags, of which there were many in Belgium, England, Holland, Denmark and Scandinavia. Woolen rags were delivered to *ȳódȳ* and there, after a generous addition of cotton paper, they were turned into "woolen" fabric. In the meantime, the excellent Belgian draughtsman Comrade Gan van Looy, who worked in England for very reputable textile firms, in advance and quietly informed us of the designs and colors of fabrics that would be the most fashionable in the next season. The *ȳódȳ* counterfeit was indistinguishable from the English original by eye, the only thing missing was an English brand, so our company took its junk to England, and there the ironing machine automatically put a white or yellow stamp on the dark edge: "Made in England". Now it was impossible to distinguish a valuable product from rubbish, their quality was tested by time: the original was worn for years, and the fake was barely lasted the season. The company shipped its products to Africa in South America.

The company's earnings skyrocketed. Soon Senya Bernstein and his brothers came to Amsterdam, then Izya Rabinovich and his sisters rolled up, a fat aunt Riva emerged from somewhere and strayed



and armless grandfather Ephraim - everyone fed heartily near the company, everyone shamelessly shortchanged me and only wondered where God came from

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sent them such a gullible fool, and I was glad, because the firm was real and gave enough money to justify living and operational trips. In a word, textile gangsters from Lodz firmly put me on my feet. Having settled down, I was able to proceed with my dangerous affairs.

- Very well! I exclaimed and opened a new page of the notebook. - I'm listening!

The scientist stroked his white beard. He smiled and began to speak:

— In the 1930s, during a period of clear growing signs of the approach of war, one of our large embassy missions in Europe ran away from an employee who held a leadership position and therefore knew a lot. Having crossed over to the other side of the class barricade, he provided himself well by taking a significant amount of money, but it was still necessary to ensure the political confidence of the new owners. And the defector gave away all our state secrets known to him and told something about them in a book immediately published. Incidentally, I mentioned a major blunder by our plenipotentiary workers.

One day, a small man with a red nose appeared at this embassy. In his hands he held a large and apparently heavy yellow briefcase. The stranger spoke in French:

"I would like to see the military attaché or secretary!"

A responsible comrade came to him.

"This briefcase contains all the codes and ciphers of Italy. You, of course, have copies of encrypted telegrams from the local Italian embassy. Take the briefcase and check the authenticity of my goods. When you are convinced, pay the cost - 200,000 French francs. With the next change of codes and ciphers, you will receive them again and pay the same amount. You are secured for many years!

Fascist Italy was already fanning the flames of war. Her diplomatic correspondence on a global scale was of considerable interest to us, so the stranger was just a gift of fate. However, the responsible comrade checked the cipher books, photographed them and returned them to the stranger with a cry:

This is a fake and a provocation! Get out or I'll call the police!

The stranger understood the maneuver, became furious, but restrained himself, saying:

"You are not representatives of a great power, but miserable swindlers!" And left.

The responsible comrade was highly praised by his immediate superiors: he saved a lot of money for the country. No one thought about the subsequent years, and no one was left with a slip.  
famous.

Now the defector has made it public. The book was read in Moscow. I was urgently summoned from the deep underground. arrived safely

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through half a dozen borders. I was handed a book open to the right page. In the margin was marked in pencil: "Resume."

I shrugged.

- Fools, of course, but what do I have to do with it?

Did you read the word "renew" in the margin?

- I read it.

Stalin wrote. That's an order. Tonight, go back abroad, find this person and resume receiving all materials from him!

I opened my mouth

- But where can I find him?

- Your business.

- Why, all that is known about him is that he is small with a nose. There are millions of them around the world!

- Maybe.

- How to look for it?

"If we had known that, we would have done without you. Is the order clear? Do it! You will receive money without limitation, the time for the operation is given with a strict limitation. Go!

So I found myself again on the shores of Lake Geneva. He sat down on a bench and slowly began to feed the swans.

There are two and a half billion people on the globe. Among them is my Spout. How to find it? Where to begin?

Among my subordinates was a young couple - Pepik and Erika, brave and executive people, both good photographers. I sent them on duty near the Italian embassies as street photographers with the task of photographing all the officials of small stature. Start with large capitals and gradually move to small ones. I already had lists of names of officials. But, feeding the swans, I thought that Nosik could not be an official at all and was not associated with a small town. He is not a traitor, but a traitor transmitter, and works in a large capital.

A week later, the swans already recognized me and rushed from all sides, as soon as I sat down on the bench. And I thought further. No, the risk of such a betrayal is too great... An embassy official with access to ciphers is in plain sight... The transmitter will be seen... Only an employee of the cipher department of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs can be a traitor. A week later, I clarified: "Or a member of the government!"

I went to Rome, in thought I walked around the beautiful old palaces. Somewhere in them sits a traitor, but I can't find him ... I have to look from the other end - from the transmitter.

By that time, materials from photographers had arrived - nothing suitable and a letter from Moscow, where it was reported that the responsible comrade remembered two additional signs: 1) The nose held

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cheeky and did not look like a well-trained diplomat, and 2) a golden tan attracted attention on his face, and the reddish color of his nose was probably due not to addiction to wine or illness, but to sunburn.

On this day, the swans received a triple portion. Firstly, Nosik's manners confirmed my guess - he is not a traitor to his homeland, but only an agent of a traitor, but a golden tan ... I thought for a week and suddenly hit myself on the forehead - this is a mountain tan, Nosik or a Swiss, or lives here! But

where exactly? Where in tiny Switzerland can a traitor agent hang out, dealing with intelligence and taking mortal risks? Only in Geneva! In a city where agents of three dozen intelligence services swarm around the League of Nations, knowing their impunity, because none of them is interested in local Swiss affairs. Nosik lives in Geneva! He roams the streets next to me!!

The swans again on this happy day got a lot, and I called Han van Looy here, my wonderful Antwerp draftsman.

Geneva is a boring, prim Calvinist city, and all cheerful foreigners, especially of dubious behavior, are sure to go to two places - the expensive International Bar and the cheaper Brasserie Universell. The walls of both establishments are covered with portraits of eminent visitors with their autographs. There are quite a few photographs among the portraits, but there are also those briskly drawn by visiting artists. No sooner said than done. I put Gan in the Brasserie, and sat down with a pencil and paper in the Bar. And both of us caught Spout on the same day!

- Great! - I said. - Well, what happened next?

"The next step was to take risks. It seemed inappropriate to admit that I was a Soviet agent, because the offended Nosik probably did not trust us and hated us more than anyone else. And I decided - I'll pretend to be a Japanese spy, and let the great Buddha himself help me!

Bartender Emil, an agent of all the intelligence services in the world, served us whiskey and soda when I confidently sank into a chair next to Nosik. There were few people, Emil was distracted by chatting with a beautiful American woman.

- But we know each other! I began impudently, opening a golden cigar case.

- I don't remember anything! Spout was surprised, but he took a cigarette. - Who introduced us?

"Not who, but what, signor," I replied. He made an impressive pause and whispered into Nosik's tanned ear:

- Italian ciphers!

He shuddered, but immediately mastered himself:

- Emil, I'm crying for both! Let's go, monsieur.

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On the street, he squeezed my elbow very tightly:

- Well?!

"The elbow has nothing to do with it, but I shoot perfectly," I answered with a laugh. - Let's be friends! The Japanese cannot manage their own affairs due to the shape of their eyes and the color of their skin, but they are silent as a grave and pay well. I know that you sometimes have goods, but I always have money. I repeat - let's be friends!

- Nosik, of course, asked how you knew that he was selling ciphers?

- Don't be naive. Scouts do not ask such questions and do not answer them. We began to cooperate, and in the course of the case, the following gradually became clear: the trade in Italian ciphers was put on a grand scale by Count Chano, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, married to Edda Mussolini. After the publication of the book of our defector Chano organized a provocation with the disappearance of cipher books in the Italian embassy in Berlin, raided there with an audit and accused

an innocent person of treason. The innocent was destroyed, and Chano was known as an indomitable fighter for his homeland. By the way, with this defensive maneuver, he confirmed the information about his role in this matter, collected bit by bit by my tireless young couple.

Nosik turned out to be a retired officer in the Swiss army, an Italian by nationality, with great connections in Rome and the Vatican: his uncle was a cardinal. Working with Nosik was not boring. Having received a wad of money, he first of all sniffed it and asked: "Real?"

"Of course," I protested.

— Nu and fools same your Japanese! Write to them to start printing dollars themselves as soon as possible, with their fine technique it will turn out great! Pay me not 200,000 real francs, but 1,000,000 fake dollars - and we are even!

But the bad thing was that this crook was taking risks on trifles. One day at Dover, in England, we disembarked from a steamboat and were walking in a group of first-class passengers—they were let through without delay. It was a foggy evening, bobbies were standing around with dogs and lanterns on their chests. Suddenly, something white rolled out of Spout's leg. I froze. Bobbies modestly lowered their eyes, ladies and gentlemen too. Nosik calmly bent down and slipped the white skein into his sock. Brussels lace! he then explained to me. - I'm taking it for extra work! I almost beat him... And then he almost shot me. I escaped by accident. After all, he was not a state worker and patriot, but a loner crook, and malice in him took precedence over calculation. He sold the new ciphers first to the Japanese in Tokyo and then to me in Berlin. According to the list of states that bought it, I established that I was a Soviet intelligence officer. He turned white with anger: it turned out that we had successfully outwitted him for the second time! He began to convince me to immediately go to him in Switzerland,

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where tomorrow morning he can introduce me to Count Chano and Edda. I agreed. In the evening we got into his powerful car and rushed south.

It was pouring rain. Through the strips of water we rushed like a whirlwind, overtaking passing trains. Both were silent. At dawn we arrived in Zurich. We stopped in front of a large dark mansion on Mount Dolder. Nosik unlocked the gate. Entrance door. I turned on the light. The luxurious vestibule was empty, a layer of dust lay on the statues and paintings, the furniture was in covers. I immediately sensed a trap. Nosik began to undress. I stood in front of the mirror so as to follow his every move - he tried to go behind me. I kept the pistol in my pocket, and the bullet was in the barrel. I saw how, with a face contorted with anger, he began to draw a pistol from a holster under his arm. I had the decisive first moment, but I didn't have to shoot: a car horn barked briefly and strongly in the street - the city was waking up, movement began. Spout shuddered in surprise and jerked his hand away. "Fool," I said. "It was my comrades who drove up and gave me a signal: if I don't come out in ten minutes, they will burst in here and quietly make a chop out of you. We are stronger. Got it? I repeat: do not play the fool! And also a scout, ha ha! The whole night you never turned around and did not notice that a second car was rushing behind us from Berlin itself! Spout whined about the money, I promised a supplement and happily got out of the mansion. I noticed the number and the street, and the mansion was the starting point for finding out the identity of Spout and his connections. So Spout fell into a trap for me, having made a mistake out of irritation, and caught himself. This happens!

- So what is next?

— Listen. The recruiter handles several cases at once. He risks not only himself, but also those who have already begun to work for us. The head of our recruiting brigade was a major general, a man of heroic stature and build, very educated, Hungarian by nationality. He was an internationalist revolutionary, a friend of the recently deceased Hungarian Minister of State Security, Ferenc Münnich. We called him Ted.